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Abstract 
This thesis explores the nexus of criminology and public policy analysis in order to better 
understand and explain the policy making processes in relation to the control of dogs in 
society. It does this through an empirical study of policy responses to the phenomenon of 
‘status’ and ‘dangerous’ dogs in England and Wales, primarily during the past three decades. 
An influential body of work has suggested an expanding trend in punitiveness within 
Western societies over the past few decades. At the forefront of sociological thinking in 
this field is David Garland’s Culture of Control that theorises that the advent of late-
modernity, with its adjusted macro-social conditions, has ushered in this new approach to 
law and order. As a theoretical scaffold, grand theories such as these can be useful, but this 
case study also seeks to go further into the empirical particulars of policy making in order 
to understand how a culture of control unfolds in relation to the lesser-explored arena of 
dangerous dogs.
The methodological elements employed were two-fold and included both an extensive 
documentary analysis (including academic work, policy documents and legislation) 
recounted via a history of the present, and a thematic analysis produced from the 
empirical data of key policy actors' accounts (involving a programme of semi-structured 
elite interviews, n=25) gained via my unique insider-researcher access as a professional 
member of the dog policy network. Findings suggest that widespread anxieties regarding 
the threat to public safety posed by dangerous dogs, have been addressed via draconian 
legislative measures, most notably breed specific legislation (BSL) designed to manipulate 
and control the dog population. Evidence that BSL and other control measures are not 
working, and that substitute harms are befalling dog owners and their pets, have been 
obscured by competition and ‘white noise’ within a chaotic policy network. Public debate, 
fuelled by high profile and disproportionate media stories, has intrinsically linked 
dangerous dogs with other risky, criminal and anti-social behaviours. This ‘othering’, coupled 
with expressive, symbolic and politicised policy making, has resulted in an overly-punitive 
culture of control for dogs and their owners in society.  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Chapter One 
Introduction 
This study explores the nexus of criminology public policy analysis in order to better 
understand and explain the policy making processes in relation to the control of dogs in 
society. It does this through an empirical study of policy responses to the phenomenon of 
‘status’ and ‘dangerous’ dogs in England and Wales, primarily during the past three decades. 
The sociological sphere has sought to develop explanations for what is perceived to be a 
growth in overly-punitive measures within Western societies over the past few decades. 
David Garland’s Culture of Control is perhaps the most influential of those theories and 
posits that the arrival of late-modernity brought with it a new response to law and order. 
This thesis seeks to apply Garland’s theory to the dog control policy sphere but will also 
delve deeper into the empirical particulars of policy making in order to understand how a 
culture of control unfolds in relation to dangerous dogs. Kingdon’s (1984) Multiple 
Streams Analysis has been utilised as an organising framework in order to delineate and 
examine the component parts of policy making.
Via the triangulation of both an extensive documentary analysis and a thematic analysis of 
the empirical data obtained from a series of elite semi-structured interviews, findings 
suggest that widespread anxieties regarding the threat to public safety posed by 
dangerous dogs, have been addressed via overly-punitive legislative measures. This is most 
notably seen in section 1 of the Dangerous Dogs Act (1991) which introduced breed 
specific legislation (BSL) as a means of manipulating and controlling the dog population. 
Evidence also suggests that BSL and other control measures are not working, with dog 
bites, not least of all, continuing to rise. In addition other, substitute, harms are befalling dog 
owners and their pets, with dogs which look most similar to those that are banned, also at 
risk. This evidence has, however, been obscured by the competition and ‘white noise’ of a 
rather chaotic policy network. Meanwhile, public debate, fuelled by high profile and 
disproportionate media stories, has intrinsically linked dangerous dogs with other risky, 
criminal and anti-social behaviours.
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The following chapter is divided into two sections. The first section contains a brief 
introduction to my professional role as a member of the policy community that is the 
subject of this thesis. This is in order to provide the background to my own orientation as 
a practitioner within that policy sphere and how I came to study this subject. The second 
section of the chapter provides an outline of the structure of the thesis.
1.1 An insider-researcher role
It is important from the outset that I present an explanation and brief history of my own 
dual role as both researcher and ‘insider’ within the policy community central to this thesis. 
For over twenty years I have been the principal lobbyist in Wales for the Royal Society for 
the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA), which, for the last five years, has been at 
senior staff level. Until 2011, and the devolution of animal welfare in its entirety, dog 
control policy had been mostly a peripheral issue in Wales although I had worked on 
tangential policies both in Wales and Westminster for many of the preceding years and 
was already very familiar with both the legislation and the key policy actors. At this same 
time, having just completed a Masters in Criminology I embarked upon a research project, 
funded by the RSPCA, with Professor Gordon Hughes  and Dr Jenny Maher , to 1 2
investigate the motivations of young people in owning and using dogs in harmful and 
criminal behaviour in the UK (Hughes et al. 2011). Inspired by the subject matter and a 
desire to understand the policy process that had led to, or was related to, the 
phenomenon, I applied to pursue doctoral studies on the matter. 
From the outset I recognised the privileged access to the policy network my professional 
role afforded me, and to the benefit of my research. Of course it also had the ability of 
dovetailing very neatly with my RSPCA role if I could successfully integrate the two, whilst 
ensuring the necessary safeguards were implemented so as not to compromise the ethical 
integrity of my research. Since 2008 the RSPCA had been actively working on the 
emergence of a ‘status' dog phenomenon and I was part of a wider team who regarded 
social scientific research as crucial to the development of our organisational policies and 
strategies for dealing with the associated animal welfare issues. I was therefore grateful the 
case for research was accepted and the RSPCA agreed to part fund my studies.
 Cardiff University.1
 University of South Wales.2
  of  4 311
It is important to note that at the time that I embarked upon this research, neither the UK 
nor Welsh governments were interested in reviewing any legislation concerning dog 
control or engaging in any debates regarding policy interventions. As such, this appeared 
to present a policy environment existing in a form of stasis, and therefore conducive to 
being investigated and analysed, especially over a longer period, to accommodate my part 
time studies. However this position changed considerably when a year or so later the 
Welsh Government announced their intention to introduce a Dog Control Bill and then 
appointed me to their various associated pre-legislative working groups. This appointment 
was of course entirely due to my role within the RSPCA however my research focus has 
provided an interesting additional dimension at times for policy makers. 
My professional role, and in particular the position I held in relation to the Dog Control 
Bill, provided me with a fortuitous position in 2013 when the UK Government began to 
quietly dismantle the Welsh Government’s programme in favour of its own legislation 
designed to encompass both England and Wales. The Home Office had announced plans 
to introduce the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill to, amongst other things, 
reduce the number of civil orders and enable various changes for status and dangerous 
dogs. A very private battle ensued between the UK and Welsh governments (to which I 
am grateful to have been uniquely privy through both my work with government officials 
and my close contact with Ministers), regarding purview over some of these matters 
including the elements pertaining to dogs. The Welsh Government Bill was withdrawn  3
with little fuss and in its place the Minister asked the RSPCA to conduct a study on 
responsible dog ownership in Wales for which I was appointed chair (RSPCA 2016a). The 
timing of this project was extremely beneficial to my research as it provided me - given 
we were taking both verbal and written evidence - with the opportunities to observe 
many of the key policy actors involved with dog control discussing the key events in the 
path of policy interventions, and to legitimately question them further on such issues given 
this was in the public arena. Plus, as other subject matters were off my priority list at the 
 The Government of Wales Act 2006 allocates animal welfare and aspects of community safety to the 3
Welsh Government and so the disagreement then became a debate as to whether the use of dogs in 
harmful and criminal behaviour was strictly animal welfare or not. The devolution settlement for Wales is 
complex and as such these matters can be wide open to legal opinion and interpretation. Successive 
Ministers in Wales deliberated, negotiated and battled with their Westminster counterparts on these 
matters, but ultimately factors led to the Welsh Government backing down. It is important to note that at 
this time the Assembly’s primary law making powers were very new and yet the UK Government had 
already taken the Welsh Government to the Supreme Court over matters where it felt Wales did not have 
purview. The standoff was eventually broken by the Welsh Government who, despite winning the first two 
cases, did not want a more risky third, high-profile, court battle over an issue that ultimately the UK 
Government intended to deal with in a forthcoming Bill.
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RSPCA, my day-to-day role and my research priorities were now even more aligned, and 
on a daily basis, for an extended period of time. 
Around 2014 I also assumed the role of principal liaison with the police across England 
and Wales for the RSPCA. Whilst most operational matters are normally executed (or, 
where there are problems, resolved) at a local level, the policy level discussions cross the 
entire range of enforcement in relation to animal welfare and control. This brings me into 
contact with the chief officers of several of the 43 territorial forces, as well as the National 
Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) lead for animal welfare. Despite the breadth of issues for 
both the NPCC and the RSPCA, the portfolio is dominated by dangerous dog and dog 
control issues and as such directly related to my research. I am conscious that this range of 
lived experiences through the course of my RSPCA duties, firmly locates me within what 
is otherwise a relatively small central core of actors in the policy network, therefore 
characterising my work as an insider-researcher. I return to the issue of this dual role 
within Chapter Six - Methodology, where the implications of conducting such research, 
including the ethical dimensions, are considered. 
1.2 Framing the field 
The aim of the research study is: 
to explore the nature and dynamics of contemporary policy making in crime control via 
a detailed case study of the emergence and re-shaping of 'dangerous' dog regulations 
in England and Wales. 
Although some historical contexts are drawn upon where relevant, the time period 
selected is predominately from approximately 1990 until 2016. The territorial context, 
namely that of England and Wales, was determined by the legislative and political 
environment, as well as the uniformity of enforcement. Although animal welfare has been 
devolved to Wales (in part) since 2006 , the control of dogs largely remains the 4
jurisdiction of the UK Parliament. This was illustrated in 2014 when the Welsh 
 the Animal Welfare Act (2006) empowered the National Assembly for Wales as the national authority for 4
implementing the Act and bringing forth secondary legislation. Further devolution in 2011 transferred animal 
welfare as a subject area, excluding hunting, animals used in experiments and aspects of transportation 
governed by EU regulation - although the latter is expected to become domestic legislation following the 
UK’s exit of the EU.
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Government was unable to progress its own Dog Control Bill, as detailed above. As the 
statute central to this thesis, the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 (DDA) was passed into law 
to be applicable in Scotland also, however the Scottish Government have since passed 
their own dog control measures. Whilst aspects of the DDA remain in force, the subject 
matter is devolved and, as such, the purview of the Scottish Government. Many of the 
participants of this study had only an England and Wales focus to their work which, 
coupled with the fact policing also follows the same boundaries, there was a natural 
jurisdiction offered to explore policy making within.
The research set out to address three central objectives which aimed to illuminate how a 
culture of control may be related to the policy making processes present in relation to 
dog control:
• To describe and analyse the dynamics and forms of 'problem definition' in 
relation to 'status' and 'dangerous dogs' in England and Wales
• To examine the various policy 'solutions' that emerged in relation to these 
‘problems’
• To assess critically the political processes via which particular policy responses 
were challenged and resisted 
Once the data from a series of elite interviews had been collected, analysed and 
assembled within an organising framework it became clear additional data through 
extensive documentary analysis would greatly benefit this study. As such two alternative 
methods have been employed however these have not been amalgamated in one series 
of findings so as not to lose their distinctly different characteristics. The documentary 
analysis, presented first within this thesis, provides a chronological and precise textual 
account of the ‘history of the present’ in the vein of Timothy Garton Ash (1999) in an 
attempt to reveal a rounded and thorough account of policy making in relation to dog 
control during the period in focus. The third part of the thesis containing empirical data 
collected from elite interviews is intended to provide the lived experience of many of the 
key actors within the policy community, some of whom have been present during the 
whole three decades under focus.
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Outline of the thesis 
This thesis is divided into four parts. The first has set out the introduction to this research 
and to my role as a policy practitioner, and will go on to explore the theoretical 
framework for this thesis. The second part contains an extensive documentary analysis of 
the dog control policy arena, along with an explanation of the methodology employed. 
The third contains the empirical findings of a series of elite interviews with dog control 
policy actors, and the final part draws the first three together to present a final discussion 
and the conclusions of this study.
Part I - Introduction and theoretical framework 
Chapter Two explores the arguments for situating animal abuse within criminology before 
moving to a discussion surrounding the theoretical framework of a Culture of Control 
(Garland 2001), with both providing the context for the study of the dog control policy 
sphere. The final section of the chapter considers the study of policy making itself, 
specifically the models of the policy process and primarily Kingdon’s (1984) ‘Multiple 
Steams’ analysis - the organising framework utilised in Part III of this study. The subsection 
progresses to consider studies of policy process methods that explore other areas of 
animal related policy making which, although only an emerging field, offers some insights 
on how other theories have been utilised to illuminate the process. The final section 
engages specifically with the small amount of literature available that seeks to understand 
crime control policy making in relation to dogs and their owners. 
Part II - Policy context 
Chapter Three discusses the methods employed within the documentary analysis of the 
policy making processes at work, contained in the three chapters of Part II. There then 
follows an analysis of the raft of policy and legislative measures in force concerning dog 
control across England and Wales. The final subsection provides a brief guide to the key 
stakeholders of the dog control policy community.
Chapters Four and Five present the findings of the documentary analysis, the first provides 
a detailed historical account of dog control and the response to a changing relationship 
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between society and dogs. The second provides an account of the politicisation of dog 
control and how man’s relationship with its most favoured animal companion became the 
domain of the nation’s politicians. These chapters are also organised so as to contribute to 
the key objectives of describing the problem definition; the policy solutions and the 
political processes at work.
Part III - Elite insights into policy formation 
Chapter Six discusses the methodological approach employed in the data collection and 
analysis for the elite interviews. The chapter outlines the aim and objectives of the 
research strategy as well as the utilisation of Kingdon’s (1984) ‘Multiple Streams’ model to 
frame and organise the empirical findings. The ethical and political dimensions of 
conducting research in this area, including the insider-researcher role, is also considered 
and reflected upon.
Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine present the substantive empirical findings of the thesis with 
each chapter based around the organising framework from Multiple Streams, namely The 
Problem Stream,The Policy Stream and The Political Stream.
Part IV - Discussion and conclusions 
Chapter Ten concludes the thesis by synergising and discussing the findings of both the 
documentary analysis and the elite interviews. The main section is organised around the 
three objectives of this study in order to address the central aim of the research and 
illuminate the policymaking processes that have led to the dog control complex that exists 
in England and Wales today. I consider the recent policy developments in relation to the 
statute central to this research - the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991. Occurring in the final 
months of my work on this thesis and after all data collection had concluded of course, it 
was not possible to incorporate these developments within the main body of the study 
without causing significant delays and I am conscious they have occurred long after the 
elite interviews were finished, presenting a potential disjunct with the data. I have 
nevertheless kept abreast of developments, not least of all as part of my insider-researcher 
role and in an attempt to explore any opportunities to present this research. And in a final 
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section I also provide reflections upon the methodological approach of this research, 
calling attention to aspects which could be improved or built upon further.
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Chapter Two  
Towards a criminology of dog control
2.1 Introduction
In order to better understand the policy processes in relation to dog control, this chapter 
will first seek to situate this subject matter within two broader fields, the first being the 
criminology of animal abuse. This will be done via a criminological analysis of the literature 
surrounding this nascent field in order to determine what represents harm to non-human 
animals and to engage with the research around what constitutes an acceptable way to 
treat animals in society. A consideration of the wider framework of beliefs and 
understanding of animal behaviours, and the interaction with their human-animal owners, 
such as the aetiology of dog attacks, has value for insomuch as it later informs part of the 
evidence utilised within the policy process. The second subsection presents an analysis of 
crime control through a focus on the institutional and cultural context within which the 
control of dogs and the regulation of their human owners exists. A third and final section 
presents an empirical analysis of crime policy making (with a particular focus on Kingdon’s 
[1984] Multiple Streams Analysis [MSA] utilised as an organising framework for the 
findings in later chapters), and an exploration of the small body of work which has sought 
to explain policy making in relation to animals.
2.2 Situating animal abuse within criminology
Although this thesis is not a criminological study of animal abuse, the control of dogs as a 
policy issue has both public safety and animal welfare at its core and its significance bears 
explanation. Certainly how dogs are treated in society engenders strong emotions 
amongst the public and in turn can draw political attention. The complex and extensive 
legislative landscape explored in Chapter Three also bears testament to the interrelated 
nature of dog control and dog welfare. 
Often the dogs subject to control are the ‘victims’ as their welfare can suffer as a result of 
the controls, or indeed controls can be imposed when a dog is deemed a risk whereas in 
fact that risk may have only been generated by the poor standards of welfare that dog has 
  of  11 311
experienced since birth. As will be discussed in later chapters, the specific dogs targeted 
by the Dangerous Dog Act 1991 (DDA) are often equated to inanimate weapons such as 
knives and guns, however animals are sentient  beings whose welfare is protected in law 5
and as such this is a vital consideration in any policy process designed to address their 
behaviour and limit their numbers. As will be seen, how these dogs are bred, socialised, 
used and abused are key aspects of evidence utilised by animal welfare Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and campaigners who seek repeal of the legislation. 
Likewise certain types of dog, identified as dangerous to the human population, remain a 
target of state control, and later chapters will explore the evidence for both. If the 
complexities of human-animal interactions are not fully understood, the policy process 
may be vulnerable to conventional wisdom. This section of the chapter will examine the 
nature of harms to those dogs identified as ‘risky’ and subject to additional controls, but 
before that it is worth noting the position of the wider field related to animals in 
criminology and indeed what constitutes harm to non-humans.
What is animal abuse?
Until quite recently there has been a paucity of social scientific research into crimes of 
animal abuse (Beirne 1995: 1), despite the fact that cruelty to animals has been on the 
statute books in some substantial form or other in the UK for nearly 200 years. Bryant 
and Siznek noted that ‘no area of human-animal behavior is more neglected than animal-
related crime and deviance’ (1993: 32). But what can be considered harm to animals?:
Animals are considered as property only: to destroy or to abuse them, from 
malice to the proprietor, or with an intention injurious to his interest in them, is 
criminal; but the animals themselves are without protection; the law regards them 
not substantively; they have no rights! - Lord Thomas Erskine (Parl Deb Vol 14, col 
554 15 May 1809)
This passionate protestation was uttered during the House of Lords debate on a Bill from 
longtime supporter of animal protection, Lord Erskine, reflecting a growing uneasiness in 
Georgian society with respect to the status and suffering of animals. Nevertheless his 
‘Cruelty to Animals Bill’, and a later incarnation, failed, although they laid the foundations 
for legislation that would protect animals for the first time in the UK, finally introduced in 
1822. 
 The sentience of animals is recognised in EU legislation. The UK and Welsh governments have committed 5
to enshrining this principle in domestic legislation following the UK’s exit from the EU.
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Two years following the introduction of that legislation, and its perceived inability to bring 
about the changes it was intended to, and in a world first, the Society for the Prevention 
of Cruelty to Animals  was established with the specific purpose of enforcing the law and 6
protecting animals. Historian Brian Harrison (1967) provides context to understand the 
RSPCA’s provenance, charting the rise of such philanthropic organisations through 
religious support and means, ‘by encouraging kindness to animals, the Society [RSPCA] 
hoped eventually to civilize manners, and hence to make the masses more receptive to 
religious instruction’ (Ibid. 100), reminiscent, of course, to Elias’s ‘civilising process’ thesis 
(1994). Kathryn Shevelow (2008) skilfully retells the story of the origins of the RSPCA, 
which led to the rise of the UK’s animal protection movement, as a cultural narrative that 
explores the change in attitudes towards animals and the role of the movement in 
influencing policy. Hughes and Lawson (2011) provide further analysis of the 
contemporary RSPCA - the primary enforcer of animal welfare laws in England and Wales 
- as an agent of control and an ‘institutional player’ caught up in a 'morality war’ as to what 
constitutes the most suitable human and non-human relationship. It was these early 
beginnings of both law and enforcer which produced the first standard of what society 
expected in regard to the treatment of animals.
One of the most commonly used definitions of animal cruelty devised by Ascione in his 
study of children committing acts of animal cruelty, states it is ‘socially unacceptable 
behavior that intentionally causes unnecessary pain, suffering, or distress to and/or death 
of an animal’ (1993: 228) however this is broad and open to interpretation given what 
may be considered as socially unacceptable in different countries and cultures. Perhaps in 
recognition of this fact, Vermeulen and Odendaal (1993: 251) suggest a more extensive 
typology of companion animal abuse that assists in detailing the prominent acts involved in 
the physical and mental abuse of animals. It consists of a prescriptive list of physical and 
mental acts, such as drowning, suffocating and instilling fear. However by narrowing 
definitions to mere illegal harms, we risk desensitising and legitimising other legal harms. 
Agnew (1998: 179-180) argues the ‘prevailing beliefs’ surrounding the necessary uses and 
abuses of animals should be rejected, or else risk having ‘political and social actors with the 
greatest power determine our definition of abuse’. In this vein he addresses what he sees 
to be the inherent inadequacies of typologies that ignore the suffering of animals within 
 Royal patronage and the associated moniker was later bestowed by Queen Victoria in 1840.6
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farming, sporting, research and other commercial or macro level practices, making the case 
for the widest possible definition. Cazaux (1999: 113) too notes the deficiencies with 
definitions that, amongst other defects, only pertain to pet animals, and goes on to 
propose that this is due to the status of animals, and therefore protection, in law (Ibid. 
117). Conscious perhaps of the tendency of earlier definitions of animal abuse which 
drew criticisms for engaging with legal definitions or what is regarded as socially 
acceptable, a later definition of animal abuse, which appears to attempt to navigate these 
issues of practices, scale and philosophical difficulties, is offered by Beirne and 
Messerschmidt (2006: 152):
[A]ny act that contributes to the pain, suffering or death of an animal or that 
otherwise threatens its welfare. Animal abuse may be physical, psychological, or 
emotional, may involve active maltreatment or passive neglect or omission, and 
may be direct, or indirect, intentional or unintentional. Some forms of animal abuse 
are categorised as socially acceptable and therefore unlikely to be recognised as 
abuse by mainstream society.
This thesis nevertheless must engage with much of the legal definition of animal harm and 
as such makes reference to the Animal Welfare Act (2006), a relatively recent 
consolidation and modernisation of legislation dating back a hundred years, which applies 
to England and Wales (Chapter Three contains further information for a more detailed 
analysis of the Act. Also, see Sweeney 2013). Nurse (2016) argues that because obligations 
in relation to animals’ needs are placed on owners, the Act introduces a version of legal 
rights for animals. I would counter  that is merely a semblance and in fact the Act was 7
constructed in such a way as to avoid a specific definition of cruelty, instead defining the 
explicit duties of care the responsible person has for their animal, and the circumstances 
whereby an offence is committed. The animal has no right of redress, and the language 
construction of the offences is one in keeping with the welfarist/protectionist ideology, 
that as animals are sentient beings it is the obligation of humans to ensure no unnecessary 
harm comes to them. Through the Act animals do not gain personhood, nor does it 
change the fundamental status of animals in law as one of property. In addition only 
certain categories of animal are protected by this statute, for instance free-roaming and 
naturally occurring wild animals are not, but it does cover the definition of animal fighting, 
something that is considered, along with additional statutes specifically concerning the 
control of dogs, in a later chapter.
 As part of the RSPCA’s public affairs team during this period I was privy to much of the construction of 7
the draft legislation which was executed in close collaboration with Defra officials.
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Attempts to define animal cruelty can be linked to the controversial and conflicting 
ideologies underpinning these definitions (for an extensive discussion see Francione & 
Garner 2010). Pierpoint and Maher (2010: 481) acknowledge the influence of the position 
of animal rights and animal welfare have upon definitions of cruelty, but contend there is a 
third and distinctly different position, that of ‘the animal as a commodity’, referencing the 
Kantian view that as animals hold no innate value, they cannot be abused. In the case of 
status and dangerous dogs, where such dogs, it could be believed, are kept purely as a 
commodity, this position may appear to hold some value for exploring further, however 
studies have shown that in fact there are far more complex reasons for the ownership of 
such dogs, often involving deep owner-dog bonds (Hughes, Maher & Lawson 2011).
The origins of the call to study animal abuse within the criminological context can be 
traced to the entreaties of Clifton Bryant (1979: 412), who believed that what he termed 
as ‘zoological crime’ was probably ‘among the most ubiquitous of any social deviancy’. The 
study of all forms of animal abuse is now often housed under the umbrella of green 
criminology but this can be an ill-fitting designation given that particular field’s primary 
concern for crimes against nature. No longer competing against just humans for the status 
of victim, animals would also now be equated to flora, despite being sentient beings, if 
green criminology was the only field to have regard for crimes involving animals. 
Meanwhile the plight of companion animals, animals in sport, experiments, food and 
entertainment remain largely ignored. In studies such as ‘Crimes Against Nature’, White 
(2008: 20) considers animals only in the context of ‘species justice’ and categorises it as 
the ‘third strand of green criminology’ and yet barely revisits the issue elsewhere in the 
text. Beirne (2007) remarks upon the comparable origins, and thus similarities, of each 
movement, as well as their ethical foundations, proceeding to set out the impediments to 
integrating the two fields of environmental and animal issues, leading him to question the 
notion that green criminology can subsume animal abuse when it essentially proposes 
researching the area within a vacuum that ignores species and rights-based argument. 
The predominance of non-animal environmental concerns in green criminology is 
pronounced (see series by Routledge 2018). Crimes of animal use and abuse, may well 
befit its own, separate category, however, as has been argued, green criminology is a broad 
perspective, not a theory, and the study of harm of non-humans and the environment 
share many common and sympathetic features (Nurse 2013: 1-4). Given then the 
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significant endeavours there were in establishing, within the mainstream, the green 
criminological perspective, perhaps more effort is needed from researchers to ensure 
animal harm is not suppressed but developed much further (see Taylor & Fitzgerald 2018). 
One way in which this may be addressed is through positioning alternative and broader 
studies, such as this one, purposefully (but not solely) within the green criminological 
category in order to push out any boundaries and augment the field to allow for research 
that includes - perhaps not always exclusively - the interests of animals.
Linking animal harm with interpersonal violence
‘He who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings with men. We can 
judge the heart of a man by his treatment of animals’ (Immanuel Kant 1979: 240).
Despite the dearth of mainstream academic literature, animals undoubtedly occupy a 
privileged position in society, with press and social media reactions portraying a very low 
tolerance for most forms of harm to animals. This is further evidenced through the 
widespread popularity of campaigns to introduce more legislation restricting their use or 
prohibiting certain activities, as well as the public donations given to UK based animal 
charities amounting to approximately £679m per year (Charities Aid Foundation 2017: 
11). As observed, ‘Animals have become an integral part of political, as well as cultural and 
social life’ (Keane 1998: 7), however the subject doesn’t often occupy a central focal point 
for policymakers except perhaps in times of crisis, such as a food scandal on a national 
scale, or a local report of cruelty generating keen media attention. What has been more 
enticing to inquiry, and also for the creation of practical responses , is the notion animals 8
may have value in the aetiology of other violent human behaviours, in that animal cruelty 
may provide indicators of interpersonal violent behaviours either concurrently, or as a 
predictor for later in life, commonly referred to as the ‘Links’. Animal abuse studies is often 
more interesting to some when expressed as a value to understanding what humans do 
to each other, for instance, where animal abuse has been discovered in a home ‘the 
preventative value’ could be employed ‘by approaching these families as potential 
incubators of other forms of criminal violence’ (Cazaux 1999: 114). This area has drawn 
more attention, and for far longer, as Pierpoint and Maher (2010: 480) note it was the 
 For example the Links Group has been developing resources and CPD courses for vets in spotting non-8
accidental injury in patients and the signs of domestic abuse in clients http://www.thelinksgroup.org.uk.
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early 1970s when research began and a link was first propounded. As a result inquiry in 
this field has been anthropocentric in nature.
Miller and Knutson (1997) substantiated the effect of punitive childhoods on offending 
behaviour in adults but could not validate the theory that subjection to animal abuse was 
also a contributing factor. Beirne and Messerschmidt (2006: 151) agreed and also 
acknowledged the otherwise and ‘obvious common sense appeal’ of the notion of a 
graduation link between violence to animals and violence to humans but urged caution, 
citing contradictory and premature evidence. Authoritative, methodologically sound and 
reliable research in the UK has been either absent in this field or has thus far failed to 
provide strong evidence of a causal link. An association of factors is accepted amongst 
many of the contemporary researchers, but the nature of that link is not yet understood 
and thus should not be adopted as a predictor of behaviour in the absence of reliable 
evidence. Beirne (2009: 167-8) concurs there is a connection but makes a sardonic point 
that the main proponents of a causal link operate within government, its agencies, and 
organisations servicing ‘at-risk’ families, with the media providing a vehicle for the 
dissemination of this rather convenient maxim. 
This has interesting connotations for the policy domain, particularly that despite the 
evidence vacuum, policymakers have, nevertheless, proceeded to endorse the Links issue 
by publishing guidance and information on their practical responses. The Parliamentary 
Office of Science and Technology have issued a POSTnote entitled ‘Pets, Families and 
Interagency Working’ (January 2010), detailing the issue of protecting children and what 
function animal NGOs can provide. Whilst encouraging awareness of the Links could be 
considered a positive move, there lacks any cautionary note regarding the lack of evidence 
and the perils of referring to any causal relationships as if they were fact. Elsewhere, the 
US Department of Justice’s Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention issued a 
Bulletin on ‘Animal Abuse and Youth Violence’ (Ascione 2001) which defines and details 
abuse, providing indicators for public officials to be on the qui vive for, although does not 
entirely endorse the evidence of the links to interpersonal violence. There has also not 
been, as yet, any substantial research into young offenders and any links between offending 
with dogs, via intimidation or assault, and other forms of interpersonal violence beyond 
Hughes, Maher and Lawson’s (2011) pilot study.
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The salience of animal related issues
Despite growing numbers of animal-related studies, researcher networks and 
criminological literature, the study of animals in the criminological context remains an 
embryonic field. The largest section of research seeks, as has been discussed, to examine 
the link between animal harm and interpersonal violence, which by its nature could be 
argued to attach less value to animals as victims. Nurse (2013) rationalises this, dismissing 
any focus on the number or nature of incidents where animals suffer, but welcoming the 
merits of better understanding criminal behaviours as well as the policing and policy 
responses. He also notes the importance of studying animal harm for the value of greater 
knowledge of key policy actors, the ‘NGOs are especially important in shaping animal 
harm policy because the NGOs that have accepted (moral) responsibility for dealing with 
animal harm operate mainly from an environment or animal welfare standpoint rather 
than a criminal justice or policing one’ (2013: 24) which perhaps also emphasises the role 
of these actors in the policy community. 
In order to understand the potential harms to the types of dogs central to this thesis and 
any effect upon the policy process, it is important that definitions other than the mere 
criminocentric are considered, otherwise those legitimised by the Dangerous Dogs Act 
may otherwise go unscrutinised. Maher, Pierpoint and Lawson (2017) examined the 
various harms to status dogs in some detail. The definition of ‘status' dogs and the 
relationship to ‘dangerous’ dogs lacks consensus and is the subject of much debate but for 
the purposes here, they are both often identified as being of greater risk to the public and 
are (or their owners are) subject to additional controls. The harms identified, 
incorporating both the legal and illegal and often related to the commodification of these 
dogs, includes: irresponsible breeding due to the attraction of the way these dogs appear 
in society as well as the financial gain to be made; inadequate stewardship leading to 
significant neglect and health issues; punitive training methods either inadvertently or 
purposefully leading to suffering and aggression; fighting and attacking other animals or 
humans resulting in endangerment, injury and seizure by the state; and abandonment or 
destruction which can involve the worst forms of suffering. 
Those dogs that are banned under the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 but have been added 
to the register of exempted dogs, are permitted to be kept only under strict conditions. 
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These conditions - applied irrespective of the dog’s past and present actions - can restrict 
a dog’s normal behaviour because they include being muzzled and kept on a lead at all 
times in a public place. This will affect a dog’s ability to play, interact with other dogs and 
exercise, which can in themselves create behavioural problems such as making them 
fearful. If these conditions of exemption are not met, or if the owners are not granted 
exemption, the dog must be euthanased and cannot be rehomed under current 
restrictions. Should an owner contest a police and court decision not to allow them to 
retain keepership, the dog can remain in kennels, with very little enrichment and no visits 
from their owners, sometimes for extended periods of time - over two years in some 
cases (BBC News 2018).
The perceived usefulness of these dogs in the execution of a crime is thought to be an 
attraction for some owners and in such circumstances the dog’s welfare may be more at 
risk, potentially making them more likely to be abused or neglected. Reminiscent of 
Garland’s (2001) ‘criminologies of the other’, measures such as Public Spaces Protection 
Orders can be used to ban dogs from certain areas. Often utilised in large municipal areas 
where certain dogs and their owners are feared, the effect is to ghettoise public spaces 
where dogs are permitted, severely reducing exercise options and limiting positive 
interactions between dogs and non-dog owners. Likewise many housing associations have 
policies preventing even the lawful keeping of dogs or those specific dogs legally 
exempted under the Dangerous Dogs Act. If the owner is unable to move homes, and 
must relinquish ownership, the dog will automatically be euthanased. The harms to dogs 
subject to the labels ‘status’ or ‘dangerous’ are numerous and complex. Their relationship 
to evidence and the role that takes in the policy debates will be examined in later 
chapters.
2.3 Contemplating a culture of control
In pursuing evidence of the theoretical framework of the culture of control, this study 
examines the nature of how the policy making process unfolds in relation to the 
regulation of dogs and their owners in society. The politics of crime control as well as 
societal shifts in recent history, and in particular the notion that threats and risks are being 
managed by ever more punitive measures, as a feature of late modernity, are therefore 
central to these endeavours.
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Many renowned scholars such as Simon (1997), Young (1999), Bauman (2000) and Lea 
(2002), have sought to pioneer theories to explain the more recent trends in crime; the 
increasing fear of becoming a victim to crime; and the often draconian responses by the 
criminal justice system, including dramatic rises in the prison population. Their theories all 
suggest, in different ways, that these developments arise from adjusted macro-social 
conditions presented by late-modernity. Evidence of exponential developments and 
advancements for humankind during the last six or seven decades are certainly plentiful. 
Technology pervades all areas of life, whilst national and global economic conditions 
fluctuate, and our cultures evolve, and thus society shapes and re-shapes in response. 
Perhaps the most influential theory that society has shifted in such a fundamental manner 
and brought with it a monumental transformation in law and order, is most associated 
with the prominent sociologist David Garland (2001) who argued that as a result of these 
changes by the end of the 20th century there emerged a ‘culture of control’. Such a theory 
has been alluring for its ability to amalgamate the incomplete and fragmented explanations 
previously offered, in order to construct a framework upon which to view the landscape 
of crime control. It is thus worth exploring the principal features of Garland’s thesis.
Late-modernity and the ‘welfare-penal complex’
The period of crime control dating from early 1900s until the 1970s is characterised by 
Garland (1996; 2001) as ‘penal-welfarism’ whereby law and order was seen to be the 
routine business of institutions such as the courts, prisons and the police. Loader and 
Sparks (2007: 79) describe this condition as being predicated upon three ‘mutually 
reinforcing axioms’, the first that crime as a concept was not viewed as too complex or 
troubling and it was believed to be geographically and socially specific. Secondly, that 
through causal theory, crime could be understood as a product of intrinsic social issues to 
be tackled through welfare, improvement and ‘correctionalist' programmes. Finally, there 
was a common adherence to the notion that policy making in respect of crime control 
remained the purview of experts and expert knowledge, with the definition of experts 
including civil servants and experienced practitioners, but excluding politicians. 
Hughes (2007: 39-40) attributes this view that crime control was the domain of specialists 
far beyond the political sphere, at least in part, to the ‘hegemony and symbolic presence of 
the legal discourse’ which centred around the ‘uniqueness’ of the criminal justice system in 
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England and Wales. And, given this regard for expertise, and the prominence of social 
science within state-sponsored positivist programmes for tackling deprivation and 
inequality as the root causes of crime, that in fact this period could be viewed as a time of 
‘criminological optimism’. This was not a condition, however, that was to last.
Crime, disorder and late-modernity
The 1970s saw profound changes in the social and criminal justice landscape. Most 
prominent perhaps are the figures for recorded crime which demonstrated a massive 
escalation beginning in the 1950s (Maguire 2007). Irrespective of the accuracy of these 
figures, their publication and surrounding debates served to position the fear of crime 
squarely within the public consciousness; normalise it as a part of everyday life; and thus 
establish it as ‘social fact’ (Garland 1996; 2001). Jock Young (1999) referred to this as ‘the 
central motor of change’ for it also suggested previous strategies to tackle offending were 
not working as intended, and also exposed new, previously hidden, crimes. These erstwhile 
invisible, or ignored, crimes are often identified, for example, as domestic abuse, child 
molestation and harms to the environment, but as will be discussed in this thesis, I will 
argue this also included dog attacks or, most likely, the perception of them, which became 
another ‘new’ focus of public and political attention and an object for control. The 
significant economic and social changes from the 1970s onwards were such that some 
theorists have been compelled to identify a move to late or post modernity (Young 1999; 
Garland 2001; Bauman 1991; Crook et al. 1992) as a means of encapsulating the 
contributing factors such as the shifts in the markets; reshaping of domestic structures; 
suburban development; and the rapid expansion of the media. 
A seismic shift also came when party politics and crime control became entangled in a 
way that had not occurred before. The domain of law and order that had once been seen 
to be above the influence of politics, was, by the general election of 1979, a prominent 
feature of the political discourse (Downes & Morgan 2007). The Conservatives focussed 
in on what they saw as Labour’s failings, characterising the reported increases in crime in 
such a way as to make it synonymous with recent episodes of unrest and strike action. 
The ‘bi-partisan’ political consensus on law and order, in existence since the second world 
war, was now gone and Labour had been successfully rebranded as weak in the face of 
civil disobedience, rising crime, and a decline of the nation, and therefore wholly deficient 
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at governing Britain. The emergence of New Right governments in Westminster and 
internationally marked a break with state-dependent social programmes to tackle crime 
and an emphasis on the individual to ‘help oneself ’ and it also intensified the open political 
discourse on framing the nature of law and order (Tonry 2004).
Successive election defeats in the 1980s perhaps made inevitable Labour’s abandonment 
of the position that deep rooted economic and cultural issues were to blame for crime. 
The public demonstrated clear support for what in effect was the symbolism offered by 
the Conservative Government, for in reality the rhetoric had done nothing to divert and 
reduce crime throughout this decade, indeed quite the opposite was thought to be 
happening. Having the two mainstream political parties now adopt similar positions on law 
and order made for a form of forced consensus. It was against the interests of any political 
party to offer anything other than unwavering support for the police and for tougher 
sentences, and to have gone against this would be to yield crucial ground to their 
opponents (Downes & Morgan 2007). The 1990s however saw Labour pull away from the 
consensus and develop a more substantial and determined strategy ultimately embodied 
in the infamous phrase ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’ which overtly 
tapped into the cadence of a Hollywood movie strap line, designed to invoke both a fear 
of crime (and the criminal) and a confidence in New Labour’s unique ability to tackle it.
The following years witnessed an open race between the parties on certain issues, such as 
increasing police numbers, which in itself created a shared culpability for any 
misinformation conveyed as to the causal relationship between police numbers and the 
prevalence of crime. Political attraction for high profile US-based policy initiatives such as 
‘three strikes’ and ‘zero tolerance’ were abundant, driven by the evidence of electoral 
success for those who adopted them in the USA. Within the UK context, however, these 
were largely symbolic manoeuvres given that in practice the similarities of any policy 
initiatives and legislation to their US exemplars was relatively limited (Jones & Newburn 
2007). It is worth noting here that there exists some indications to the contrary at least in 
relation to dangerous dogs, indeed substance rather than symbolism may have been 
present during this period in this regard, given legislation identifying dangerous and risky 
dogs via the criminality of their owners (with measures designed to target specific breeds) 
was first introduced in the USA and later appeared to be presented to Parliament as an 
almost exact facsimile. Nevertheless, overall the culmination of a series of populist 
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positions on the penal system meant that ‘the politics of law and order had now become 
inherently and increasingly punitive’ (Downes & Morgan 2007: 215).
Contradictory adaptations
As the previously dominant ideal of rehabilitation waned in the face of mass social and 
political change, Garland argues a ‘policy predicament’ was arrived at against a backdrop of 
‘nothing works’ (Martinson 1974). The state was obliged to concede that previous 
strategies, delivered only by state-operated institutions, were incapable of addressing crime 
as it had been framed in this new era. Simultaneously, however, it had to be acknowledged 
that the political sphere had now seized hold of the sovereignty of crime control and it 
would be any government’s undoing to dismiss this as a factor. Emerging from the conflict 
of the state needing to be mindful of its own shortcomings, whilst also needing to appear 
’tough of crime’, Garland argues, is a ‘culture of control’, the evidence for which exists, he 
outlines, in a number of adaptive and non-adaptive strategies. 
These conflicting manifestations appear as both adaptive preventative strategies with 
community focussed partnerships, as well as the non-adaptive punitive responses of ‘acting 
out and denial’ (Garland 1996). The former, Garland suggests, is based upon ‘a criminology 
of the self ’ where crime is regarded as routine and rational, and where markets develop as 
private and non-statutory agencies also contribute to managing risky populations as part 
of the new ‘criminologies of everyday life’. In contrast, however, the latter non-adaptive 
strategy is concerned with denying that rising crime and incarceration rates are evidence 
of a failed approach, which thus requires a new 'myth of sovereign crime control’. In this 
highly political sphere, evidence is forgone in favour of the populist approach, which is 
usually exclusionary in nature, such as zero-tolerance and segregating individuals from 
public spaces and communities. 
Garland (2001: 143-4) also notes the ‘sanctification of victims’ a process whereby 
politicians and the press have capitalised upon their experiences, thrusting the suffering of 
the victim to centre stage, to engender mass appeal and acceptance for a regime based 
upon punishment. In this environment where the victim is given a voice, ever-more 
punitive measures become desirable, justified and openly-embraced. Garland also notes 
that as a consequence of this sanctification of victims, concern for the offender is nullified, 
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‘any show of compassion for offenders, any invocation of their rights, any effort to 
humanize their punishments, can easily be represented an insult to victims and their 
families’ (Ibid.). In the case of dog attacks, the victims are more often young children which 
may intensify this condition even further. It may certainly explain why a nation that 
considers itself animal lovers, was in support of the wholesale eradication of certain types 
of dog following one or two high profile attacks on humans.
Perhaps also linked to the status of dogs as the perpetrators of criminal acts is Garland’s 
notion of the ‘criminologies of the other’. As Hughes (2007: 30) notes, ‘the expressive, 
punitive logic rests ideologically on a moralizing and atavistic’ strategy where offenders are 
set apart from ‘us’ and positioned as ‘them’, being characterised as ‘opaquely monstrous 
creatures beyond or beneath our knowing’ (Garland 2001: 184). A deep divide is created 
between the respectable citizens and the ‘otherness’ of criminals, which works to 
demonise and to ‘act out popular fears and resentments, and to promote support for 
state punishment’ (Ibid.: 137). As will be discussed later, there is an interesting parallel to 
‘innocent’ and ‘dangerous’ dogs, with only certain breed/types being successfully labelled as 
the latter (irrespective of their individual actions) and being subject to drastic legislative 
responses.
The discourse fed by New Labour’s emphasis on anti social behaviour, and the crime and 
disorder measures designed to tackle it, have been argued to have resulted in society’s 
waning tolerance and growing sensitivity towards misdemeanours and minor offending 
(Tonry 2004). With retribution, punishment and ‘just desserts’ central to a culture of 
control, it is perhaps easy to see why  it became possible to legislate to exterminate 9
certain types of dogs in their thousands. In this new era of law and order, the ‘crimes’ (or, 
in essence, the potential crimes) of these dogs, could be more purposely linked in political 
campaigns to the mauling and deaths of children, conflating them with the ‘dangerous 
other’. It was now straightforward, effortless perhaps, to demonise certain dogs and 
portray them as either the tool of the ‘moral underclass,’ or indeed the ‘moral underclass’ 
itself, and therefore in urgent need of more punitive controls than the country had ever 
witnessed before.
 particularly in the absence of any new variables or evidence of disease or genetic developments to explain 9
any changes to dog aggression, or any other factors to explain why these attacks on children could be 
thought to be different to any occurring regularly throughout history.
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A critical appraisal of The Culture of Control as a theoretical framework
The culture of control provides an extremely useful lens through which to examine and 
interpret the context of policy making in relation to the regulation of dog owners, 
however Garland’s work is not, of course, without limitations or criticism, not least of all 
for its pessimistic outlook (see Matthews 2002; Loader & Sparks 2007). It has also been 
considered, for instance, to suffer from ‘a lack of depth and empirical specificity concerning 
the interaction of political institutions, processes and cultures across different governable 
spaces’ (Brewster 2017: 567). Garland (2001: vii) had been relatively mindful of this noting 
‘the unavoidable tension between broad generalization and the specification of empirical 
particulars’ but is unequivocal in his claim that his intention was to engage a ‘sweeping 
account of the big picture’ and ‘to stand back from the immediacies of current events and 
the recent policy initiatives and offer an historical and structural account’ (Garland 2004: 
169).
Tonry (2004: 60) summarises that the fundamental concern with Garland’s theory is that 
the same social and economic developments are also present in every wealthy nation of 
the world and yet the control responses of the UK and the USA remain relatively unique. 
He posits that in fact this is because there are other cultural and social factors at play, such 
as race, judicial independence and patterns of liberality in the USA, and in the UK an 
exaggeration of crime that has led to greater fears, along with a cultural predilection for 
punishment. Therefore The Culture of Control fails to consider how the sui generis of 
cultural and structural factors give rise to shifts in the nature of crime control. Garland 
(2004: 179) himself later asks the same questions of how late modernity has been 
experienced by other nations and argues that ‘[w]hether or not the central thesis of The 
Culture of Control turns out to be correct, it has the virtue of stating a definite thesis in a 
way that lends itself to comparative investigation’.
In 2004 Garland revisited his theorem, not necessarily to address all the direct criticisms it 
had received but to acknowledge and consider the implications of constructive 
suggestions. He restates that, ‘[t]he critical aim of the book is to prompt readers to think 
differently about the culture of control, and to attribute responsibility for its development 
to actors and processes who are not the usual suspects’ (2004: 185). It is worth noting 
that criminology as a whole has been relatively uninterested in undertaking empirical 
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studies of policy making processes, concentrating instead upon the effects of legislative 
measures (Jones & Newburn 2007). This oversight ensured the criminological effects of 
meso-policy making have so often gone explored, the consequences of which also remain 
unknown. 
It is also worth nothing that in years following the publication of Garland’s The Culture of 
Control, there was a major and sustained drop in crime. After a period of time there also 
then followed a cooling of crime as a political issue particularly during major elections 
where it featured less than in previous decades (Loader & Sparks 2010). Arguably these 
trends may well be changing again but in any case understanding how, why and when 
policy is made within a social context is of growing interest due to the potential to make a 
meaningful contribution to both theory and practice. To look beyond the criminological 
anatomy of policy outcomes is to consider the political processes that have engineered 
policy responses (Jones & Newburn 2007). This thesis attempts to understand one 
specific arena of the policy making processes in the context of the UK’s political and crime 
control complex in order to illuminate an area of crime policy hitherto ignored and 
contribute to the growing consensus which regards some of the main measures to 
control dogs and their owners in society as draconian and ineffective.
2.4 Policy theories
Understanding how policies are created, developed, implemented and evaluated has been 
the subject of much inquiry in political science and related subject areas, but to date 
received only limited attention within criminology (Jones & Newburn 2007). This has also 
shaped and informed the development of what social sciences can offer for policy analysis. 
Stoker and Evans’ (2016: 9) presentation of the abundant methods for connecting the two 
comes with the candid admission that ‘social science and policy making are not natural 
“best” friends….The two sides can be locked in a distant, difficult and disobliging 
relationship’ and certainly the findings of this thesis may later provide confirmation of this 
in relation to the creation of dog control policies. 
But as a study of contemporary policy making in England and Wales, it is important to 
discuss the extant research and scholarly literature that relates to such endeavours and 
how this assists in answering the key aim and objectives outlined in the previous chapter. 
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In order to determine later in this thesis how dog control policy has emerged, been 
framed and responded to, it is first prudent to consider the various methods of 
understanding the genesis of policy making, including why I have chosen one specific 
approach - Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Analysis (MSA) - as the framework in which to 
later present the case study findings of Chapters Seven to Nine. Following this I review 
the small number of studies that have sought to explore policy making in relation to 
animals, which serves to discuss the approaches they have chosen to employ. This also 
demonstrates the limited regard there is in scholarly research for this policy community, 
which indeed may itself reflect that community’s own, thus far, under-developed interest in 
comprehending the nature of policy making. The subsection will end with an examination 
of the small body of research that has specifically sought to understand how crime policy 
has been shaped with regard to the control of dogs to provide additional context for this 
study and the chosen methods.

Defining ‘policy’
In his discussion on the origins of public policy, Page (2008: 207) considers that: 
insofar as they arise from conscious reflection and deliberation, policies may reflect 
a variety of intentions and ideas: some vague, some specific, some conflicting, some 
unarticulated. They can…even be the unintended or undeliberated consequences 
of professional practices or bureaucratic routines’. 
Factors such as an event, or a discovery of some kind may then encourage its progression 
or development. Hill (2013: 14-19) discusses the various definitions and attempts to 
determine what is meant by ‘policy,’ drawing upon the plethora of definitions in existence, 
which perhaps reinforces the view of Sir Charles Cunningham (1963: 229), a former 
senior civil servant in the Home Office, that ‘policy is rather like the elephant - you 
recognise it when you see it but cannot easily define it’. Hill (2013: 15) considers the 
issues surrounding definitions, which reflect an inherent lack of specificity influenced by 
temporal issues, as evidence that ‘it is difficult to treat [policy] as a very specific and 
concrete phenomenon’ and warns social scientists against attributing narrow meaning to 
such a ubiquitous word given the influence and bias this might produce. He proceeds to 
count seven features of the policy process, namely that it must be viewed as a complex 
series of interconnected decisions, and thus it is never merely one resolution. Events and 
time can influence its path, as such it is regarded as ‘dynamic rather than static’, and it does 
not exist in isolation, it is subject to influence by its environment in an already ‘crowded 
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policy space’. Much of policy making can be about its own dissolution and successor, which 
can often mean that policy studies are about ‘the examination of non-decisions’ and 
resistance to change, which in itself raises ‘the question of whether policy can be seen as 
action without decisions. It can be said that a pattern of actions over a period of time 
constitutes a policy, even if these actions have not been formally sanctioned by a 
decision’ (Hill 2013: 16-17).
Whilst public policy - the purview of government and its ancillaries - could be argued to 
differ little from those developed by non-governmental or private entities, some 
researchers have turned to these lower level actors and to the ‘street-level 
bureaucrats’ (Lipsky 1980), to unearth more facets of the policy making process. Page 
(2008: 221) writes this arena is about policies without agendas - where policies are about 
executing functions and often bypass the upper echelons or any formal interface with 
legislation or government. However others, such as Chaney (2016), have sought to 
address a perceived lacuna as to what position, if any, civil society organisations play within 
the policy making environment, particularly at a formative phase and ‘meso-legislature’ 
level. In such environments smaller organisations can struggle to participate in the policy 
process due to resource constraints which can adversely affect the plurality of the field. 
Similarly, where one political party’s dominance persists, policy can instead be generated 
through its own party - rather than parliamentary - networks (Ibid.: 518). Each of these 
salient points raises issues of transparency and inclusivity within the channels leading, albeit 
indirectly, to the creation of public policy.
Pollitt’s (2001) three dimensions of public policy, based upon those of Brunsson (1989), 
can provide a useful schematic distinction for the study of the policy process, whereby 
policy ‘talk’ can be seen through political rhetoric, discussion and paraenesis; policy 
‘decisions’ manifest as affirmative decision making through published policy or legislative 
moves; and policy ‘action’ is the implementation of such decisions by the lower level 
bureaucrats. The stages approach to the study of the policy process involves dividing the 
process up in order to focus on, and understand, distinct stages of what is otherwise a 
large, complex sphere. Initially proposed by Easton (1953 and 1965), the principles were 
elaborated upon by Jenkins (1978) and then later by Hogwood and Gunn (1984) who 
describe nine stages of ‘deciding to decide’, ‘deciding how to decide’, ‘issues definition’, 
‘forecasting’, ‘setting objectives and priorities’, ‘options analysis’, ‘policy implementation, 
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monitoring and control’, ‘evaluation and review’ and ‘policy maintenance, succession and 
termination’, with the latter stages of implementation and evaluation, of course, attracting 
the majority of inquiry. It is important to note that the stages approach can portray the 
policy process as a rational sequence of developments which is far from the empirical 
reality of my own experiences of what can be a complex, contingent and often chaotic 
affair. Nevertheless, I have summarised these ‘stages heuristic’ within the following three 
sections of the chapter which have been organised around agenda setting, policy networks 
and epistemic communities, and lastly a more detailed discussion of Multiple Streams 
Analysis due to its use as an organising framework in later chapters. But the primary 
empirical focus of this study is upon the ‘concrete manifestations’ of policy as set out in 
formal statute and policy documents rather than in the more diffuse dimensions of ‘policy 
talk’ or the much more finely-grained areas of policy implementation on the ground – 
although, where relevant, these dimensions are also considered.

Agenda setting
Understanding how polices first come into being has been the subject of much inquiry, 
albeit conducted largely outside of the criminological spectrum. This phase can be said to 
be when social and institutional processes transform conditions to create publicly-
acknowledged problems worthy of a response by government. It can also be the most 
impenetrable part to investigation as so much of it can occur in private. Hill (2013) 
presents three approaches to researching how policy is formed: firstly the rational model 
(Simon 1957) which argues that decision-making is characterised by the comprehensive 
and logical consideration of alternatives and their consequences, which resonates with a 
conventional view of government whereby agenda setting emerges from a democratic 
and empowered way. The second model of incrementalism, or ‘successive limited 
comparisons’ (Lindblom 1959), clearly reflects pluralist thinking and contends that 
decision-making is about revisiting problems and earlier efforts, to resolve them 
pragmatically, in the real world without seeking to achieve some ideal future state. The 
third approach of agenda setting (and also the framework utilised in Chapters Seven to 
Nine), was devised by Kingdon (1984) and notes the unpredictability and instability in the 
maelstrom of policy making but nevertheless offers three ‘streams’ for understanding the 
process, and thus appealed to this study as an organising framework. These features are 
discussed in more detail later in this chapter, and again in Chapter Six. Kingdon’s approach 
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to agenda setting was itself built upon the earlier works of Cohen, March and Olsen’s 
(1972) ‘garbage can’ model - the proposition being that policy making is characterised by 
the union of three features, namely that problems are seeking solutions; that solutions are 
seeking a problem; and that people are seeking to act. These theories may not in 
themselves illuminate the origins of policy however they do provide:
a framework that allows one to outline the proximate causes that lead to 
attention being devoted to an issue: how an issue comes to emerge from relative 
obscurity to becoming something that is being discussed as a serious contender 
for legislation or some other policy measure (Page 2008: 208).
Policy networks and epistemic communities
Focusing on the institutions and participants, and their relationship or interdependence on 
one another, Policy Network Analysis (PNA) seeks to enable a greater understanding of 
the policy making sphere. Most associated with Rhodes (1981) this approach examines 
the complex connections of complementary and mutual relations between state and non-
state institutions. Rhodes and Marsh (1992) later developed a typology of policy networks 
to be viewed as a continuum, containing five types - ‘Policy Communities’ are described as 
having a relatively contained membership, boundaries and power, which is similar to 
‘Professional Networks’ although they will work in isolation and in response to the needs of 
that profession. ‘Intergovernmental Networks’ have a broad interest area but draw only from 
representative bodies and ‘Producer Networks’ are driven of economic need so have a 
fluctuating membership and a dependency upon the supply and demand of industrial 
relations. ‘Issue Networks’ are more diverse in terms of both participants and participation, 
with varying levels of power. Given these labels can all be attributed different meaning and 
employed by a variety of disciplines, definitional issues can result, which is also a 
reoccurring feature of the literature. 
Rhodes and Marsh (1992: 202) recognised ‘there is a danger that the study of policy 
networks will become….a field bedevilled by arguments over the “best” definition. 
However, future developments need not hinge on definitional agreement’. As such this 
study does not seek to test this typology and, whilst it may be concluded from the data at 
a later point that there is likely to exist, in relation to dog control policy, an ‘issue network’ 
rather than of the others described, the terms will be used herewith interchangeably. The 
typology is not claimed by the authors to be definitive, nor are those specified types 
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deemed to be mutually exclusive, as they can operate side by side in the same policy 
space. It is claimed however that networks affect change which is, of course, of key 
interest to this research which seeks to understand how dog control policy is made. As 
Rhodes and Marsh (1992: 197) observed, ‘All the case studies suggest that networks affect 
policy outcomes. The existence of a policy network, or more particularly a policy 
community, constrains the policy agenda and shapes the policy outcomes. Policy 
communities, in particular, are associated with policy continuity’, although they also 
recognised that 'policy networks are a source of inertia’ (Ibid.: 203). 
Dowding’s critique of Policy Networks Analysis, (PNA) and what he saw as this ‘dominant 
paradigm’, claims it is merely a metaphor, and along with all other descriptors is used to 
portray the same essential attributes of policy making:
that the distinction between public and private organizations was flexible, the 
pattern of linkages within a sector affected policy outcomes, and the sub-
governmental level was most important for understanding the detail of policy 
formation and the success of policy implementation (1995: 138). 
The PNA approach fails in his view due to the individual characteristics of the 
components in each network which must be understood to be the real ‘driving force of 
explanation’ and because, he argues, grand theories of the state must be generalisable to 
all to which it is applicable. Although PNA could be viewed as ill-equipped in such regard, 
and indeed unable to explain change, it could be argued to have nevertheless weathered 
the storm. Whilst Atkinson and Coleman (1992) acknowledge it has retained some of 
those ‘metaphorical qualities’ they also judge it has been successful at least in portraying 
the fluidity of the policy making process as well as moving the focus from national bodies 
towards lower levels. In dismissing Dowding’s verdict, Rhodes (2008: 434) points to PNA’s 
continued popularity, and proliferation in other disciplines such as criminology, as evidence 
of its veracity and relevance.
With a similar attention to the study of policy via an emphasis on the importance of 
networks and communities, Sabatier (1987) developed the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework (ACF) approach which assumes that both government and private 
representatives within the policy arena can be categorised into coalition groups. Sabatier 
(1998) developed this approach to understanding the policy process as a countermeasure 
to what he termed the ‘stages heuristic’ that was sweeping through policy studies and in 
order to reposition the contribution of technical information to a more elevated role. This 
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role of - and importance attributable to - expertise is central to Haas’s (1992) ‘epistemic 
communities’ which are differentiated from other networks in the policy process by their 
combination of beliefs and their superior technical knowledge. He describes them as, ‘the 
transmission belts by which new knowledge is developed and transmitted to decision-
makers’ (Haas 2004: 587). As we will see other models place far less emphasis on this role 
of these knowledge communities and the expertise of the expert, and more upon the 
role of policy broker or entrepreneur (Hall 2013: 170). Despite the endurance and 
usefulness in understanding the importance of policy networks and communities, 
approaches such as PNA do not offer sufficient opportunities alone to explore the 
genesis of policy in relation to dog control because ‘network theory lacks explanatory 
power’ (Ibid.: 67). Some understanding of the policy network is essential in any 
examination of the dog control policy process, but in itself the use of such an analytical 
tool cannot reliably offer explanations of the generation of policy, particularly, as 
highlighted by Dowding (1995: 144) the government can effect great changes without any 
reference to the policy network simply ‘by ignoring or bypassing’ it, because ‘at the end of 
the day, the material power and legitimacy of elected government can ride roughshod 
over any policy community’.
Multiple Streams Analysis (MSA)
Mindful of the view that the policy process is significantly vague and elusive, with often 
indistinguishable stages, Kingdon (1984) strives to make sense of the agenda setting phase. 
He eschews rational choice for its impracticality, dismisses incrementalism for its inability 
to explain sudden change in the policy process (1984: 82-85), and suggests instead that 
the process can be better understood through the three streams of problems, policy and 
politics. These three streams are explained such that various problems will present 
themselves and be known to government - they may have a pattern and be incremental; 
they can arise following an event or sudden jump in statistical indicators; or it can be 
where previous policies and initiatives have been deemed to have failed. Policy ideas are 
continually being explored, hotly debated and regurgitated within policy communities who 
try to determine what solutions may work best and how. Such ideas form and circulate 
within what Kingdon refers to as the ‘primeval soup’. The political stream reflects the 
shifting dynamics of civic life and the influences upon that, including the role of legislators 
and administrators, complete with their own predilections; the national mood reflected in 
  of  32 311
elections, polls and the media; as well as the interests of organised forces. The three 
streams are said to operate independently of one another in response to their own 
internal forces, however they must converge, in a process Kingdon refers to as ‘coupling’, 
for policy to occur. 
MSA then describes ‘policy windows’ where opportunities for change present themselves, 
often with some warning (such as the expected renewal or updating of legislation) but are 
only open for a short period of time and thus require a high degree of preparedness in 
order to take advantage of the opportunity. Under the right conditions this is when the 
coupling of the streams occurs. ‘Focussing events’, however, are unpredictable but, as often 
they take the shape of a crisis or disaster with high public interest, have the effect of 
propelling the issue on to, or higher up, the priority list. Though Kingdon found that only 
on rare occasions could they do this alone, usually it is preceded by a similar event or is an 
indication of a wider problem with the aggregation of the issue lending weight to that 
focussing event. This has interesting implications for the control of dogs and the events 
leading up the Dangerous Dogs Act of 1991 (discussed fully within Chapters Four and 
Five) where a very small, but serious, number of dog attacks occurred in quick succession. 
There is no evidence to suggest these attacks could be viewed as unique or fundamentally 
different to earlier and historical dog attacks however they occupied a far higher public 
profile and they generated unprecedented fear, which could be viewed as features of a 
focussing event in the context of a new culture of control. 
The linking of the three steams is unpredictable even if argued to be engineered by policy 
entrepreneurs whose role it is to educate policy communities to attune them to new 
ideas, and build acceptance for them. Far from being considered coherent and rational, 
Kingdon argues that policy emerges from the aforementioned ‘primeval soup’ - a biological 
and evolutionary analogy of how only certain elements of life emerged successfully from 
the swamp. Béland and Howlett (2016) examine, through the notion of ‘instrument 
constituencies’, the claim that solutions can pursue problems to determine how these two 
elements are eventually matched, concluding it should be considered a routine factor. 
Kingdon (1984: 215) acknowledges that ‘advocacy of solutions often precedes the 
highlighting of problems to which they are attached’ and therefore the process is 
vulnerable to policy entrepreneurs who have their own agenda and may seek to 
manipulate outcomes. Kingdon, though, favours the view of one of his research 
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participants who likened policy entrepreneurs more to the political equivalent of skilled 
surfers perpetually paddling ‘waiting for the big wave’ and this plus ‘using the forces beyond 
their control contributes to success’ (1984: 173 and 190).
Gains and Stoker (2011) develop further this idea of the policy entrepreneur, focusing 
specifically on the ‘processing’ role of the Special Advisor, who Hall notes 'are neither 
direct recruits to the civil service nor political appointees in a party political sense but 
experts in specific policy areas’ (2013: 196). Gains and Stoker (2011: 495) argue Special 
Advisors act as mediators which highlights ‘the messy interplay of problematisation, policy 
and politics streams in the primeval soup of policy making….the role of special advisers 
should be understood as playing a ‘brokering’ role, acting as ‘middlemen’ between the 
social science, bureaucrat and political decision-making worlds’. Special Advisors though 
may represent just one position within government and political forces who have an 
expert and/or brokering role in the policy process that is far from fully understood. Within 
my own research for this thesis, the language of participants reflected this idea, as the 
function of Special Advisor was often not differentiated from any reference to 
government and was used interchangeably with Ministers, with whom they are invariably 
very close, or civil servants. Haas (2004) regards epistemic communities as far more 
significant in the understanding of what constitutes power and influence in the policy 
process, however they may all be considered ‘important actors involved in designating and 
defining policy problems and moving them forward through political processes’ (Béland & 
Howlett 2016: 394). 
Of course, MSA can be subject to criticisms in terms of its coherence as a general theory 
of policy making, or in relation to its relevance to the policy process in jurisdictions other 
than the USA. Kingdon developed the original MSA framework in relation to specific case 
studies of the USA’s federal policy making within health and transport during the 1980s, 
which raises the question of its applicability to studies of more recent policy making in the 
contrasting legal and political contexts of other nations. Nevertheless, the approach has 
been utilised extensively elsewhere in the three decades since (see, for example, Béland & 
Howett 2016) suggesting that the particular concepts underpinning MSA are transferable 
into other national and temporal contexts as a way of making sense of the inherently 
messy and unpredictable world of public policy formation. The USA’s political institutions 
are unique to that country and as such the political stream cannot ‘include the same 
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dimensions in all contexts’ but these are factors that, it has been argued, are best 
addressed less through ‘empirical studies and more systematic theory development’ (Jones 
et al. 2016). Cairney’s (2014: n/p) analysis of the contribution of MSA to policy studies, 
sampling those studies that have used MSA for inspiration and empirical purposes, 
concludes ‘that there is no immediate prospect of turning MSA into a detailed model with 
hypotheses that are tested in multiple cases’ although he doesn’t address whether that 
was ever Kingdon’s intention. Even judged as a ‘framework’ rather than a true explanatory 
theory, MSA is also often accused of being too metaphorically driven, which in itself has 
escaped detailed inquiry resulting in a lack of clarity as to their universal applicability 
(Béland & Howett 2016). The employment of metaphors may also have encouraged 
scholars to merely borrow from the framework. Thus, it is suggested that some studies 
have only superficially employed the language and concepts of MSA without delving into 
the inherent features of the streams themselves (Jones et al. 2016; Cairney & Jones 2016). 
However as Cairney (2014) concludes, MSA remains an effective framework for the case 
study process - which is indeed how this study utilises it - and that for this purpose it 
continues to ‘represent a thriving field of study’ (2014: n/p).
Imperfect by its own architect’s admission, MSA wasn’t designed in order to capture the 
subsequent stages of formation, implementation and evaluation, and this can be viewed as 
a key failing in the interests of the fullest exploration of policy making. However scholars 
have responded with the approach that rather than view policy making theories as 
mutually exclusive, they can be combined to potentially produce a four or five stream 
model and be applied to the different stages (Howlett et al. 2014). Winkel and Leipold 
(2016) argue that such recombination is in line with Kingdon’s own propositions about 
how ideas emerge from the swamp, and it also addresses MSA’s theoretical 
underdevelopment (Ackrill & Kay 2011).
Notwithstanding these criticisms, MSA remains relevant, and as such was chosen as a 
framework for the analysis of the findings in Chapters Seven to Nine for several reasons, 
not least of all because it is purposely designed as a system for focusing on the agenda 
setting phase to explain how policy emerges: the central aim of this thesis. MSA also 
provides an extremely practical framework for organising and analysing a multitude of 
data, making sense of what is otherwise a complex quagmire of information from a 
somewhat unpredictable and chaotic policy arena. In addition, key themes, arising from my 
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early elite interviews, surrounding the articulation of the ‘problem definition’; the nature of 
the solutions being proposed and often cannibalised; a political fascination with the subject 
matter (in contrast to many other animal related subjects); and the influence of major 
events such as fatal dog attacks, suggested a clear disposition towards MSA. It is important 
to reiterate however that this thesis does not seek to test Kingdon’s approach or use it as 
an explanatory theory, but instead merely utilise it as an organising framework in such a 
way as to permit an understanding of what the empirical data may be offering.
Animals and the policy process
With the context for the study of public policy outlined above in brief it is worth 
exploring what use has been made of this field for the study of policy in relation to the 
control or protection of animals. Nurse (2013: 222) states that ‘public policy on animal 
harm is predominantly concerned either with animal protection or welfarism rather than 
animal harm as an aspect of criminal justice’ but whilst he considers the role of NGOs, 
and the priority and implementation of public policies, nowhere in the chapter does he 
examine how or why those policies come to exist. Indeed one of the leading research 
network organisations concerned with animal protection, the Animals & Society Institute 
(2018), concerns itself with the scientific evidence base for policies, not the process for 
their creation. As an emerging field of study, this is perhaps to be expected. In contrast for 
some, however, ‘…public policy is a key arena in which to explore the (re-)definition of 
human–animal relations. Yet, hitherto insufficient attention has been paid to the formative 
phase of public policy-making….to the evolving relationship between human and non-
human species’ (Chaney 2014: 907). 
Whilst this remains a very limited field of research it is clear that a small number of 
scholars have been committed to exploring how public policy has come to be in relation 
to animals. Indeed a dedicated charitable think tank - the Centre for Animals and Social 
Justice (CASJ) - was launched in 2011 with the mission statement ‘Policy research to 
advance animal protection’. Their inaugural seminar was entitled ‘Animals and Public Policy’ 
with a primary ‘strategic aim to embed animal protection as a core goal of public 
policy’ (2011: 2) although there are only tantalising details within the summary document 
as to the CASJ’s views on the policy making process itself and how this can be best 
utilised to achieve their objective. It is likely they view themselves as part of the epistemic 
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community given they present the CASJ as ‘a vital new bridge between academics and 
policy-makers’ (Ibid.: 3). 
The individual founding members of the CASJ have, however, explored policy making in 
more detail. In his 1998 extensive study of the nature of animal welfare policy making in 
the UK and USA, Garner (1998: 8) employed Policy Network Analysis which he reasoned 
was the optimum method ‘given the fact that it is a policy area which is particularly subject 
to sectorization’ and because it also offered an opportunity to ‘comment on the utility of 
the network approach itself ’ (Ibid.: 10). He concludes by finding that 'political 
systems….have played a significant role in determining the nature of policy 
outcomes’ (Ibid.: 229) and that Policy Network Analysis was the correct model for 
revealing this. However it is also clear that there are suggestions within the text that the 
roles of focussing events and policy entrepreneurs - which he acknowledges are key 
drivers of change - have not been quite accounted for. His later work in this same field 
examines the role in the policy process of political parties, public campaigning and, in 
some detail, the various NGOs, he states: 
[P]ublic policy, of course, is not made in a vacuum and is never simply a product of 
moral principles, however valid one may think them to be. More important is the 
crucial contribution made by pressure groups. Indeed without the concerted 
efforts of those who have perceived a need for greater legislative protection for, 
and a change in society’s attitudes towards, animals there would not be a set of 
political issues here requiring resolution (2004: 194). 
This does not assist in explanations however as to the dog control measures at the centre 
of this thesis, where it will be later argued that change has not resulted from the efforts of 
the NGOs involved. Garner (2004: 230) does also acknowledge that in addition to other 
factors ‘there is a limit, in the present social climate, to what governments will regard as 
acceptable demands from the animal protection movement' and that the ‘outsider’ role 
many animals rights abolitionists adopt does not usually result in any impact upon 
government policy (Garner 2008). 
Lyons (2013) also employed Policy Network Analysis, specifically the Marsh and Rhodes 
(1992) model, for his award winning investigation of experimentation upon animals. In 
justifying this approach he acknowledges that it was initially developed from a static model 
of the political environment but that it now attempts to ‘account for the interactions 
among exogenous factors, network structures and agents, thereby postulating a dynamic 
dialectical policy network approach’ (Lyons 2013: 52). For the implications upon animal 
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related public policy, Lyons found that it is made and administered within insulated policy 
communities, hidden behind walls of statutory confidentiality, where its dominant actors 
are also those with a vested interest in the continued exploitation of animals; a condition 
that has existed since the creation of the policy community nearly a hundred and fifty 
years ago. He concludes that it remains a ‘policy community that excludes effective 
participation by animal welfare interests’ (Lyons 2011: 366).
In their in-depth comparative study of the development of animal policies and law in 
North America, Hunter and Brisbin, (2016: 27) determined a number of social scientific 
methods appropriate but due to issues of scale and complexity are unable to ‘offer a 
formal policymaking model that rests on universal assumptions and laws of political 
behaviour. Instead we can only offer a framework for the analysis of pet politics’ for which 
they repeatedly draw upon MSA. It is clear aspects of this analytical method offered these 
researchers a more applicable framework with which to examine their findings, which has 
parallels to my own reasons for selecting this method over another. Hunter and Brisbin, 
(2016: 142) focus specifically upon the role of policy entrepreneurs and whose 
responsibility it is to identify policy windows. Examples of coupling streams are explored, 
from puppy mills  and kennel regulation, to the abandoned and feral cat problem. 10
Seemingly reconfirming MSA’s appropriateness as a organising framework, Hunter and 
Brisbin, (2016: 399) conclude that advocates for animals must ‘join together and cooperate 
as policy entrepreneurs eager to educate, mobilize, and organize quiescent pet lovers into 
a coalition with an avowed and shared political agenda’ in order to develop proposed 
solutions and to harness focussing events, all as crucial constituent parts of any process to 
initiate policy changes that will benefit animals. 
In the UK, Chaney focuses on the hitherto unexplored formative stages of policy making 
within the party political sphere as a means for revealing what position animal welfare 
occupies and as ‘a corrective to traditional instrumental policy studies that focus solely on 
policy implementation and outcomes’ (2014: 926). By studying the specific framing of 
animal related matters Chaney’s intention is to illuminate how they lead to political 
agenda setting. Summarising growing public interest in the subject matter, Chaney’s mixed-
method research utilises two data sets of election manifestos and Early Day Motions 
(EDMs), over a period of thirty or so years to determine what, if any, topics concerning 
 referred to more commonly in the UK as ‘puppy farms’.10
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animal welfare have become mainstream areas of policy and to which end of the political 
spectrum they can be said to align. Chaney finds that since the late 1970s the main 
political parties have espoused animal related policies during this formative stage, with 
increasing salience. The findings also suggest there are correlations with party politics and 
with claims of ownership, ostensibly confirming the centre-left domination. The 
development of animal related policies is also subject to events, activism and public and 
media attention, however they remain in a ‘fragile’ position, falling short of any mainstream 
status.
Chaney also notes that a significant proportion of attention to pet animals in EDMs in 
recent decades can be attributed to concerns surrounding dangerous dog control. EDMs 
were utilised because they offer ‘insight into whether animal welfare policy proposals are 
party political in nature or subject to cross-party support’ (2014: 909) and indeed, as 
explored in Chapter Five, this research also found a number of tabled Labour-led EDMs 
concerning dog control which could be argued to illustrate the political cleavage between 
left and and right at certain moments in time - specifically, when Labour is in opposition. 
Dog control and the policy process
The literature on the protection and control of animals, as has been seen, is sparse, but 
the numbers of scholars that have turned their attention to the policy process with 
specific regard to dog control can only be described as diminutive, which in part 
contributed to the decision for this thesis to explore that field. The majority of texts that 
have some regard for the subject matter do so as part of a wider investigation of policies 
in relation to all animals, or as an examination of regulation. The study by Hood et al. 
(2000) of a government’s method of assessing regulatory law, via the Better Regulation 
Task Force (BRTF), is examined with specific regard to the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 
following the BRTF’s verdict that the DDA was an example of a ‘knee-jerk response’, a 
condition in law-making that, they claim, should be avoided. The study, drawing again upon 
MSA, counters that:
If all regulation introduced in such circumstances were to count as a “knee-jerk 
response", then many regulatory regimes would have to be condemned along with 
the DDA. The nature of the legislative process means that many regulatory 
changes need to be introduced during a limited time when a policy ‘window’ 
opens after a tragedy or in a period when public feelings are running high…. The 
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fact that a measure is introduced quickly - as it must be to enter a “policy window” 
- does not necessarily mean that it is “ill-thought-out”.
The study concludes that ‘it is ironic that the BRTF’s condemnation of the DDA seems to 
have been as much of a knee-jerk reaction to media attention as the DDA itself was 
alleged to have been’ (2000: n/p).
In his 2004 review of animal protection and public policy Garner uses, amongst others, the 
case study of the RSPCA’s campaign to secure dog licensing in the early 1990s, during the 
formative stages of the Dangerous Dogs Act. He found that despite a formidable policy 
network which included farming groups, the police, and the British Veterinary Association, 
the Government was unmoved. Garner determines that this was a classic example of the 
power of the executive branch: 
[W]inning the informed public debate, therefore (particularly when the issue, as in 
this case, is not high on the public’s agenda), is not enough if a group has failed to 
win the argument where it really matters - in Whitehall and the counsels of 
government. Indeed paradoxically, the very fact that the RSPCA had the temerity 
to mount such a successful public campaign against the government’s opposition 
was always likely to increase the determination of ministers and civil servants to 
defeat the amendment when it was tabled in parliament (2004: 206).
As will be discussed in Chapter Five, Lodge and Hood (2002) note the pressures the 
Government of 1991, and specifically the Home Office Minister, were under, by exploring 
the theory of Forced Choices with reference to MSA. During that period of time, as a 
General Election was fast approaching, prison riots, by-election losses and a new form of 
media frenzy in response to a few (but serious) dog attacks on humans could be argued 
to have propelled the Government towards anything that appeared to be a solution and 
would change their fortunes. However, it can also be argued that: 
Policy making is always a matter of choice under constraint. But not all constraints 
are material. Some are social and political, having to do with the willingness of 
people to do what your policy asks of them or with the willingness of electors to 
endorse the policies that would-be policy makers espouse (Goodin et al. 2008: 
21). 
As with Kingdon’s notion of the focusing event, Lodge and Hood find that ‘small events 
can have big consequences’ if occurring alongside a perfect set of conditions:
[O]ne dog bite at a strategic moment could trigger an institutional reaction that 
demanded heavy attention and activity by political leaders, cabinet committees, 
high officials, street bureaucrats and court systems. Given the right circumstances - 
in this case a combination of an attack in a public place, an innocent victim, a 
developing pattern of incidents that led to “institutional vulnerability” and an 
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absence of rival big news stories - one dog bite can present policy-makers with 
“forced choices” in the same way as large-scale events that rank high on any 
‘objective' scale of public risk (2002: 10).
Such a set of conditions is found to temporarily propel the issue from the unlit corners of 
policy making to centre stage so that it ‘becomes part of a macro-political agenda’ (Ibid.) 
until, that is, the ‘media-frenzy’ eventually subsides. They did not, however, in this study, 
discover any policy entrepreneurs manipulating or utilising the policy window.
Boucher however regards breed specific laws as examples of panic policy making referring 
to it as ‘legislation versus logic’ (2011: 61-76) and indeed this notion that breed-bans occur 
in relatively unusual political environments has been explored in some detail by Hunter 
and Brisbin, (2007):
Unlike adoption of some palliatives for risks, breed bans appear in circumstances 
marked by great emotionalism and limited inquiry into the sources and probability 
of a risk and limited consideration of alternative policies. Especially the alternatives 
suggested by animal rights and animal welfare advocates appear to be ignored. 
Therefore, to address how dog breed bans have come about, this paper proposes 
a framework to explain panic policy making. Unlike a theory, this framework is a 
guideline that organizes inquiry and uses partial theories about the influence of 
ideas and political mechanisms to evaluate generalizations about policy change 
(Hunter & Brisbin, 2007: 2). 
Panic policy making is defined as the swift passing of new legislation (or rules) in response 
to a rapid manifestation of uncontrolled fear and 'is more closely akin to an individualized 
rather than an organizational or institutional policy making process’ (Ibid.: 3). Using surveys 
of the public and interviews with both activists and public officials, Hunter and Brisbin,’s 
study also draws upon key features of Multiple Streams Analysis as a direct comparison 
with panic policy making to determine that:
it is too simplistic to capture the range of events that open a policy window. Fear 
and injury can induce policy action, but the framework ignores the ability of one 
or two powerful people to manufacture a danger and push legislation through at a 
municipal or even a provincial government with little real evidence to support the 
need for the policy. The lesson is that there are many policy “solutions” to the 
dangerous dog problem that result from an extensive array of causal events in 
diverse institutional and historical contexts (Ibid: 37).
Hunter and Brisbin, also claim that the media is not always responsible for inflaming fear 
towards specific dog breeds (and even where they try, they are not always successful at 
engendering it) but the press can also fail to hold some policy making in this arena to 
account. Power was deemed to reside with a small number of elites however apathy 
amongst members of the public was also a key factor, in that they can be passive in 
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response to new breed specific laws. The combination of the two factors was seen to 
produce the necessary conditions for panic policy making. In contrast they also found, in a 
certain region of Canada at least, that when the process attracts interested communities 
and experts, the debate shifts away from dog behaviours to the human behaviours of dog 
owners. In terms of studying the policy process itself they acknowledge the pitfalls of the 
framework employed but defend the overall contribution to this field of study particularly 
with regard to the wider debates surrounding the amount of policy making occurring 
which eschews scientific evidence.
2.5 Summary
This chapter has reviewed three main bodies of literature to provide context to the study 
of the dog control policy process in England and Wales. Situating animal abuse within 
criminology has significance for myself both in terms of my scholarly research and my 
professional role, as well as the legitimate interests of my employer, the RSPCA, whose 
only purpose is to prevent harm coming to non-human animals (not regulate dog 
ownership), within the dog control policy sphere. As animals are recognised legally as 
sentient beings and have their standards of care protected in a multitude of statutes, it is 
incumbent upon us to be cognisant of the effects punitive controls can have upon dog 
welfare and how criminology may contribute to our understanding of that. 
Positioning the dog control policy process within the context of the grand narrative of a 
culture of control provides interesting dimensions and parallels for exploration in later 
chapters. It is through this lens that it is possible to understand how the escalation of 
punitive dog control measures developed exponentially, with certain dogs, and potentially 
certain owners, demonised and characterised as the ‘dangerous other’, and ultimately how 
a nation of dog lovers suddenly found the extermination of a certain type of dog more 
than palatable.
So too the exploration of the methods of studying policy making in the latter part of the 
chapter has assisted with both an explanation of why MSA provides a more suitable 
framework for my empirical findings (in Part III), but has also been a useful exercise in 
understanding the strengths and deficiencies of alternative methods to gain an insight into 
why other researchers have employed them. They also contain useful tools to assist with 
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the later partial exploration of the policy community and in particular its epistemic status 
given the concerted, but thus far futile, efforts to prove the DDA does not work and 
should be repealed. As has been noted, much of the literature around animals and public 
policy is concerned with influencing the process and whether the implementation of 
those policies has been successful. There has been very little attention paid by scholars to 
the agenda setting phase in order to understand how and why policy has come about. 
This could be argued to present significant barriers for those seeking to understand the 
genesis of contemporary dog control policy, and for those seeking to bring about change. 
These are issues central to the aim and objectives of this thesis and as such will be 
repeatedly returned to and later directly addressed in Chapter Ten. 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PART II
The policy context 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Chapter Three 
The policy landscape 
3.1 Introduction
The following chapter is the first of three which constitute Part II - The policy context of 
the four overarching sections of this thesis. My original intention was to employ a 
methodological approach based solely upon interviews with the elite actors within the 
policy community of dog control. It became apparent that it would be fundamentally 
beneficial to this case study if a thorough documentary analysis was also completed in 
order to properly illuminate this previously relatively unexplored arena. The results of such 
an analysis forms a 'history of the present’ (Ash 1999) within the following two chapters 
of this study, providing the policy context for defining the nature of the problem and the 
evidence for it in Chapter Four, and the politicisation of dog control in Chapter Five. This 
chapter begins with a brief explanation of the methods employed in the document 
analysis, before providing a detailed examination of the most relevant legislation in relation 
to dog control and welfare in England and Wales. This is intended to provide clarity and 
assist with navigating the empirical analysis which forms the core of this study of what has 
essentially been, until now, an opaque policy landscape.
3.2 Methodological approach
From the outset of this study it became clear a conventional literature review would face 
challenges as so few researchers had examined the policy process in relation to dog 
control from a sociological perspective. Nevertheless an abundance of valuable textual 
resources and evidence is available in relation to the nature of the dog problem in society, 
and how that is defined and responded to, through the legislative, policy making process. 
As May (2001: 176) suggests ‘documents, read as the sedimentations of social practices, 
have the potential to inform and structure the decisions which people make on a daily 
and long-term basis; they also constitute particular readings of social events’. Thus a 
qualitative documentary analysis was undertaken in order to ‘elicit meaning, gain 
understanding, and develop empirical knowledge’ (Bowen 2009: 27). This primary research 
process of locating, selecting and appraising of texts produced a rubric whereby themes 
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could be collected and presented. A variety of document sources were utilised including: 
legislation and associated statutory and non-statutory guidance; journals and books; press 
releases; published Freedom of Information data; press cuttings; archived government 
material; biographical accounts; publicity materials; organisational and operational reports; 
institutional correspondence; and records of Parliamentary proceedings. The vast majority 
of these are open and freely available, and none are restricted access.
By utilising document analysis in combination with the qualitative interview method 
adopted in Part III of this study, it is hoped this thesis will benefit from a degree of 
triangulation as the corroboration and convergence of both data sets aims to mitigate the 
effects of researcher bias, which has the potential to be exacerbated by my profession as a 
member of the policy community (this is explored in more detail in Chapter Six). Bowen 
(2009) discusses the benefit verification brings, and outlines additional uses for this 
method which this study hopes to gain from, namely it can provide background 
information as well as insight in order to provide the context within which the research 
participants work; documents also provide supplementary data as invaluable augmentation 
of the knowledge base; and opportunities to monitor change over time are presented 
where documents develop via successive editions.
One of the strengths of this method is that the contents of the texts cannot be altered 
through the research process and thus remain free from my influence. However, there are 
some cautionary notes to acknowledge when employing such methods. For instance, 
there can be ‘bias selectivity’ arising from the determination of which documents are 
pertinent and also emanating from within the documents themselves for what they 
choose to report (Bowen 2009). As such care was taken to ensure a rigid impartiality and 
the analysis was focussed upon identifying any such pitfalls, whilst simultaneously tuned to 
recognise any meaning conveyed by those authors opting to account for only certain 
materials and facts. Clearly as researchers employing such methods we can be somewhat 
constrained by what is available in terms of documentation, and the quality therein. These 
factors can be at least partially mitigated against through triangulation and the 
employment of at least one other method - in this case study that is the qualitative 
interviews with key participants of the dog control policy community, discussed in Part III.
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For the selection and evaluation of text, Scott’s (1990: 6) rigorous criteria of authenticity, 
credibility, representativeness and meaning were utilised throughout the process. The 
function of performing a document analysis initially requires a superficial examination 
followed by a diligent and in-depth exploration of the text before developing an 
interpretation of the materials. For this study sections of text relevant to dog control were 
first identified before a thematic analysis was employed to develop and organise patterns 
of information into sections. Reading, coding and re-reading formed an iterative analytical 
process in order to be able to develop robust findings and supplement an element of pre-
defined codes that had emerged from the process of analysing the interview data.
The analysis of documentation explored within Chapters Four and Five is interpretative in 
nature as it must be recognised, particularly perhaps in a highly divisive and controversial 
subject area, that different actors attribute different meaning to the same text. Indeed 
documents may be viewed not as self-evident, but as just one component in how ‘truth’ is 
generated (Foucault 1991). Certainly the view that the danger posed by one dog over 
another can be determined purely based upon its breed, is a widely accepted social fact 
enshrined in law, but is also an entirely antithetical view to many within the policy 
community. As such I have also attempted to take a critical approach to the same 
documents with a view to determining how and when some of the documents analysed 
become accepted - or indeed have been rejected - as knowledge, which itself may be 
subject to social control (Jupp 2006). 
The sub-chapter that follows produces an analytical guide to the legislative and policy 
landscape drawn from the statutes themselves as well as some of the guidance produced 
for enforcers. The main actors within the policy community are also explored utilising my 
own knowledge gained from within my professional role working for the RSPCA. Chapter 
Four considers definitions and meaning as well as the emerging area of evidence around 
dog bites and their relationship to breed or type of dog as an essential feature of the 
evidence base for what is the pinnacle of dog control - the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 
(DDA). Media representations of dog attacks, Pit Bull Terriers (PBT), and dogs in general 
provides rich material and is also another central aspect to society’s response to 
regulation. 
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Bearing witness to past events, as May (2001: 175) notes, document analysis can act as a 
‘means of enhancing understanding in case studies through the ability to situate 
contemporary accounts within an historical context’ and thus the origins of dog control 
and its early development in England and Wales are explored, with the aim of also 
enabling a broader examination of the data and analysis in Part III of this thesis. 
Additionally, such analysis has enabled the exploration of the political aspects of policy 
development through time, in order to shed some light on the political processes of the 
construction of both the key dimensions of the ‘dog problem’ and the framework of 
control that has emerged in relation to this. Both of these two aspects of historical 
context and politicisation form the basis of Chapter Five.
3.3 Legislative and policy landscape
The section of the chapter that follows provides a brief overview of the key pieces of 
legislation concerning dogs in England and Wales. It is further subdivided into specific 
legislation relating to: animal welfare and dog control although many aspects of the law 
speak to both purposes. It should be noted there is also case law for many of these pieces 
of legislation and so this account should not be seen as an exhaustive review of the legal 
context. It does, however, cover the areas of most relevance to this thesis.
Animal welfare legislation
Although the focus of this thesis is dog control there are elements of animal welfare 
legislation that are relevant to aspects of this study, such as the problem definition and the 
solutions proposed, to be discussed in later chapters. Provision for animal welfare in law is 
often recommended as the foundation for encouraging responsible dog ownership 
(RSPCA 2016a) which includes both better welfare and control of the animal. As such the 
two issues are inextricably linked.
a) Animal Welfare Act 2006
Until 2006 the most relevant legislation central to establishing the acceptable treatment of 
animals in society was the Protection of Animals Act 1911 with archaic provisions detailing 
such out of date practices as dog-drawn carriages. A much needed modernised and 
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reformed law in the form of a framework statute  came with the Animal Welfare Act 11
2006. It makes provision not only for unnecessary suffering but also, for the first time, 
places a duty on people responsible for protected animals to take such steps, as are 
reasonable, in all the circumstances, to ensure that the needs of the animal are met to the 
extent required by good practice . The needs are set out as: a suitable environment; a 12
suitable diet; an ability to exhibit normal behaviour patterns; an ability to be housed with, 
or apart from, other animals; and to be protected from pain, injury, suffering and disease. 
In order for owners to understand their obligations in meeting these welfare needs, the 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra 2018a) (for England) and the 
Welsh Government in Wales (2018) have each produced a statutory Code of Practice for 
the Welfare of Dogs , which in fact differ extensively in content, but do not contradict, 13
each other. Although being found in contravention of the Code is not an offence, the 
evidence can be used against the owner in court as a means of proving a welfare offence. 
Alternatively police or local authorities can issue a statutory improvement notice which 
informs an individual (or organisation) where they are failing, often in consultation with the 
Code. Failure to meet the requirements of the notice may lead to prosecution. The 
RSPCA issues similar, but non-statutory, notices and although non-binding on members of 
the public, reportedly have a 99% effectiveness in terms of compliance (Efra 2016: 72) 
which allows the RSPCA to act in a more preventative way.
This is first and foremost an Act about protecting animals but there are also elements of 
control - primarily through setting out the responsibilities of the keeper, but also by 
stipulating the offence of animal fighting in s8 of the legislation. The root of this section is 
an intention to provide standards for animal welfare but the offences also cover, for 
instance, being in receipt of related monies, publicising a fight, being in possession of any 
animal fighting related paraphernalia, or sharing a video of a fight. The nature of dog 
fighting in the UK (Lawson 2017) may not be quite how it has been consistently framed 
and connected to the dangerous dog issue by policy makers, indeed it has been cited as 
 The Act is considered framework in nature because it provides clear pathways for secondary legislation to 11
be made such as regulations to prohibit or license, or make statutory codes of practice.
 This continues to apply to enforcers when dogs are seized for offences under other legislation e.g. DDA.12
 These are both redrafted versions of the Codes which were originally issued in 2008 Wales and 2009 13
England.
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the reason for some of the specific legislative measures relating to ‘risky’ dogs. This is 
considered in detail by participants of this study, which is discussed in Part III.
b) Animal Welfare (Electronic Collars) (Wales) Regulations 2010
Wales led the way within the UK in introducing legislation to prohibit the use of electronic 
collars on dogs (and cats). This was an important step forward in that it was the first 
legislative indication that negative training methods, based upon punishment, are no longer 
advocated or supported by evidence, and in extreme examples of these training regimes, 
such as this, where an electronic shock is administered to the animal wearing the device at 
the will of the owner, they are now specifically banned. It is now clear, in law, that it is not 
acceptable for an owner to control their dog via these means of punishment and negative 
reinforcement. England and Scotland announced plans to legislate in this area in 2018, 
although England, at least, is not expected to extend the prohibition to cover fences that 
transmit a signal to collars that emit a shock to an animal approaching an invisible 
boundary.
c) Breeding puppies
The breeding, sale and supply of puppies and dogs to the pet trade is regarded by many 
as a fundamental contributing problem when trying to ensure animal welfare and 
encourage responsible dog ownership - and it has not always been helped by a plethora 
of legislative measures to navigate. There are factors such as the appropriate socialisation 
period, which will determine the dogs behaviour including aggression as a response to 
certain stimuli. There are the welfare factors involved with breeding and whether the 
acquisition of puppies is sufficiently regulated as to provide appropriate welfare conditions. 
The growing divergence in laws pertaining to animal welfare in England and in Wales has 
also been stark in this specific policy area in recent years.
The Breeding of Dogs Act 1973 and the Breeding of Dogs Act 1991 had their provisions 
amended and extended by the Breeding and Sale of Dogs (Welfare) Act 1999, the 
culmination of which sets out what constitutes a breeding establishment and when a 
licence is required. For a local authority to issue a licence to a breeding establishment it 
must be satisfied that the animals have suitable accommodation, food, water and bedding; 
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are exercised sufficiently; and there are suitable disease prevention measures. This 
legislation was not sufficiently prescriptive as to provide for higher enough standards for 
animal welfare, particularly after the introduction of the Animal Welfare Act (2006) with 
which it was incompatible. As a result the Welsh Government brought forward the Animal 
Welfare (Breeding of Dogs) (Wales) Regulations (2014) which largely replaced its 
predecessors - and as of October 2018 England have also revised their regulations - with 
an emphasis on responsibility and welfare, whilst also providing clearer offences and 
punishment.
Developments in scientific knowledge around socialisation has propelled this issue into the 
forefront in terms of the debate around dog bites and attacks. The development of a 
puppy is thought to be most acutely influenced by the first three to 16 weeks and as such, 
where the puppy is bred; how soon it moves to its new home; and the environment it 
ends up in are of utmost importance, as are the skills of those caring for that puppy 
throughout that period. These are not the only factors of course as to whether a puppy 
will grow up to be an aggressive dog, but they play a much larger role than had once been 
thought. Given the lack of any minimum mandatory education for dog owners, or licence 
to own a dog, and the fact the evidence regarding the importance of the socialisation 
period is relatively new and still emerging, legislation would currently appear to be the 
only bridge between expert knowledge and the practice of keeping a dog.
Dog Control Legislation
There have been various pieces of legislation concerning dog control enacted over the 
years and it is considered one of the more complex and confusing areas of law, much in 
need of consolidation and simplification (Efra 2018d: 28). As will be seen in later chapters, 
aspects of control legislation is also a more controversial area of law, for example it 
includes breed specific legislation (BSL) which prohibits certain types or breeds of dog. 
There now follows a brief description of the most relevant statutes in force today, in 
chronological order.
a) Dogs Act 1871
Despite the age of this legislation it retains an important role in a considerable number of 
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dog control cases. The measures contained within this Act allow for a complaint to be 
made by any individual (including the police, local authorities, a member of the public) to a 
Magistrates Court about a ‘dangerous dog’. The Court may make any Order they feel is 
appropriate to require the owner to ensure that the dog is kept under proper control, or 
ultimately, if necessary, destroyed. The Court may also specify measures to be taken for 
keeping the dog under control, and this is most commonly muzzling or being made to 
remain on a lead when in a public space.
This Act’s scope extends to both public and private places, although the complainant must 
show that the dog was not only a danger to others but was also not under the proper 
control of the keeper. A key aspect is that these conditions are not confined to the dog 
posing a danger to a member of the public - which is the case for its legislative cousin, the 
Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 (see below) - and as such can be used very effectively where a 
dog attacks another animal. Another fundamental feature is that any complaint to a court 
is classed as civil action, so the state need not always be involved. There are various 
significant effects from this, namely court action may be limited to those with the means 
to take a dog owner to court, and the outcome may also be influenced by the defendant’s 
ability to support themselves through the process. This may also be a factor where the 
police utilise the Act (which is not uncommon). Being a civil process, there are no powers 
for enforcement bodies to seize or retain a dog pending the outcome of the complaint, 
which may influence the enforcer’s choice to use the more severe measures made 
available under the DDA. 
In terms of the offence of being ’dangerous’, this was given its ordinary everyday meaning 
and then further defined by an amendment via The Dogs Act 1906 whereby a dog is 
classed ‘dangerous’ where it injures cattle or poultry or chases sheep. For those making a 
complaint to court, they will only need to prove their case on the balance of probabilities, 
as is the case with civil proceedings, and is a threshold considerably lower than for the 
criminal offences of the DDA. Procedures under the 1871 Act can also be a quick and 
low cost method depending on the local circumstances for securing controls on an 
individual problematic animal owner (the costs for the time in Court and preparation of 
an Order are at present around £200). However the time taken to obtain evidence and 
prepare a case will generally cost enforcement authorities who utilise the measures in this 
Act, considerably more, and pressures on the Court system may delay any hearing.
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b) Dogs (Protection of Livestock) Act 1953
This legislation creates an offence for an owner or keeper (person in charge) of a dog to 
allow it to worry livestock on any agricultural land. The definition of ‘worrying’ includes 
attacking livestock as well as chasing them in such a way so as to cause injury or suffering, 
as well as simply being ‘at large’ in a field where there are sheep. Certain groups of dogs 
are exempt from this including police dogs, guide dogs, trained sheep dogs, gun dogs and 
hunt packs of hounds. The legislation provides for a limited power of seizure and very 
limited fines if convicted of an offence.
c) Pet Animals Act 1951 and The Animal Welfare (Licensing of Activities Involving Animals) 
(England) Regulations 2018
The Pet Animals Act (1951) made provisions for a licensing regime for the types of 
animals that are permitted to be traded and where this may take place. It is for local 
authority licensing officers to enforce this piece of legislation. The Act has recently been 
repealed and replaced, in England only, by new broader regulations to cover a range of 
animal activities including vending. It is worth nothing however that pet shops are no 
longer the primary source in the pet trade that they once were. For example, shops now 
account for less than five percent of puppies sold, with half of all people now obtaining 
their puppies from commercial breeders. Backstreet breeders, the internet and 
neighbours account for almost a third whereas rescue organisations may only be a fifth 
(APGAW 2009) . In one survey it was estimated that a mere two percent of pet shops 14
had a licence to sell puppies (Pet Industry Federation 2008). S1 dogs and the sought-after 
bull breeds with a similar appearance to those prohibited dogs make up part of the 
backstreet and internet seller category as most of these dogs will not be sold through 
licensed legitimate trade. Traditional methods of pet sales have declined, having been 
replaced primarily by the internet, akin to other consumer patterns, and perhaps as a 
reflection of the challenges of regulating such an arena both UK and Welsh governments 
have recently announced plans to ban sales of dogs by third parties. It remains to be seen 
how this will be implemented and what effect it may have in those dogs deemed to be 
dangerous.
 This data collection was conducted in England only.14
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d) Animals Act 1971
In addition to the provisions of the Dogs Act 1953, dogs that are found to be worrying 
livestock on agricultural land may, under specified circumstances, be shot by the livestock 
owner, during the course of the attack or immediately following, under the provisions of 
the Animals Act (1971).
The status and dangerous dog problem could be characterised as an inner city issue 
however farms are often located on the fringe of urban areas and there is growing 
evidence that another guise of irresponsible dog ownership is witnessed where 
irresponsible dog owners walk their dogs through farm land or permit their dogs to stray 
into neighbouring agricultural land during the day (APGAW 2017: 8), certainly it would 
appear a growing contingent of dog owners within an expanding population is interacting 
with livestock in a way unlike previous generations.
e) Dangerous Dogs Act 1989
This statute creates an offence of failing to comply with a Court Order under the Dogs 
Act 1871; gave courts extra powers, and increased the range and levels of penalties that 
could be imposed on dog owners. It also included powers for the destruction of dogs 
other than strays and provided courts with the power to issue orders banning dog 
owners from having custody of a dog for a specified period.
f) Environmental Protection Act 1990 (as amended by the Clean Neighbourhoods and 
Environment Act 2005)
The issue of stray dogs is a key area for local authorities in terms of encouraging 
responsible dog ownership, although the legislative focus has traditionally been on the 
environmental impact of dog straying rather than public safety or animal welfare. Local 
authorities have a statutory duty to appoint an officer for dealing with stray dogs and a 
register must be maintained setting out the number of stray dogs seized by the local 
authority. A stray dog must be kept for seven days and then if it is unclaimed, the 
legislation allows for it to be sold, rehomed, or euthanased. In 2007, dealing with stray 
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dogs moved from a shared role between the police and local authorities to being the sole 
responsibility of the latter.
g) Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 (as amended)
This legislation has two main features of note, the implications of which will be returned 
to in later chapters, but both refer to what is considered to be ‘dangerous’. The first (s1) is 
the list of types  of dog deemed to be inherently dangerous and banned from ownership. 15
The second (s3) concerns the offence of allowing any dog - irrespective of breed - to be 
dangerously out of control. Following a high profile attack the DDA was rushed through 
Parliament (see Table 1) with the intent of providing for public safety and as such does not 
focus on animal welfare, nor does it consider the effects of its measures on animal welfare.
The possession, ownership, breeding, sale, exchange or transfer, advertising or gifting of 
certain types of dogs is prohibited by s1 of the Act. These dogs were identified by 
legislators in 1991 as being those traditionally bred for fighting, namely, the Pit Bull Terrier, 
the Japanese Tosa, the Dogo Argentino and the Fila Brasiliero. A dog is identified as being 
of such a type based entirely on its physical conformation and whether it is deemed to 
have a ‘substantial number of characteristics’ so that it can be considered to be ‘more’ a 
prohibited type than any other type of dog .16
Under s3 any dog  can be regarded as ‘dangerously out of control’ in any situation where 17
there are grounds for ‘reasonable apprehension’ that it will injure any person regardless of 
whether or not it actually does so. So while the focus is on people rather than animals, 
where a dog attacks an animal and any person present at the time of incident has 
reasonable apprehension that it would injure them whether or not it did so, it may be 
possible to consider a prosecution under s3. Although local authorities are able to appoint 
officers to enforce this piece of legislation, most incidents under the 1991 Act are 
investigated by the police specialist Dog Legislation Officers (DLOs). 
 They are specifically and legally referred to as ‘types’ because they are not breeds (as recognised by the 15
Kennel Club) and because the breed and genetics of any dog is irrelevant within this legislation. It only 
matters whether a dog looks like the types banned under s1.
 This principle was established in R v Crown Court at Knightsbridge ex parte Dunne; Brock v DPP [1993] 4 All 16
ER 491.
 Whilst this includes the types listed under s1 these were not the target of s3 given legislators fully 17
expected them to be eliminated in the UK.
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Table 1: Timeline of key events relating to contemporary dangerous dog legislation 
The s1 offences within the DDA are also unusual insomuch as the burden of proof is 
reversed. Rather than it being the prosecutions’ role to prove the guilt of the defendant, it 
is for the owner to prove that the dog is not a prohibited s1 type. This was challenged, 
14.4.1989 Significant media attention on dog-bite risks following a Rottweiler attack 
which killed Kellie Lynch. Government conducts urgent review of 
legislation
15.6.1989 Calls for breed specific bans as as means of assessing dangerousness 
rejected by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, during House of Commons debate
27.7.1989 A new Dangerous Dogs Act introduced which amended the 1871 Dogs 
Act, providing courts with extra powers and increasing penalties of 
offending dog owners, essentially providing a criminal emphasis rather 
than solely civil
10.11.1989 The Government issues a consultation ‘Action on Dogs: the 
Government's proposals for legislation’
27.6.1990 The Government issues a consultation paper ‘The control of dogs: a 
consultation paper’ which discussed general changes in the law on all dogs 
and proposals for special controls on particular breeds or types
18.5.1991 Dog attack on Rukhsana Khan, reported to be by a Pit Bull Terrier. She 
survives but with life-changing injuries
21.5.1991 Prime Minister John Major MP told the House of Commons that action 
to tackle dogs was now imminent. Supported by Labour, the Government 
immediately banned the import of several breeds deemed to be ‘fighting 
dogs'
22.5.1991 Homes Secretary Kenneth Baker MP announces plans in a House of 
Commons statement to legislate to control dangerous dogs
23.5.1991 Mr Baker MP writes to parliamentary colleagues to provide further 
details on the intended measures
Parliamentary Proceedings of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991
04.06.1991 House of Commons 1st reading (a formality, no debate)
10.06.1991 House of Commons all stages of the Bill completed in one day
12.06.1991 House of Lords 1st reading 
25.06.1991 House of Lords 2nd reading
10.07.1991 House of Lords Committee
23.07.1991 House of Lords 3rd reading
25.07.1991 Royal Assent
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and lost, at the European Commission of Human Rights, who ruled that it was justified 
given the intent to provide for human safety from the risk s1 dogs pose (McCarthy 2016: 
567). They did not challenge the evidence for the basis in law that s1 dogs pose a greater 
risk than other breeds of dog.
The Act was amended in 1997 and 2014 and on both occasions with some important 
changes. Until the 1997 amendments to this legislation were passed, the only option open 
to the Courts was to euthanase any dog found to be a prohibited type. However, 
following these amendments, the Courts are now permitted to allow for the exemption 
of such a dog which, in their opinion, does not pose a danger to public safety through the 
use of a Contingent Destruction Order (CDO) i.e. the dog will be destroyed unless the 
owner of the animal complies with the following conditions: the dog must be neutered 
and permanently identified with a tattoo  and microchip; the owner must take out (and 18
renew annually) third party insurance for their dog; the dog is muzzled and kept on a lead 
when in a public place; the dog cannot be taken out in public by anyone under 16 years of 
age; the dog must be kept securely at home, i.e. ensure gardens are secure; and the dog 
must be registered on the Index of Exempted Dogs (administered by Defra) and a 
certificate issued to the owner. 
h) Identification - The Control of Dogs Order 1992, The Microchipping of Dogs (England) 
Regulations (2014), and The Microchipping of Dogs (Wales) Regulations (2015)
In order to be able to trace animals back to their owners, whether they stray, are involved 
in an incident or are cruelly treated, identification is important. Legislation has been in 
existence for a number of years, although it is not well known by the public and 
compliance is therefore very inconsistent. The Control of Dogs Order 1992 makes it a 
requirement for all owners or people in charge of dogs to ensure their animals wear a 
collar and tag, featuring the name and address of the owner, when in public or on public 
highways . In April 2016 new legislation in both England and in Wales brought mandatory 19
microchipping for all dogs.
It is worth noting that dog licensing, which was abolished in Great Britain in 1987 still 
 This requirement was removed under the Dangerous Dogs Exemptions Scheme (England and Wales) 18
Order 2015, see further below.
 There are exemptions for example hunt hounds, those used in sport, guide dogs, and farm dogs.19
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exists in Northern Ireland where it is an offence to own an unlicensed dog unless the dog 
falls into a series of exemptions, such as police dog, assistance dog, etc. All domestic dogs 
must be individually licensed with a fee of £12.50 paid annually, although there are some 
concessions. The history of the dog licence and the campaign by some organisations for 
the re-introduction of licensing in England and Wales, as part of a package of measures 
designed to aid the repeal of s1 of the DDA, is explored further in subsequent chapters.
i) The Policing and Crime Act 2009
This Act has provision for Gang Injunctions to prevent gang-related violence and gang-
related drug dealing. The associated statutory guidance issued by the Government (HM 
Government 2016: 24) identifies situations where dogs are used to ‘incite fear, intimidate 
others or to commit acts of violence’. A Gang Injunction in such circumstances is 
recommended as a means of prohibiting the individual from being in charge of dog (or 
any animal) or from being in a specific location with an animal. This relates to all dogs and 
is not related to the definition of dangerous in legislation.
j) Anti-social Behaviour Crime and Policing Act 2014 Act
In 2014, a series of amendments to dog control legislation within the Anti-social Behaviour 
Crime and Policing Act led to the following changes: the scope of the 1991 Act was 
extended to cover private places (with a limited exception) in addition to public places  20
and powers were provided for a constable or an appointed local authority officer to seize 
a dangerously out of control dog in a private place; prison sentences were increased for 
those convicted of some offences; a new offence was created for a dog attacking an 
assistance dog (these will be treated under s3) ; and specific considerations were 21
provided concerning the suitability of an owner and the behaviour of a dog a Court must 
consider if it is not to order the destruction of the animal.
The new s3 offence where a dog causes injury to a person or an assistance dog means 
that it is now both a recordable and notifiable offence whereby any alleged offender will 
 In short it covers all places in England and Wales except where a dog attacks a trespasser or burglar. 20
However even in such circumstances the dog must either be in, or partly in, a dwelling and the person being 
attacked must be in, or entering, a dwelling and either be, or suspected to be, trespassing.
 Note this does not apply to attacks on any other animals.21
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be fingerprinted, photographed, have their DNA taken and have all of this added to the 
Police National Computer, irrespective of any judicial outcome. However if a dog  is 
dangerously out of control in exactly the same way as the conditions in the s3 offence, but 
only injures or kills another animal (not a person or an assistance dog), the offence is 
neither recordable nor notifiable. Apart from any perception of disparity regarding victims 
and the degree of seriousness of the behaviour and attack, there is no available method of 
tracking those offenders which is ignoring any potential escalation factors and the 
opportunity to prevent a more ‘serious’ attack, by working with the dog and the owner.
Another significant element within the Anti-social Behaviour Crime and Policing Act 
(2014) is the extension of enforcement powers to private land, including domestic 
premises, meaning that potentially irresponsible dog ownership can now be addressed 
wherever it occurs. This can enable enforcement action in more circumstances, for 
instance where there is serious injury or death, as well as for the more common issues of 
dog barking, fouling and straying that can affect local communities. The legislation removed 
powers from community councils, but gave new powers to Housing Associations to 
enable them to use a range of enforcement tools in addition to their powers as a 
landlord. The Act also introduced a series of anti-social behaviour measures that can be 
used by statutory enforcers to deal with dogs being used in an anti-social way. These 
included Community Protection Notices (CPNs), Injunctions, Criminal Behaviour Orders 
and Public Space Protection Orders. Defra and the Welsh Government (2014) have 
produced specific guidance on the use of these measures and other issues.
k) Dangerous Dogs Exemption Schemes (England and Wales) Order 2015
Further changes were made to the nature of dangerous dog control in 2015 when the 
Dangerous Dogs Exemption Schemes (England and Wales) Order came into force, 
replacing the previous pre- and post-release conditions for any prohibited dog becoming 
exempt. The Order also introduced the Interim Exemption Scheme (IES) - a system of 
‘doggie bail’ - which permits a DLO police officer to return a dog suspected of being of 
type, to the owner who has indicated they intend to apply to the court to have the dog 
placed on the Index. The DLO must be satisfied that the dog will not pose a threat to 
public safety. If the owner breaches the conditions of the IES, the dog may be seized once 
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more and all relevant factors will contribute to the court’s determination as to the 
suitability of the owner and the dog for entry on the Index.
The Order also specified the limited conditions under which a prohibited and exempted 
dog may be transferred to another keeper, namely as a result of serious illness or death or 
the previous owner. Before the order was passed there existed a degree of confusion as 
to Parliament’s will in relation to this issue. Certain courts decisions, such as R (Sandhu) v 
Isleworth Crown Court [2012], were being interpreted as to suggest the transfer of 
ownership was permissible. The order clarified the only circumstances under which this 
could be considered, as well as resolving the main issue arising from the Sandhu case - 
whether it is possible to consider the temperament of the dog and the character of the 
owner, when deciding upon exemption - these are now clear contributing factors. One of 
the core aims of the original legislation was to prohibit the selling or gifting of s1 dogs and 
prosecutors and courts have been reminded not to transfer ownership in any way other 
than by those conditions laid out in the Order, and that ‘a Court ordering someone else 
to take charge of the dog for the remainder of the dog’s life is exposing that prohibited 
dog as a de facto gift’ (Crown Prosecution Service 2017). It is possible for a dog to remain 
the property of its owner but have the court appoint a new keeper, where it will live and 
be looked after. The rulings here have permitted this only where it can be proven that the 
new keeper has already been ‘the person for the time being in charge of the dog’ at the 
time of application to the court, this requires the person to have had responsibility for the 
dog in the past or the present. As yet there are scarce examples from court and so it is 
currently only an emerging area of law 
           
3.4 The Policy community
The participants of the policy arena concerning the control of dogs is diverse in terms of 
primary interest and indeed experiences, originating from different sectors, whether that 
be enforcement, animal welfare or victim representation. The elite interviews in Part III of 
this thesis were conducted with a range of experts drawn from these sectors, of which 
more will be discussed in Chapter Six. Whilst mapping the policy landscape within this 
chapter however it is worth providing a brief overview of the sectors within which these 
experts reside in order to offer a rounder explanation of the arena in which dog control 
policy is debated and produced. Not listed below, but still of note, are the civil servants 
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and politicians also often considered members of the policy community, as discussed in 
Chapter Two. In this instance and given the study’s territorial context of England and 
Wales, this includes both the UK and Welsh Governments due to the complex devolution 
settlement which sees some aspects of the control of dogs, although not the DDA, 
devolved to the Welsh Government. 
a) Enforcement bodies
Figure 1. A representation of organisational roles in relation to the enforcement of dog control22
The enforcement of various offences surrounding dog ownership falls to three main 
bodies in England and Wales, namely the Police, the RSPCA and local authorities. Although 
some areas of legislation are dominated by one enforcer, they are by no means exclusive, 
and there is a great deal of crossover. Figure 1 presents a visual representation of the main 
enforcement activities in relation to dog control.
 NB some local authorities (e.g. those interviewed for this study) are involved in certain aspects of the 22
enforcement of s1 legislation, as part of their prevention work, however most are not. Also the RSPCA will 
prosecute s1 offences but only where other cruelty, welfare or fighting offences also exist. It must also be 
noted that the diagram in Figure 1 doesn’t represent the proportionality of roles - for instance the RSPCA 
investigates and prosecutes the vast majority of cruelty & welfare offences.
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The three enforcement bodies will attempt to work together as needed, and 
Memorandums of Understanding have sometimes been developed which can often help 
to explain and formalise these relationships and roles. There is regular communication 
between these organisations at national levels, as well as ad-hoc communication, 
intelligence sharing and joint working as needed at a local level. It is recognised however, 
that conflict can arise where responsibility for action is not clear-cut or where resources 
are not in place (Efra 2016). It can also be difficult for members of the public to 
understand who they should contact, which can lead to duplication where more than one 
enforcement body has been asked to investigate a complaint, or indeed an absence of 
anyone responding where confusion between enforcers exists.
The way priorities are formed for these three bodies is also often linked to funding, which 
is itself under pressure. Although local authorities and the police may have powers under 
key pieces of legislation to take action (and, in very limited cases, a statutory duty to do 
so) enforcement is not specifically funded, nor hypothecated, and is varyingly prioritised at 
a local level leading to a piecemeal approach. This can mean that different approaches are 
taken in different enforcement areas, ranging from very good to little or no enforcement 
action. The RSPCA is in a similar position to both local authorities and the police with 
limited resources and has no statutory duty to enforce animal welfare legislation, instead 
taking action as a private prosecutor. Although statutory duties in terms of enforcement 
are rare, they do exist in relation to dangerous dogs. Once having reasonable suspicion of 
a s1 dog in someone’s possession the police are obligated to respond. It is a straight 
offence for which the police have no discretion. Accordingly the associated kennelling and 
prosecution costs have been outside the control of the police.
The training that each of these enforcers receive differs significantly. In recent years the 
Police have developed a standardised two week intensive DLO course covering canine 
behaviour, the identification of a suspected prohibited type dog and animal welfare, which 
is approved by both the National Police Chiefs’ Council and College of Policing. Criteria 
have also been laid out which qualified Dog Legislation Officers have to follow annually in 
order to retain their occupational competence in role and to remain registered to 
practice - such as recording a minimum of four dog identifications in a new competency 
log book as well as having their evidence accepted in two court cases. Historically RSPCA 
Inspectors have completed an initial twelve month training programme before qualifying 
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to work as an Inspector. The training course consists of modules on relevant aspects of 
legislation, animal welfare and behaviour, and standard operating procedures which 
includes a period of field work and residential coursework. This covers all species they are 
likely to come into contact with and is not specific to dogs, they are also not trained or 
permitted to identify s1 dogs. They will attend regular refresher training and professional 
development courses. Much of the training for local authority dog wardens is on-the-job 
and through experience and, as such, focussed on the practical aspects of the job such as 
catching stray dogs. Indeed, there are no accredited training courses for dog wardens 
although all officers specifically carrying out enforcement will have completed accredited 
training around enforcement protocols and procedures.23
Almost all of the 43 territorial police forces in England and Wales have at least one DLO 
amongst their dog handlers. The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) have the only 
dedicated unit, named the Status Dog Unit (set up in 2007). The RSPCA has 
approximately 340 RSPCA inspectors in addition to 50 animal welfare officers who can 
investigate welfare offences,  and 88 animal collection officers who collect and rescue 
animals. Responsibilities for the various aspects of enforcement regarding dogs at a local 
authority level is made up by a variety of metropolitan, borough, unitary and district 
councils and as such therein no standardised service, and it has been noted that ‘some 
local authorities do not have the resources nor finances to offer full Dog Warden/Animal 
Welfare Services’ (Efra 2013b: Vol II, Ev w25). 
b) Victim representatives
There have been two major campaigns of note relating to the framework encompassing 
dog control legislation, that have been led by organisations outside of the animal welfare 
sector, and representing the victims of dog attacks. The first and largest was mounted by 
the trade union Communication Workers Union (CWU) who represent postal, cable and 
telephone personnel across a range of businesses and the Royal Mail Group who 
recognised the effect upon their staff (Langley 2012). Numerous case studies were 
publicised to demonstrate the dangers faced by these workers on a daily basis, most often 
on private land, as they tried to go about their job. Very serious attacks on several postal 
 Much of this information, which is not published in the public domain, has been gained: from personal 23
correspondence with these practitioners; the discussions of the Task & Finish Group (RSPCA 2016a); and 
the RSPCA’s working group meetings with police representatives. 
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workers highlighted the life-changing injuries which went uncompensated and without any 
legal redress due to the attacks taking place out of the jurisdiction of the DDA. The 
changes brought forward in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 were 
designed to address that by extending the legislation to cover private places. 
The second major campaign representing victims of dog attacks is the Guide Dogs for the 
Blind Association (2018). Although representing the interests of dogs, Guide Dogs are not 
an animal welfare organisation with instead their purpose being to breed, train and place 
assistance dogs with those in need. Reports of attacks upon assistance dogs (Moxon 
2016) drew attention to the effect both upon the dog and the owner who was often 
traumatised by an attack they are unable to see; their inability to protect their guide dog; 
and the injuries, or risk of injuries, sustained themselves. The Anti-social Behaviour, Crime 
and Policing Act 2014 introduced, by amending the DDA, a new aggregated offence of 
attacking an assistance dog, which attracts a maximum of three years imprisonment.
c) Dog welfare Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)
All dog welfare charities and NGOs have taken a position on the control of dogs and in 
particular the DDA, with almost none in favour of s1. Most recently Peta UK (People for 
the Ethical Treatment of Animals) have stated a position in favour of retaining and 
extending the list of prohibited dogs in England and Wales because in their view BSL can 
protect those dogs specifically targeted by criminals for their ability to attack and fight 
(PETA 2018). However all other animal welfare organisations have a position to repeal 
BSL (although Chapter Four reveals how this was not the case during the passage of the 
DDA), though they may differ on what framework is best placed to replace it. This 
contingent of groups includes Battersea Dog and Cats Home, Blue Cross, Dogs Trust, as 
well as the RSPCA, who in addition to being an enforcer, as detailed above, also campaign 
and lobby on this and other animal issues. Also closely aligned to this sector and motivated 
by animal welfare objectives are the British Veterinary Association (2018) and the dog 
behaviour sector represented by Association of Pet Behaviour Counsellors (2010) who 
exist as representatives of animal-related services and also oppose BSL as a means of 
identifying and controlling dangerous dogs.
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There are a number of specialist groups concerned with the issue of breed specific 
legislation, such as DDA Watch, Draconian Dogs Act, Deed not Breed, and Born Innocent, 
who are almost all staffed by volunteers. These groups campaign about the negative effect 
of the DDA on the welfare of dogs and their owners, but many are more often likely to 
be involved in supporting owners caught up in the minefield of legislation when they find 
themselves unwittingly in possession of a suspected s1 dog. In addition to these 
organisations there are a multitude of groups on social media raising the same issues. They 
will have anything from a few hundred to many thousands of followers, both within the 
UK and abroad.
d) Forensic and other expert bodies
The Dangerous Dogs Act is a specialised area of law which has led to the need for 
experienced legal expertise of a specific nature. One profession emerging from this need 
is Forensic Behaviourists, who are sometimes vets, or sometimes ex-DLOs with 
behaviourist qualifications, who have the recognised expertise to identify a s1 dog and 
testify to that fact in court. They will often act for both the defence and the prosecution. 
The identification process is a highly controversial and contested area of law as it is an 
extremely subjective process based upon a series of measurements and physical 
observations of the animal. The burden of the reversal of proof upon the defendant adds 
more meaning to the need for a strong forensic behaviourist who may be the only person 
to convince the court the dog is not one prohibited by s1.
Often those being prosecuted for DDA offences will seek out the services of legal 
practices that have defended other clients from s1 and s3 offences before and that also 
understand the nuances that can be present in different courts and different police forces. 
There is a small number of solicitors and barristers who advertise such expertise, with 
many of these also connected to other related activities such as working directly for 
animal welfare charities seeking repeal of BSL, or offering services such as diversion 
courses in animal welfare and dog handling to provide enforcers with the option of an 
out-of-court disposal, rather than a simple destruction order. 
Specialists within this policy community also include scholars and researchers from a 
number of relatable fields. Much of the early literature has been on the epidemiology of 
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dog bites and this has progressed to include collaborations with the medical profession, 
particularly maxillofacial surgery, in exploring what dogs are likely to bite and how the 
injuries might be prevented. Veterinary research has also sought to establish risk factors in 
certain breeds, whereas the social sciences have examined the behaviour of the human 
victims and society’s response to the issue.
3.5 Summary
Following an explanation of the methods for documentary analysis employed for the 
three chapters within this section of the thesis: Part II - the Policy context, this chapter has 
served to explore two substantive areas namely the legislative landscape and the key 
policy communities of England and Wales. These are intended to provide a solid 
foundation for navigating the policy context explored within the two subsequent chapters 
which consider the definitional issues of the problem as well as the evidence for it, and 
how dog control has become a highly politicised issue.
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Chapter Four 
A history of the present: dog control 
4.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to present the findings of an extensive documentary 
analysis of the policy debate, in the tradition of a ‘history of the present’. As an approach 
employed by Timothy Garton Ash (1999) it encapsulates a style for ‘everything….written 
at or shortly after the time it describes’ by the 'historically minded witness' of our times 
and 'combining the crafts of historian and journalist’ (Ash 2000). This method is of great 
assistance when the subject of study is complex and extensive, and consists of a series of 
interwoven events and current affairs, with many separate pieces of evidence requiring 
forging together into a unified representation. This analysis has been conducted to assist 
with addressing the first research objective of this thesis surrounding the dynamic and 
form of the 'problem definition’. As such the chapter has been divided into two main 
sections, the first discusses what the documentary evidence reveals about the definitions 
attributed to status and dangerous dogs. The second section of the chapter focusses on 
unearthing the nature and meaning of the dog problem by illuminating the evidence - or 
otherwise - of a problem, as well as the influences on the meaning in society of that 
problem. This section is further subdivided into sub-sections which consider dog fighting, 
other criminality and gangs, followed by dog attacks and Pit Bulls in particular, with a final 
section on the media’s portrayal of these dogs.
4.2 Defining ‘status’ and ‘dangerous’ dogs 
In terms of the problem definition the following section of the chapter will be confined to 
the most salient areas of the public debate on dangerous and status dogs. However it is 
noted that participants of this study, as will be explored in Chapters Seven to Nine, were 
inclined to be ‘broad-brush’ in their explanations of the issues at hand. Puppy breeding, 
identification and straying were amongst the topics relating to irresponsible owners and 
the state’s response were all raised in relation to the root causes of society’s dog control 
problems. In addition to their interpretations of how and why these are interconnected it 
is worth noting that the participants are also reflecting the views of a wider collection of 
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stakeholders concerned with the welfare of companion dogs in the UK, which, to note, 
also saw status dogs ranked as a significant issue (Buckland et al. 2013).
‘Dangerous’ dogs
There are inherent difficulties in determining the exact meaning of both the terms ’status’ 
and ‘dangerous’ dogs. Complications arise from legal definitions and the vast differences in 
how the terms are employed by governments, and further still within the wider policy 
community itself. Many governments have enacted legislation to protect the public from 
dog attacks and it is how this is done, either focussing on the dog or the owner, that 
creates the definition of dangerous (Schaffner 2011: 124). Status dogs, as will be discussed 
below, are not defined in law. The specific legislation in England and Wales governing dogs 
has been discussed in more detail in Chapter Three, but in order to provide some clarity 
and context for the purposes of this case study regarding definitions, it is important to 
first consider the history of the dog problem in England and Wales beginning with the 
very earliest pieces of legislation and a series of dog attacks in the late 1980s / early 
1990s. 
Dog control in the UK has in fact been long established, with early roots dating back to 
the Cruelty to Animals Act 1835 which criminalised dog fighting, and a short time later 
the Metropolitan Police Act 1839 which extended police powers in relation to dog 
fighting as well as determined the penalties for any person permitting to be ‘at large an 
unmuzzled ferocious Dog, or set on or urge any Dog or other Animal to attack, worry, or 
put in fear any Person, Horse, or other Animal’ (Metropolitan Police Act 1839: 512, 2). The 
Town Police Clauses Act of 1847 extended these offences to cover ‘every person...in any 
street' if their dog was determined to be dangerous and not on a lead. The Dogs Act of 
1871 then empowered the authorities with the ability to seize the dog in such 
circumstances, and is a piece of legislation still in use today. It is not however until the 
1980s that it is possible to see that society’s control (or lack of control) of dogs was 
fuelling heated debate. The UK’s dog licensing requirements were abolished in 1987 in 
recognition of a failed system that had seen costs exceed income (RSPCA 2010a); this 
was inevitable perhaps when it cost just 37½pence . To put this in context in 2018 the 24
 The amount was a precise conversion from seven shillings and sixpence at decimalisation in 1971. When 24
the halfpenny was withdrawn from circulation in 1984 the licence fee became 37pence.
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equivalent cost of the same licence would be just £1.15  and so it is unsurprising that it is 25
estimated only half of dog owners complied with the regulations (Hughes 1998: 6). 
Despite the inefficacy of the licensing system, its repeal led to, or certainly coincided with, 
public concerns over stray, out of control, and dangerous dogs. On the 14 April 1989 
Kellie Lynch was attacked and killed by two Rottweilers she was taking for a walk with a 
friend and immediately the calls to ban certain breeds of dogs were ignited, leading the 
Government to conduct an urgent review of legislation in relation to dangerous dogs. In 
response to this Parliament debated on the 15th June 1989 and The Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State for the Home Department Mr. Douglas Hogg rejected the notion the 
state should seek to determine dangerousness and the level of threat to the public based 
purely on breed stating ‘the evidence of the last few weeks and the tragic attacks which 
have occurred suggest that dogs of a whole variety of breeds can be dangerous’ and ‘I do 
not think that there is anything to be gained by trying to define dangerous 
breeds’ (Hansard, HC Deb 15 June 1989; Vol 154, col 1186). The Under-Secretary went on 
to classify the American Pit Bull as a fighting dog but although legal to keep would likely 
have a ‘propensity to violence, which might well classify them as ferocious animals within 
the meaning of the 1847 Act’, so, in fact, suggesting the legislation at that time, which 
prohibited unmuzzled dogs running loose, was sufficient for controlling what he deemed 
to be the more vicious breeds. This adjournment debate gave the Government the chance 
to reveal details of a new Dangerous Dogs Act which was passed the following month 
and increased the powers given to the courts.
Just a short time later, in November 1989, the Government issued a consultation ‘Action 
on Dogs: the Government's proposals for legislation’ in recognition of the still growing calls 
to curb dog fouling, straying and attacks (Department of the Environment / Welsh Office 
1989). In June of the following year yet another consultation was issued ‘The control of 
dogs: a consultation paper’ (Home Office, Scottish Office, Welsh Office and Department 
of the Environment 1990) reflecting what was characterised as the escalating public 
concerns regarding the unaccountable actions of some dog owners. Fixed penalties for 
non-compliant identification, and measures to tackle persistent straying were offered for 
consideration, along with new offences of allowing a dog to be dangerously out of control 
 The Office for National Statistics’ composite price index, records an average inflation rate of 3.40 percent 25
per year for the pound. Prices in 2018 are therefore 211.7 percent higher than prices in 1984.
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and owning certain breeds, despite the Under Secretary’s statement on the extensive 
practical barriers to such measures just the previous year. Compulsory registration was 
consistently rejected by the Government throughout the consideration of various 
proposals, and although new measures for controlling dog fouling was included within the 
Environmental Protection Act 1990, this did not include the planned fixed penalty notices.
It was the culmination of these unremitting debates that led to many of the proposals 
mooted in the consultation progressing to the statute books. It became the Dangerous 
Dogs Act 1991, an Act that remains in force today, albeit amended, and will be central to 
much of this thesis. But it was the devastating attack on a little girl, Rukhsana Khan, on 
Saturday 18th May 1991 - the kind of ‘focussing event’ to which Kingdon (1984) refers - 
which finally spurred the action needed to create this legislation. It is important to note 
the strong parallels to the development of other punitive crime control responses 
following single horrific incidents - these have often been involving children, such as 
‘Megan’s Law’. These focussing events, regarded as a feature of Garland’s (2001) Culture of 
Control, grab public imagination and fuel ‘knee-jerk’ punitive responses such as sex offender 
notification or three strikes, all of which are expressive measures designed to calm fears 
irrespective of the evidence of how they may actually prevent atrocities happening in the 
first place.
The political context of the early 1990s is explored in the next chapter but it is important 
to recognise the speed with which this legislation was passed (as outlined in Table 1). It 
was just three days later that the Prime Minister, John Major told the Commons:
Everyone will have been shaken by the attacks during the past few weeks, 
particularly the horrific attack on Rukhsana Khan at the weekend. I have discussed 
the matter with my right hon. friend the Home Secretary and we are persuaded 
that urgent action must be taken.…it is clear that such dogs have no place in our 
home (Hansard, HC Deb 21 May 1991 col 776). 
Just the following day Kenneth Baker MP, the Home Secretary, announced ‘legislation which 
will ban the breeding and ownership of Pit Bull Terriers and other dogs bred especially for 
fighting’ and further ‘I emphasise that the ban will initially apply only to those breeds of 
fighting dogs, but it is clearly important to prevent new and dangerous breeds coming 
in….The legislation will therefore include powers to add other types of fighting dogs to 
those which are banned’ (Hansard HC Deb 22 May 1991, Vol 191 cc945-58). This was a 
momentous moment - dangerous dogs had just received a new definition: those bred for 
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fighting. Little or no mention can be found amongst the reports of the dozen or so high 
profile attacks on children and adults in the run up to the legislation passing, of any of the 
dogs being thought to have been involved in dog fighting. The Home Secretary offered no 
explanation or evidence as to why dogs (individual or breeds), which might be bred for 
fighting, could be deemed riskier to humans. This was left to be self-evident. Supported by 
the opposition and the main animal lobbying organisations such as the RSPCA and Kennel 
Club, conventional wisdom faced no obstacle or exposure.
Even within that debate others nevertheless sought to have recognised the complexity of 
the dog problem society was facing: 
I shall certainly support today's announcement…However, it does not go nearly 
far enough. It does not address other problems with dogs in society, which the 
Home Secretary must tackle. We need a comprehensive Dogs Act and a 
neutering programme, we must stop puppy farming and we must engage in an 
exercise to promote responsible dog ownership. That can be done only through a 
dog registration scheme (Terry Lewis MP, ibid). 
Despite strong support across the opposition benches, these other components 
perceived, by some, to be inextricably linked to the dog problem, were ignored by the 
Government in this and subsequent debates. The Home Secretary’s intention to legislate 
for out of control dogs (of any breed) is also mostly ignored, the debate instead fixates on 
the panacea to dog attacks being the extermination of certain breeds or types bred for 
fighting, even when one member notes that the Pit Bull Terrier is responsible for only a 
quarter of bites in London, the Home Secretary remains steadfast in his mission, citing the 
dogs who are ‘trained to fight and to kill’ without reference to any link to the illegal sport 
of dog fighting (Kenneth Baker MP, ibid.).
The Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 (DDA) was introduced on the 4th June 1991 with a long 
title  that firmly established, without challenge or evidence, the connection to dog 26
fighting: 
An Act to prohibit persons from having in their possession or custody dogs 
belonging to types bred for fighting; to impose restrictions in respect of such dogs 
pending the coming into force of the prohibition; to enable restrictions to be 
imposed in relation to other types of dog which present a danger to the public; to 
 The ‘long title’ is the formal title of an Act of Parliament, and is not always widely known. It usually appears 26
at the head of a statute or other legislative measure and is intended to be a fuller description of the 
legislation's purpose and effects. Whereas a ‘short title’ is the formal name by which a statute will be widely 
known and referred to. 
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make further provision for securing that dogs are kept under control; and for 
connected purposes. 
It passed all of its Commons stages in one day (the 10th June), glided through the Lords in 
six weeks, and gained Royal Assent on the 25th July 1991 (see Table 1). It remains 
notorious as an example of badly expedited and under-scrutinised, legislation both in 
terms of its speedy passage born out of a moral panic (Jones 2006) and for its ‘lack of 
logic and fairness’ in its application (Sweeney 2013: 241). The Act introduced the offence 
of any (breed of) dog being dangerously out of control in a public place (recently 
amended to include private spaces, see Chapter Three) and the highly controversial ban 
on certain types of dog, the so-called ‘breed specific legislation’ (BSL). 
The UK is often reported to have been the first country, or amongst the very first, to 
introduce BSL (Jones 2016) but this is wholly incorrect, it is actually a prime example of 
US-UK policy transfer needing little in the way of domestic justification and evidence but 
based solely on the perceived success of a measure demonstrated through popularity, and 
its implementation being first in the USA (Jones & Newburn 2007). It was in New York in 
the 1920s following concerns about German Shepherds, labelled as ‘wolf ’ dogs by worried 
citizens despite there not being very many attacks, when city officials first proposed a ban 
(Delise 2007: 74-75) . Medlin (2007) identifies a breed specific ban eight years earlier 27
than the UK in Cincinnati in 1983, and Dickey (2016) traces BSL to an ordinance 
introduced in Hollywood, Florida in 1980 which required owners of Pit Bulls to have 
$25,000 of liability insurance. Since those days, 850 counties and municipalities in the USA, 
have had some form of restriction on breeds of dogs owned (as will be discussed many of 
these bans have since been reversed)(see Applebome 1987 for early BSL measures in the 
USA). The intention of Ministers in the UK in 1991 though was clear, they believed the 
extinction of certain breeds of dog, deemed ‘dangerous’, along with measures to address 
any dog being dangerously out of control, would reduce bites and attacks, thus improving 
public safety. They chose to ban ‘ownership, breeding, sale and exchange and advertising 
for sale of specified types of fighting dogs’ (Defra 2007) through s1 of the DDA. The term 
‘type’ is also used because the four dogs are not recognised as breeds in the UK and in 
addition it captures any dogs cross-bred to look like the four dogs banned, namely Pit Bull 
Terrier, Dogo Argentino, Fila Brasileiro and Japanese Tosa. With the latter three almost 
 In 1929 Australia banned the import of the German Shepherd (a ban that stayed in place until the 1970s) 27
(Delise 2007: 74-75). Whilst not a ban of these dogs within society as such, this is regarded, by some, as the 
first known breed specific law.
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never being found in the UK, the central focus landed upon the Pit Bull Terrier (Clarke 
2017: 194), which was to be identified through using a ‘breed standard’ published in the 
American Pit Bull Gazette in 1977 (Defra 2009: Annex 2). The law therefore defines 
dangerousness as something to be determined via a judgement on mere physical 
characteristics. However the literature on the blamelessness of the Pit Bull Terrier, in terms 
of any inherent aggression or danger to the public, particularly any to be detected through 
appearance, is abundant and increasing, and will be explored further in a later section.
Status dogs
In contrast to dangerous dogs, which was created from within legislation, the term ‘status’ 
dogs is relatively new and reflects a phenomenon many have argued (discussed in 
Chapter Seven), that existed for a relatively short period of time predominately between 
2007 and 2014. However as a label it is still employed by a few stakeholders and the 
media. Harding notes that the earliest use of the term that he can find is within an RSPCA 
briefing of 2007 (2012: 41) which is corroborated by an RSPCA participant of this study 
who acknowledged an uneasiness that the RSPCA probably did invent the term (see 
Chapter Seven). However the origins may have begun slightly earlier in 2006, in a short-
lived RSPCA campaign  featuring a poster and leaflet entitled ‘Your Dog is Not Just a 28
Status Symbol: it deserves your respect’. A large bull breed dog displaying obvious 
aggression was the face of the campaign, which also contained the words ‘Encouraging a 
Dog to Attack or Frighten People or other Animals is a Criminal Offence’, and yet only in 
the small print, and in the detail of the leaflet, was there any information about dog 
welfare - the sole raison d’être of the RSPCA. Until this point in time, however, ‘status’ 
would have had wider connotations, indeed owning certain breeds of dog could be 
interpreted as having meaning and thus emulated by others (Hirschman 2002), such as 
having toy or ‘handbag’ dogs made famous by celebrities and the wealthy (Maher et al. 
2017) and ‘some owners may value a dog's pedigree as a status symbol, or believe that a 
pedigree means that the dog possesses superior behavioural characteristics’ (Turcsán 
2017). Elsewhere the Pit Bull was being recognised as a status symbol for certain 
communities thought to be actively enhancing aggression in dogs and fighting them 
(Hussain 2006). By 2007 in the UK, the various authorities were reporting an increase in 
 These materials are no longer publicly available from the RSPCA but I have retained copies in my own 28
personal files.
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banned dogs and dogs appearing physically similar (though not conforming to s1) from 
within the family of bull breed dogs, being used to threaten and intimidate people and in 
other anti social behaviour (Rawstorne 2009). The RSPCA published its definition of status 
dogs as those ‘used in an aggressive intimidating way towards the public and other animals, 
often involving the fighting of these dogs…These dogs are traditionally, but not exclusively, 
associated with young people on inner city estates and those involved in criminal 
activity’ (RSPCA 2010b).
Concern about the use of certain types of dog goes back much further however, before 
the moniker ‘status’ dog was invented. Indeed in one Parliamentary debate ahead of the 
introduction of the DDA, Diane Abbot MP raised the issue:
Public concern is about the irresponsible owner who keeps potentially vicious 
breeds,……not as family pets or companions but as potential offensive weapons. 
Such people can be seen every day swaggering up and down the streets of our 
inner cities. Such irresponsible ownership cannot be tackled without dog 
registration. How long will the Government set their face against public opinion in 
this matter? (Hansard HC Deb 22 May 1991 vol 191 c955). 
Other terms such as ‘weapon’ dog (as implied above), were in circulation at the beginning 
and height of the phenomenon, between 2007 and 2010 - certainly the Greater London 
Authority appeared wedded to the term weapon dogs (GLA 2009) - along with ‘devil’ 
and ‘bling’ dogs (RSPCA 2010b and O’Neill 2010). Reports, particularly in the media 
(Rawstorne 2009), of dogs being used by criminals or potential criminals were increasing 
as was concern amongst the statutory (both police and local authorities) and third sector. 
The view that ‘many criminal gangs now adopt “status” dogs as a weapon of choice to 
protect them and impress their friends while frightening their enemies’ (Sweeney 2013: 
280), was beginning to spur action. The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) set up a 
dedicated Status Dog Unit in March 2009 and in April of the same year the first Status 
Dogs Summit was held for a wide group of stakeholders (RSPCA 2009). It is worth noting 
that the majority of the MPS’s Status Dog Unit focus is, and always has been, tackling the 
illegal ownership of banned breeds under s1 of the DDA and not anti-social behaviour 
with legally-owned dogs, nor dog fighting offences. This presents an interesting effect on 
the terminology although not acknowledged by the Government’s own definition:
The term ‘status dog’ describes the ownership of certain types of dogs which are 
used by individuals to intimidate and harass members of the public. These dogs are 
traditionally, but not exclusively, associated with young people on inner city estates 
and those involved in criminal activity (Department for Environment Food and 
Rural Affairs [DEFRA] 2010: 4).
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It is also worth noting the similarity between the Government and RSPCA (previous 
page) definitions of status dog. This would appear to reflect a consensus view at that time 
of the emerging phenomenon and which elements in society were to blame. This was a 
situation that was to change, however, as will be seen. 
The conflation of dangerous and status is seen throughout the literature and is clearly 
evidence of the ‘problem definition’ to be elaborated upon in Chapter Seven. It is worth 
noting that it is possible for a status dog to also be a dangerous dog, as it could also be a 
banned breed (s1) or dangerously out control (s3), but the reverse is not true in so much 
as a dog that is not of a banned type nor out of control may still be a tool in anti social 
behaviour and thus be a classified as a status dog. The Home Office ASB Focus circular of 
2010 attempted to separate these factors with a clear explanation of dangerous dogs 
emanating from the 1991 legislation (which had brought the very first offences for 
enforcers to protect people), before progressing to a differentiation of what ASB in 
relation to dogs manifests as (Home Office 2010: 1-4).
4.3 Evidence and prevalence of a ‘problem’
Having considered what the documentary evidence tells us of the definitions and meaning 
of status and dangerous dogs as terms, the following section turns to what it reveals of the 
nature and prevalence of a dog problem. This section of the chapter is sub-divided into six 
parts reflecting the emphasis afforded to these issues and the primary themes that 
emerged from within the literature. The aim is to understand the meaning of 
dangerousness attributed to certain dogs through an examination of the evidence put 
forward which it is claimed establishes a clear and significant risk to public safety. The 
contention that dog fighting, and other criminality is connected, is explored before 
progressing to a consideration of whether an association with gangs and other anti social 
behaviour is persuasive. An overview of the statistics that report upon bites, attacks and 
deaths is followed by a review of the scientific studies surrounding dog aggression 
specifically focussed upon the Pit Bull Terrier along with a wider consideration of how this 
dog has come to be regarded in society. The final section focusses on the media 
representations of the dangerous dog issue to understand its influence upon depictions of 
the dog control issue and what factors may be at work to produce these conditions.
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Dog fighting
From an early point in the dog control policy agenda dog fighting was linked by 
Government to dangerousness and public safety. It was the reason given for banning four 
types of dog in the DDA, although no evidence was offered in the public or policy arena 
to demonstrate that dogs used in fighting were more likely to bite or endanger human life, 
or that the attacks that were occurring had only, or predominately, featured those four 
types of dog. 
As discussed later in Chapter Seven the problem definition is exacerbated by the nexus of 
a plethora of dog issues, and dog fighting itself also suffers from definitional complexities. 
Much of the research that exists on dog fighting is based upon studies in the USA and 
does not translate well to the UK, not least of all due to the significant differences in scale. 
I explored this issue of a typology of dog fighting recently (Lawson 2017) and found little 
to support the conclusions of Harding and Nurse (2015) that Ortiz’s (2010: 14–18) USA 
characterisations of a) street-fighter, b) hobbyist and c) professional, exist in the UK, but 
instead there would appear to be evidence for just two categories, of informal and formal. 
The UK formal fighting sphere is as savage and inhumane as in the USA but the criminal 
network is minute in comparison. In the States there are sophisticated networks of 
perhaps 40,000 professional dogmen operating (Gibson 2005), with significant sums of 
monies involved - for instance one fight saw the seizure of $500,000 (Lockwood 2012: 8), 
an estimated 2,000 dog fights per year (Strouse 2009: 17), and many hundreds of 
spectators. In the UK, however, there can be just single figures of those involved, including 
spectators, and much smaller amounts of money of perhaps just £5,000 or £10,000 as a 
result, with around 500 reports of dog fighting to the RSPCA, resulting in less than 30 
convictions per year in England and Wales (Lawson 2017). 
It is possible that the lower level of the informal category crosses over with the more 
severe end of the behaviour of status dog owners (Hughes et al. 2011: 14; see also Maher 
et al. 2017). Not involved in organised dog fighting or the discipline, training and 
subculture that it involves, they will nevertheless attempt to train dogs to attack and may 
engage in impromptu fights with other dogs on the street or in parks. Their ignorance of 
positive training methods and their desire to cultivate aggression in their dogs for street 
credibility could end up producing a dog that has a greater potential to be a threat to the 
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public (Maher et al. 2017). Conversely organised or formal dog fighters specifically train 
for dog-directed and not human-directed aggression (Hallsworth 2013: 32). 
During the debate on the Dangerous Dog Bill (HC Deb 10 June 1991 vol 192 cc705-68) 
there was an attempt to have Rottweilers also banned under s1, which ultimately failed, 
but this revealed how Members from both sides of the House accepted the apparent 
merits of the arguments on why fighting dogs were to be banned, ’The Bill singles out and 
bans only fighting breeds. The Home Secretary justified that course of action because the 
threat of fighting dogs presented a different degree of seriousness from other breeds of 
dog’ (John McAllion MP). The Minister Angela Rumbold MP spoke of the Government’s 
view that it believed ‘Clause 1 will protect the public against fighting dogs, while the other 
clauses will protect [from ] dogs that might be considered aggressive, but only a few of 29
which are likely to cause harm’ (Hansard, HC Deb 10 June 1991 vol 192 cc746-68). No 
figures of dog fighting or evidence of such a problem being on the increase was offered 
and there is no explanation amongst the literature of the time why that went 
unchallenged.
There is no evidence within the UK that dog fighters graduate from informal to formal, or 
have any interaction, with perhaps an exception within the Asian community (Lawson 
2017). So it could be argued that s1 of the DDA was designed to tackle just a handful of 
people and their dogs not erstwhile indicated as being involved in the dog bites and 
attacks in the lead up to the 1991 Act. The DDA demonstrated the Government’s belief 
that dog fighting was the cause of the problem and that banning certain dogs would 
significantly reduce attacks, and as a consequence it could be argued ‘whenever pit bulls 
are outlawed, the ownership of the breed and association with dog fighting can become 
an “outlaw” status symbol’ (Lockwood 2012: 8). Arguably therefore (and as will be 
explored through the data in Chapter Eight) the Act created a substitute harm because it 
made ‘tough’ looking dogs attractive to those intending to use dogs in their anti-social 
behaviour and criminal acts. Whilst the Association of Chief Police Officers  noted the Pit 30
Bull type was ‘without doubt the breed of choice for certain elements of the criminal and 
irresponsible dog owners in our communities’ and had become ‘quite a status symbol’, 
they rejected this was due to their notoriety bestowed by the legislation to ban them, 
 Presumably the Minister misspoke and meant to say ‘protect from dogs’ or she was not accurately 29
recorded in Hansard, which is often not verbatim. 
 Renamed the National Police Chiefs’ Constables (NPCC) in 201530
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instead attributing it to the reason they contend the dogs were originally prohibited 
(Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee 2013: 20). Nevertheless the dogs and 
owners involved within the informal dog fighting category are consequently feared by the 
public but it has to be noted that they look indiscernibly akin to innocent owners dressed 
comparably, with similar looking dogs, in the same types of inner city neighbourhoods.
The conflation of the issues of dog fighting and status dogs is partially understandable 
given the involvement of some status dog owners in informal dog fighting, as well as the 
role of the media (see later in this chapter) promoting the issues as inextricably linked. 
There are also other forces at work to encourage this perception, not least successive 
governments who have defended the DDA for over 25 years, but also from elsewhere in 
the policy network. The League Against Cruel Sports re-launched their dog fighting 
campaign in December 2015 with the headline statistics that there is at least one dog fight 
per day in the UK (Snowdon 2015). This campaign and the associated data were based 
upon Harding and Nurse’s commissioned report (2015), and openly includes the lower 
strata of informal dog fighting and status dogs, and as such tangles together very complex 
social issues and motivations for dog ownership issues. This aggregation, however, could be 
a barrier to the development of any tailor-made, UK-focussed, solutions.
Interestingly and also connected to problem definition, is the fact the law isn’t always clear. 
Recent High Court clarifications, as a result of a case involving the use of dogs on wild 
animals, concluded ‘a “fight” must be a contrived or artificial creation, specifically for the 
purpose of a fight during which the other animal must not be able to escape….The High 
Court was clear that a “fight” could not be a by-product of a chance meeting’ (Cooper 
2016). The placing of two dogs together in an area from which they cannot or would not 
escape does fall into the definition of dog fighting in s8 of the Animal Welfare Act (2006), 
thus it would appear this legislation, like the DDA, is more aimed at the organised, formal 
category of dog fighting.
Connections to other criminality
The links to other criminality has also been signposted by both researchers and 
practitioners alike, such as the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 
(ASPCA) Senior Vice President; academic; and forensic expert, Dr Randall Lockwood 
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(2012: 4) ‘dogfighting is almost inseparable from drugs, illegal weapons, illegal gambling, and 
many other activities’. The Kennel Club attributes this to the effects of the legislation, ‘the 
Dangerous Dogs Act just pushed the whole issue underground. Making some dogs illegal 
made them more attractive to some groups, such as gangs, who used them to intimidate 
others or as weapons in fights’ (Parkinson 2009). The statistics surrounding status dogs are 
usually expressed through other criminal behaviours, such as in the case where the 
RSPCA noted 284 reports of dog fighting in 2008 (up from 24 in 2004), with two-thirds 
of those involving ‘youths using their dogs as weapons in street fights - 188 cases in 2008 
compared with 132 in 2007. The RSPCA is worried dogs are being used as "weapons of 
intimidation"’ (BBC 2009). 
A lesser, but nevertheless frequent, offence is allowing a dog to stray (or be abandoned) 
the statistics for which the Dogs Trust collect from local authorities and compile in an 
annual public report. For a number of years that survey has included a question on status 
dogs and in 2011 they reported a 140 percent increase in dogs deemed to be ‘status 
dogs’ (Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee 2013: 20). Their 2016 report 
included a descriptive definition of status dogs:
Over recent years, there has been a rise in the number of people owning 
aggressive dogs for intimidation and dogfighting. These dogs are typically referred 
to as ‘status dogs’ and can pose a threat to humans. These dogs tend to be certain 
breeds – such as Bull breeds (including ‘Staffies’ and Mastiffs), Rottweilers, Akitas or 
crosses of these – as their looks and type are thought to convey a certain 
impression of their owner (Dogs Trust 2016: 12).
In fact despite this description their 2016 data suggested a decline in status dogs straying, 
to 19 percent, (as a proportion of all strays), down from 21 percent in 2015, and in the 
numbers euthanased due to aggressive behaviours of 5 percent, down from 6 percent in 
2015 and 8 percent in 2013-14 (ibid.). What is interesting certainly, in terms of the 
problem definition and the use of the terminology, is that as of 2017 Dogs Trust have 
removed the definition and questions relating to status dogs and replaced it with 
questions around the intake of dogs under the Dangerous Dogs Act (Dogs Trust 2017: 
11) although they do not acknowledge why within the report. The new data on the DDA 
is also useful, although on this point only 63 authorities (of a possible 376 who operate 
dog control services in England and Wales) responded, with 31 of those taking any dogs 
and 21 percent of those seizing, or accepting, just one that year. Only seven councils took 
in ten or more s1 dogs. It is impossible to draw comparisons with their previous figure of 
14,519 status dogs that the local authorities reported handling the previous year (Dogs 
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Trust 2016: 12), not least of all because of the level of interpretation and recording 
methods local authorities would have likely employed to record status dogs, and because 
most of them would not be involved in seizing or collecting dogs subject to the DDA. 
Some, particularly in and around London, have traditionally done this work, but others are 
likely to record DDA dogs amongst their figures because they temporarily board them for 
the police.
The figures for dogs seized by the police for s1 and s3 DDA offences are not routinely 
collected nor available in one repository - they are held separately by the 43 forces and a 
multitude of courts. Table 2 contains the data the RSPCA collated on the number of 
prosecutions for s1 and s3 offences under the DDA between 1992 and 2010 for its 
evidence submitted to the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee’s investigation 
into dog control and welfare which clearly showed an increase in the offences of owning a 
banned type and of allowing a dog (of any breed) to be dangerously out of control. It is 
important to note that the factors influencing these statistics, such as police priorities (e.g. 
the creation of the MPS’s Status Dog Unit), an increase in reporting due to public 
awareness following media attention or even changes in recording practices, remain 
unknown. It is possible to see clearly however that the s1 offences tail off dramatically 
after the legislation was introduced before rising sharply in 2007. That year immediately 
followed the tragic death of Ellie Lawrenson and a review by Defra of enforcement across 
the 43 police forces. From 2007 onwards forces began recruiting and training Dog 
Legislation Officers (DLO) which may account for the sharp rise in 2008, 2009 and 2010. 
Unfortunately there is no available data as to whether these offences tally geographically 
with the location and number of DLOs in each force but it is reasonable to assume that 
an increase in officers trained to detect these specific offences could lead to an increase in 
offences detected. 
In figures obtained under Freedom of Information it is also known that 4,757 s1 dogs 
were seized between 2013 and 2016 in England and Wales (BBC 2016) and that around 
3,000 dogs have been processed and added to the register of exempted dogs (first 
permitted by the 1997 amendment to the DDA) maintained by Defra (Lyons 2015). 
Despite the ban, 18 years after it came into being the Kennel Club estimated ‘There are 
more pit bulls now than there have ever been before, but there are lots of pit bulls that 
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have responsible owners. There are also lots of cross-breeds. There's a bit of a 
misconception. Any breed of dog can be dangerous with a bad owner’ (Parkinson 2009).
Table 2: Number of prosecutions for s1 and s3 offences under the DDA 1992 - 2010
The Sentencing Council produced an analysis and research bulletin specifically on DDA 
offences in 2011, reporting a sharp increase in the volume of sentences from 439 adults in 
in 2000, to 1192 adults in 2010 with the biggest increase centred on both the possession 
of a s1 dog and the incidents where a dog has injured someone, but with relatively steady 
numbers for dogs found to be dangerously out of control in a public place. Just over half 
of all DDA offences in 2010 were for a dog injuring someone (an aggravated offence), 
Year s1(3) DDA - Possession of 
a prohibited type of dog
s3(1) DDA - Owner/person 
responsible for dog at time 
allows it to be out of 
control in a public place
s3(3) DDA - Owner/
person responsible for 
dog at time allows it to be 
out of control in a place it 
is not allowed to be
1992 209 696 50
1993 167 656 57
1994 57 482 33
1995 35 448 40
1996 18 383 22
1997 15 434 32
1998 23 681 40
1999 12 703 43
2000 5 724 72
2001 4 768 70
2002 6 821 56
2003 1 889 72
2004 5 887 59
2005 11 923 68
2006 8 981 73
2007 87 1008 72
2008 117 1031 64
2009 149 993 78
2010 354 1210 86
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with just over a quarter being for the possession of a s1. Other trends are noted such as 
the move away from fines in favour of community sentences but with an acknowledgment 
that the data does not allow for any qualitative analysis for correlations with severity. 
Accepting the inherent flaws of police officers determining ethnicity the report also 
reveals offenders to be 44 percent White, 23 percent Black, eight percent Asian, and the 
rest unknown, with the largest age group to be 22-29yrs on 38 percent, followed by 
30-39yrs on 24 percent, and then with both 18-21yrs and the over 40s representing 19 
percent each (Sentencing Council 2011). This rather contradicts the notion that the issue 
is one of young people, if we are to accept the detection and prosecution of these 
offences is uniform in society. It is a great shame this report was not repeated and the 
data for later years not collated and published, as detailed information surrounding 
sentences could provide an insight into general trends and any potential deterrent factors. 
However following the increase in the prosecution of dog attacks; the public profile they 
received; and the resultant exposure of disparity in sentencing, the Sentencing Council 
consulted on, and then introduced, the first Sentencing Guidelines for the DDA (Sweeney 
2013: 402-3), later updated to reflect significant changes to the legislation (Sentencing 
Council 2016).
A gang issue?
From the very beginnings of the phenomenon the descriptions or definitions used in 
relation to the threat dogs posed to public safety was spoken of in terms of gangs, dog 
fighting and other serious criminal offences, ‘Animal fighting, like drugs, gambling, weapons, 
and other violent behavior, is one manifestation of the same problem – gangs’ (Randour 
and Hardiman 2007: 199). The suggestion, within media and political circles, of links to 
criminality, particularly amongst young people, is consistent with the deviance 
generalisation hypothesis which posits that animal abuse, especially amongst young people, 
is significantly related to interpersonal violence (Arluke et al. 1999; Ascione 1993; 2001). In 
one study, with the Chicago Police Department, other criminal behaviours such as carrying 
firearms, selling narcotics and involvement in street gangs were more likely to be prevalent 
amongst animal abuse offenders (Degenhardt, 2005). In a study of the ownership of ‘high 
risk’ dogs, Barnes et al. determined ‘that choice of a high-risk dog breed by the owner can 
reflect the deviant nature of the owner’ (2006: 1632) based on the higher number of 
convictions for serious violence and drugs offences committed by status dog owners than 
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non-status dog owners. It would therefore appear entirely legitimate to consider status 
dog owners to be amongst the more risky and dangerous of people in society, but there 
are limitations to this research not least of all the fact it was all conducted solely within 
the USA.
In the UK’s earliest research conducted upon the phenomenon, the focus was specifically 
upon young people and gangs (Harding 2010, Maher and Pierpoint 2011), but with quite 
different results. Harding encountered the issue as a result of his doctoral work on gangs 
in the UK and based his later work on this early singular empirical data collection (Harding 
2012, 2017, Harding and Nurse 2015). Seen through this lens - and one that presupposes 
gangs exist in the same format and condition as in the USA, and where their use and and 
abuse of dogs has been the subject of more study - it would be reasonable to conclude 
an exclusive relationship between owning a status dog and criminal behaviours. Whilst the 
evidence available in the early stages of the phenomenon supported the appearance of 
this more simplified view of serious criminals fighting dogs; attacking people with their 
dogs; and using their dogs as tools for enforcement and protection in the criminal 
underworld (Harding 2010), it soon became apparent to other researchers that the 
factors at work were far more complex:
Most dangerous dog owners…are young people who are born into poverty, have 
poor parenting, fail in the education system, have no job, and are gang members 
or on the fringes of gangs. They can be said to be the result of a conveyor belt of 
social and educational deprivation that begins at birth. Their dogs are simply a 
marker for the social problems mentioned above (Grant 2011). 
Maher and Pierpoint found that, in fact, dogs were used more for ‘socialising and 
companionship, protection and enhancing status’ within gangs and youth groups, and the 
relationship was deemed to be intrinsic and not extrinsic as portrayed by the media 
(2011). In their analysis of the ‘dark side of pet ownership’ Beverland et al. observe how 
the ‘desire for status or control may motivate some consumers to own certain types of 
pets’ (2008: 490) and Dotson and Hyatt also found that ‘younger people, overall, 
experience more strongly the dimensions of dog ownership, possibly due to a 
generational effect or perhaps due to more openness to the interspecies connection and 
a greater flexibility in their lifestyles’ (2008: 465). A relationship between young people and 
status dogs, including the abuse of those dogs, clearly exists however the notion that the 
‘underclass’ with ‘their feral children and feral pets’ was found to be ’caught up in the 
moral panic and the demonisation of youths’ (Maher & Pierpoint 2011). 
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Hughes, Maher and Lawson (2011) conducted the first investigation of young people - 
widely branded as ‘hoodies’ during the height of the phenomenon - and their motivations 
in owning status breeds and found an ‘evidential quagmire’ due to the fragmented 
collection, categorisation and recording of data. This, along with the driving forces of the 
media and political discourses, was distorting and obscuring the true nature of the 
problem, resulting in the ‘humanization of dogs and the canine‐ization of youth’. That said 
this study also confirmed four direct links with criminality, i) committing an offence with 
the dog, ii) committing an offence to the dog, iii) dog theft, and iv) offences protecting or 
avenging the dog, as well as evidence for the links between: demonstrating masculinity; 
status; and existing on the periphery of violence, all impacting upon the motivation for dog 
ownership (and specific breeds of dog). Studies by both Ragatz et al. (2009) and Schenk et 
al. (2012) suggest that owning a problematic (‘vicious’) dog is an indictor of broader social 
deviancy with higher incidents of arrests, violence and drug use.
Veterinary practitioners dealing with the manifestation of the new dog problem have 
been unequivocal about the underlying causes noting a new type of ‘ignorant’ dog owner 
using their dogs for ‘protecting criminal assets, intimidation, or attacking people’ which in 
itself acts as a ‘marker for inner-city poverty and wider socioeconomic problems’ (Grant 
2011). The interaction with such dog owners on a daily basis provided an insight into their 
lives to determine the view that ‘in some sections of society, children and young adults are 
at risk of leading blighted lives and blighting the lives of others, causing suffering to dogs 
and other animals along the way’ (Ibid.). Despite the evidence of the link to gangs, violent 
behaviours and the suggestion owning a ‘socially deviant dog’ may indicate a deviant 
identity in the owner, dog ownership can be an extremely positive force for some young 
people. The literature suggests that dog ownership ‘leads to expanded social networks and 
increased civic engagement’ (Bueker 2013) but given status (and restricted) breeds are 
rarely included within such studies, the social capital inherent with owning a dog may not 
be fully understood in all stratum of society and indeed choice of breed can also lead to 
clique formation and stereotyping (ibid.). The much maligned breed considered to be most 
alike to a PBT is the Staffordshire bull terrier (SBT) and one survey in 2011 found that 
young people were more likely to regard SBTs as illegal or guard dogs rather than family 
pets (Vet Times 2011). Lem et al. (2013) also found that whilst the bond between youth 
and dog owner can be strong, creating structure and reducing drug dependency, it can 
also be detrimental to their welfare for instance where homeless youths will reject 
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resources or assistance if it means being separated from their pet. 
The research connecting criminal gangs to status dogs in the UK is now dated having been 
conducted nine years ago, so as such could merely reflect one aspect of a relatively short-
lived phenomenon at its height. There is still, of course, real life examples of the currency 
of dogs, particularly amongst young men, often in gangs with connections to dog fighting 
and using dogs as protection (Combi 2013) but there is less to indicate these are 
representations of a large scale problem and continuance of the phenomenon and not 
merely isolated examples of an age old problem first legislated for nearly 200 years ago. 
Hallsworth (2013) has been scathing in his ridicule for the notion status dogs is exclusively 
a gang issue. Despite Harding’s contention that gangs obtain and train puppies to be 
deliberatively aggressive ‘weapon dogs’ (2012: 65), Hallsworth notes the necessary skill and 
effort required to do such a thing and doubts that ‘most young people (gang-affiliated or 
not) possess the refined dog-training capabilities of this kind‘ (2013: 32). In his view the 
issue is one of a moral panic with the evidence of gangs using status dogs to be one of a: 
…continual self referential feedback loop whereby various control agents, 
including the police, journalists, practitioners and politicians, end up quoting each 
other about a problem everyone takes for granted and which must be serious 
(because everyone keeps telling everyone else it is) (2011: 398). 
As Burley (2008: 16) points out, our society has been persistently inclined to judge this 
particular group negatively and this translates to an inability to see the potential to exploit 
the opportunities presented by the relationship between a young person and their dog, 
and instead ‘the owning of the dog does little more in society than bolster the image of 
the young person as a ‘problem’’. In the minds of most young people however the dog 
may never have been a manifestation of any oppositional stance because one study found 
only in London were particular breeds acquired as accessories to image, and perversely 
the same respondents felt the type of dog owned communicated nothing about the status 
of the owner (Diesel 2008: 6).
Aggression and attacks
Other statistics that have been used to confirm the existence of a problem with either 
dog control or status and dangerous dogs include the various data sets on dog bites/
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attacks. Regular visitors of domestic premises, such as those within communications 
services, the health sector and tradespeople are naturally more vulnerable and as such 
some of the most powerful statistics that underline this fact have been collected and 
issued by the Royal Mail and the Communication and Workers Union. In 2007 the total 
number of attacks upon postal workers was estimated to be more than 5000 annually 
(Morgan & Palmer 2007). The affect on individuals and the overall service delivery for 
these sectors led to the Royal Mail Group commissioning the Langley report in 2012 
which describes 82 percent of staff having either been attacked or barely managed to 
escape one, in just a single area delivery office  (2012: 9). The report is scathing in its 31
assessment of the legislative framework, ‘The existing law in England and Wales is, I repeat, 
a mess and patently inadequate to address what is a serious problem’ as was the verdict in 
relation to society’s control of the situation 'inadequate laws and sanctions do not 
encourage those whose task it is to enforce the law to do so. It is no surprise that 
enforcement seems to be patchy’ (2012: 16). The statistics convey a scale far beyond that 
which is conveyed by other dog-stranger attacks, such as those that led to the DDA. In 
the latest industry report there were still nearly 2,500 recorded dog attacks upon 
postmen and women in the UK between April 2016 and April 2017 (Royal Mail Group 
2017). The trend is one of decrease however, and is reported to be a fall of some seven 
percent on the previous year, which they accredit to their Dog Awareness campaign, but 
may also reflect the decline of the phenomenon or a response to changes in potential 
penalties. They also note that 71 percent of these attacks occurred within the garden or at 
the entrance to the property (ibid.) and as such is the reason why their campaign sought 
to change the legislation to include private spaces (as well as public). 
Hospital admissions as a result of dog attacks rose in England by 76 percent from 4,110 in 
2005 to 7,227 in 2015 (available each year from the NHS , but collated in RSPCA 32
2016a). The NHS is part of a devolved function but there are no comparable figures 
collectively published for Wales. Public Health Wales however did conduct a review of 
child deaths resulting from dog attacks (Humphreys et al. 2014) and it has also been 
reported that there was an 81 percent increase in hospital admissions between 2002/3 
and 2014 (BBC 2014), with some 800 admissions specifically between 2013 and 2015 
(Shipton 2016). Dog attacks are three times higher in areas of deprivation with people in 
 Cardiff was chosen for the this data collection for the report.31
 https://digital.nhs.uk/article/4144/Hospital-care.32
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Merseyside most likely to fall victim (NHS 2014) and the cost to the NHS in England for 
just 2009 was estimated to be £3.3 million (Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
Committee 2013). Data for bites or attacks of humans however is inherently flawed. Not 
all victims will seek medical attention for a bite (Oxley et al. 2017; Westgarth et al. 2018). 
Those that do, may only see a GP and the information may go no further. If the victim 
attends an Accident and Emergency Department they may not be sufficiently 
knowledgeable about dog breeds and neither may the medical staff be accurate when 
entering the information into hospital records, nor is it a notifiable incident. If someone is 
knocked down and injured by a dog - perhaps an accident by an over-excited pet rather 
than any form of aggression - this will also be recorded, rather spuriously, as a dog attack 
(Orritt 2014). If someone is readmitted for their injuries this would also be double 
recorded. Epidemiologists also struggle with the denominator - the baselines used to 
assess the risk of a genuine dog bite in society - but have recently concluded, by using the 
most robust methods and all available data, that the dog breed responsible for the most 
(in total, a third) of all bites is the German Shepherd, whereas the Doberman, Jack Russell, 
Pit Bull and Chow Chow account for just 7 percent each (Morgan et al. 2017). Four out 
of five of these breeds, of course, are not banned in the UK.
Detailed information on the rare tragedy of a human death resulting from a dog attack is 
also extremely difficult to ascertain, but the Office of National Statistics has recorded 63 
deaths between 1992 and 2015 (ONS 2016) and 15 deaths between 1981 and 1991 
which is an increase from an average of 1.4 deaths per year to 4.5 after the introduction 
of the DDA. A recent study in Spain has determined that breed specific laws do not seem 
to have produced any reduction in fatalities caused by dog bites during the past decade 
(Mora et al. 2018), whereas in the UK, far less is known about the victims to enable such 
analysis. The ONS publish no detail beyond the total number of deaths per year and 
instead this information can only be gleaned from tracking media reports, accepting all the 
inherent flaws with determining: dog breed; ownership of the dog; which dog in a multi-
animal household was responsible; the background and behaviour of the dog; and the 
circumstances leading up to and immediately preceding the death of that person. 
Although the statistics reveal that elderly women are at an increased risk of succumbing 
to dog-bite related injuries, it is young children who are most vulnerable, and in most 
circumstances the dog is also known to the victim (Mannion et al. 2015; Van de Voorde & 
Rijken 2017: 159-160; Sarcey et al. 2017). This would rather contradict the notion of 
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stranger attacks in public by dogs used for fighting, as was the justification for BSL. 
However, as above, and as Crosby (2017: 205) notes, more information is desperately 
needed, ‘Why does the lack of investigation matter? A half-hearted approach fails to 
address core concerns and needs of trainers, owners, the public and the legal system, 
which at the very least might help us develop a evidence-based approach to prevention’. 
Statutory agency reports into two tragic child deaths in recent years have highlighted the 
missed opportunities to prevent them ever occurring and also warned of the need to 
learn from these incidents as well as radically change procedures and legislation - the UK’s 
first known Serious Case Review following the death of a 7-month old baby ‘Child Q’ in 
Northamptonshire (Fox 2014) as a result of an attack by the family’s pet (but illegally 
kept) Pit Bull, and the Coroner’s report following the death of 14 year old Jade Anderson 
killed by more than one (non s1) dog at a friend’s house (Walsh 2014).
The Guide Dogs for the Blind Association currently report more than 100 incidents of 
guide dogs being attacked by other dogs per year (Guide Dogs 2018) with the total 
veterinary costs to the Guide Dogs’ stock of over £34,500. Between 2010 and 2016 
attacks have increased by a mean of three per month to 11.2, but it is acknowledged this 
may be due in part to increased reporting (Moxon 2016: 10). Owners of the attacking 
dog were present in over three quarters of cases and would have been aware of the 
guide dog’s clearly visible working harness, which the majority were wearing at the time. 
The trauma of the attack for the owner and the dog cannot be underestimated and it can 
be long term, with 20 percent of dogs needing time off from working and many left 
unable to ever return. The cost of the withdrawal and replacement of these assistance 
dogs was estimated to be over £600,000 to the Guide Dog charity in one five year study 
which saw the forced retirement of 13 dogs (ibid.). Dog attacks are not, however, limited 
to humans and to other dogs (see Winter 2017 for estimates of dog-on-dog attacks), and 
the British Horse Society have reported between three and 15 incidents of horses being 
attacked each month, since they began recording such statistics in 2010 (RSPCA 2016a: 
31). Horse and other livestock attacks are less likely to be considered part of a status dog 
problem given their rural location in most incidents, however they must be considered a 
strong indication of a wider societal problem with irresponsible ownership and general 
dog control.
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Pit Bulls - a danger or a distraction?
‘The Pit Bull Terrier is no villain, nor is British society the victim of this breed. The 
victim here is a dog that has found itself subject to a staggering degree of 
inhumanity on the part of society that has lost all moral bearings in relation to its 
relations with non-humans’ (Hallsworth 2011).
Given that BSL, embodied in s1 of the DDA, is predicated upon the notion that specific 
breeds or, more accurately, types of dog are born dangerous, and the threat of dog attacks 
to the human population can be controlled through the elimination of those types of dog, 
it is important to examine the evidence for such claims as well as the wider context of 
such legislation. There is sufficient anecdotal evidence and media reports to suggest the 
wider public has felt, and may still feel, threatened by certain breeds of dog (Burley 2008; 
Rollins 2014) but the reason why is far more difficult to unearth. As has already been 
discussed the risk of being bitten by a dog is very small - the UK Government estimated 
this to be 740 people per 100,000 (Defra 2011) - and the risk of that dog being of a 
banned type is even smaller (a risk which is unaffected by the ban given the evidence 
previously discussed that PBTs exist in significant numbers, confirmed by numbers of 
prosecutions and the number on the Index of Exempted Dogs) and the vast majority of 
people will never have been near a dog fight, so what explains this fear? Certainly there 
have been a few studies linking dog aggression to breed, although how far such research 
has been communicated, in order to be influential, remains unclear. Sacks et al. (2000) 
appear to corroborate a link between aggression and breed, reporting the Pit Bull far in 
the lead for causing deaths in the USA, however the authors have acknowledged 
unreliable recording and identification methods, and warn against basing dog control 
policy on the rare occurrence of fatalities which, along with constitutional and practical 
aspects, they conclude results in there being no case for BSL. 
In 2009/10 the UK Government funded a systematic review of scientific studies to 
establish what evidence exists of the factors for human-directed aggression in dogs (Defra 
2011). This located and investigated 27,565 publications spanning 50 years of which 164 
were worthy of detailed scrutiny, from this only eight studies had sufficient quality in their 
methods as to be considered valid and none found breed as a risk factor for aggression 
(Newman 2012). It is reasonable to expect these findings to have informed the 
Government that breed or type specific legislation was not rooted in science, and that 
aggression, and therefore the risk to the public, could not be attributed to the breed/type 
  of  91 311
of dog. Instead the Government never responded to its own commissioned research, at 
the precise point in time at which the phenomenon was developing and escalating fast. 
Worse perhaps is the continued reference by Government to population bite statistics 
that have been discredited (Orritt 2014).
International warnings from the outset about the supposed effectiveness of BSL as a 
means of remedying the ‘pit bull controversy’ (Lockwood & Rindy 1987; Oropallo 1988) 
were clearly ignored. Even early studies of the UK ban concluded that it had not resulted 
in a reduction of attacks by ‘banned’ dogs; that it was failing to protect the public; and it 
was based on absence of any data to support it (Klaassen et al. 1996). Dog bites have not 
been shown to have decreased since the introduction of BSL, they have in fact increased, 
and this is attributed by many to BSL itself because of the danger of creating a false sense 
of safety around dogs that are not banned (RSPCA 2016a: 13; Clarke 2017: 91), ‘the 
increased perception of threat from specific breeds, and the lack of perceived threat from 
other breeds are essentially two sides to the same counterproductive coin’ (Creedon & Ó 
Súilleabháin 2017: 8). The origins of BSL has been discussed earlier but it is worth noting 
that at the time of introduction in the UK, the Metropolitan Police’s own report attributed 
only 34 percent of attacks to Pit Bulls, and other studies were reporting 85 percent of 
bites occurred in the dog’s home (Hughes 1998: 9), and these were not suggested to be 
the homes of dog fighters. How then legislation to remove the Pit Bulls of dog fighters 
would benefit people who were being bitten, mostly by other breeds, and mostly in their 
own (or family/friend's) homes, was never explained during the introduction of the DDA, 
nor since. Hallsworth (2011: 397) noted very few Pit Bulls implicated in human deaths 
which in its 25th anniversary of the DDA report the RSPCA quantified in more detail, 
‘thirty people have died in dog-related incidents since the DDA was enacted of which 21 
involved dogs that were not prohibited under the law. Only nine were carried out by dogs 
identified as pit bull terrier types’ (RSPCA 2016b: 3). Clarke also analysed press reports of 
fatalities between 2005 and 2013 and found 88 percent were not attributed to s1 type 
dogs (2017: 91).
One recent study also found no difference in the type of bite nor the necessary medical 
treatment between dogs that are restricted/banned and those that are not (Creedon & Ó 
Súilleabháin 2017) and Capra et al. (2009) found no difference in human-directed 
aggression between a group of rescued Pit Bulls that had been used for fighting, and a 
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group of mixed and purebred dogs. This corresponds with the successful rehabilitation and 
rehoming of the dogs used in the infamous American Footballer Michael Vick’s (see 
Strouse 2009) dog fighting ring, although interestingly these dogs had to be taken away 
from their locale, by animal rescue NGOs, across country to other states to escape the 
‘contagion of danger’ (Tarver 2013: 11).
BSL is not without its supporters, of course, as illustrated by one case study of the 
Canadian province of Manitoba, where the researchers offer evidence that restrictions on 
which breeds can be kept has appeared to protect children and young people more 
effectively from bites (Raghavan et al. 2013). However the authors do fail to examine 
other contributing factors such as a rising public fear and resultant drop in ownership of 
such dogs, accompanied by an increase in reporting, in addition to other factors which 
could be at work. Villalbí et al. (2010) report a significant decrease in hospital admissions 
from dog attacks which they attribute to stricter dog controls targeted on dogs of certain 
breeds deemed ‘potentially dangerous dogs’, but it is not possible to ascertain what 
cultural shifts and trends in dog ownership occurred as a result of restrictions. Initially at 
least BSL gave an impression it might work in the UK, with the Metropolitan Police 
reporting a huge drop in Pit Bulls being used in criminal activity, from 372 cases in 1992-3 
to 87 in 1995-6 (Hood et al. 2000). However the vast majority of scientific studies do not 
support BSL as a means of controlling or reducing dog attacks over the longterm, because: 
BSL directed against the group of breeds with the worst bite records would be 
unlikely to affect bite frequencies for long, as even with rigorous and effective 
enforcement, there are many other breeds’ individuals of which irresponsible 
owners could render dangerous (Collier 2006). 
In the face of such evidence it is legitimate to ask how the Pit Bull found itself ‘entrenched 
as the super-predator?’ (Delise 2007: 95). There are a great number of extensive and 
thorough works charting the history, role, and political, and media, representations of the 
Pit Bull, which also expose the defects in the evidence and the true nature of society’s dog 
control problem and most trace the contemporary and negative view of the Pit Bull to 
the mid 1970s in the USA (Delise 2007; Boucher 2011; Dickey 2016). In the years 
following the high profile death of a child in California the resultant crack down on dog 
fighting by law enforcement saw the media discourse confuse and mistranslate the 
inherent aggression of dog fights, with human-directed aggression:
Unbeknownst to the media, law enforcement and shelter workers, the exposure 
of this cruel and seedy subculture and their descriptions of the Pit Bull’s fierce but 
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loyal nature would strike a chord with a segment of the human population which 
has always been attracted to dogs they believe will enable them to impress or 
intimidate other humans (Delise 2007: 96). 
Thus the Pit Bull as a dog caught up in the myth of the underworld is ‘figured as carrying 
the contagion of criminality’ (Tarver 2013). Further confusion about these dogs ensued 
until ‘“Everyone knows” and “no one knows” what a “pit bull” is. Everyone knows, and no 
one knows, that “they” are dangerous’ (Garber 1997: 194). 
In their investigation of ‘Pit Bull Panic’, Cohen and Richardson (2002) found cause to be 
optimistic about people’s perceptions of Pit Bulls however there was extensive 
misinformation in circulation about aggression in dogs used for fighting, and it is worth 
nothing this research was conducted in the USA some time before the status dog 
phenomenon, at least, arose in the UK, although of course BSL was in force at that point. 
Clarke notes the rise of the Pit Bull as a ‘folk devil’ during the late 1980s in the UK when 
its 'name became a metaphor for aggressiveness and tenacity’ (2017: 88), and this 
construction of Pit Bulls as socially threatening extends of course to status dogs as well. To 
further evoke Cohen’s seminal work, certainly the notion that society desires control over 
elements it has labelled as dangerous or deviant can affect perceptions of the risk posed, 
Societies appear to be subject, very now and then, to periods of moral panic. A 
condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a 
threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and 
stereotypical fashion by the mass media (Cohen 1972: 9). 
Hallsworth certainly appears to regard the RSPCA, Harding and others as ‘moral 
entrepreneurs’ and ‘right-thinking people’ for their invention, then perpetual use, of ‘status’, 
‘weapon’, ‘devil’ and other stigmatised labels for dangerous dogs (2013: 29-34). Even 
healthcare professionals are guilty of widespread misrepresentations of dogs within peer-
reviewed journals, often demonising the dog, on which Arluke et al. (2017: 8) noted:
Of course, we cannot determine the degree to which these reports contribute to 
or merely reflect moral panic about the dangers of dogs to humans. But they are 
part of a feedback loop, providing “scientific” legitimacy to support this panic 
while at the same time being by-products of such general fear and concern.
Despite the UK Government’s ‘attempt at a Canine Genocide’ (Hallsworth 2011: 392), it 
has been claimed that Pit Bull numbers only increased as a result of the DDA and its new 
found status (Parkinson 2009; Hallsworth 2011) but the reasons may be more complex 
given that the knowledge of the banned types of dog was low in a recent study of dog 
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owners in the UK (Oxley 2012), which in itself has further implications for the reliable 
reporting of breed type in dog attack incidents. There have of course been other effects 
from the legislation. Being in possession of an ‘outlaw’ dog has its own stigma for owners 
not seeking to confer a tough or aggressive status and there is likely to be an effect on the 
dog itself given the reaction to them by dog owners and non-owners in public situations, 
and as such owners may intentionally misrepresent the breed to avoid the stigma (Twining 
et al. 2000) of being ‘denounced as “chavs”, “hoodies”, “soap-dodgers”, “thugs” and the 
criminal underclass’ (Harding 2017: 72). One effect of the legislation - returned to within 
the findings from the empirical data in Chapter Eight - is that of the substitute harm of 
creating appeal in similar tough-looking, status, dogs amongst groups ill-equipped to care 
for their needs or intent upon using them in criminal or anti-social behaviour, as noted ‘the 
prohibition of certain breeds has directly increased the allure of behaviourally similar, but 
marginally physically dissimilar breeds, in order to circumvent legislation’ (Maher et al. 2017: 
147; see also Dobson 2011). Hussain also noted this effect, ’Prince George's County, 
Maryland, which bans pit bulls and Rottweilers, has, since the ban's institution, witnessed an 
introduction into the community of large, powerful dogs not subject to the ban’ (2006: 
2874). This would look set to continue while BSL remains, as Kaspersson notes it can only 
be reversed through repealing that part of the statute, ‘by abolishing breed bans the 
attraction of Pit Bulls for the ‘wrong’ kind of owners will diminish, rather than increasing it 
as the outlawing of certain breeds does’ (2008: 221). 
It may be asked where next for BSL then? Hussain notes that internationally breed bans 
merely follow whatever is the popular breed of the moment (and therefore involved in 
more incidents), referring to this as the ‘slippery slope’, citing Germany which started with 
just a few restricted breeds and ended up with a law governing any dog over 15.7 inches 
tall with a weight of 44 pounds (2006: 2874). Calls to add dog breeds to the banned list 
have been made during regular intervals since the DDA was brought into force (most 
recently PETA 2018) but this has been resisted largely, it would seem, down to some of 
the political factors to be discussed in the next Chapter. There is also little to suggest 
within the current discourse that repeal is in the UK’s near future either, despite the trend 
internationally including dozens of municipals and States in the USA. Cooke reviews this 
and repeal in other contemporary countries including the recent move by the 
Netherlands reportedly due to doubt over the effectiveness of the measures (2017: 
192-198). Of course any evaluation of the effects of reversal could be pivotal to 
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convincing agencies in the UK of the merits of repeal. But could policy makers be already 
awakening to the dog control crisis? The policy network has drawn attention to the 
deficiencies of the current regime - our communities are no safer (Hussain 2006) as a 
result of BSL and indeed bans on certain breeds are merely ‘symbolic actions of control 
and are meant to make people feel safe’, (Franklin 2013: 55) and it is argued the 
investment used to enforce BSL would be better spent on community safety programmes 
and educating owners and non-owners about dog welfare and behaviour (Ibid.). In 2018 
the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee conducted an inquiry into the DDA 
and published a report (Efra 2018d) in October 2018 condemning BSL and the dog 
control legislative framework in general, although from the written and verbal evidence 
provided by Ministers during proceedings and in the surrounding media coverage, the 
Government remains unmoved, ‘the Government says the Act is helping to prevent dog 
attacks and that banning breeds that have been developed for fighting is critical to helping 
to protect the public’ (BBC Radio 4: 2018)(see also Chapter Ten).
Dogs in the news
The role of the media in reporting status and dangerous dogs has already been alluded to, 
however its function and influence bear further scrutiny to see what contribution, if any, it 
makes to the dog problem in society. Before turning to the British press, and given both 
the modern day Pit Bull and BSL emanate from the USA, it is worth exploring the 
influence exerted upon the issues surrounding dog control by their own press first. 
Extensive study has been made of this area by several researchers, Delise (2007) went 
back to examine reports of bull breeds throughout the 19th and 20th centuries 
discovering in the main positive headlines and content charting these dogs as loyal, hard-
working guardians. Many bull breeds were becoming popular in urban environments by 
the 1900s no doubt increasing in popularity when President Theodore Roosevelt brought 
Pete, a bull terrier  to the White House, although he was later exiled to the family’s Long 33
Island home after perpetually biting staff and visitors, and then tearing the bottom out of 
the French Ambassador’s pants. Roosevelt was apparently insouciant to Pete’s attacks on 
his cabinet ministers, which may or may not be indicative of a general view of dog bites at 
the time, attributing them to ‘his attitudes towards their political stances’ (Coren 2002: 
 There are conflicting accounts of the breed (interestingly reflecting a central problem that persists today) 33
although it seems certain whatever derivative he was a bull breed of some sort.
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279). A similar fate awaited Major, Franklin D Roosevelt’s German Shepherd after he 
attacked Prime Minister Ramsey McDonald, the press, never failing to miss an opportunity 
for symbolism, made much of the origin of the breed and its victim, as the world poised 
on the brink of World War Two (Ibid.).
Other dogs became famous, not because of who their owners were, but because of the 
human deaths in which they were implicated. Delise (2007) and Dickey (2016) elaborate 
upon numerous accounts of these attacks in great detail, revealing the true nature of the 
incident which often involved bites inflicted postmortem following a natural human death; 
or prior and sustained abuse of the dog; or the culpability of an entirely different (often 
non-proscribed) breed than the one named in the article. Each era though has had its 
‘monster’ breed and, as has been seen, this has more often not been the Pit Bull, 
particularly in the UK, nevertheless it was the Pit Bull that spurred legislation to ban or 
restrict ownership of specific breeds, largely believed to be due to its use as a fighting dog. 
Certainly Cohen and Richardson’s study revealed the perceptions of Pit Bulls as fighting 
dogs to have been informed by the media’s non-factual representations (attributed in part 
to ‘pack journalism’ where reporters regurgitate and amplify inaccuracies in stories they 
have read in other respected papers) and although Pit Bulls were demonised by only a 
small number of participants of their survey, they did find a strong ‘recognition that the 
news media exaggerate and exacerbate any real or potential problems that may exist with 
Pit Bulls’ (2002: 314). Dickey notes the media’s representation of dogs in criminal activities, 
with the Pit Bull as the accomplice to the crack-dealing ‘urban predator’, evident in data 
records charting the use of ‘crack cocaine’ and ‘Pit Bull’ in published materials between 
1986 and 1990 where their trajectories are exactly the same (2016: 185).
What is also interesting is the way in which media reporting of attacks in the USA has 
changed, whereas at one time the press felt some obligation to provide a reason for the 
dog’s actions, demonstrating a respect for the animal, its emotions and behaviour, in more 
recent times the media representations can be described as more ‘sterile’ and lacking in 
any compassion. Delise provides examples from the late 1800s which used the language 
of human emotion - although not excusing the dog - which guides the reader to an 
appreciation of the complexities of dog behaviour (2007: 58-9). As reporting changed in 
the 1980s so did the relationship between the press and the readers, and a case of 
feeding the beast ensued as the ‘media recognised that Pit Bill attack stories elicited an 
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emotional reaction from their audience, the media went into overdrive…churning out 
emotionally charged articles about Pit Bull anatomy and behaviours that were based on 
rumours, myths and unproven claims by both experts and laymen’ (Delise 2007: 96). 
Boucher notes the pervasive myth of the Pit Bull’s locking jaw and despite being 
scientifically proven to be untrue (in any breed of dog) ‘the media has continuously 
reported on this so-called ‘fact’ for decades, and far-reaching acceptance of this myth has 
only caused the frenzy against pit bulls to grow’ (2011: 25). Dickey however notes ‘what 
appears in the local newspapers and on local television is as much a reflection of the 
public’s obsessions as it is of the media’s agenda’ and as news outlets acquire most of their 
Pit Bull stories on tip offs from the public or local government, they claim they aren’t told 
of incidents involving other breeds (2016: 198).
As the sector of population being primed to fear Pit Bulls grew, so did the sector who 
sought out such dogs, as seen in the registrations of Pit Bulls with the United Kennel Club 
rising 30 percent between 1983 to 1984 (Delise 2007: 96). In 1986 there were 350 
articles in the USA about Pit Bulls (Boucher 2011: 31), by 1987 this had risen to 850 
(Delise 2007: 100) and this hysteria was set to continue. Thus the Pit Bull’s 
transformational journey is a very recent phenomena in itself, starting in the USA in the 
late 1970s and breaking into full stride in the aforementioned ‘Pit Bull Panic’ through the 
early 1980s, at least in part attributed by most researchers to ‘media misrepresentation, 
pejorative imaging and associated myths’ (Harding 2012: 235). Lockwood and Rindy 
(1987) reviewed the press clippings of 1,100 newspapers over a period of nine months in 
1986 and found an over-reporting of Pit Bull attacks versus other breeds, and a significant 
mis-identification of what constitutes a Pit Bull, both of which call into question any study 
of bites and fatalities reliant on media representations. As to why such stories of dog 
attacks captivate the press, we can look to Ericson’s explanations on the essential 
ingredient of deviancy as a ‘defining characteristic of what journalists regard as 
newsworthy’ (1998: 84), which he describes as the essence of both the story and the 
methods the reporter will employ, explaining further, ‘Normal crime is not news; only 
abnormal crime is. If there is no deviance, there is no story’ (Ibid: 88) and the nature of 
dog attacks, I argue, appears to fulfil this criteria.
Perhaps some of the best explanations for the nature of the media coverage comes from 
one of their own, journalist Debra Saunders of the San Francisco Chronicle who on 30 
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July 1990 wrote:
The Pit Bull scare illustrates how skittish we have become…skittish and ineffective, 
because this fad scare will do next to nothing to lessen dog attacks…Fad scares 
have been on the rise since we first learned about AIDS. Stations found that their 
ratings shot up whenever they ran an AIDS exposé or [a program on] the dangers 
of crack cocaine. They saw scaring viewers sells…Pit Bulls make for good local TV 
because they require no expertise. No need for facts, just get the best teeth 
shot…There aren’t a whole lot of Pit Bull owners to alienate…There are no Pit 
Bull advertisers. Fad scares scare and soothe at the same time. If we stop taking 
crack or get rid of a nearby Pit Bull we’re saved. Unlike the Middle East or acid 
rain, the Pit Bill problem is easy: Get rid of Pit Bulls. It won’t upset an ecological 
food chain. No jobs will be lost. Most people won’t be offended (cited in Dickey 
2016: 190-191).
In the UK Podberscek (1994) produced an analysis of articles on dog attacks in five major 
daily newspapers (one tabloid and four broadsheets) and their Sunday editions from 1988 
to 1992 and discovered a greater intensity of interest in dog incidents from 1989 to 1991. 
There was far less coverage in 1988 and 1992, either side of the frenzied coverage of dog 
attacks, mostly on children, and the resultant legislation. The German Shepherd and 
Rottweiler featured far more frequently and in a negative context in 1989 and 1990, with 
the Pit Bull dramatically overtaking them with 53 percent of such headlines in 1991 
(although the Rottweiler had 70 percent of headlines at its height), all of which correlates, 
of course, with the debates within Parliament at that time as to which breeds were to be 
blamed and then banned. It never seemed to occur to the press that they were reporting 
on relatively short-lived trends in both breed popularity and dog bites, and the one 
common denominator was the owners . Press cuttings and press releases by the main 34
stakeholders, from around the time of the introduction of the DDA, that I have 
collected , would appear to further confirm Podberscek's findings. More measured pieces 35
referencing dog behaviour experts or concerns raised about the effectiveness of BSL are 
more obscure, buried deeper in editorials or less well-known publications. The main 
 It should be noted that in some cases of dog bites there have been clinical explanations for the aggression 34
such as the dog being in pain from an unknown source/illness. Unfortunately it hasn't been possible to 
collect robust data on this as often the dog is rehomed or euthanased, and owners who retain dogs that 
bite but do not seek veterinary assistance are unlikely to participate in any study. There are recognised 
conditions however that can explain aggressive dog behaviour and thus it has not been as a result of 
irresponsible ownership. As an owner of a rescue dog that has bitten I am also aware of the conditioning 
through negative reinforcement that can happen to dogs where that punishment has led to aggression, 
indeed this is sadly the situation my dog experienced, who was beaten for the early part of his life by his 
previous owners.
 As part of a personal and professional archive, I have collected a number of press releases and articles 35
since my introduction to the phenomenon of status and dangerous dogs around 2008, however I was 
extremely fortunate that several participants interviewed for this study were kind enough to supply me with 
copies of their own files. These provided a wide range of articles from publications from around the time of 
the introduction of the DDA and also in the intervening years.
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tabloids and broadsheets contain emotive and alarming headlines and pictures of injuries, 
such as ‘Baker plans to outlaw savage dogs’ (The Times) and ‘Destroy these disgusting dogs’ 
(Independent). These plus: ’Savaged: Baker to Wipe our mad dog menace’ (Mirror), ‘An 
Unpredictable Fighting Machine’ (also Independent), ‘Girl savaged by Pit Bull is scarred for 
life says surgeon’ (Daily Telegraph), and ‘Killers on the Street’ (Evening Standard) are all 
from 21 May 1991 three days after the attack on six year old Rukhsana Khan.
In their analysis Orritt and Harper 2015 highlight the common existence of an ‘angelic 
victim’ and ‘demonic dog/offender’ and news reports ‘…typified by negativity and 
unrepresentative prototypes, with audiences inferring these extreme cases as grounds for 
punitive legislation. The populist and reactionary nature of modern politics contributes to a 
self-perpetuating cycle of inadequate legislation, increased public concern, and emotional 
news coverage’. Certainly this was evident during the height of the status dog 
phenomenon which saw women’s publications fight against any blame being attributed to 
parents or any explanations as to why small children were being attacked and/or killed, 
‘Most sane people are certain of one thing - the child is innocent in the purest meaning of 
that word. Wherever the fault may rest, surely no one would blame the victim, small and 
harmless’. And this article, entitled ‘Real Life Public Terror: Mums insult Dead Kids’ (Take a 
Break 4 November 2010) denigrated in no uncertain terms those keeping Pit Bulls and 
similar looking dogs, alongside case studies and photographs of dead children and other 
horrific incidents. As Clarke notes a, ’dog bite fatality involving an unremarkable breed and 
adult is not nearly as newsworthy as a Bull Terrier and a child’ (2017: 91). The 
representation of both the angelic victim and the dangerous menace to social order and 
wellbeing posed by dogs - with these breeds and their owners depicted as threatening 
‘outsiders’ and ‘dangerous others’ - directly corresponds with Garland’s (2001) culture of 
control and the ‘sanctification of victims’. Any desire to understand the deep complexities 
of a situation that led to an attack on a child, or indeed any concern for the welfare of the 
dog, is nullified, given it may represent the ultimate insensitivity to the grieving family and 
wider community. 
A potential catalyst for much of the wider media awakening to the status dog 
phenomenon in England and Wales was the murder of Oluwaseyi ‘Seyi’ Ogunyemi, by a 
gang with dogs. Although Seyi was not killed by the dog - he was in fact knifed to death by 
the dog’s owner - the use of the dog to attack and restrain Seyi was enough to fully 
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implicate it, in media reports, in this heinous murder. The attackers were also apprehended 
using innovative adaptions of DNA techniques and a new dog DNA database 
(Bhattacharya 2010). Clearly the inherent deviancy of this incident, plus its unique facets, 
gave it instant newsworthiness. Already engaged in research into gangs, Harding readily 
admits the media coverage of this murder drew his attention to the use of dogs by young 
people (2012: 3), he does not however admit that it was an isolated incident that has not 
been seen since. He also doesn’t acknowledge the dog’s peripheral and largely irrelevant 
role in what was example of a tragic long-running feud between two gangs, nor the 
limitations of exploring the phenomenon of status dogs through the solitary lens of gang-
warfare. Part of Harding’s research involved a media discourse analysis of 12 newspapers 
between 2009 and 2011 which did, however, find that ‘without doubt these discursive 
strategies are used to manipulate our perceptions regarding how we view the breeds 
involved and their owners’ (2012: 47). Given that one survey found that a quarter of its 
respondents based their knowledge of the most common status dog - the staffie - upon 
news reports (Vet Times 2011), this would appear to be somewhat troubling for certain 
breeds of dog at least if the content of those stories contains inaccuracies regarding any 
link between breed and aggression or the use of dogs by gangs, as an indication of the 
scale of a problem. The issue could be one of media hyperbole, whereas Hallsworth says it 
is one of media myth (2011), but Harding believes his findings contradict this and that the 
headlines are reflective of a real problem (2012: 49). Reviewing my own research in this 
area, I would agree that the media has certainly played a significant part in the social 
construction of the dog problem, but it has focussed on the wrong labels for the 
characterisations, causes and solutions (Maher et al. 2017).
Recent research into the nature of media coverage in the UK examined the websites of 
three national newspapers from the beginning of 2013 until the end of 2014. These were 
found to be consistent with previous research in revealing biased opinion in relation to 
bull breeds irrespective of the absence of any evidence that such dogs are responsible for 
more bites than any other breed. The authors also noted, in one example, the difference 
between two newspapers in reporting (in the aforementioned death of Jade Anderson) 
the breeds of dog involved and found other evidence of guesswork by journalists on 
breed (Kikuchi & Oxley 2017). Clarke implicates the media in facilitating fear in an 
increasingly risk-averse society, citing the example of a nine-fold increase in the mention of 
‘risk’ in publications by the UK’s media between 1994 and 2000 (Furedi 2006). A focus on 
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child safety, along with compelling visual representations of dogs attacking humans, supplies 
the necessary ingredients to sustain society’s fears.
There have also been very significant changes to the way in which news is transmitted 
and is accessible during the past few decades, not least of all the introduction of twenty-
four-hour TV news channels  and of course the internet. Dickey (2016: 157-8) argues the 36
abundance of outlets makes it harder for people to filter out the untruths, particularly as it 
facilitates a proliferation of the self-appointed expert. The advent of social media during 
the past decade or so has had further, potentially larger, connotations for determining 
facts. It can also be a force for good, of course, not least of all providing new opportunities 
for anti-BSL campaigners to network, and work to dispel the myths that the media is less 
keen to address given the lack of deviancy (as per Ericson 1998 above) or focussing event, 
rendering the topic less newsworthy. Kikuchi and Oxley (2017: 66) observe the great 
potential of social media for further research using analytics and collecting photographic 
records, and certainly there is scope for monitoring injuries and identifying breeds more 
accurately. In addition to the benefits of social media, Dickey notes the communication of 
the ‘sinister other’, ‘some animal advocates displayed a cringe-worthy lack of cultural 
sensitivity by first equating breedism with human racism, then using coded racial language 
to condemn certain pit bull owners’, with an emerging theme that Pit Bulls only become 
an acceptable as a pet when owned by middle class white people (2016: 251).
The media construct of the dog problem is not without some foundation and this would 
correspond with Garland’s view that the media do not produce an interest in crime or 
punitive responses, more that it ‘has tapped into, then dramatized and reinforced, a new 
public experience’ (2001: 158). But the characterisation of the dog and its underclass 
owner, as the dangerous ‘other’ or ‘outsider’, serves to only deepen the alarm about the 
risk they pose to society. The issue, I argue, follows Garland’s assessment of the period 
during which the DDA emerged:
In the 1990s the pattern was for high visibility crime cases to become the focus of a 
great deal of media attention and public outrage, issuing in urgent demands that 
something be done. These cases typically involve a predatory individual, an innocent 
victim (often a child), and a prior failure of the criminal justice system to impose 
effective controls - their regularity reflecting the structure of middle-class fears and 
mass media news values rather than the statistical frequency of events. Almost 
inevitably, the demand is for more effective penal control (Garland 2001: 172-173). 
 CNN, launched in 1980, was the first twenty-four-hour news channel.36
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He references several examples of legislative responses, amongst which I argue the DDA 
sits very comfortably as an example of ‘the rapid response system that now characterises 
policy making in this field’ (2001: 172-173).
4.4 Summary
The chapter has presented a documentary analysis of the definitions of both dangerous 
and status dogs - the very centre of the dog control problem, and explored the evidence 
supporting or refuting the problem, as set out in the research questions. It is clear that 
there is some compelling evidence of the very real nature of some form of a dog problem 
existing in society, not least of all the data that demonstrates the attacks upon 
communication workers, young people and other animals, which illustrates it is not merely 
a moral panic or a media construction. However the real nature of what dog problem 
exists in society is being obfuscated by the perpetual myth that only certain dogs are 
dangerous and will attack and injure, and those dogs are only owned by a certain ‘outsider’ 
element in society, and as such indications of a culture of control have been revealed 
during this process. As intended by Garland (2004: 185), it is necessary to look to the 
social and cultural arrangements, and their modification via economic, media and the 
institutional systems, in order to determine the perceptions of danger and to begin to 
understand the answers to the ‘question of how we fail “to recognise the other”, how we 
limit compassionate identification, how we establish distance and demonisation’. This 
process will continue in the next chapter which considers the politicisation of dog control.
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Chapter Five 
The politicisation of dog control 
5.1 Introduction
The following chapter is the last of the findings from my documentary analysis and focuses 
on how the legislative and policy responses to dog issues in society have become 
politicised, starting in Victorian times and escalating in recent decades. I continue in the 
vein of a history of the present, mindful that ‘History is like therapy for the present: it makes 
it talk about its parents’ (Jasanoff, 2017: 6). The chapter is constructed in order to address 
two of the research questions via a somewhat chronological and interwoven path, namely 
an examination of what ‘solutions’ emerged in relation to the perceived problem, and 
secondly the political processes evident within the policy responses. There follow seven 
sub-sections starting with the earliest responses to dog control issues in the 1800s before 
a consideration of the importance of pets within the political and social spheres. The 
political context of solutions is examined via discussion on the media, party politics and 
BSL. Dogs as a symbol of class war is considered before following the development of 
responses to the perceived failings of the DDA in its immediate aftermath. The emergence 
of the status dog phenomenon in the mid-2000s is explored before a final discussion on 
some of the most recent policy and legislative amendments designed to tackle the 
dangerous dog problem.
5.2 A Victorian dog problem
Dog control arguably became a political issue in the UK from as early as the 1860s when 
growing concern within Victorian society in relation to the serious zoonotic disease, rabies, 
led to the introduction of regulations. Walton (1979) discusses this subject in terms of the 
wider debates at that time regarding the primary rights of the individual versus the 
interference of the state in the name of protecting wider society. He charts the initial 
increase in dog ownership amongst the growing middle classes, who had begun to use 
dogs for more than just sport/hunting, and namely to put on show and to impress. This led 
to the creation of the Kennel Club to regulate dog breeds and dog shows and trials, and 
the market in pedigrees quickly became very lucrative, ‘the dog was becoming a status 
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symbol’ (Ibid. 222). This new fascination and use for dogs expanded rapidly amongst the 
lower classes and by the 1880s there existed ‘a full scale dog industry…catering for a mass 
market’ (Ibid. 224). There were fringe consequences to this emerging industry and indeed 
the contingent of lower classes not participating in the showing and breeding of pedigrees, 
but nevertheless keeping pet dogs, were blamed for the exponential increase in stray dogs 
(McCarthy 2016: 562). This was a problem that was also aggravated by puppies becoming 
more costly due to the need for a licence once they reached 6 months of age. By the 
following decade the Metropolitan police were collecting and destroying 20,000 dogs per 
year. These dogs were deemed to carry and spread disease, cases of hydrophobia were 
well publicised, panic grew, and thus emerged the ‘Victorian dog problem’, which soon led 
to the formation of a House of Lords Select Committee on rabies (HL Deb 17 May 1887 
vol 315 c246). As this frenzied response intensified, ‘powerful vested interests were 
involved, and a brisk debate soon began over what form the control of dogs and their 
owners ought to take, and how far it should go’ (Walton 1979: 227). 
After the consideration of import controls; expanding police powers; raising the cost of 
the licence (specifically to out-price the lower classes); and an increase in resources to 
enable the total destruction of stray dogs, the Victorian authorities settled upon muzzling 
as the most immediate and effective method to control rabies. This was a highly 
controversial and contentious move but the perceived link between muzzling and a drop 
in rabies cases only served to encourage Parliament to act further with a Rabies Order to 
enable Councils to introduce and enforce muzzling irrespective of the presence of rabies. 
However ‘dogs were part of the family and in intervening here the state was meddling in 
issues outside its remit’ (Keane 1998: 92). Local politicians were unwilling to act when 
faced with such strong resentment within their communities when it was deemed, 
amongst other things, to ‘constitute an unnecessary infringement of civil liberties’ (Walton 
1979: 233). Frustrated by this, Parliament empowered itself to act, however, once rabies 
appeared to be under control, muzzling orders were dropped, as national politicians also 
recognised the hostility the move attracted from constituents. This pattern was repeated 
over many years as the disease picture increased and decreased over time. 
McCathy notes the transition from the use of the word ‘disease’ to ’dangerous’ and 
connects the historical accounts to the contemporary in order to illuminate how state 
responses relate to the social controls introduced which target certain groups such as the 
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working class noting that, ‘by situating current debates about dangerous dogs in a historical 
timeframe, it has been argued that we can learn much about the ways that political 
responses to human–animal relations are regulated by the state’ (2015: 12). The Victorian 
dog control problem contained many of the same features of the policy process as 
presents today, with clear issues defining the concerns (particularly the epidemiology of 
the disease); the existence of a varied and diverse policy community (then consisting of 
groups du jour, such as the Anti-Muzzling Association, as well as the enduring RSPCA); the 
growing media reported on the focussing events of major outbreaks of rabies; and 
copious solutions were proffered and debated. There was also an abundance of political 
will eager to address the problem. Keane follows Walton in charting the political activities 
of some of the main actors of the policy community who were actively reflecting the 
views of society at that time, citing the National Canine Defence League’s  Annual 37
Report of 1899-1900, which stated with notable clarity that ‘the dog lover as a political 
force is not to be despised’ (Keane 1998: 94). 
The debates around out of control and dangerous dogs didn’t end with the elimination of 
rabies of course. A Victorian measure still in force, and often utilised, was passed in the 
form of The Dogs Act 1871 (see Chapter Three for the analysis of legislation). It did not 
however directly criminalise the keeping, or being in control of, a dangerous dog, instead it 
was more to introduce moderate penalties where an individual had not complied with 
their court order. There is little to suggest this legislation followed huge public outcry or a 
rise in incidents involving dogs, but instead was more likely as a result of the tidying and 
ordering of the administrative elements of dog control not covered within the criminal 
law introduced by the Town and Police Clauses Act 1847.
Perhaps in recognition of the fundamental opposition to state interference in what has so 
often been deemed a private, family issue, there has been an absence of animal related 
issues in election manifestos and mainstream political business. Despite this, dogs and their 
negative impact on communities, in various guises, continued to develop as a much 
politicised, often highly charged, issue. Keane (1998) examines the development of the 
animal focussed NGOs from when they sprang up, throughout the latter part of the 
1800s, to maturation and widespread prominence, adapting their campaigning styles to 
the broader political movements of their time. Large scale campaigns with strong imagery, 
 Renamed the Dogs Trust in 2003.37
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petitions and protests ensured animal issues, such as the highly contentious practice of 
vivisection on dogs, remained prominent on the political agenda, even where solutions 
were not immediately secured. In relation to the control of dogs, there is a clear recurrent 
theme throughout this thesis that policy and legislative measures have sometimes 
developed in conflict with, and in spite of, the animal welfare and rights agenda. As 
Schaffner (2011) aptly details, the status of animals in law is one of property and the 
existence of animal control laws in most nations is to define and often curtail animal 
ownership, and the vast majority of these rules are in relation to dogs. Disease and the 
physical threat they can sometimes pose, coupled - and conflicted - with their close 
relationship to humans, has therefore afforded dogs a unique status, compared to other 
non-human animals, in politics and the public consciousness.
5.3 The political and social climate
Moving forward in time, the following sub-section of the chapter considers the rising 
political prominence of dog control issues and some of the social factors during this 
period that influenced rapid changes to the political views, of the time, on dangerous dogs. 
As dog attacks took on a new significance (despite no obvious deviation from previous 
patterns) within public debate, more radical proposals began to surface along with what I 
describe as a purposeful or irresponsible attribution to dog fighting trends. 
In answer to their own question of ‘does the treatment of pets possess any political 
importance?’ political scientists Hunter and Brisbin, contend that ‘the treatment of pets is 
intertwined with politics’ and ‘the identification of an animal as a pet, demands for political 
action, the practice of political institutions, public policies, and criminal and regulatory law 
enforcement agencies and courts, affect the lives of animals’ (2016: 10). They chart in 
more detail, throughout their book, the areas of concern for animals prevalent on the 
political agenda and note the few studies that have even sought to examine the influence 
of pet ownership on voting preferences, as well as the role of dog ownership in major 
election campaigns. Perhaps the politicisation of dog control however was in fact solidified 
in the UK with the introduction of the Dangerous Dogs Act, a proposition supported, I 
would argue, by the Act’s persistence beyond a quarter of a century. For, as it is argued in 
this thesis, it has no foundation in science nor is it defended with the use of statistical or 
any other robust evidence to prove it is working to reduce dog attacks, its existence 
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therefore is one, I argue, the evidence suggests serves only political symbolism. Questions 
have been raised as to the true nature and intention of the legislation ‘it's [s1] punitive 
rather than controlling’ (Cooper, T. cited in Clare 2012). Previous legislation for controlling 
dogs was not without controversy either but in contrast was, crucially, not intended to - 
and in the main did not - result in owned dogs being seized and euthanased where no 
disease or history of violent aggression existed. The DDA is therefore roundly regarded as 
a ‘typically political act’ (Sweeney 2013: 241).
There exists, outside of the dog policy sphere, an extensive body of work critiquing the 
DDA usually with specific reference to section 1, ‘in public debate the Dangerous Dogs 
Act…has become a synonym for any unthinking reflex legislative response to media hype.’ 
(Hood et al. 2000: 283). The website ‘Politics’ ran a poll of ‘What's the worst British law of 
all time?’ listing the DDA amongst a total of eight options and labelling it as: 
The daddy of bad legislation. A law so terrible it became a byword for how not to 
do it. The Dangerous Dog's Act was a reaction to a much-publicised series of dog 
attacks. It was classic something-must-be-done territory, in which the thing which 
was done showed all the hallmarks of what happens when that territory is 
entered into (Dunt 2015). 
One study reviewed the Daily and Sunday Telegraphs which ran 35 editorials between 
1991 and 1998 citing the DDA as the epitome of bad regulation, and thus concluded 
therefore ‘it is “a truth universally acknowledged” that the UK’s Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 
is a cardinal example of poor, ill-thought-out regulation’ (Hood et al 2000: 282). But could 
legislation of this nature - which had very significant consequences (the death of 
thousands of pet dogs) - have really been predicated merely on political goals? There is of 
course more context in the decades leading up to the Bill’s introduction to first be 
considered. 
Molloy (2011) posits that the discourse surrounding dangerous dogs in the latter part of 
the twentieth century was influenced by early press reports in the 1970s about the 
aggression of, and attacks, by guard dogs - specifically German Shepherds. Two high profile 
and tragic cases lit the debate resulting in Parliament passing the Guard Dogs Act in 1975, 
laying out the controls under which such dogs could be kept. What differs entirely from 
the debates 15 years later, however, is the attribution of aggression to specific breeds, in 
fact in 1975 it was accepted that a dog attack was as a result of the circumstances specific 
to that individual dog, including its training (Ibid.). Concern at that point in time regarding 
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dogs went further than their use in guarding property, well rehearsed discussions were 
also being had in Parliament regarding fouling, straying and disease control, plus of course 
the dog licence which was under continual scrutiny and criticism. There are echoes in the 
press from a century earlier of the hysteria regarding rabies with one broadsheet noting 
the German Shepherds involved in the two fatalities were not tested for the disease 
before being shot dead, thus leaving the suggestion open in the reader’s mind that they 
were infected. ‘In this way anxieties about the abject canine body in the 1970s articulated 
a nascent discourse of risk, predominantly through the media, and located the dog as a 
growing social problem that required regulation in the form of control, training or 
destruction’ (Molloy 2011: 115).
As charted in 4.3 of the previous chapter, the conflation of dog fighting and dog attacks 
emerged in the USA, but it also appeared, albeit slightly later, in the UK. In 1985 the 
RSPCA undertook the first dog fighting prosecution in perhaps a hundred years and as a 
result, Molloy argues, ‘introduced the term “fighting dog” into the discourse of canine risk 
and situated the RSPCA as a significant voice of authority’ (2011: 116). Whilst this may be 
used to explain the Home Secretary’s decision in 1991 to ban certain dogs, given it was 
also eagerly supported by the RSPCA, this fails to note that the RSPCA was 
simultaneously advocating for a dog licence which the Government unequivocally rejected. 
Nevertheless with regard to the developing lexicon at that time, and its influence on the 
perception of risk, it would appear fighting dogs and attacks on humans were to be 
viewed as being firmly linked. Media reports, in lieu of any government statistics on total 
numbers of dogs; numbers of attacks; and which breeds were implicated, would also have 
their guesswork in relation to these issues go unchecked. Their influence on the debate 
and in turn the perceptions of the nation’s policy makers at that time cannot be fully 
understood but certainly cannot be dismissed as irrelevant.
Breed specific legislation wasn’t always the Government’s first choice, indeed it was 
ridiculed just two years before it was introduced in the 1989 debate on dangerous dogs 
by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, Douglas Hogg 
MP, who called the proposition ‘manifest nonsense’ and ‘the idea of simply prohibiting an 
American pit bull terrier is a non-runner’ (HC Deb 15 June 1989 vol 154 c1179-1201). 
Being unequivocal in his assessment of such a move, he stated ‘I do not think that there is 
anything to be gained by trying to define dangerous breeds’ and referring to recent 
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incidents he noted ‘the evidence of the last few weeks and the tragic attacks which have 
occurred suggest that dogs of a whole variety of breeds can be dangerous’ (Ibid.). These 
comments came in response to calls for the prohibition of certain breeds from both the 
opposition benches and the animal welfare lobby, such as the RSPCA. Whilst these NGOs 
might prefer not to recall their previous position on BSL, it is recorded clearly within 
Hansard, ‘RSPCA experts had defined five breeds of dogs which are particularly 
dangerous’ (John McAllion MP) (Ibid.). Unmoved however, and despite a Government 
commitment to develop dog legislation to better protect citizens, the Minister concluded 
the debate by rejecting both dog licensing and BSL, noting ‘that the responsibility for the 
control of dogs rests much more on their owners than upon the framework of law’ and ‘I 
am concerned that we should introduce only changes which are viable and not promote 
changes which are simply unsustainable’ (Ibid.).
5.4 Exploring the political context of ‘solutions’
Moving forward in time yet again, albeit now with smaller strides, it is important to review 
next what role public opinion, the media, party politics, and focussing events (Kingdon 
1984) played in the development of BSL within the new Dangerous Dogs Act (1991). It is, 
though, quite difficult to unearth the facts of what could have changed the same 
Government’s mind so completely in just under 24 months as there are few primary 
accounts. There are even some indications this policy reversal emerged from an even 
shorter window: during the passage of the 1991 Bill, Robin Corbett MP cited a 
Government response of October of 1990 (just seven months before) which stated that 
the Town and Police Clauses Act 1847 was sufficient for dealing with dog control issues 
and, should it not be, enforcers should employ the Animals Act 1971 (HC Deb 10 June 
1991 vol 192 cc644-99). Corbett went on to claim the Prime Minister and Home 
Secretary had rejected calls for a change in dog control legislation from the dispatch box 
just a month before the DDA was introduced (Ibid.). During that same debate, opposition 
members who had supported BSL in 1989 were incensed at the Government’s u-turn, 
often focussing on this rather than the success of securing the measures. For example, 
(John McAllion MP, ibid.) noted ‘they cannot explain their sudden shift in attitude towards 
the ban that is set out in the Bill. It is not credible for Ministers to argue that the sheer 
ferocity of attacks in recent times has convinced them of the need to change their policy’.
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Extra-parliamentary media representations and popular concerns
The media may have played a role in leading public opinion in the months preceding the 
introduction of the DDA but when retrospectively reviewing material from that period it 
is clear that they act as a reflection of a substantial public outcry about dogs and wider 
social issues. As Molloy (2011: 107) observes:
Heightened public anxieties about canine-associated risks were reported in the 
popular press along with calls for immediate government action as debates about 
dangerous dogs became intrinsically linked to discourses of antisocial behaviour, 
masculinity, violence, the erosion of national identity, social responsibility and drug 
culture. 
There were also a number of polls conducted by the media during this period which 
reveal that Government proposals were closely aligned to the very significant public 
feeling occurring in response to high profile dog attacks such as the one Rukhsana Khan 
endured (as discussed in the previous chapter). Polling can only provide a limited account 
of public opinion but these repeated national and local surveys demonstrated clear 
approval for a ban on dangerous dogs, with many, although not all, confirming extensive 
support for the mandatory destruction of banned types (Hood et al. 2000: 20). However 
it is worth noting these polls also showed clear support for dog registration, which the 
Government actively ignored. 
During the passage of the DDA, the Minister of State, Home Office, Angela Rumbold MP 
reminded the House that a recent consultation had illuminated the strength of feeling 
upon dog control and the need to eliminate certain breeds:
[O]n two points the general public were unanimous. The first was the widespread 
desire for the new general criminal offence which my Rt. Hon. friend the Home 
Secretary announced yesterday, together with increased powers for the courts to 
muzzle dangerous dogs. The second was the universal public dislike of dogs such as 
the pit bull terrier which represent such a danger to small children such as Rukhsana 
Khan (HC Deb 23 May 1991 vol 191 cc1058-69). 
Although she summarised public support slightly erroneously as unanimous, it is clearly 
the case - if the accounts given by numerous MPs during the debates is accepted - that 
public feeling was firmly behind any moves to significantly tighten dog control, criminalise 
‘bad’ owners and remove certain dogs from the population. Clarke (2017: 88) is mindful, 
on this point, of the body of research, from Durkheim (1897) to Cohen (1972), and 
others, which suggests labelling of specific populations as ‘dangerous’ is an integral part of 
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the need in society to identify threats and exercise control over them, which would 
appear to be applicable here. 
Molloy discusses dangerous dogs in terms of social constructionism, a position that views 
the problem through a contextualised, socially constructed view of risk. By examining 
media reports and parliamentary transcripts she describes a division between ‘an idealised 
majority of “good dogs and owners” and a deviant subset of “bad dogs and 
owners”’ (2011: 108), and analyses the discourses that have fused dangerous dog policy 
with the disintegration of social structures. This may also explain the enduring appeal of 
the DDA to policymakers or their reluctance to act on any evidence that jeopardises the 
foundation of that aspect of the law. Molloy’s examination of the dog control problem 
through risk theory offers other explanations in so much as any threats to children, as is 
so often the media and political characterisation of dangerous dogs (which the statistics 
do in fact support), have been a catalyst with regard to moral panics, in the so-called 
‘politics of substitution’ (Jenkins, P 1992: 10 cited by Molloy 2011: 111).
The body of social constructivist-oriented sociological literature analysing this period of 
dog control policy posits that:
Dominant discourses centralised the pit bull terrier as an aberrant canine breed, 
uncontrollable and synonymous with tenacious aggression. Pit bull owners were 
similarly constructed as social deviants with violent tendencies suggesting shared 
characteristics between human and canine. In this sense, a moral panic abut the risks 
posed by fighting dogs and their owners was able to focus public anxieties about 
social deviance, drug taking, violence, animal cruelty and the collapse of social 
responsibility onto an imagined community of dog owners (Molloy 2011: 120). 
In this social context it is easy to see why a government may react quickly to reassure the 
public, perhaps not stopping to truly understand the consequences of spontaneous 
legislative measures that have not been adequately scrutinised, particularly if that is not 
their primary concern, ‘Policymakers can become moral entrepreneurs by implementing 
knee jerk policies to give themselves a better foothold in their community under what 
may be a guise of community safety’ (Franklin 2013: 3). These are grand theories of 
explanation regarding the state of the nation and the role of moral panics, to which I have 
to admit to some concern. There is little in the way of empirical evidence to support this 
form of grand narrative theorising which could be in danger of producing an over 
simplified and tidier perspective of the criminological milieu, although my work may be 
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subject to similar criticism when drawing parallels between society’s response to the 
dangerous dog issue, with the conditions set out in Garland’s Culture of Control (2001).
Party politics, electoral cycles and inside Parliament/Government circles
Having considered the documentary evidence with regards to the social context at this 
moment in time, the following section explores the deeper political manoeuvres at work, 
as various solutions were articulated and mediated. During the Second Reading of the 
Dangerous Dogs Bill the Member for Dundee East, John McAllion MP offered this analysis 
of why the Government had come around to BSL, ’It is my judgment that the Bill reflects 
the relative strength of the Government two years ago and the relative weakness of their 
position today’, then proceeded further with a candid assessment typical of House of 
Commons debates:
The Government are trailing in the opinion polls and they have had first to 
postpone a June general election and then an October election because they 
knew that they would not be able to win either. The Government are politically 
weak and they are vulnerable. It is from their position of weakness that they have 
been bounced into introducing the Bill because of the pressure mounted by the 
tabloid newspapers. In short, the Bill represents the Government's panic reaction. 
It will be pushed through the House in one day not because the Government are 
legislating for a real emergency in the real world but because they, a weak 
Administration, cannot guarantee the unequivocal support of Conservative Back-
Benchers (HC Deb 10 June 1991 vol 192 cc644-99).
Of course it is worth nothing at this point that Garland has explored, as a feature of the 
culture of control, the fact that weak governments tend to ‘play to the gallery’ with more 
intensely punitive policies, ‘it is worth noting that punitive outbursts and demonizing 
rhetorics have featured much more prominently in weak political regimes than in strong 
ones’ (1996: 462).
It was certainly a matter of fact that John Major had only recently become Prime Minister 
and in charge of a party and a Government weakened by the exit of Margaret Thatcher 
and a series of by-election defeats as well as scandals. The country was in recession and 
had recently fought a war against Iraq. Frightening symbols were commonplace in the 
media and Pit Bulls made a relatively easy addition to the depiction of Britain as an 
increasingly aggressive and fearsome place, particularly given the availability and use of 
emotive and gruesome images of apparently aggressive dogs and the injuries they were 
reported to have caused. Kenneth Baker MP had himself been weakened in his position as 
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Home Secretary by a major riot in Strangeways prison which made him vulnerable to the 
impending reshuffle and he would therefore be keen to assert his authority and regain the 
nation’s confidence (Lodge & Hood 2002: 5-6). Thus it is easy to understand Kaspersson's 
(2008: 217) contention that ‘breed‐specific legislation can also be used politically for 
ulterior motives such as re‐election and has been introduced, or lobbied for, by sometimes 
dubious methods – such as selectivity of data used and tweaking the interpretation of 
these data.’ 
The 1871 legislation was deemed sufficient certainly for enabling the police to deal with 
stray or out of control dogs, and for the courts to order owners meet certain conditions 
or face a fine. That is until the Government responded to unfolding events and took the 
view that criminal sanctions (in the form of the DDA) were needed in order to tackle the 
problem of dog attacks (Bleasdale-Hill & Dickinson 2016: 66), although Lodge and Hood 
contend the Victorian systems were also generally deemed to be outmoded (2002: 4). But 
either way the Government was fast approaching a general election with a new leader 
facing challenges his predecessor had escaped and it is for this and other political reasons 
that it is argued the Government hastened the legislation through Parliament in effort to 
appear agile, responsive and, crucially, ‘traditionally punitive tough on crime’ (Clark 2017: 
87). One examination of risk regulation regimes concluded that with a minimal state role 
much of the control of dogs conformed to a minimal feasible response hypothesis, apart 
from, that is, the ban on certain types of dog leaving other breeds, known to be involved 
in attacks, uncontrolled. This particular aspect of BSL would instead appear to fit the 
hypothesis of a responsive government whereby the regulatory regime will reflect the 
public attitudes towards a particular risk, and ‘suggesting, for example, that ‘dread’ risks will 
be more heavily regulated than others’ (Hood et al. 1999: 152).
Another concern for the Government ahead of the general election was that the 
opposition, who were gaining considerable ground in the polls, were mobilising on this 
specific issue having recognised its importance to voters. An almost exclusively Labour led 
‘Control of Dangerous Breeds of Dog’ Early Day Motion stated:
That this House condemns the importation of dangerous breeds of dogs into the 
United Kingdom; and urges the government to introduce a dog registration scheme 
for all breeds, compulsory third party insurance; and a programme of humane 
destruction of all dogs of breeds which are specifically raised for illegal dog fighting, 
namely, Japanese Tosa and American pit bull terriers (EDM 840 1990-91).
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Pressure on the Government intensified given this EDM was tabled four days before the 
attack on Rukhsana Khan even took place, making the Labour Party appear more in touch 
with the threats to, and needs of, society. This was also an unusually early attempt by 
Labour to out-flank the Conservatives on a regulation of crime issue (some time ahead of 
Blair’s re-positioning of the party in the run up to the 1997 General Election).
Lodge and Hood (2002) employ a theory of ‘forced choice’ as to explain the 
Government’s actions with regard to dog control policy during the period surrounding the 
introduction of the DDA. They put forward the view that governments are ‘filters’ not 
‘weathervanes’ in response to external ‘shocks’ and as such must still act, and are obliged 
to legislate, but in a way that aligns to their own mandate. They also acknowledge that 'the 
pit bull tragedies of 1991 helped to accelerate changes in the criminal law that had already 
been mooted by government departments’ (Lodge & Hood, 2002: 10). However this 
theory alone would appear insufficient in explaining why the attacks leading up to the 
DDA differed in any way to a very long history of similar incidents - during periods of 
fluctuating political fortunes - which did not spark a reaction as draconian as the 
euthanasia of thousands of pet dogs solely for how they looked and for some perceived 
potential for what they might do.
‘Evidence’ for the sourcing of BSL as a policy: a case of ‘policy-led evidence’?
With the political conditions during this period explored, I now return to the central issue 
of Breed Specific Legislation and what the documentation reveals as to its origins. Where 
a government’s role is to reflect the norms and values, as well as the expressed wishes, of 
its citizens and, not withstanding the inherent flaws in accurately gauging such wishes, it 
could be argued that public opinion was the only ‘evidence’ the Government of 1991 
needed in order to proceed with the DDA. Except that is, during the introduction and 
short passage of the legislation, the Government repeatedly claimed the measures would 
better protect citizens from the inherent dangers associated with specific breeds and 
types of dog. However a government cannot expect an average member of the public to 
determine the viability of the evidence for, or against, the factors that may indicate 
aggression in dogs, although it must be acknowledged that this particular branch of science 
was in its infancy and there was an absence of robust evidence to prove breed was not a 
factor. It is in this context, only just over a quarter of a century ago, that the Home 
  of  116 311
Secretary, Kenneth Baker MP claimed sole credit for the proposals and clearly felt no 
requirement to provide robust scientific evidence to support them. At one point in 
correspondence with fellow MPs  he cited an unnamed dog expert  who supported the 38 39
case for a ban and around the same time, during a Parliamentary debate, listed the NGOs 
who approved, ‘one thing that is agreed between the RSPCA, the Kennel Club, the British 
Veterinary Association and ourselves is that we want those types of dogs to be removed 
from our society permanently. They made that very clear to me yesterday’ (HC Deb 22 
May 1991 vol 191 cc945-58) .40
International political influences must also be considered and indeed there are numerous 
references to the problem of dog control in the USA, often specifically in relation to Pit 
Bulls, throughout the Parliamentary debates at that time. John McAllion MP, a vehement 
supporter of BSL at this time made such references: 
[T]he Government were well warned—I played my part in the Adjournment 
debate to which I referred—that American pit bull terriers posed a serious threat 
to public safety in the United Kingdom. The Government knew at least two years 
ago that the breed had killed and killed again in the United States (HC Deb 10 
June 1991 vol 192 cc644-99). 
However there is little amongst the documentation to suggest that policy makers were 
aware of the increasing number of breed specific laws being created in the States. Some 
scholars nevertheless suggest the evidence from the States, whilst defective, remained a 
key influence:
Evidence concerning dog bite related fatalities and the relationship between pit 
bull ownership and youth violence presented within the Parliamentary debates 
was taken from American studies, which proved later to be flawed and not 
applicable to the UK situation. In the absence of a scientific assessment of the risk 
the mass media construction of the “dangerous dog” and the dangerous dog 
owner was positioned as the dominant form of knowledge production (Molloy 
2011: 127). 
In contrast Lodge and Hood state that there ‘is no evidence that the act was based on 
 A participant of this study was kind enough to provide me with a hard copy.38
 This expert was later revealed (HC Deb 22 May 1991 vol 191 cc945-58) and (Daily Mail [1995] ‘At £750 39
a day, a mad dog expert - He backed the Act, but then changed his tune.’ 15 May 1995) to be Dr Roger 
Mugford who had worked with the Queen’s huskies. Dr Mugford subsequently reversed his position and 
campaigns against the DDA as well as testifies as a defence expert.
 It should be noted in contrast, however, that one Chief Executive of the RSPCA who had led the Society 40
in dealings with the Government in 1991 later claimed, 'We warned at that time that breed-specific 
legislation and the approach that was being taken, without a comprehensive underpinning, would singularly 
fail to deal with the problem. Here we are 22, 23 years later, and sadly - I hate to say it - our words have 
been proven correct.’ (Gavin Grant, CE of the RSPCA, HC Public Bill Committee: Anti-Social Behaviour, 
Crime and Policing Bill 20 June 2013 c111).
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learning from other countries to any extent’ (2002: 6), however the banning and 
extermination of certain breeds had only recently been rejected by a predecessor 
Minister, not least of all for the extensive complications of determining breed. Kenneth 
Baker MP himself, both within Parliamentary debates and in his autobiography, was 
unusually quiet on the origins of BSL (Baker 1993). Justifications regarding public safety and 
reducing attacks by reducing dogs bred for fighting were cited frequently during this 
period, but explanations of where BSL came from as a policy initiative, and how it had 
been proven to be effective in response to such problems were not forthcoming. 
Accusations of a political motivation for the creation of s1 of the DDA, such as those of 
John McAllion MP (cited earlier), were never responded to by the Government either. 
These issues are revisited as part of the findings from my interview-based research with 
elites from the policy community (active during this period and more recently), in Chapter 
Nine.
5.5 Dogs as a symbol of a political class war
The following subsection of the chapter explores the evidence for the depiction of certain 
dogs as being inherently connected to criminal subcultures, in order to understand 
whether such symbolism has played any part in the policy process at a political level.
Through a combination of media content and parliamentary debate analysis, Molloy points 
to the fact that from the late 1980s ‘dog fighting, anti-social behaviour and masculinised 
violence became clearly associated in press reports with repeated links to the status of Pit 
Bull owners as unemployed or involved in some aspect of drug culture or violent 
crime’ (2011: 119) and she uses the example of the Daily Mirror from the 14th May 1991 
which stated that ‘the pit bull is often a favourite of social inadequates to show how 
macho they are’ (2011: 119-120) to reveal how the dogs and their owners were being 
openly labelled as a clear danger to others and a separate distinct group set apart from 
other dog owners of more acceptable, average or harmless breeds. The criminologist 
Daniel McCarthy conducted a documentary analysis examining the various referencing 
and problem classifications utilised in societal and political language in respect of 
dangerous dogs and the resultant melding with the condition of the ‘non-respectable class’ 
thus offering valuable insight into the ways in which responses by the state ‘have shored 
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up concerns about the condition of the working class and introduced subsequent social 
controls to target such groups’ (2015: 571). 
Kenneth Baker MP’s own words would appear to verify the presence of a bias regarding 
the class of dog owners. He corresponded with MPs  to reassure them that breeds such 41
as Rottweilers and German Shepherds were not bred to fight and would therefore not 
be targeted by the ban under s1, a claiming that ‘there is therefore a clear distinction 
between those domestic pedigree dogs, and the crossbreeds we intend to classify as 
dangerous dogs to be banned.’ He talked often of his view of the uniqueness of PBTs, 
claiming ‘increasing evidence that they [Pit Bulls] were being bred quite specifically for 
their power and viciousness’ (1993: 433) but he also acknowledged some flaws: 
The issue was made more complicated by the fact that the largest number of 
reported dog attacks was caused by Alsatians and other domestic breeds whose 
owners would never have regarded their pets as dangerous. But I considered that 
pit bulls represented a quite different scale of menace and caused far worse 
injuries than other dogs (1993: 434). 
As an aside, Kaspersson argues that this indicates Baker was therefore aware there was an 
exaggeration or disproportionality at play, which forms one of the main pillars of a moral 
panic (2008: 208). Baker continued to reveal inherent prejudices, and his vulnerability to 
certain sections of voters:
There was a danger of over-reaction, with demands to have all dogs muzzled and 
to put Rottweilers, Dobermans and Alsatians in the same category as pit bulls. This 
would have infuriated the “green welly” brigade. However, the “pit bull lobby" came 
to my aid by appearing in front of TV cameras with owners usually sporting 
tattoos and earrings while extolling the allegedly gentle nature of their dogs, who 
names were invariably Tyson, Gripper, Killer or Sykes (Baker 1993: 435). 
Hallsworth (2011) would therefore appear to have at least some justification for his 
rather hyperbolic view that Baker’s actions are symptomatic of a wider class war, although 
employing routine activity theory by way of explanation, and pointing to the lack a capable 
guardians for PBTs, he may well himself be contributing to the labelling of their owners. 
Building upon Lodge and Hood’s notion there existed a ‘canine class issue’ (2002: 10), 
Kaspersson points to conflict theory to explain ‘those in power were not worried about 
their own dogs, but of those of the “dangerous” classes’ (2008: 209). Molloy agrees, ‘during 
parliamentary debates on the matter a clear schism began to emerge that aligned dog 
problems with certain social groups and linked social identity to particular types or breeds 
 A participant of this study was kind enough to provide me with a copy of the letter.41
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of dog’ (2011: 118). She also points to the role of the Kennel Club who in refusing to 
recognise the breed of Pit Bull Terrier were argued to be contributing to the problem. 
While other breeds such as the German Shepherd, Doberman and Rottweiler featured 
regularly in well publicised dog attacks (and any dog bite data table) these breeds, and 
their more wealthy breeders and owners had the full weight of the Kennel Club behind 
them. Thus: 
[I]n this sense, social identity, economic status, leisure pursuits and activities, and dog 
ownership were intrinsically linked. Pit bull owners were identified as a 
disenfranchised social group that existed apart from a larger set of socially 
responsible ‘dog owners’ and pitbulls were a type of dog that lacked legitimate status 
as a recognised ‘breed’. With arguments that confirmed a relationship between 
violent humans and aggressive dogs gathering momentum by the late 1980s, the pit 
bull was centralised as the principal signifier of risk within the dangerous dogs 
discourse (Molloy 2011: 119). 
The Pit Bull owner represented much less of a threat to policy makers than that of the 
owners of recognised and approved-of breeds, and Baker was unashamed in his 
representations and parodies of them. In the debate as to whether to microchip or tattoo 
s1 dogs he said:
[T]his led to humorous exchanges about exactly who would volunteer to tattoo a 
pit bull’s inside leg, and whether the dog’s tattoo should match that of their owner. 
Would pit bulls have ‘love’ and ’hate’ inscribed on each knuckle? (1993: 436). 
These words, published just two years after the legislation was introduced, would have 
been written in the knowledge of the devastation some dog owners had experienced 
when faced with putting their beloved pet to sleep, there were even high profile cases of 
owners who had committed suicide to escape the feelings of guilt and loss (Sweeney 
2013: 241). 
Excluding for a moment those individuals who used Pit Bulls to fight and intimidate, it may 
be that some owners of Pit Bulls may have engaged with the practice of tattooing or 
piercing, and indeed dog-naming practices, that signified and glorified violence, 
disobedience or rebellion as a means of communicating and reinforcing anti-social 
identities for themselves, and by extension their dogs. What is important to note is that 
given the views of Government as expressed by Baker above, these owners would have 
few, if any, opportunities to counter these perceptions. This further reduced their 
credibility with regards to views about the true nature of these dogs, the result being ‘Pit 
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Bull owners were excluded from authoritative participation in the organisation of meaning 
within the mainstream media’ (Molloy 2011: 122).
Such factors as those that have been discussed above, in my view, can only have 
contributed to the ‘outsider’ and ‘dangerous other’ status of the Pit Bull Terriers, similar 
looking dogs, and their owners. There is no evidence to suggest that the estimates of large 
numbers of Pit Bulls in ownership across England and Wales bears an exclusive 
relationship with anti social behaviour or offending patterns, which suggests these much 
maligned breeds and types of dog may be growing in popularity amongst other sectors of 
society. Certainly the Interim Exemption Scheme, known as ‘doggie bail’, is predicated on 
the owner being considered ‘fit and proper’ but its use by the police is thought to be 
growing each year. There may then be indications the labelling is lifting, or can be lifted in 
the near future (see Chapter Ten).
5.6 Political concessions and amendments in the aftermath of the DDA
Despite concerns that Pit Bulls lacked the representation that was needed to prevent the 
fate they ultimately suffered in 1991, disquiet grew fairly rapidly, across many quarters, in 
the years immediately following the implementation of the Act. The following sub-section 
charts these events within the political sphere which paved the way for a minor relaxation 
of the legislative framework in the form of an amendment Act.
The Dangerous Dogs Act was expedited through Parliament into law and then into force 
by late 1991. The initial chaos regarding owners identifying their dogs and either getting 
them exempted and added to the register, or relinquishing them to a certain death (as 
possession and transfer of ownership was now illegal), did not immediately subside in the 
way Ministers had hoped. As has been discussed, the dog has a very popular role in British 
culture as a faithful and loyal companion, and even given the enormous public support for 
controlling dangerous dogs, there was also widespread discomfort on the wholesale 
euthanasia of thousands of family pets. The postbags of politicians started to fill with a new 
narrative of the dog problem as people began to react to the DDA’s measures and more 
harrowing examples came to light. None more eloquent than the prominent animal 
welfare campaigner Lord Houghton of Sowerby summed up the issues:
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The Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 is in my experience the most outrageous law ever 
passed in Parliament……It has now been in operation for about a year. I have to 
raise a question regarding the working of the Act so far. My conclusion on the 
working of the Act is that it is working within the structure of law and an ethos of 
administration which has all the characteristics of a police state. Indeed, we have 
planted inside our tolerant and democratic community an isolation of neo-fascist 
conditions which would have fitted comfortably in the works of any authoritarian 
state but which is alien to our own traditions and thoughts regarding the way to 
run a country. There is growing anxiety about the Act. Many people, quite apart 
from those grievously affected by it, are beginning to complain. I suppose the 
difficulty is that the British people, by culture and experience, tend to look to the 
law for justice. But there is no justice in the Dangerous Dogs Act. It was not 
introduced to provide justice. It was introduced to suppress. It was the next best 
thing to the wholesale execution of dogs known as Pit Bull Terriers. That was the 
sequel to the brainstorm which the then Home Secretary went through when he 
proclaimed that mass slaughter was a remedy for the danger of Pit Bull Terriers to 
public well-being….I am not being extreme in my language when I say that those 
are the conditions of a police state. We have them all. We have the informer. 
Plenty of information has been given. Some officials of estimable societies have 
given information away. Police raids take place and the police turn up in riot gear 
with all the equipment to subjugate a lion, and possessing warrants to enter and 
forcibly remove dogs. The dog is taken away and one is told that one will hear 
from the police or the court later. One can wait 14 months and still not hear a 
word. During all that time one is denied access to one's dog; one is not even told 
where it is. The anxiety of waiting day by day, week by week for a summons from 
the court to enable one to appear to defend the life of the dog is a misery 
beyond belief. I cannot contain my emotions when I read the innumerable letters 
that I receive from all over the country every day. Some were handed in only this 
afternoon. All that is not because of what the dogs have done, but because of 
what they are. It is a form of ethnic cleansing. It is the breed that is important. 
What matters is what they are or what we think they may do; it is not what they 
do (HL Deb 20 January 1993 vol 541 cc933-56).
This was an impassioned and knowledgeable monologue from an experienced 
parliamentarian who was at odds with his own party on this issue, particularly so during 
the passage of the DDA in 1991 (HL Deb 10 July 1991 vol 530 cc1407-61), which was a 
rather courageous endeavour but an entirely appropriate contribution of speaking truth 
to power given his recognition for the constitutional (the policy process had been 
woefully inadequate with no time for proper scrutiny) and evidential deficiencies he 
observed in the Bill.
Although those campaigning against the Act were aware that repeal was unlikely, a series 
of proposals emerged to soften the negative effects on the welfare of both dog and 
owner. The British Veterinary Association (2018) were amongst the first to suggest a 
system of ‘doggie bail’ could be utilised which allowed the dog to be kept at home until 
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their case made it to court, thereby reducing costs and improving welfare. A change to the 
mandatory sentence of death for dogs found to be conforming to that of s1 was also 
proposed, as was a reversal on the burden of proof , all regarded as essential in order to 42
‘humanise’ (ibid.) the law. It took a further four years for some of these measures to be 
accepted and implemented, but 22 for others. Some areas, such as the method of 
identification and the reversal on the burden of proof, remain in force today. It is not a 
coincidence that the amendments which were ultimately successful in the form of an 
Amendment Act in 1997 were primarily two fold, those that responded to calls from the 
enforcers to remedy aspects of legal processes, and those that could silence, or at least 
dampen, the growing protestations about the automatic death sentence for the dogs 
involved. A context of events at this time may provide insight as to why.
 
Despite giving their support for the 1991 Act, Parliamentary debates continued to be 
driven on a frequent basis by an official opposition seemingly conscious of the growing 
disquiet of certain provisions within what had essentially been hurried and untested 
legislation. Other tools open to MPs such as Early Day Motions were also utilised. One 
such measure, on the two year anniversary of the attack on Rukhsana Khan, dominated by 
Labour but including other parties, proposed: 
That this House is deeply concerned at the failure of the Home Office to 
recognise the fundamental flaws in the Dangerous Dogs Act and the 
overwhelming case for urgent changes; and urges the Government to (a) remove 
the mandatory destruction section of the Act and give the courts discretion to 
take into account the circumstances of a case before ordering the killing of a dog, 
(b) give courts discretion whether or not to have positively identified dogs 
destroyed, (c) declare a temporary amnesty by reopening the Index of Exempted 
Dogs for those who have not registered their animals, (d) allow owners to apply 
for bail for their dogs and (e) ensure that dogs kept in kennels (and refused bail) 
should conform with the requirements of the Animal Boarding Establishments Act 
1963 and that owners should be allowed supervised visits’ (EDM 2031 1992-93).
Six months later, and in response to the focusing event of another horrific attack on a 
child, (mostly) Labour MPs tried again:
That this House notes with regret the latest killing of a child by a dog; calls for an 
immediate response from the Home Secretary; believes that the Dangerous Dogs 
Act 1991 is totally inadequate and needs an urgent and immediate review; 
recognises that a comprehensive but balanced approach is necessary, and that this 
should include consideration for a more widely drawn Dogs Act, designed to 
educate and encourage responsibility among all dog owners, particularly among 
the minority of inconsiderate owners, and consolidating all dog-related legislation, 
 See 3.3 whereby the offender is required to prove their dog is not of type.42
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a national registration scheme, including third party insurance, for all dogs rather 
than one which is ineffective and covers just a few breeds to enable all dog 
owners to be traced and the breed of a dog to be more accurately and easily 
defined, to fund a national dog warden scheme and, where necessary, to enable 
neutering of dogs, working with and listening to responsible dog owners, the 
RSPCA and others in a Dog Advisory Committee, freeing magistrates to use their 
discretion on the full range of controls and penalties against irresponsible and anti-
social dog owners and taking action on strays and uncontrolled dogs which cause 
problems of fouling public places, traffic accidents, and neutering, to avoid having 
350,000 dogs destroyed each year, all of which would be tackled by effective 
registration and education; and believes that further consideration should be given 
to the breeding and sale of dangerous dogs and examining whether the 
ownership of such dogs should be limited to those who genuinely need 
them’ (EDM 71 1993-94).
Interestingly this EDM provides an insight into the position of other members of the 
policy community such as the RSPCA who now supported a system that included judicial 
prudence. Although around the same time the RSPCA was quoted as briefing 
Parliamentarians with the view that, ‘whilst the Act has clear weaknesses, the RSPCA 
supports the stated intention in the Act itself, “to prohibit … possession or custody of 
dogs belonging to types bred for fighting”’ (Lord Hayter, HL Deb 20 January 1993 vol 541 
cc933-56).
Lodge and Hood note that enforcement of the DDA was far from uniform across police 
forces and that the courts were uneasy with the mandatory destruction element which 
prevented them from exercising their own discretion, and as such representations were 
made on these points (2002: 6). The Government of 1992-97 was perhaps particularly 
open to the influence of the police and courts given the political imperative of appearing, 
to the public, vigorous on tackling crime. The policy community were beginning to 
organise in response to the Act and formed an influential working group (which 
continued for two further decades) under the leadership of seasoned dog welfare and 
control campaigner, Lord Houghton of Sowerby who first attempted to amend the DDA 
with a Bill eighteen months after it came into force (HL Bill 86 1993-94). Press reports 
seemingly in favour of exterminating certain types of dog, particularly Pit Bulls, now also 
carried heartbreaking stories from families desperate to save their family pet, and of 
instances of vigilantism such as the case of a Staffordshire bull terrier mistakenly identified 
as a banned dog by the mob of men who broke into the home in which she was kept and 
beat her to death (Baroness Wharton, HL Deb 20 January 1993 vol 541 cc933-56). The 
influence of all of these factors upon an ailing Government may well be evidenced in the 
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concessions that were ultimately made but perhaps a more certain contribution to the 
pressure to amend came from the Home Affairs Select Committee investigation into the 
DDA in 1996 which concluded in no uncertain terms the legislation was in need of 
substantial change (Hughes 1998: 11).
Early in 1997 the Government announced it was willing to amend the DDA although they 
publicly credited this decision to the original legislation, and not any other factors, as in 
their view it had ‘achieved its main objectives, to reduce the number of Pit Bull Terriers, 
and, by deterring irresponsible dog owners, to raise the standard of dog ownership 
generally’ (ibid.). The changes included providing the courts with the discretion they had 
petitioned for. Those who had innocently acquired a Pit Bull or a dog looking ‘of type’, 
would be able to go through a court process to be added to the Index of Exempted 
Dogs and to eventually return home with their pet, albeit with numerous strict conditions 
including muzzling and keeping their dog permanently on a lead in a public place. The 
reality is though that the Conservative Government knew an election had to take place by 
early May and Labour was leading the polls by an overwhelming margin with a manifesto 
that included a commitment to amend the legislation in favour of judicial prudence 
(Hughes 1998: 11). A Conservative MP had launched a Private Members Bill which again 
the Government could not afford to be seen not to back. Having been elected with a 21 
seat majority in 1992, there were a series of defections and by-election defeats until finally 
from December 1996 the Conservatives led a weak minority Government. The 
Government had little choice but to support the PMB and pass the amendments into law 
in March in the vain hope it would benefit them with the electorate in May.
Labour swept to power in May 1997 with a significant mandate for change however ‘the 
alleged propensity for introducing extra regulation that was shown by the New Labour 
Government elected in 1997 did not extend to new dog laws or more vigorous 
enforcement of the existing ones’ (Lodge & Hood 2002: 6). But the Government would 
have been aware that public support for controlling dangerous dogs remained, a MORI 
poll in 1999 demonstrated that 76 percent of respondents backed the ban on dangerous 
dogs (Hood et al. 2000: 294). The amendments were still relatively new and time was 
needed - or certainly could be argued to be so - to see if the measures had the 
appropriate capacity to deal with the key flaws that were raised with the original 
legislation. 
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Despite the appearance of relative contentment for the time being at least, there still 
came a damning verdict on the DDA from within the Government’s own circles. In 1998 
it had established the aforementioned Better Regulation Task Force  (BRTF) which 43
developed the ‘Principles of good regulation’, namely 'transparency, accountability, targeting, 
consistency and proportionality’ and that regulation ‘Must have broad public support; Must 
be enforceable; Must be easy to understand; Must be balanced and avoid impetuous knee-
jerk reaction; Must avoid unintended consequences; Must balance risk, cost and practical 
benefit; Must reconcile contradictory policy objectives; Must have accountability; and Must 
be relevant’ accompanied by examples. Under the section ‘Must be balanced and avoid 
impetuous knee-jerk reaction’ by way of example was the verdict ‘Ministers are often 
under pressure to regulate in response to a short-term public concern. Regulations 
introduced quickly because of an outcry about dangerous dogs were ill-thought 
out’ (Better Regulation Task Force 1998: 5), but the DDA cannot be said to have followed 
many of the conditions set out for good regulation and as this thesis argues in particular 
there are unintended consequences that have continued until today. Conversely perhaps, 
Hood et al. consider that 'like so many of the BRTF’s principles, ‘avoidance of “knee-jerk 
responses” may conflict with the popular support principle, which expects democratic 
governments to be responsive to public and media demands for urgent action. One 
person’s ‘knee-jerk reaction’ may be another's opinion-responsive government.’ (2002: 24) 
and moreover that it is ‘ironic that the BRTF’s condemnation of the DDA seems to have 
been as much of a knee-jerk reaction to media attention as the DDA itself was alleged to 
have been’ (2000: 33). 
5.7 The mid-2000s and the emergence of the ‘status dog’ phenomenon
The following sub-section considers the emergence of a new dog problem in the 
mid-2000s and how political forces responded to that problem. There is, in fact, very little 
to reflect upon regarding the control of dangerous dogs for much of the ten years 
between the Amendment Act and 2007. During this period there were very few 
prosecutions under the DDA - ‘with police rapidly returning to the traditional “one free 
bite" approach’ (Lodge & Hood 2002: 10) - and very little enforcement in relation to the 
 The Better Regulation Task Force was set up by the Labour Government in 1997, was subsumed by the 43
Better Regulation Commission in 2005 and then closed with its responsibilities transferred to a unit in 
central Government in 2007, and now sits within the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy.
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banned types of dog, certainly outside of London which had almost all of the Police Dog 
Legislation Officers (DLOs) specially trained to identify s1 dogs. There were also far fewer 
parliamentary questions and debates, although dog bites and deaths resulting from dog 
attacks continued to occur. An increase in these incidents began to be reported around 
2006 and this is then said to have precipitated a consultation with police forces by Defra 
in early 2007 (McCarthy 2016: 564-565). Certainly the death of five-year-old Ellie 
Lawrenson in the early hours of New Year’s Day 2007 can be seen as an acute focusing 
event (Kingdon 1984) as media and public attention were intense particularly around the 
gruesome details of her injuries (Bunyan 2007). 
Defra wrote to all Chief Constables in England and Wales just 22 days later, citing the 
incident and asking for views on the effectiveness of the legislation and what changes 
might be needed. Commander Bray’s response , on behalf of the Met Police, provides 44
some interesting insights into the police position, crucially he categorises the enforcement 
of the Act as ‘one we police reactively, however the numbers of dog seizures have risen 
since the introduction of Safer Neighbourhood Teams’. Unfortunately he stops short of 
analysing whether the Safer Neighbourhood Teams had been in a position to detect dog 
control offences and indeed whether their presence had encouraged reporting, to 
determine if this played any part in giving rise to the phenomenon. Also of note are his 
suggestions regarding: reducing court time to improve dog welfare; more discretion for 
police (for example where owners innocently acquire a puppy which grows to be a PBT); 
making prosecution of the owner and destruction of the dog mandatory only where 
there are aggravating circumstances; including private spaces; and increasing sentences.
Commander Bray also wrote that ‘current legislation does little to allow police to 
effectively deal with people who may keep dogs to protect drugs or other property’ 
which sits in contrast to comments made more recently, as will be discussed in a later 
section. Support for the DDA or perhaps just parts of it from within the police is not as 
consentient in 2007 as it may have been thought, ‘It is our view that it is not a realistic 
ambition to eradicate these breeds from the UK….and therefore we would rather see a 
more realistic and practical cost effective way of managing the problem as an alternative’, 
although stopping short of advocating repeal ‘at this moment in time, we feel that the 
 A copy of the Met Police’s response to the consultation on Commander Bray’s headed paper was very 44
kindly given to me by an ex-Met DLO who was a participant in this research. 
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prohibition set out in Section 1 should stay’ (Ibid.). Despite the number of 
recommendations for change from the police and their reticence regarding s1, a year later 
in answer to a written question the Defra Minister Jonathan Shaw MP stated that:
[W]e consulted police forces in England and Wales and discussed the outcome of 
this consultation with the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO).…In the 
light of the response from the police service, we concluded that the current 
legislation is sufficiently robust to effectively deal with the problem of dangerous 
dogs (HC Deb 10 March 2008 Vol 473 c36W). 
Certainly at this point in time the police do not appear to have had the political influence 
on the policy process that it may otherwise have been thought.
In 2007 the Met Police set up their dedicated Status Dogs Unit in response to the 
growing problem in London, which inevitably drew more attention to the issue, and would 
also speak to the ‘tough on crime, tough on the cause of crime’ approach the Labour 
Government wished to engender. Nevertheless the Labour party was not seen to be 
wedded to the DDA and indeed from within its ranks criticism of the legislation 
continued. For example, Nick Raynsford MP wrote, the: 
Dangerous Dogs Act is the classic example of an ill-thought-out knee-jerk reaction 
to media pressure…As a result we have too much legislation produced as 
propaganda or as a sop to media pressure, which is rushed through Parliament 
without sufficient time to consider whether or not it is necessary, properly 
conceived and likely to achieve its objective (2007: 561). 
In 2008 the influential Associate Parliamentary Group for Animal Welfare (APGAW) 
produced a mini report which detailed the growing problem since the previous year and 
the negative effects on animal welfare. It also demonstrated there was cross party 
agreement on the deficiencies of the legislation, citing the then Labour spokesman on 
animal welfare, Ian Cawsey MP, ‘It is clear to me that the current legislation is inadequate 
and we need new measures that will address this’ (APGAW 2008), however their 
consensus fell short of support for the outright repeal of BSL. 
In 2007 Kenneth Baker, now Baron Baker of Dorking as a Member of the House of Lords, 
defended the legislation he had created and shepherded through Parliament, ‘there is no 
doubt that the act has been a success in that the number of attacks by Pit Bulls declined 
dramatically ‐ there was only one last year and it was not fatal ‐ and so Britain has been a 
safer place as a result of the Dangerous Dogs Act’ (Baker 2007). In answer as to why 
problems remain he countered that ‘unfortunately the act was watered down in 1997 
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when the argument was put that it was the owners and not the dogs that were at fault - 
so dogs were given a second chance. This was a mistake’ (ibid.). He argued for 
strengthening and extending the legislation by removing the exemptions and adding to the 
list of banned breeds. He would therefore probably see the escalation of enforcement, 
such as the new status dog unit, as a result of the relaxation of the original measures 
although he did not comment on this directly. He also did not address the argument that 
the ban on certain ‘breeds’ merely led people to seek out physically and behaviourally 
similar dogs (Harding 2012: 241) with some worrying consequences for people and for 
dogs. Around this time Kaspersson warned of the consequences and argued that ‘by 
abolishing breed bans the attraction of Pit Bulls for the ‘wrong’ kind of owners will 
diminish, rather than increasing it as the outlawing of certain breeds does’ (2008: 221). 
Initiatives such as Operation Navarra in the London borough of Lambeth in 2010-11 
were tried in an attempt to address dog incidents. In reality the operation became more 
about the removal of illegal types of dog and so, in essence, this was proactive policing 
regarding s1 perhaps for the first time. Enforcement, at the scale it was at, at least, could 
not have been argued to be adequately addressing the general dog control problem and 
perhaps partially, at least, in reaction to this, the Government issued a detailed Guidance for 
Enforcers around the legal framework for tackling dangerous dogs (Defra 2009). Further 
incidents of dog attacks, growing media attention and increasing public concern eventually 
led the Government to conduct a wider consultation for all stakeholders and the public in 
2010 (Bennet 2016: 6; Defra 2010a), which resulted in firm proposals for the 
consolidation of all dog legislation; mandatory microchipping, repeal of BSL; and the 
extension of s3 of the DDA to cover private spaces, being put forward by respondents 
(Defra 2010b). In fact there were 42,500 responses, with 71 percent of those and 20 key 
interested parties  in favour of repealing s1. Interestingly 88 percent said that BSL was 45
ineffective, which may mean the difference indicates those who wish to see it 
strengthened not repealed. Those that argued BSL was effective included local authorities 
and the police (both individual forces and the Association of Chief Police Officers [now 
NPCC]), which represented a policy shift from their response to Defra three years earlier. 
In the interim period the problem, as quantified by enforcers via tables of data on dog 
attacks and prosecutions under the DDA, had only grown worse. What had also grown, of 
course, was the number of DLOs across other forces in England and Wales and 
 There were 31 total ‘interested parties’ listed, with 14 of those being local authorities. 45
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corresponding budgets of the dog units in each police force which could have been an 
influencing factor given that increased social control leads to increased deviance (see Table 
2 and associated discussion).
In looking at the weight of evidence put forward in the consultation it is difficult to 
ascertain why Defra’s response six months later was so particularly weak 'Defra will 
continue working closely with interest groups to look closely at community initiatives and 
other issues raised in the consultation - such as breed specific bans’ and is working ‘with 
the Home Office on their review of all anti-social behaviour tools and powers, including 
Dog Control Orders’ (Defra 2010b: 35). In what may have been ultimately significant, the 
Government revealed, perhaps unintentionally, an integral part of their policy process 
through their response to the consultation. In the section on BSL they summarise the 
reasons given for repeal: ‘dangerousness of a dog is not linked to its breed; it has failed to 
prevent dog attacks or reduce pit bull ownership; it is difficult to enforce/identify the 
prohibited types; resulted in lengthy kennelling of dogs waiting to be identified’, whereas 
the reasons for retaining BSL are summarised as: ‘no realistic alternative; useful 
enforcement tool; helps tackle illegal dog fighting’. The reasons for retention are not even 
linked to the purpose of the Act and the third reason actually falls under the s8 of the 
Animal Welfare Act (2006). Although officials were summarising responses, they made 
choices on which excerpts to utilise, thus intentionally or unintentionally attributing 
meaning to that process particularly when showing preference to particular respondents. 
This may be evident too in Defra’s choice of quote from the Met police on the issue of 
BSL, ‘there appears to be insufficiently robust alternative laws to ensure the protection of 
the public if the DDA were repealed’ (Defra 2010b: 13).
Elsewhere in the summary of responses Defra chose to include a section of the 
submission by West Midlands police:
One cannot say how many people have never been injured due to certain breeds 
being prohibited in this country. Certain groups will criticise BSL when a person is 
injured by a legal breed of dog, stating, “Any dog can bite”. Yet when a person is 
bitten by a Pit Bull Type dog, the legislation is still criticised for being ineffective. 
Similar “preventative legislation” is not considered for repeal when an individual is 
shot, stabbed or poisoned, it is accepted that although not all incidents can be 
prevented, the preventative legislation has been beneficial to some (Defra 2010b: 
12). 
Initially there were some indications that despite this the Government were listening to 
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the majority of stakeholders and were open to repealing s1, Lord Henley, then Defra 
Minister with responsibility for this policy area, said in November 2010 that in view of the 
‘enormous support among experts in dog health and welfare for an end to the failed 
breed-specific legislation … Ministers must now take on board the strong views from this 
consultation to implement changes’ (Efra 2013a: 19-20). However the legislation was not 
repealed, nor even considered for it, and so it can only be concluded that more weight 
was applied to the now strong preferences shown by the police. Throughout this period 
the policy community spent a great deal of time discussing and producing responses in 
broad organisational coalitions to try to effect change. There are many iterations evident 
in the various consultation responses and references in parliamentary questions and 
debates. However, it can be argued that the Police have emerged as the dominant player 
in the policy process, given the only amendments that were introduced in practice were 
measures the police had either initiated or supported. 
5.8 Focussing events and further adjustments to the legislative framework
In this final sub-section of the chapter, I consider events within the last six or so years that 
have led to significant political responses with respect to dog control measures. Both 
deaths caused by dogs and published statistics of worrying numbers of workers being 
attacked in the course of their duties have precipitated change. Whether such events are 
linked in any way to BSL or not, however, the Government has remained steadfast on this 
issue despite strong voices within the policy community.
In 2012 the Government announced another consultation on measures within the 
framework of dog control legislation, namely the DDA’s extension to private property 
and a system of ‘doggie bail’ removing the obligation to seize and kennel all dogs awaiting 
court dates - the very proposals the police had called for many years earlier and 
consistently since. Mandatory microchipping of dogs was also mooted by the 
Government, as was a commitment to retain BSL. The announcements in relation to this 
consultation with the changes the Government intended to make was made in February 
2013 and covered all of the same proposals as well as the addition of funding made 
available (Bennett 2016: 6-7). However clearly the argument that BSL was causing much of 
the dog problem, and solving none of it, put forward by most of the policy community, had 
been lost again. This had happened during the tail-end and demise of the Labour 
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Government and now again with the new coalition Government of Conservatives and 
Liberal Democrats, the political sphere had thus become (or always had been) immune. 
Elsewhere within Parliament, when launching their own report a week after the 
Government announcement, the cross party Efra Committee had a raft of criticisms for 
the Government’s proposals but despite hearing the same evidence about the 
ineffectiveness and dangers of s1 of the DDA, concluded not only that it should be 
retained but that ‘the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 be amended to enable the Secretary of 
State to add other types of dog with particularly aggressive characteristics to the list of 
banned types from time to time’ although they did recognise banned dogs with a good 
behavioural characteristics ‘were being destroyed unnecessarily’ (Efra 2013a: 21).
In March 2013 Jade Anderson was tragically killed by two or more dogs, although none 
were of a prohibited type and the attack took place in a home, so not within the remit of 
the DDA at that time. The Coroner took the unusual step of issuing a Regulation 28: 
Report to Prevent Future Deaths (Walsh 2014) in which he was very critical of the 
legislative framework for the control of dogs not least of all for its fragmented and 
confusing nature. He noted that incidents of dog attacks; the keeping of prohibited dogs; 
and offences for having a dog out of control were all rising, stating ‘legislation is not 
working and continues to put public safety and animal welfare at risk’. He requested the 
Minister carried out a review in relation to consolidating the law; switching from a breed 
specific approach to one centred on behaviour; and improving training for owners and 
enforcers, concluding with the strong statement, ‘in my opinion urgent action should be 
taken to prevent future deaths and I believe you and the Government.….have the power 
to take such action’. The mechanism for such reports in enshrined in legislation; namely 
The Coroners (Investigations) Regulations 2013 and they require the receiving body - in 
this case Lord De Mauley at Defra - to respond within 56 days (The Chief Coroner, 
2014). However, if such a response by the Government was generated and submitted to 
the Coroner, it has never been made public. For all intents and purposes there would 
appear to have been no response by the Government and little in the way of scrutiny by 
others of this serious omission which it must be remembered was in light of a young girl’s 
gruesome death.
Pressure was nevertheless now coming from very varied quarters, the CWU had been 
running a successful annual dog awareness campaign which featured uncensored pictures 
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of the horrific injuries sustained by postal workers in dog attacks. The Welsh Government 
had launched its own Dog Control Bill centred on the ‘action and behaviour of an 
individual dog and not on the breed or type of dog’ (Efra 2013a: 21). Attacks on assistance 
dogs were also making headlines and the campaign by the Guide Dogs had strong 
resonance with parliamentarians. The Government can be argued to have been highly 
responsive to many of these needs except in relation to BSL. The Anti-social Behaviour, 
Crime and Policing Act 2014 was chosen to be the vehicle to introduce all the announced 
measures to amend the DDA. Certain members of the dog policy network received 
credit, such as those working to have sentences for attacks on assistance dogs raised to 
act as a deterrent, and the CWU who had worked to have the 75 percent of all dog 
attacks previously excluded due to being on private premises now included within the 
scope of the law (IIRSM 2014). Welfare organisations supported many of these changes 
however all recognition for their petitioning on the effects of BSL had been in vain, 
politicians remained immune. 
Continuing though with the responsive government theme, Defra then issued a guidance 
booklet, Dealing with irresponsible dog ownership Practitioner’s manual in October 2014, 
which has over a hundred pages when including the detailed annexes. The size of this 
handbook reflects both the complexity of the legislative landscape and specifically the 
new tools provided through the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act (2014), for 
this was far from straightforward. Rejecting dedicated dog control notices, similar to those 
in place in Scotland and proposed by the now abandoned Dog Control Bill in Wales, the 
Act has provisions for four avenues, Community Protection Notices (CPN), Injunctions, 
Criminal Behaviour Orders and Public Spaces Protection Orders (PSPO). Often referred 
to as Dog ASBOs or ‘DogBos’ by practitioners, CPNs were envisaged to be the early 
intervention, and most often utilised, tool within the Act in relation to dog control and 
they can require a dog to be neutered or muzzled in a public place, or mandate training, 
for instance. The other measure the Government anticipated being utilised regularly is the 
PSPO which is designed to exclude dogs from certain areas such as parks or estates. 
None of the measures were accompanied with funding or specialist training in dog 
behaviours for the officers permitted to use them. The criticism from the welfare 
organisations and dog experts was that without this the enforcer could unwittingly make 
the problems worse.
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Contrary to the view that the Government was responsive on this issue others argue that 
politicians ‘are deliberately ignoring the testimonies of legitimate professionals 
(veterinarians, human society personnel, dog trainers, breed clubs)’ (Delise 2007: 103). 
Defra had commissioned the aforementioned research with University of Liverpool’s 
Institute of Veterinary Science into human-directed dog aggression which concluded that it 
was not possible to indicate breed as a factor (Defra 2011), which it has seemingly chosen 
to ignore along with other peer-reviewed scientific papers on the factors surrounding dog 
bites and attacks produced since (see previous chapter). It would appear these have been 
dismissed in favour of the views of the practitioners and enforcers. It is also true that 
other factors could have driven the changes on dog control the Government has made. 
Whilst ‘Doggie Bail’ (officially Interim Exemption Scheme [IES]) could be packaged as 
benefitting welfare, they also hugely reduce the kennelling costs that were crippling police 
forces in most major urban areas (Jones 2015; N. McCarthy 2016). If indeed this was a 
factor, reducing the proportion of public money spent on tackling the problem may not 
be the most prudent if investment could be shown to produce results. As Franklin points 
out ‘the solutions to breed neutral city ordinances for managing dog and human safety are 
much easier to apply and are less costly than enforcing or maintaining a dog breed specific 
ordinance’ (2013: 55). This conclusion is supported by Hussain who notes that ‘dangerous-
dog laws share many of the same direct costs as breed specific legislation’ (2006: 2875). 
Evidence of such has been presented to government, committees and politicians 
throughout this latter period but to no avail.
The 2014 measures have been too recent to draw in depth evidence-based conclusions 
about their impacts. However, there are some early indications of concern. The extension 
of the law to cover private property has been explored by Bleasdale-Hill and Dickinson 
who found it, amongst other issues, to be ‘problematic in that it places unclear 
expectations upon householders with dogs on their premises and there are ambiguities 
around how far the definition of “dwelling” extends’ (2016: 75-76), leaving such a lack of 
clarity as to threaten the objectives of these amendments. The authors also call for 
consolidation of the law, something that has been echoed in the most recent Efra inquiry 
(2018), and they also warn that legislating alone won’t bring about change as it will only 
be followed by the more responsible, ‘whilst further changes to the law could encourage 
some of these different owners to take more care and be more accountable for their 
dogs’ actions, it is submitted that other types of dog owners are unlikely to respond to 
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such legislative modification alone’ (Bleasdale-Hill & Dickinson 2016: 65). McCarthy too 
comments on the most recent legislative changes and describes them as ‘extensions of 
control that both depart from and complement discourses of “dangerousness”…one 
should consider these regulatory instruments as an extension of, not a departure from, 
earlier conceptions of dangerousness rooted in the DDA’ (McCarthy 2016: .568-569). He 
does, however, note a general trend, through the post-2012 discourse, of a move from a 
focus on the fault of the dog to that of the owner. Even in that context the Government 
responded firmly in January 2016 to an online petition calling for the repeal of BSL stating 
that the ban on dogs bred for fighting should remain in place and that the police were 
also in agreement (Bennett 2016: 14). In response to this, in an book chapter I co-
authored, we argue that ‘by retaining and even solidifying BSL on the UK statute books the 
Government ignores the contribution this has made to the status dog problem, while also 
causing hysteria and myth-making around links between status dog and the more serious 
criminal activities, including dog fighting and gangs’ (Maher et al. 2017: 146).
5.9 Summary
This chapter has presented the findings of a documentary analysis of the political journey 
through which the Dangerous Dogs Act has travelled over the last quarter of a century or 
more. This has covered its antecedents, enactment, (un)intended consequences, and 
particularly its status as symbolic politics.The evidential arguments discussed expose the 
absence of any scientific foundation for BSL, and therefore it has been argued to have all 
the characteristics of a situation of ‘policy-led evidence’. Solutions have been clearly 
discussed, developed and implemented during the intervening years, most notably in the 
1997 and 2014 Acts, however the fundamental objections to BSL, and the arguments it is 
not only contributing to, but also perpetuating, a dog problem, have been ignored. That is 
not to say it would not take an extremely brave government to repeal s1 given that an 
attack on a person by a dog currently subject to prohibition (as well as many other 
breeds), could be considered to be inevitable, particularly if there are no alternatives put 
in its place. 
This concludes Part II of the thesis which has sought to present the findings of a detailed 
documentary analysis in relation to the policy process for status and dangerous dogs in 
England and Wales. This has illuminated the nature and form of the problem definition; the 
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various statutes manifesting as policy solutions as well as their perceived effects on the 
problem; and the political path and context of the policy process. The literature has 
provided the means to delve deeper into the historical and contemporary details of the 
position and development of dog control in our society than could be afforded by the 
data and methods utilised in Part III. That empirical data, formed from elite interviews 
discussed in Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine, instead provides a rich and comprehensive 
account of the lived experiences of those operating within the policy community itself, 
which allows, for instance, an exploration of those networks in a way that is not possible 
in a documentary analysis simply because those accounts are entirely absent from 
literature. But first, in Chapter Six, I explain the methodology utilised within Part III of this 
study.
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PART III
Elite insights into 
policy formation
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Chapter Six 
Methodology 
6.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to reflect upon the how the research relating to the third 
part of the thesis was conducted whilst also making the connection with the central 
research aim, and the objectives, through a discussion on the design, methods and analysis 
adopted. What follows includes a description of the research strategy and design as well 
as a consideration of the insider-researcher role. The methods of data collection and 
analysis employed will be explored before consideration is given to the political and 
ethical factors to conducting such research.
6.2 Research aim, objectives and approach
The aim of this research study is: 
to explore the nature and dynamics of contemporary policy making in crime control via 
a detailed case study of the emergence and re-shaping of 'dangerous' dog regulations 
in England and Wales.
In order to engage successfully with this central aim, the research set out to address three 
principal objectives which aimed to illuminate how a culture of control may be related to 
the policy making processes present in relation to dog control:
• To describe and analyse the dynamics and forms of 'problem definition' in relation to 
'status' and 'dangerous dogs' in England and Wales
• To examine the various policy 'solutions' that emerged in relation to these ‘problems’
• To assess critically the political processes via which particular policy responses were 
challenged and resisted
  of  139 311
Chapter Two of this thesis framed the subject matter within a culture of control (Garland 
2001) in order to understand the policy developments relating to dangerous dog over the 
last few decades in England and Wales. In addition to providing an in-depth review of the 
literature on policy making in this field, the documentary analysis of Chapters Three, Four 
and Five offer confirmation of the usefulness of such a culture of control framework as they 
suggest a hardening in approach to certain critical elements of dangerous dog policy. This 
is to be further explored in the following three chapters as the nature of the policy 
process is unearthed from the policy actors and the voices integral to that process. 
However as acknowledged from the outset by Garland (2001) himself, grand theories can 
have a habit of obscuring the finite and salient details of how a culture of control unfolds 
within the policy making process. To counter this he encourages empirical research: 
‘[s]weeping accounts of the big picture can be adjusted and revised by more focused case 
studies that add empirical specificity and local detail’ (2001:vii). However in an erstwhile 
unexplored subject area, this detailed case study is the first to become immersed in the 
empirical particulars of the dog control policy process in England and Wales, and as 
Merton (1967) argues there is little guidance from any grand theories as to influence the 
collection of empirical evidence.
In order to address the research objectives successfully it is, of course essential to develop 
a medium that could identify data associated with those lines of enquiry (Francis 2000: 
39). However it has to be noted that governments and large institutions - such as those 
associated with this study, including the one I also work for  - are often predisposed 46
towards nomothetic studies of a positivist nature, where the natural science model, 
utilising experimental or quasi-experimental methods (Sherman et al. 1998), is perceived 
to be indisputable science and therefore more desirable. However, attempting to quantify 
the dog problem via such methods could fail to comprehend the idiographic nature of 
social meaning and the importance attributed to it by those experiencing it (Edwards & 
Hughes 2005; Hughes 2007), moreover the weaknesses of the statistical data often used 
in the problem construction (discussed in Chapter Four), are now quite conspicuous. 
Similar issues exist in relation to elucidating the solutions and to the political context 
leading to policy interventions. Such quantitative data have proven to be no more than 
peripheral information, at best, and cannot address the central questions of this thesis. 
Whilst it would be erroneous to dismiss all statistical data relating to dog control, it is also 
 and who part funded my doctoral studies.46
  of  140 311
important to note that such data provide a, at best, partial, and at worst, skewed 
representation of the ‘problem’ that they are deemed to measure. As a means of 
exploring the construction of the problem; the associated responses; and the political 
context, official statistics can therefore be seriously misleading (May 2001: 74).
When determining an appropriate research strategy - in order to understand the policy 
process for the control of dogs - it is perhaps as fundamental to reflect upon the 
acquisition of knowledge of the social world itself. This case study has been designed in 
order to excavate applied meaning, or in other words, it is constructed so as to ensure 
significance is placed upon deciphering the interpretations and experiences of the social 
world, by others, in order that it becomes possible to comprehend that world. As Bryman 
(2004: 14) notes: 
[S]ocial reality has a meaning for human beings and therefore human action is 
meaningful – that is, it has a meaning for them and they act on the basis of the 
meanings that they attribute to their acts and to the acts of others.
The social world is presupposed to be a semiotic environment; a construct, whereby the 
dangerous dogs policy process is far from being a universally understood social fact but is 
actually being ascribed meaning by social actors, a meaning which is also in perpetual 
change. The interpretivist epistemological foundation of this research, however, also draws 
upon an element of ‘scientific realism’ (Pawson & Tilley 1994; Tilley 2000) in so much that 
understanding the underlying mechanisms leading to policy development within the social 
phenomenon of dog control is fundamental to its evaluation.
In seeking to establish a posteriori knowledge, the experience and findings of this study, 
being empirical in nature, are intended to produce knowledge which is not gained through 
prior intuition or deduction. As such I drew inspiration from Noaks and Wincup: ‘research 
should be fun, it should be conducted in a reflexive manner and.…it should be 
accomplished in an open, exploratory way, thus allowing theories to be developed from 
careful analysis of rich and detailed data’ (2004: 139). However, it has to be acknowledged 
that such a grounded relationship between theory and research is rarely so exclusive and 
in reality, and in the practice of conducting research, it can become necessary to draw 
upon both inductive and deductive methods. Layder’s (1993) ‘middle-range’ adaptive 
theory is, therefore, useful as it encourages the researcher, from the very initial stages, to 
tacitly acknowledge their own values and suppositions around theoretical framing. Layder 
(1993) contradicts the notion that inductivist and deductivist approaches are opposing 
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and alternative distinctions, and proposes that, in fact, a combination of both is valid and 
unavoidable. The pitfalls of not recognising the interrelationship has also been highlighted 
by other scholars: ’researchers need to guard against the inclination that they can 
unproblematically reflect social reality by producing data without theory and the idea that 
that theory without data can speak in the name of reality’ (May 2001: 43).
Framing the approach
Layder (1998) rejected the antipathy between grand theories and substantive theory 
however his adaptive theory argues that general theories should be far from unyielding 
but, instead, pliant to change and reformation, in light of results generated from new 
empirical research. For Layder it is imperative that there is room for any form of 
theorising in the research process, and as such the selective use of concepts from general 
theories is to be encouraged as a means of increasing the ability for theorising or 
explaining social behaviour. As Bottoms (2008: 101) notes neither inductive nor deductive 
empirical approaches find the inclusion of general theory that straightforward and 
helpfully adaptive theory ‘deliberately seeks to overcome this difficulty’. Garland too, of 
course, encourages focussed case studies to build upon his own general theories and as 
such the culture of control thesis (2001) has been utilised as a theoretical substructure to 
this study, thus providing for the identification of any factors which facilitated or resisted 
such tendencies. 
The study of policy has erstwhile concerned itself largely with the outcomes of 
developments in practice, usually through the impact of legislation. However, as has been 
previously noted, how and why policy comes into being is becoming increasingly more 
common as the object of enquiry (Jones & Newburn 2007). Nonetheless embarking upon 
a road less travelled often requires a researcher to purloin conceptual frameworks from 
other disciplines as some means to exploring and presenting the data. In such a tradition 
the middle-range analytical framework of Kingdon’s Multiple Streams model has been 
utilised as an organising structure, in the following three chapters, in order to understand 
how dog control policy is debated, resisted and made for England and Wales. 
Although this section does not seek to repeat the explanations of Chapter Two, it is 
worth noting that the selection of Multiple Streams Analysis (MSA) for this study was 
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based upon its proven suitability to making sense of what can often appear to be a 
complex and orderless milieu, ‘MSA has proven to be a very productive and analytically 
useful way to study public policy’ (Jones et al. 2016). Whilst other studies of the policy 
process in relation to animals have employed Policy Network Analysis (Garner 1998 and 
Lyons 2011; 2013) these have also sought to place greater emphasis on power relations 
and resources, and on structure versus agency, and they can as a result sometimes suffer 
from a rather static perspective. Kingdon however recognises the policy process is far 
from a rational event and is instead chaotic and unpredictable (though crucially, not 
random), and thus offers a way to understand what goes on even if it cannot easily 
predict outcomes: ‘He has given us an approach - we may even say a “toolkit” - which we 
can use to explore agenda setting elsewhere’ (Hill 2013: 179).
6.3 Research design
The case study as an empirical research design was chosen because it is compatible to 
applied problems that need to be studied in context, that is, a phenomenon that cannot 
be separated from - but must be studied within its real-life - context. This is especially so 
where, as in the policy process in relation to the status and dangerous dog phenomenon, 
the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are obviously evident. Inductive or 
exploratory case studies can be invaluable when illuminating a research landscape that has 
little in the way of explored theoretical knowledge (Siggelkow 2007). Of course all 
research designs are intended to provide the fabric between the research objectives, the 
data gathered and the conclusions reached. However fewer researchers may utilise the 
case study design as it has an occasional distinction as being the ‘soft option’ due to the 
lack of structure in terms of questions and data collection favoured by those employing 
the design. What critics may overlook however are the related advantages of the case 
study such as its plasticity, being emergent and exploratory in nature, and allowing the 
investigation of a extraordinary situation - the terra incognito - where strict pre-structuring 
can be counterproductive (Robson 1993: 148-149). 
The ‘case’ within this research study is the unfolding policy process on dog control with 
specific regard to the dangerous and status dog phenomenon primarily between the 
period of 1991 to 2016. This was selected due to the particular characteristics of the 
policy process during that timeframe suggesting a culture of control has become a 
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dominant feature. The ‘units’ for analysis are the official government policy developments, 
and the legislative acts and amendments passed in the UK Parliament, and applicable to 
England and Wales.
6.4 The insider-researcher role
Chapter One was designed, in part, to provide a detailed background to my professional 
role at the RSPCA and how I came to study the policy process in relation to dog control. 
To build upon that description I return now to the dual insider-researcher role to consider 
the implications for the research itself. 
There are examples, of course, of researchers who have themselves been immersed 
within a policy making environment whilst studying it, for instance Rock’s (1986) seminal 
ethnographical investigation of the evolution of policy making in a justice ministry, whereby 
he adopts the role of ‘story-teller’. His study may differ, however, in a number of ways to 
my own insider-researcher experiences. For instance, Rock readily admits to the 
unfamiliarity of his surroundings:
……strange part of a strange Ministry in a strange country, it was difficult to 
recognize pattern and meaning in the world about me. I was not familiar with the 
staff, their work, their problems, and their universe of assumptions’ (1986: xii). 
He was also unaccustomed to the subject matter or even the more trivial details such as 
how materials were to be stored. In order to be accepted in the policy making 
environment to the degree to which he would be allowed to make observations, Rock 
conceded it was first important to learn these salient details. Despite doing so he also 
acknowledged that he never lost his outsider label amongst certain groups. 
 
Insider-research has not been the subject of much inquiry and the critical attention it has 
received has been to warn against the incompatibility of the twin role (Brannick & 
Coghlan 2007) although some accounts suggest a delineation of the benefits and 
weaknesses of this form of research is emerging (Labaree 2002). The extant literature 
employing the approach would appear thus far to have been dominated by accounts from 
within the disciplines of medicine and education (see for instance Bonner & Tolhurst 2002; 
Sikes & Potts 2008) perhaps as testimony to the predisposition of those environments to 
learning ‘on the job’. It is not a method that can only be confined to certain professions 
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however. Insider researcher is defined as any study conducted within a social grouping of 
which the researcher is also a part, whereby they can ‘play two roles simultaneously: that 
of researcher and researched’ (Greene 2014: 2). The group that is the object of study is 
already understood and experienced by the researcher from within, as a prior and existing 
member. The paramount consideration in definitional terms is the positionality, in other 
words the propinquity of researcher and participants and how aligned their shared 
experiences and normative values are, ranging from total insiders to partial insiders along a 
moveable scale (Chavez 2008). As with other methods of conducting research there are 
both potential benefits to be gained as well as pitfalls to be carefully navigated, which I will 
briefly explore. 
Greene (2014) identifies three advantages to insider-research, namely knowledge, 
interaction and access. The knowledge is characterised by the researcher being already 
pre-oriented to the research environment and as such the topic and participants are 
known to them, what can be termed a ‘re-understanding’ (Brannick & Coghlan 2007). It 
should, therefore, be easier for the researcher to seamlessly observe and collect data with 
the most minimal of effects upon their subjects. Interaction denotes the ease to which the 
insider-researcher can communicate with a participant given the familiarity and safety that 
participant will likely expect from someone they may consider they share experiences and 
an understanding with. Access to participants can be a blatant benefit for the insider-
researcher given their pre-acceptance within their social group, however that may not 
always be the case and is considered by some to be ‘situational depending on a number of 
critical factors that are determined by the circumstances of the moment’ (Labaree 2002).
The drawbacks to insider-research may be considered more numerous, as Greene (2014) 
points out, the proximity of the subject to the researcher potentially producing subjective 
viewpoints characterised by assumptions and an over-familiarity they may be unable to 
challenge. Indeed there is, beyond other forms of interpretivist methodologies, an 
increased risk of bias, objectivity and validity issues arising from the researcher being on 
the inside which it must be acknowledged may ‘compromise their ability to engage 
critically with the data’ (2014: 5). A crucial way to address some of these threats is to 
engage with a highly reflexive methodology and indeed my system of recording field 
notes was supplemented by a methodological log and a research diary the contents of 
which I systematically reviewed during my time in the field and beyond in order to 
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challenge my perceptions and responses to participants, the data and the gathering 
process. Gaining access to participants is largely considered easier for insider-researchers 
but there are still issues to consider such as the relationship to the social group, they may 
still be considered an outsider within the group (DeLyser 2001) which may well exist in 
professional networks where hierarchies are underlined by length of experience and job 
titles for instance. In a much different way to an outsider, the expectations of participants 
may be more challenging to manage if it proves difficult for them to see the researcher 
swap between member to researcher and back again: ‘insider researchers must be able to 
shift between identities and their dual roles of researcher and the researched, but without 
causing a noticeable disturbance to the research setting’ (Greene 2014: 7). Rather than 
studying my community group, my workplace, or a local ethnic population to which I 
belong, as is the case with some of the insider-researcher literature, participants in my 
research work for other organisations or in other professions. As such the visibility of my 
‘insiderness’ may be different, and indeed in my circumstances ‘positionality is defined 
more by what you do than who you are’ (Labaree 2002). Whilst we may all belong to the 
same ‘epistemic’ community on dog control policy, we also often work on opposing sides 
to one another on other, very public, issues and as such there were delicate professional 
jealousies and courtesies to consider as well as matters of confidentiality and power 
relations. Outside of the professional policy sphere some of the participants are also long 
term friends which can bring a complicated additional dimension including a risk of 
tension and a very real threat to that friendship. There are natural limits to the extent to 
which such personal relationships can be recast during interview, placing barriers on the 
research it may be impossible to lift. Further consideration of the insider role is given in 
the ethics section of this chapter.
6.5 Research Methods
The methods for generating data for Part III of this thesis, were selected for their capacity 
to address the key research aim and objectives and in contrast to the documentary 
analysis in Part II. This was principally done via 25 semi-structured elite interviews although 
my privileged position also allowed me to collect observations of key events in the policy 
process, such as the Task & Finish group and meetings with government and key 
stakeholders.
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Elite interviews
In order to determine the features of the dog control problem; its solutions both past and 
future; and the political context to the policy process it was necessary to procure and 
explore the accounts of those prominent figures working within the network, and who 
possess germane knowledge of its inner processes, to include governments, statutory 
bodies, veterinary and legal experts, and animal welfare agencies. Interviewing remains one 
of the most favoured data collection instruments employed by social researchers but, as 
noted by Morris (2009: 209), the preponderance of which is conducted with regular, ‘less-
powerful’ members of society. Engaging with elites requires a recognition of the differences 
to other forms of interviewing, although it is not uncommon. There are a number of 
notable examples of research hinged upon elite interviews such as Reiner’s examination 
of Chief Constables in England and Wales (1991). Lilleker (2003: 207) offers a typology of 
this form of interviewing stating that ‘[e]lites can be loosely defined as those with close 
proximity to power or policymaking’. Whilst most elites are interviewed because of the 
position they hold in society, not all elites can be regarded as powerful and within a 
specific sample they may also not be of equal stature (Odendahl & Shaw 2002). Whilst it 
is important to understand the seniority, experience and position of each individual 
captured within the study’s category of elite interviewees, these need not be relative to 
their position within the policy network. The constituent parts of the network may 
present a different balance of power and influence depending on a range of factors - as 
illustration a police constable would not be considered influential within wider policing 
however if their role within this network is pivotal to police policy on dog control they 
themselves then, in the context of this research, transform into a powerful elite.
Sampling and Access
The selection of participants followed a logical purposive sampling - providing a ‘better 
purchase on the research questions’ (Robson 1993: 155) - in utilising my insider-
knowledge of the policy network with a very minor element of snowballing when two of 
the elites recruited three more participants who were less known to me at that precise 
time. This brokering in fact mirrors the everyday experiences of the policy network as 
individuals move on from their professional role, others will act as intermediaries in 
introducing the organisation’s replacement to their key contacts. Although, of course, the 
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policy community, as a whole does not operate as one agency and therefore there will 
always be individuals unknown to others. In sampling I was careful to examine my 
preconceptions as to what constituted an elite, and it was beneficial to me that in seeking 
representation from key organisations they could self-select their own representative 
individual for interview (although they were invariably who I had already identified). Care 
was also taken to ensure there was a broad representation of elites identified to reflect 
the range of disciplines and organisations, both statutory and non-statutory, directly 
involved.
The challenge remained however that considering the constant state of flux of status and 
dangerous dog debates that those individuals and organisations could be persuaded to 
participate. This posed a significant threat to the research given that within such a narrow 
area of policy making there could never be a surplus of candidates qualified and prepared 
to participate. Whilst my insider role, representing one of the major stakeholder 
organisations, afforded me access to many of the participants, this could also act as a 
barrier to acquiring consent. Indeed all the key politicians present during the passage of 
the 1991 Act and with the portfolio at the time of data collection either refused to 
participate or declined to respond. I had not experienced this before when in earlier 
research I had been able to secure UK Government Ministers for interview (Lawson 
2010). There are a number of factors that could have contributed to this development - 
the political party in power had since changed and my organisation’s relationship with the 
new Government and some key parliamentarians could be considered strained at times. 
Indeed during the Parliamentary session immediately following my data collection period a 
Commons committee inquiry, with the subject matter of animal welfare, was widely 
regarded - given the nature of the call for evidence - to in fact be about the RSPCA (Efra 
2016). The lack of participation by elected politicians was a key reason for the extensive 
documentary analysis of Chapters Three, Four and Five, so that their account may be 
unearthed from the literature and triangulated with the data from interviews representing 
the rest of the policy community.
Detailed information regarding the terms on which I proposed to interview including an 
overview of the subject matter was provided in advance. Avoiding any potential of 
accusation that I had sought to obfuscate my role (with anyone I was not familiar) or the 
methods being employed, before they were asked to provide written consent and either 
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during my approach or at the start of the interview, I explained in detail how the ethical 
pitfalls had been mitigated against. I provided finite details on the ethical oversight of the 
University and how the data was being collected, stored and processed in complete 
isolation from my professional role and my organisation’s reach. I did not want to attract 
participants who were not prepared to offer genuine authenticity in their responses. 
Particular emphasis was given in asking all individuals to deliberate carefully as to any likely 
consequences to their participation and indeed if there could be any barriers to full 
disclosure.
Doing the interviews
Once consent had been obtained, all interviews took place face-to-face, between mid-
year 2014 and late 2015. I continued to pursue interviews with politicians for another 12 
months. I met the majority of participants for interview at either their offices, throughout 
England and Wales, or at my own office in Cardiff. Three took place in a quiet corner of 
various hotel lounges and five participants were kind enough to invite me to their home. 
As such I was able to avoid the public venues where background noise can hamper 
recording equipment and generally negatively affect the flow of conversation. Interviews 
lasted between an hour and three, with the majority over one and a half hours. 
The questions were semi-structured (see Appendix A for Interview Schedule) in order to 
mitigate post-coding but also to provide the appropriate latitude for discussion and 
elaboration on identified tangential issues whilst remaining within the interview schedule 
(Bryman 2004: 321). Remaining circumspect regarding some of the factors that jeopardise 
such research is quite judicious, the principle of which perhaps is the memory and 
recollection deficiencies that can plague first-hand accounts and result in impaired data. 
Careful consideration was therefore given to such possibilities particularly in the 
construction of the question areas and later in the transparency of coding. If the 
participant was working within the network during the passage of the 1991 Act, I ensured 
that I provided advance warning of the inclusion of this topic to aid their recollection. 
Indeed this prompted three participants to dig out old paper notes and cuttings to aid 
their memory, which they were also kind enough to pass me copies of afterwards.
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The risk of a participant deliberately misrepresenting the facts to any particular degree is 
perhaps minimised when elite interviews are conducted by an insider as they could 
reasonably expect me to have an insight into the truth. However I had always feared my 
RSPCA role could potentially stifle fully authentic accounts in that the interviewee may 
hold back from explaining the extent of their views on a subject. The proof that this, 
however, was not the case came in the very real and brutally honest nature of the 
insightful criticism of the RSPCA and, in particular, of the one particular Chief Executive 
who had by then departed and another of a colleague that remains in post today. The 
danger with this candid criticism of the RSPCA, however, was its ability to dominate the 
conversation and blur the lines between wider animal welfare and organisations issues, 
and this research topic. 
My insider-researcher status may well have facilitated a reduction in inhibitions and 
enabled a full and frank disclosure but there were consequences to navigate in the short 
window afforded by a research interview. The RSPCA was not the only topic that 
participants wanted to discuss enthusiastically, indeed our shared experiences of other 
campaigns, meetings, conferences and individuals appeared to make some eager to 
deliberate over these at the expense of the interview. I came to refer to this as ‘falling 
down a rabbit hole’ with participants as a means of lightly refocussing our conversation 
back to the schedule. Other challenges presented when participants would defer to me, 
appearing reluctant to answer, as found by other researchers, data was ‘difficult to elicit 
because respondents expected that I “knew it already’“ (Porteous 1988). The same 
obstacle presented when interviewees would express views through non-verbal language. 
To counter these issues I adopted a tactic used by others in such a scenario (Chavez 
2008) and began to introduce each question with the acknowledgement that we may 
have discussed the topic previously, possibly many times, or they may just believe that in 
my role I would have a good understanding of the topic, but that I particularly needed 
their views and their voice on the matter, in some detail. 
Other impediments to data collection emanated from the sway (or not) my organisation’s 
name carries presenting as minor antagonism over past business dealings. A few 
interviewees demonstrated a heightened sense of risk particularly to their own 
employment and asked that certain specific comments they had made were not to be 
quoted out of a sense of professional self-preservation should it be possible to identify 
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them, however thankfully this proved to be a rare occurrence. My own relationships and 
friendships with others within the network or indeed certain participants of this study 
seemed to produce some occasional over-familiarity due to friendships and/or the level of 
extraprofessional information previously exchanged. It is prudent to be cognisant of what 
can manifest from some familiar relationships, where ‘increased contact brings sympathy, 
and sympathy in its turn dulls the edge of criticism’ (Fenno, 1978 cited in Bachman & 
Schutt 2007: 277). Conversely some elites exerted a dominance and a sense of 
superiority during interview, expressed verbally which was problematic, at times, for 
retaining control over the interview schedule. This proved to be a delicate predicament to 
overcome due to the balance of power being decidedly in their favour (Morris 2009: 209). 
Interviewing elites presents a number of obstacles that must be planned for and navigated, 
as DeLyser (2001: 443) acknowledges: ‘in interviewing members of one’s own community, 
asking the simplest question can present great challenges. A tension has to be negotiated 
between assumptions and the researcher's desire for data’.
Observations
Whilst the 25 elite interviews became the main conduit for data collection, my insider-
researcher status afforded me other forms of access to the policy process on a weekly, if 
not daily, basis. As my RSPCA role changed to adapt to the evolving environment on dog 
control policy, and my responsibilities increased significantly leading the Welsh 
Government’s Task and Finish Group, as well as later the addition of the policing policy 
role, I became a regular member at meetings with a range of dog control stakeholders, 
many of whom I also interviewed for this study. I had fortunately begun a research diary 
from the outset and so as additional opportunities to observe the policy process 
presented themselves I further developed my method of recording written observations 
via the diary with the addition of a methodological log. My role within such ‘policy soup’ 
meetings, was to represent and further the goals of the RSPCA, however I was also able 
to ensure the other parties were aware of my research. For transparency and to comply 
with the ethical approval my research had received, I would reassure participants at these 
meetings that I was not recording them and would not be attributing any quotes or data 
findings to them or any individuals who had not already provided written consent. Instead 
I was using these observations as a means to reflect upon the process as I experienced it 
and to inform my analysis and findings. I also attended and chaired several dog control 
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policy conferences during this period and I was careful to overtly explain my dual role to 
other attendees. In all of these instances I was grateful to receive the support of others 
within the policy process.
The proceedings of the Task & Finish Group were, of course, recorded, both through 
written evidence and via transcriptions of the verbal evidence sessions (and are also in the 
public domain, see RSPCA 2016a), which allowed me to repeat my reflections upon my 
experiences several times over an extended period. It was also helpful this fell during the 
12 months immediately following my interview data collection.The timing of this generally 
reflexive approach has helped to both develop my skills as a researcher and been 
invaluable at triangulating my data so that I may have confidence in my analysis and 
findings.
6.6 Data Analysis
Before embarking upon the analysis I ensured the data was anonymous by first developing 
a suite of codes to denote five sectors of expertise, namely ‘Police’ (POL), ‘Local 
Government’ (LG), ‘RSPCA’ (RS), ‘Dog-related NGOs’ (DNGO) and ‘Technical 
Specialist’ (TS) (Table 3 in Appendix B). The second stage was to allocate a code to each 
individual within the five sectors. These codes are contained in Table 4 of Appendix B 
along with a short anonymised biography to each participant’s background.
All 25 elite interviews were recorded using a compact digital dictaphone, the files from 
which were deleted once they had been backed up to a personal home computer. It is 
worth noting the practical implications and challenges of qualitative interview methods in 
this research, namely the prolonged length of interview required in order to extract the 
relevant data, which necessitated a large amount of time initially being dedicated to 
transcribing with careful planning so as to avoid a loss in tempo, which can be more 
challenging within part-time hours. Once this was completed the data could be analysed 
through a thematic approach and although I have been trained in, and used on previous 
research projects Computer Assisted Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS), such as NVivo, I 
chose a manual coding approach. In a previous research project utilising CAQDAS I 
experienced a feeling of distance from the data when coding, which had not been offset 
by any significant gains in time by using it. Although the data coding may have ended up 
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taking slightly longer, I felt more confident that I would be more able to retain the context 
in which the data was generated. The data are therefore set to evolve through three 
sequential stages, from transcription it is probed for themes and patterns before codes are 
produced to aid interpretation.
 
The main analytical framework provided the matrix for coding data, organised around the 
three streams of ‘problem’, ‘policy’ and ‘political’. From here there is a back-and-forth 
interplay when sifting through data, requiring checking and rechecking concepts and 
elemental codes to ensure no emergent themes are overlooked. Data must be compared 
with other data to organise similarities, patterns and ideas that may be clustering together, 
before the process is repeated many times over and the substantive categories are 
confirmed. Other codes were inductively generated as the process developed in order to 
organise the problem construction and definition issues in Chapter Seven and the policy 
solutions proposed and resisted, structured in two main sectors of time - pre and post 
1991 - for Chapter Eight. Where the data allowed, meta-codes from within MSA were 
utilised although this is only significantly prominent within the political stream organised 
around ‘national mood’, ‘organised political forces’ and ‘government’ in Chapter Nine. 
Although the reality of analysis is messy for all researchers, as intended, the theory to 
research relationship adapted through an iterative process of utilising a theoretical 
framework to aid empirical interpretations.
6.7 Political and ethical considerations
Ethical dimensions are a crucial and constant consideration for all researchers throughout 
the process as a whole and do not stop once consent is granted by the University’s ethics 
committee of course. Fortunately in addition to the School, there is an abundance of 
authoritative literature to advise and support (Bryman 2004; Noaks & Wincup 2004, Jupp 
et al. 2000; May 2001) and although I have ceased to be a member of the British Society 
of Criminology, I have continued to observe their guidelines. An attempt has been made 
throughout this chapter to address the predominant ethical issues at the appropriate 
juncture, however there are additional facets, particularly within the political features of 
the research, that would also benefit from exploration.
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A methodical approach was taken to ensuring ethical mores were observed. At the initial 
stages detailed information sheets were sent to all participants to corroborate and 
reinforce the verbal information that had previously been given. This was further 
reinforced by the inclusion of a précis on the consent form, of which two copies were 
signed by each candidate and myself. Anonymity has been afforded to all interviewees but 
this was paramount and of particular concern to certain participants, as such additional 
reassurances on data storage and ongoing confidentiality were provided where needed. 
Where any participant referred to a third party those identities have also been 
anonymised in the corresponding transcript to minimise their identification and the ability 
to identify the interviewee themselves.
As Greene (2014: 2) notes, ’insider researchers may be confronted with methodological 
and ethical issues that may be deemed to be irrelevant to outsider-researchers’ and these 
have been explored extensively earlier in this chapter however it is worth noting more 
specifically that the RSPCA can itself be a polarising force. The Society has occupied a 
political position for many years in that it is actively lobbies and campaigns for changes in 
legislation, although as a charity and through self-imposed professional ethics does not 
operate on a party political basis. Noaks and Wincup (2004: 20) explore the definition of 
political and note that it can include societal and organisational, and at interview these 
were interwoven by participants who provided indications of responding to both. As is 
discussed in later chapters, some of the participants were content to explore the highly 
political issues of competition and conflict (from their own or their organisation’s 
experiences), although others may have been more reticent during interview on the 
subject given the organisation is my employer and partial funder of this research. As 
Hughes (2000: 235) states however ‘no criminological research takes place in a political 
and normative vacuum’. Structured topics, detailed analysis of the accounts given, as well 
as the researcher’s knowledge of these motivations were pivotal in evading or mitigating 
against such pitfalls.
Before embarking upon my doctoral studies I was advised by more seasoned researchers 
that a key component of the ethical dilemmas I would face would be the suspicions that, 
as ‘paymaster’ or ‘piper’ (Noaks & Wincup 2004: 24), the RSPCA had, or would seek to 
have, influence over the direction of my research particularly as they have contributed to 
its cost and have a keen interest in its findings. This is a routine issue for researchers 
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pairing their studies with a professional role when funding is sourced from an employer. A 
robust methodology and transparency of findings can counter these concerns, thus 
ensuring confidence in both myself and the research. I have also paid due care and 
attention to the practical details of storing data at home and using only home computers 
and equipment, to meet confidentiality and practical requirements but also as a wider 
symbol of separation. A foothold in both the professional and academic spheres, a so-
called ‘user involvement’ (King & Wincup 2008: 29-30), brings undoubted benefits such as 
emboldening a renewed focus upon the policy process. During the near two centuries 
that the RSPCA has operated it has sought to capture and utilise developments within 
the animal welfare sciences but perhaps what has lacked hitherto is an appreciation of the 
social sciences and the motivations of people who use and abuse animals and how the 
policy process responds and adapts to those issues. This is a deficiency to which I am 
committed to addressing.
I also faced a political and ethical issue regarding the existence of some policy elites and 
literature orientated around animal rights. As provocative as it is, the challenging position 
of the more extreme interpretation of animal rights would be that the issues of status and 
dangerous dog problems in society, the responses to those problems and the policy 
process itself would be irrelevant, if dogs were not reared and kept as pets. It is therefore 
important to note that none of the participants in this study, nor myself, occupy an 
abolitionist position in our professions or workplace, the consequences of which is indeed 
an absence, within the data, of engagement with the animal rights’ ideological position for 
any explanations or contributions it may provide as to the issues surrounding status and 
dangerous dogs. However the welfarist and anthropocentric nature of this study and that 
off the elite participants was justified in its early stages because of the focus on the policy 
processes in relation to a phenomenon regarding owned dogs, and because the influence 
of animal rights advocates does not yet feature in that particular policy process.
6.8 Summary
This chapter has sought to describe and present the theory-method approach that was 
adopted for the findings presented in the subsequent three chapters, constituting the third 
part of this thesis. Following a recapitulation of the core aim and objectives to unearth the 
nature and dynamics of the policy process on dog control, the research strategy, design 
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and methods were discussed in some detail. The adaptability of qualitative methods has 
demonstrated their suitability and strength for this research, as Coffey and Atkinson (1996: 
3) note, such methods share a ‘central concern with transforming and interpreting 
qualitative data in a rigorous and scholarly way – in order to capture the complexities of 
the social worlds we seek to understand’. The impact of my status as an insider-researcher 
has now been properly explored and this along with the political and ethical dimensions 
this study is subject to, will inform the following three chapters. The combination of the 
two methodological sections of this thesis in terms of their contribution to the overall aim, 
will be discussed in Chapter Ten.
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Chapter Seven  
The Problem Stream:  
The social construction of the ‘dog problem’ 
7.1 Introduction
The employment of Kingdon’s evolutionary policy model ‘Multiple Streams Analysis’ (MSA) 
provides this thesis with a rudimentary framework within which to explore and present 
the data. What follows, along with the successive two chapters, utilises the three main 
elements of MSA, beginning with the ‘problem’ stream. I draw upon a number of data 
sources, most importantly the elite interview accounts of the policy process, but also my 
own observations of key discussions including the Task and Finish Group on Responsible 
Dog Ownership commissioned by the Welsh Government (RSPCA 2016a), and detailed 
policy meetings involving many of the stakeholders and all levels of local and national 
governments within the policy community. 
There has been a persistent perception of a dog problem in society (as explored in 
Chapters Four and Five), resulting in a plethora of policy and legislative responses 
stretching back decades. The precise nature of this dog problem is however more 
complex to decipher, but features both the historical definitions and classifications Kingdon 
refers to, as well as the key ‘crises, disasters, symbols and other focussing events’ (Kingdon 
1984: 103). Definitions, specifically those enshrined in legislation, were dealt with in 
Chapter Three and thus what follows does not attempt to duplicate that but instead 
reveal the role these and other definitions play within categorisations and manifestations 
of the ‘problem’ as held by the key actors in the policy community. The following sections 
are divided along the themes that emerged from the data on the articulation of the 
problem, namely, 
• breeding and trading; 
• identification and BSL; 
• dog attacks gangs and dog fighting; 
• responsible dog ownership; 
• dangerous dogs, status dogs; 
• substitute harms and the media. 
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These sections seek to present the social context of the dog ‘problem’ in England and 
Wales, demonstrating the challenges within the data of defining the policy problem, which 
has complex root meaning for the participants. Whilst these differ between, and within, 
sectors - of animal welfare NGOs, veterinary, scientific, dog behaviour, enforcement and 
local government (often seemingly due to their professions’ partial perspective on the 
phenomenon) - there are also strong areas of consensus. The existence of such diverse 
accounts of the problem are consistent with Kingdon’s notion of how particular problems 
- or potentially different definitions of just one problem – circulate within the system. I 
explore the contribution these perceptions, definitions and categorisations of the problem 
have made; the role of the media; and what factors may have led to the dominance of 
certain dimensions of the problem.
7.2 Identifying the policy ‘problem’
As noted in Chapter Four there has been a very significant level of media debate and 
political activity in relation to the issue of controlling ‘status’ and ‘dangerous’ dogs over the 
past few decades. However, close analysis of the views of key policy actors engaged in this 
debate suggests that it is strikingly difficult to clearly define the ‘problem’ for which various 
policy ‘solutions’ have been put forward. The diverse range of professions included in the 
elite interview sample highlighted a range of general ‘problems’ faced by policy makers 
relating to dog ownership and the part dogs play in society, rather than a particular focus 
on ‘dangerous’ or ‘status’ dogs per se. This was most likely explained by the fact their 
perspectives were shaped by the specific sector within which they work, informed by their 
direct experiences that shaped their sense of the most pressing ‘problems’ within a 
broader field. Some also, however, disclosed a determined and conscious resistance to 
focussing specifically on, and utilising the labels of, status and dangerous dogs: 
Ask any of us what the dog problem is and we’ll tell you something different from 
each other and something different each time you ask, not because we forget or 
change our minds, but because it is huge and complex and we’ll probably talk to you 
about the thing that is bothering us most at that moment. What isn’t helpful though, 
sorry Claire, is some obsession with status dogs. That is usually at best, a distraction 
and at worse, damaging (RS3).
Although these issues explored within this first section of the chapter may not always 
appear at first glance to be specifically about the phenomenon of dangerous and status 
dogs, to the subjects interviewed they are central to both defining it and designing the 
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solutions. This was perhaps most apparent within the written and verbal evidence 
submitted to the Task & Finish group in Wales (RSPCA 2016a). From the outset this 
project was petitioned by a number of animal welfare groups and other member-led 
NGOs representing the rural sector and working-dog owners, seeking assurances that any 
recommendations put forward to the Welsh Government would not be primarily driven 
by the aim of retrospective punishment of those with dogs behaving aggressively. I 
observed a clear consensus on a desire for a deeper consideration of the issues, and the 
inclusion of substantial proposals on the various contributing factors to the problem of 
‘dangerous’ dogs. Indeed the Task & Finish group concluded as a result (amongst other 
recommendations) that a new holistic approach to responsible dog ownership (if not all 
‘pet’ owners) in society was long overdue (RSPCA 2016a). This is but one example of the 
definitional complexities I found during the analysis of the data, which gave rise to a 
number of distinct dimensions to the ‘problem’ of dangerous dogs - a pattern strongly 
consistent with the MSA approach.
Breeding and trading
For many of the welfare sector participants the issues around the birth and early life of 
puppies was by far their main concern. It was offered not just as a root to dangerous and 
status dog issues (due to significant behavioural issues that will arise later from poor 
practices during the first stages of life), but also as the substratum to all dog problems in 
society. This is well illustrated by a participant with a multi-agency perspective:
…the puppies then, are not socialised, not habituated to the normal things that 
you’d expect a puppy to be habituated to. They’re brought up in, squalor, is probably 
the kindest word. They are not trained to be people-friendly. Many of them are 
trained not to be people-friendly, not trained to be dog-friendly, because they only 
ever see the bitch, they don’t see other types of dogs. So I would guess a lot of 
them are then showing significant fear responses that lead to aggression. So huge 
welfare problems for the puppies, and puppies then sold on to an owner who 
knows little or nothing about dogs. They then breed them and the cycle continues, if 
not deepens (RS3).
I also consistently observed and recorded this concern surrounding the raising of puppies 
within my own fieldwork notes throughout my research and in particular whilst immersed 
in the work of the Task & Finish group, where this was strongly emphasised. Since around 
2009 this issue has been more sharply in focus as the figures of puppies bred and the 
associated welfare issues have been increasingly under the public and media spotlight. The 
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various studies and quantitative data gathering exercises conducted by both the NGOs 
and the local and national governments were discussed in interviews to highlight the 
prolific nature of legal and illegal dog breeding and its contribution to the problem. Across 
all my data sets I recorded a very deep-seated concern from the dog welfare sector 
regarding the increasing ‘commodification’ of dogs in contemporary society which has led 
to a degradation of the value of these animals as sentient beings: 
The accessibility of getting a dog has definitely changed. Everybody blames stuff on 
the internet but you can’t ignore the fact that if you want to get a dog, you can do a 
quick search and within a few minutes you could have bought yourself a dog, of 
whatever kind. There is no cooling-off period. You have now got that dog and you 
haven’t really thought about it. I think that the accessibility and this instantaneous 
nature, has changed, and it is not that thought-through process, for a lot of people, 
which perhaps would help prevent some of these bad things from happening (RS4).
The potential for profits in the trafficking of puppies has also expanded both the illegal 
and legal trade. Large scale puppy supermarkets, where there is a structured marketplace 
devoid of messages of owner-responsibility towards the puppy and wider society, provide 
a guiltless avenue for consumers. It was also felt by some participants that no educational 
messages of the association between raising a puppy and later behavioural issues, 
potentially leading to bites/attacks or aggressive traits, are usually provided: 
It makes no real sense if you think about it. I know we try to avoid comparisons 
with people, but we do as a society look to a child’s upbringing and early 
experiences to explain worrying behaviours, so why not dogs I have to wonder. The 
more this is a business for people the less they seem to care about warning people 
about the huge responsibility they are taking on (DNGO2).
The reason for this void in educational messages, anti-puppy farm activists declared, is 
simply that the topic of early socialisation - beginning long before the puppy is separated 
from its mother and continuing throughout its early life - could draw attention to the 
trade’s modus operandi of utilising large scale breeders and puppy farmers  separating 47
the litter from each other, and the mother, in order to be sold on as soon as possible. Due 
to the large-scale consumer demand for puppies, what was once merely a sphere of 
breeders flouting relatively minor licensed-breeder regulations has, since the mid 2000s, 
become far broader. The lack of regulation, the significant potential profit and the relative 
ease in which puppies can be bred in very poor conditions, has seen the rise of highly 
organised criminal networks: 
This is big business but also something done in people’s homes. It has always been 
 So-called because they are not legitimate, licensed breeders.47
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notoriously difficult to find out what is happening on the ground but it has definitely 
got worse. This internet and imports from abroad are only part of that. Some of the 
problem lies of course, is there is no enforcement, or ver y little 
enforcement….there is nobody looking at who is breeding these dogs (DNGO3).
Equally of concern to the dog welfare groups (DNGO) within my interview sample was 
the validity of focussing entirely on the large scale legal and illegal breeders, traders and 
traffickers when it was felt there is clear evidence of the so-called ‘backstreet’ breeder or 
home/hobby breeder - whose activities are not even breaking any licensing regulations. 
This was highlighted as being of even more importance when considering the ‘bull breeds’ 
of choice: 
The bottom has fallen out of the market for Staffordshire Bull Terriers and akin, no 
self-respecting [licensed] breeder would imagine they could make any money nor 
would voluntarily add to the excessive numbers of abandoned, stray and homeless 
in rescues and pounds across the country (DNGO2). 
As such it is the opportunist breeder intent on producing more of these breeds 
irrespective of whether there is a sufficient market, or it is the accidental and irresponsible 
breeder contributing to the issue without facing any direct consequences. Participants 
believed that related to this there was also the illegal breeding of s1 dogs - most notably 
the Pit Bull Terrier, where the motivations to breed are either ignorant of this type’s status 
in law, or a direct intent to ignore and circumvent it. However, paradoxically, it was also 
argued that perhaps there is the potential within small scale breeding practices in 
domestic circumstances to meet the needs of the bitch and puppies more adequately 
than large scale breeding, although interviewees acknowledged this did not mean it was 
actually happening. As noted by veterinary professionals within the interview sample, there 
are no qualifications or experience required to breed dogs and no redress should that 
puppy go on to display worrisome behaviours, ending up as a direct cost to society, either 
through straying, being abandoned or attacking another animal or person.
The trade in puppies is heavily driven by the most popular breeds or type of dog. Animal 
NGOs have been dealing with the consequences of particularly sharp trends since the 
influence of TV, film and other popular cultural representations could affect such 
consumer behaviour. The so-called status of specific types or breed will be discussed in a 
separate section, but in the context of this subject it is noteworthy because of its 
connection to the most basic of misunderstandings - that of the link between a particular 
breed of dog and the reputation it has for certain behaviours. These myths regarding dog 
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behaviour and related training for owners were an important element in many of the 
interviews particularly amongst those most closely linked to the policy and scientific 
exploration of dog welfare:
We’re talking about the way people keep their dogs, and they do not understand or 
know how to look after that animal properly and that can then lead to all these 
other perceived problems of irresponsible dog ownership, whatever that means. I 
think it actually boils down now to just a complete lack of understanding. I think 
dogs understand us, a lot more than most people understand dogs (RS4).
The attraction for certain individuals to Pit Bulls is based on what such scientific experts 
view as a total lack of understanding regarding the basic premise that aggression isn’t 
inherently linked to a breed or type of dog. This fundamental misconception, being 
prevalent across society, relates to all types of dogs because in the wrong hands any dog 
can become aggressive, which many participants stressed at key points throughout the 
interview. Owners not seeking to use their pet for criminal or harmful behaviour, are not 
immune from problematic behaviours in their dog, indeed not understanding and 
responding to the development of certain behaviours can still result in a dog which 
displays aggression. In interviews with the dog NGOs it was suggested that where 
punishment is administered, a fearful and confused dog may for instance escalate those 
behaviours and bite. If these behaviours are not dealt with in the correct way, they may 
escalate even further and end in a serious attack:
It’s not just those who want an aggressive dog or train it to be so. Not socialising 
and training a dog can in some circumstances lead to unwanted and dangerous 
behaviours. It’s not specific to a breed and so some owners may yet end up with an 
aggressive dog simply because they may have thought they were safe with a 
‘harmless’ breed (RS2).
The scientific community’s understanding of early socialisation; the consequences of poor 
breeding; and the breadth of dog behaviours has developed in the past ten years to the 
extent it is unrecognisable from the standards espoused by most animal NGOs, until very 
recently. Animal welfare NGOs, vets and statutory bodies are only now getting to grips 
with this knowledge and its implications and implementing changes to policies, standards 
and practices as a result: 
The public consciousness has been left even further behind and it is daunting to 
think about how we can possibly improve that to the benefit of dogs and society. It 
could take several generations (DNGO1).
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Identification and Breed Specific Legislation (BSL)
The lack of mandatory identification was raised by most participants as a very 
conspicuous problem in some form or other. Whilst proposals around addressing this, 
from mandatory microchipping - which were introduced during my data collection period 
- to annual licensing, are solutions discussed as part of the policy stream in Chapter Eight, 
it is also important to recount the significance of these issues to the problem definition. 
Those working in enforcement - both police (POL) and local government (LG) - had a 
greater clarity regarding the contribution this issue had to the dog problem:
The issue is you don’t know how many dogs there are, never mind what breed, 
shape or size. You don’t know who owns them and that’s before you even consider 
what they are up to, good or bad. If you catch them for something, the next day you 
still don’t know what dog they have or will go and get. Where do you begin in 
understanding scale (LG4).
Others in the same sector raised the issue of there being a lack of deterrent for owners if 
their dog’s behaviour can’t be traced back them, potentially affecting offending with 
regards to straying, fouling and attacks. For other sub-groups of participants such as the 
welfare NGOs there was more emphasis on a fundamental need to understand exactly 
what dogs were owned, by who, and where, so that programmes and responses could be 
designed accordingly. With no way to quantify and understand the issues, there was 
reported to be a rather obscure picture of the degree of welfare and public safety issues 
at large.
Dog Identification itself also possessed a much wider meaning, for many participants, 
particularly given the subject matter on which they were being interviewed. The meaning 
of ‘dangerous’ took on an entirely new essence following the passage of the DDA in 1991 
which introduced Breed Specific Legislation to the UK for the first time. Whilst the DDA 
was considered a solution to the dangerous dog and dog control problems of the UK in 
1991, and as such will be explored in detail in the next chapter in relation to the policy 
stream, it was also offered in itself by a majority of participants as a definition (if not the 
definition) of the dog problem as it now exists, and so will be discussed briefly in this 
section.
As part of this legislation, dogs banned by section 1 of the Act have to first be identified - 
a highly controversial and very subjective process reserved for specialist trained police 
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officers and a handful of other experts. Some participants, such as those involved with 
these legal cases, recounted how subjective and highly emotive this issue is because it is 
often a death sentence based solely upon the way a dog looks. However those involved 
with the ID process from the police side questioned the merits of this process less at 
interview. They did however recall that from their experiences there was a need for a ban. 
As suggested by one of the first ever trained Police Dog Legislation Officers and a 
founder of the Met Police’s Status Dog Unit, their experiences were different in the 
beginning: 
I have got to admit through the 1980s I thought Pit Bulls were devil dogs. They were 
in drugs dealer’s houses, firearms dealer’s houses, you know they were the ones that 
were a problem (TS5). 
Fairly early into the process the risks with identifying prohibited dogs quickly became a 
factor for those charged with enforcing the DDA: 
If someone rings in, and says there’s a Pit Bull at 27 Arcacia Avenue, if you go and 
seize it and it’s a nice family pet you’re all the devils under the sun. If you don’t go 
and seize it, and it bites someone, you’re all the devils under the sun (TS5). 
All police participants confirmed this same daily dilemma and its inherent link to 
identification remains today. While not implicating themselves in such action they spoke 
openly about the risk to identifying dogs correctly - given the implications - and how dogs 
who might otherwise be ruled not of type (and not covered by s1) getting swept up in 
the legislation: 
If all dogs subject to s1, but that have not displayed any worrisome behaviours are 
‘innocent’, what would we call the ones deemed by the authorities as s1, when they 
are in fact, not? How even more innocent are they?! (TS4).
Further to the sensitivities of identifying s1 dogs, participants discussed another 
complication arising from the DDA and identification - the confusion between s1 and s3 - 
the former prohibiting those four types of dog and the latter prohibiting any dog (of any 
breed/type) to be dangerously out of control. 
We need to acknowledge something crucially important. The [Dangerous Dogs] Act 
gave us a new problem, perhaps the only problem that matters right now, because 
to this day people hear dangerous dog and banned dog as the same thing 
(DNGO4).
Participants traced this to the nature of breed restrictions being governed by the same 
legislation as for those owners who allow their dog (of any breed) to behave dangerously. 
There was also a general understanding from those interviewed that the public, even 
long-standing dog owners, could be somewhat forgiven for absorbing and being 
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influenced by this. The enforcement section of interviewees, as civil servants usually in a 
government service role, can, as a profession, be less questioning of the nature of the 
legislation they are there to uphold, and as such these participants were more focussed 
on what evidence now existed to enable or justify repeal, rather than what evidence 
existed that gave rise to the original Act. 
To varying degrees participants either proffered, or agreed following questions, that BSL 
was inextricably linked to the ‘status’ and ‘dangerous’ dog issues under discussion. For the 
majority of interviewees, BSL was deemed to be the problem itself. Whilst it was 
recognised in its original form to have been proposed as a solution, it had since became 
the recipient of great criticism and blame for the modern day dog problem. This did not, 
however, for all participants naturally lead to the conclusion that BSL should be repealed, 
indeed some police officers in interview, extolled the virtues of s1: 
Yeah I won’t even believe just getting rid of it is the right thing to do. Those people 
don’t see what I see. Sadly it is often the only thing we have to stop the types of 
bad dog owners having and using the types of dogs in criminal activities, that we 
really all don’t want to encounter (POL2). 
In these conversations, where I detected a significant shift from previous attitudes that the 
Pit Bull was inherently dangerous, it was clear that repeal could only follow new measures 
where the police remain equipped to act wherever necessary:
I know you understand this. We’ve talked about it before. It’s not that we’re sticking 
our heels in, far from it, but nothing can change, really, can it, until we have the 
incidents of dog attacks, dog bites and deaths, criminal behaviours with these dogs, 
down. And we know it’s working. We know that whatever it is we’re doing is making 
the kind of difference needed (POL1). 
In all interviews with police officers I prompted them on their views on what the welfare 
sector refers to as a vicious circle - that attack incidents with dogs will continue while 
these types of dogs are made more attractive to the very owners who either create 
those situations or do not understand dog behaviour to stop them, and that dog attacks 
by non-s1 dogs will continue to rise while sections of society are misled that only those 
types of dogs banned, are dangerous. There was a frustrating agreement on the idea of 
this vicious circle, but this did not, in discussion, lead to an acceptance that a solution may 
therefore be linked to repeal, with or without substitute powers and measures. I return to 
BSL and its influence on the phenomenon in a later section of this chapter.
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Dog attacks, ghettoisation, gangs and dog fighting
As was seen within the literature discussed in Chapters Four and Five the issues of dog 
attacks, gangs using dogs and dog fighting have often been cited as prevalent problems in 
society, not just as evidence for the 1991 Act but since that time also. Within both my 
discussions with the elites and my observations during working groups and other 
meetings, however, there was less emphasis than might be anticipated regarding these 
issues. There was an exception to this, of course, amongst the police participants, as might 
be expected given the greater significance they naturally attribute to public safety issues 
and their immersion in dog attack incidents. For the other interviewees, there was more 
of a tacit recognition that it was an element regularly highlighted in discussion and of 
relevance, but only as a factor that motivates government and the media and, as such, one 
that should be harnessed by the animal welfare and other expert lobby extremely 
cautiously. Concerns about misinformation regarding the facts of dog attacks, such as the 
hugely unreliable hospital statistics (as explored in Chapter Four) were raised by most 
interview participants. So too was the recognition that some sectors had purposively 
deployed such statistics to promote solutions of greater control, for example the 
Government in strengthening the DDA via the 2014 Act. It is also worth noting this 
position by the animal welfare sector has essentially reversed since the research for 
Hughes et al. (2011) was conducted when such data was regarded (by the animal welfare 
sector) as proof of the problem. At interview there was a convincing appreciation for the 
complexities of the data and the dangers of misinterpreting it - wilfully or otherwise: 
‘Big Society' think there is a large problem with status dogs and dangerous dogs, but 
from, at least, the research I’ve done if you look at dangerous dogs and dogs that 
have bitten it is actually a very, very small number. So for example the evidence from 
hospitals - the number of people that go forward for treatment - is around six or 
seven thousand, that’s going to be an underestimate anyway, but when you think 
about that as a proportion of the total population you’ve got to question how big 
the issue is around dangerous dogs anyway and especially when you think about the 
number of fatalities (RS2).
Clearly dogs attacking, biting and sometimes killing other animals and more importantly 
people, causes the animal welfare sector concern, not least of all because of the obvious 
consequences of these actions, but also because it contributes to the further labelling and 
misinformation of both dog breeds and dog behaviour. A new awareness of the effects of 
mislabelling expressed in the interviews was recounted has having led to a re-definition 
regarding the involvement of young people. In 2010 the RSPCA and others drawing 
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attention to the problem of status dogs, lent heavily on data purporting to show that 
young people and their misuse of their dogs were almost wholly the problem. 
Interviewees were now citing a distinct awareness of stigmatisation and thus a reticence 
to frame the problem as one centred only on young people. Although those struggling 
with defining the section of society most closely associated with the problem also 
recognised the importance of doing so in order to design solutions: 
It is more a young person’s issue rather than middle aged or older. Yes it goes 
beyond that…it’s particular types of young people. I would probably go as far as to 
suggest.…it’s people in deprived areas with hooded jackets on and up to no good 
(RS2).
Irrespective of this young people were in fact drawing support from the animal welfare 
sector, specifically for being ghettoised by measures within the new 2014 Act. The new 
powers to allow dogs and their owners to be banned from certain zones, with young 
people deemed to be the most likely to find themselves subject to these restrictions, 
were cited by participants. It was also feared that further measures such as forced 
muzzling, neutering and having to be kept on the lead, would only contribute further to 
poor welfare for certain dogs, and crucially provide the wrong kind of information on the 
correct ways to look after and control your dog: 
It’s not that we don’t want more tools in the kit to be able to tackle issues, but you 
gotta know what you’re doing, not everyone suits them, not every situation is right. 
For those, such measures will not educate owners, often young people in these 
circumstances, on the right way to understand and control their dog (DNGO1). 
It was also feared by both local authorities and welfare groups that conversely dog bites 
and attacks and other harmful forms of behaviour exhibited by these dogs at the hands of 
their owners may actually become more frequent without any associated training and 
development of the owner’s understanding of dog behaviour.
There was an interesting consensus between the enforcement agencies and the animal 
welfare NGOs, in fact amongst all interviewees, in terms of the rejection of the notion 
that criminal gangs are a significant factor in the wider problem of status dogs. This was 
not the case, perhaps, five or six years ago, as alluded to in Hughes et al. (2011), when 
organisations responded - akin to wider society as expressed through the media - with a 
fearful knee-jerk verdict on the problem. Since that time, as I have observed in my 
fieldwork notes over several years, there has been a softening and a palpable shift in 
attitudes, with some organisations, such as the RSPCA and Dogs Trust, adjusting their 
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language slowly and quietly rather than through any pivotal moment or formal 
announcement which was acknowledged by the participants from those organisations. As 
RSPCA participants argued, following the emergence of the status dog phenomenon of 
course the social factors have been appreciated far more, for example with the RSPCA 
commissioning the Hughes et al. (2011) report. Other organisations and statutory bodies 
also sought to work, often in multi-agency partnerships, with groups inside the very 
communities they had previously blamed for the issue. Participants speculated that both 
avenues probably contributed to the policy language change considering the lack of 
alternative explanation. Of course, policy windows, in Kingdon’s view, often present 
themselves following a focussing event and as such the lack of any such event coupled 
with this subtle and somewhat lengthy enlightenment experienced by these sector bodies 
at the forefront of dealing with young people and their dogs, may have by-passed or been 
devoid of the very ingredients needed in the policy process to bring about the change 
most of the sector so desires - the repeal of s1.
There was a renewed fear of the damages of mislabelling appearing as a result of the 
breadth of issues now perceived to be captured by the terms ‘status’ and ‘dangerous dog’. 
In talks and presentations (e.g. PPE conferences May 2015 and May 2017) Harding 
regularly cites the London case of a dog used in the murder of young man by a gang. As 
more intervening years pass the isolated nature of this case and its irrelevance to the 
wider phenomenon becomes apparent. I found no evidence, even amongst several 
interviews with police Dog Legislation Officers (covering inner city and metropolitan 
areas), to support Harding’s claims that gangs and their use of status dogs are a significant 
element of the problem:
One of the lectures today  was on status dogs and gang members. We wouldn’t 48
really accept that that was the issue. We don’t think that the media image of most of 
the dangerous dogs are with some hoodie-wearing gang member, that’s not what 
we see. We see dogs coming from every strata of society. Yeah, there is an issue with 
youngsters on estates with, sort of, threatening dogs, I’m not pretending that that 
doesn’t exist, but the image that I think some people would like to promote, that it’s 
all about gang members, we don’t see that. We don’t follow with that (POL5).
There was just one exception to the above amongst the evidence collected, where an 
 Both POL5 and myself had just attended a Policy Knowledge conference in London entitled ‘A New 48
Strategy to Tackle Dangerous Dogs: Assessing the Reforms to the Dangerous Dogs Act’ on 12th May 2015, 
where Harding had presented on the role of gangs in this issue. The participant nodded and pointed several 
times during interview to indicate they were referencing Harding, who we could see in another room.
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NGO - the League Against Cruel Sports - argued that gangs are indeed a core problem 
requiring attention, but they conceded during their evidence to the Task & Finish Group 
that this emanated from a recent commissioning of Harding’s services to compile a report 
on the matter (Harding & Nurse 2015). Being relatively new to this issue, as this NGO 
was, alongside their alignment with a criminologist outside of the policy process, could also 
explain the lack of awareness of recent changes to thinking on this aspect. Indeed I 
participated in a meeting with their status and fighting dogs campaign project leader in the 
summer of 2016 where they admitted to having no empirical evidence to support their 
assertions that gangs and dog fighting should be considered key characteristics of the 
status dog problem, and they expressed a view that the League needed to attune more to 
the current debates and tone of other more experienced animal NGOs.
The interview data from those working in enforcement and in local government provided 
no evidence to support the view that organised dog fighting was a significant part of the 
problem. This label of dog fighting is recognised to be distinct from ad hoc street clashes 
between dogs at the hands of their owners. Organised dog fighting in the UK has been, 
and continues to be, an extremely secretive and resistant sub-culture that operates 
around an impregnable network of dogs and ‘dogmen’ . However there has been one 49
area developing in parallel:
Experience of dog fighting up until late 1990s early 2000s, when we were dealing 
with the all-traditional, white, English, dog-fighter, they were very, very proud of their 
bloodlines, so they breed dogs that they, well breed the gameness into the dog. That 
changed really with the Asian population becoming involved in dog fighting from 
sort of 2000 onwards when they didn’t really give a damn about the breeding lines, 
they are just going to fight the thing, and if it died, it died, they’d buy another one 
from Ireland. So there are two distinct factions there (RS1).
So no argument was made for the crossover or transfer between status dogs and dog 
fighting within the traditional white male dog fighting community, as further observed by 
the same participant:
Status dogs, from my viewpoint, is a social problem, isn’t it really….potential injuries 
to people, potential injuries to other dogs and pets, whereas the dog fighting 
fraternity, I don’t really see them as a harm to anybody other than their own dogs. 
Because rarely, if they are fighting dogs, well they are not going to be training them 
in a park, they are going to be running them on a treadmill. And more often than 
not raids are on people’s house, warrants on houses, the dogs are living as pets 
within that environment. So they’re not, they don’t tend to be any more dangerous 
to their family than any other pet dog (RS1).
 A term used, more widely in the USA perhaps, to describe the men involved in training and fighting dogs.49
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However the enforcement group perceived there to be some evidence, at least, for 
crossover between lower level offending with dogs, to the more serious dog fighting 
offences amongst the UK’s Asian community. This was confirmed by one frontline expert:
Within the Asian community it has become a natural progression. The status dogs 
being used by potential young drug users, dealers, becoming involved in, I’m still 
never sure if it’s their history from their roots in Afghanistan and Pakistan and they 
transfer that over here, or whether it is just a progression of the street culture really. 
But that’s how it started really with status dogs, then moving on to chain-fighting or 
fighting in the parks and then to becoming more organised and mingling with the 
whole traditional dog fighters, who I think in the first place were just selling them 
their cast off dogs (RS1).
Whilst this underworld may hold some fascination to would-be dog fighters, mostly 
deemed to be young people on the fringes of criminality, enforcers report no crossover 
(bar the ethnic minority faction uncovered within one specific inner city area in England 
described above), and almost no access points for the majority of young people and their 
dogs. What many in wider society and the media classify as dog fighting differs from the 
organised sector greatly. This type of informal dog fighting involves no organisation of any 
sophistication; more often than not a relatively public venue; and only very small amounts, 
if any, of money changing hands (Lawson 2017). Accounts from young people in such 
scenarios, such as in Hughes et al. (2011), betray a distressing ignorance of dog behaviour 
and their welfare needs. Although discussed in detail, at interview the elites within this 
sector classify informal or street dog fighting as a secondary factor, important only in so 
much as the way it influences other dog owners and societal responses. 
’Responsible dog ownership’
This particular phrase has had a meteoric rise during the past few years. This is largely 
because its apparently straightforward and all-encompassing nature appears to unite 
commentators, because what it implies, in the loosest possible sense, cannot surely be 
rejected. What can be regarded as obscure though, within the data and in the wider 
literature, is what this term means to those employing it on a regular basis. When 
questioned, all respondents were at pains to demonstrate their commitment to, and 
knowledge of, a range of rather vague principles, in relation to responsible dog ownership. 
No two interpretations were identical, and on further probing all participants admitted 
there was certainly no universally agreed definition. And yet for the welfare sector 
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representatives I interviewed and observed during meetings and conferences, the term 
forms a cornerstone of their mass public awareness campaigns and education materials. 
Within the statutory sector and indeed within government there is rarely a clear 
definition of ‘responsible dog ownership’. Several interviewees observed that the 
Government’s own consultation entitled ‘Promoting more responsible dog 
ownership’ (Defra 2012) had provided no definition, with only a vague reference to the 
parameters of the exercise being to ‘invite views on possible new measures to provide 
better protection for the public from dog attacks and to generate a more responsible 
attitude to dog ownership’. The consultation questions in the documentation covered: 
mandatory microchipping; extending criminal law to include private property; owners 
retaining their dogs during the court process for a suspected s1 identification/offence; and 
increasing the fee for registering a dog on the Index of Exempted Dogs. A number of 
participants from both welfare NGOs and local authorities observed that this curiously 
lacked any mention or measure regarding the responsibilities of individual dog owners. 
Instead the proposals all related to:
Did you have a look at the consultation? We went through it with a fine tooth 
comb, as always. Couldn’t find much on responsible dog ownership, just further 
control of dog owners, which rarely works for responsiblising them in the way we 
would all like (DNGO4). 
Also pointed out during interviews was the lack of any ‘health warning’ from Government 
that its consultation didn’t contain a comprehensive definition, review or strategy for all 
the issues it considers under the umbrella of the term ‘responsible dog ownership’.
The RSPCA’s Task & Finish Group 2015/6 in Wales, wrestled with this very issue, with the 
group researching previous proposed versions and eventually settling on a five point 
definition merely to be able to move forward with the task at hand (RSPCA 2016a: 
11-12). So some attempts at definitions have been made, but they are not universally 
adopted or employed, a key point participants agreed on. With so many facets making up 
the definition there is ample room for individuals to re-prioritise and even substitute their 
own agenda with dog policy issues that mainstream users of the term might see as more 
obscure. As one participant who researches and publishes on this very issue succinctly put 
during interview:
I’ve had this conversation a hundred times and I’m really interested in it, I want to 
produce some work on this as it is fascinating. We need to push people on what 
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they think they mean and what the problem actually is. As I always say, what does 
responsible dog ownership even mean? (TS1). 
This was echoed across various participants when I pressed for their interpretations. 
Another participant, a vet and forensic behaviourist, admits to behaving argumentatively 
on this to try to force the debate forward. She had significant concerns specifically in how 
the term responsible dog ownership also mislabels and misleads: 
This idea that it’s other people and their dogs is the problem you know. People 
think to themselves well I’m responsible because I love my dog and it lives in the 
house with us. But the bottom line is those aren’t the only issues and ultimately 
responsible dog owners’ dogs bite too, you know! (TS4).
This reflects a classic issue of symbolism versus substance in the politics of crime control 
where symbols are difficult to excavate and distinguish for any practical dimension, they 
also of course then become impossible to oppose in any meaningful way. Participants 
identified consequences to this and expressed their fears of the confusions created 
amongst dog owners. Such confusion can lead to dog owners mislabelling themselves as 
responsible when in fact they are not properly equipped to provide for that animal’s 
welfare nor ensure it is not a danger to other animals or members of the public. Once 
this had been explored during interviews, participants proposed that the complexities of 
defining this term (and its subsequent imprecise but generalised deployment) were, at 
least in part, contributing to the construction of the policy ‘problem’.
’Dangerous dogs’ and other types of bull
In terms of Dangerous dogs, there definitely needs to be change because the 
current legislation that we have isn’t evidence-based because it is suggesting that 
certain breeds or types of dogs are more likely to be aggressive than others and are 
more likely to cause more severe damage than others and that isn’t the case. I just 
think the term ‘dangerous’ is so often fundamentally misunderstood and misused 
(RS2).
As illustrated in the above quote, there are a number of terms in use with regards to 
categorising and characterising the dogs which are central to this phenomenon, with 
varying implications. Within the pool of elite interviews, once again, there were clear 
differences in the nomenclature, although the welfare NGOs were relatively similar. They 
also reported a strong desire to eschew the collective term of ‘bull breeds’, which is often 
used in public arenas to mean the various breeds of dog of a particular type. They 
acknowledged its use privately however as a convenient way to describe a collection of 
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breeds, such as those with ‘bull’ in the title, e.g. Staffordshire bull terrier, but also including 
other breeds such as boxers. However, those in the animal welfare sphere have begun to 
publicly raise concerns about the labelling effect this term can have on the dogs involved. 
Given the disproportionate way in which their numbers appear in animal rescues and 
pounds, coupled with their popularity with individuals who use and abuse dogs 
irresponsibly (and sometimes illegally) due to their similarity to the banned types of dog, 
such concerns may well have a solid foundation. Most other participants interviewed had 
fewer qualms about the term, which may well be explained by the fact they are not 
normally involved with the rehoming of such dogs in their own fields of work, and 
therefore have less motivation to avoid these pitfalls. But even where there is an element 
of a rehoming function, such as within the local authority participants, they were 
comfortable with the term:
There are categories for everything, toy, scent dogs and so on. It doesn’t have to be 
negative, it doesn’t have to mean bad dogs. I mean, why worry so much when it is 
what the public understand and better they think before taking on a bull breed in 
case they don’t understand (LG3). 
This and similar testimony from other elites appeared to suggest that despite the 
predominance of ‘deed not breed’ amongst those working within the dog welfare policy 
field, there remains a residual concern about some breeds in certain sectors of 
enforcement. About a third of participants emphasised they were not anti-dog, signing up 
to the mantra ‘deed not breed’ or similar categorisations:
I’m not a fan of deed not breed, it’s still focussing on breed and s1 dogs aren’t 
breeds, but more importantly it just doesn’t fully encompass the issues. It still says 
look at the dog for the issues and problems. We prefer to say that it [society] is 
looking at the wrong end of the lead - to focus in on the owner’s actions, whatever 
they may be (DNGO5). 
Some ‘deed not breed’ subscribers amongst the participants still appeared to transfer at 
least some blame from the owners to the dogs. These participants were not working with 
dogs directly but are involved with supporting the victims of attacks - such as owners of 
guide dogs and communications workers. As such this may well be a layman’s mistake in 
extending the recognised characteristics and traits of certain breeds, as recognised by 
animal scientists, and linking this incorrectly to aggression and problematic behaviours 
which are in fact a result of the way in which the dog has been reared and kept.
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When pressed about the contribution to the perception of dog owners, both ‘good and 
bad’, and their use of ‘bull breeds’, policy actors from the statutory sector were less 
convinced of its influence and indeed their experiences of the more difficult dogs 
emerging from unfavourable environments (neglect, cruelty and mere negative training 
methods have been linked to dogs who have gone on to attack) has affected their views. 
Within the police sector and during the time span of the data collection phase of this 
research, there has been a palpable change with regards to their view on Pit Bulls for 
instance, which can in part be attributed to the body of science emerging which strongly 
suggests there is no evidence for such a thing as a ‘dangerous breed’, but despite this, 
doubt prevails. Being charged with keeping the public safe and finding themselves in 
extremely dangerous situations facing a dog out of control, who may already have mauled 
or even killed an individual, was reported to be both sobering and influencing:
It’s not something you really get into, describing what its like. I’ve not been in that 
situation all that often to be honest. Thankfully. But when you are faced with it and 
you feel absolute fear looking into the jaws of something that can kill you, and these 
dogs I’ve seen anyway look similar, it just can pull you towards an opinion you may 
otherwise not have believed (POL3). 
This is inherently linked of course to the inculcation police dog legislation officers receive 
during training and beyond, in addition to their onerous duty of protecting public safety:
When you first see those images of children almost decapitated by ultimately a dog 
that was known to the local force and kept by a known offender, you fear being the 
DLO at the centre of that case. It’s your worst nightmare (POL2). 
The context of the DDA - the legislation central to the control of dogs with regards 
human safety - is that it purports to reduce the risk of bites and attacks on humans by the 
removal of certain breed types. Police officers have been criticised in the past for failing to 
act on information regarding banned types of dog being kept, dogs which have later gone 
on to kill or maim:
…it’s a constant worry you know. I know these dogs would have been different in 
someone else’s hands, but I also know that ‘dangerous’ becomes something specific 
to that moment and to that dog and I have to think about what could happen to a 
child or anyone really (POL4). 
In reality participants from the police reported that when responding to a report of an 
illegal s1 dog they will, more often than not, find a family pet that is no danger to anyone. 
However those police officers are understandably susceptible to a fear of blame following 
a major incident, and are therefore quite risk-averse: 
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After these major incidents I can tell you the talk is about what we did and what we 
could have done or thank god that’s not my area as well. We start thinking it could 
be though and we’re trained and told, really, to seize these dogs. The legislation is 
called the Dangerous Dogs Act after all, not the ‘what to do if someone trains an 
innocent dog to be aggressive Act’, is it? (RS3). 
Whilst participants reported being content for the need for s3 of the DDA, to enable the 
police (and some local authorities) to deal with a dog (of any breed) dangerously out of 
control, the same legislation lists those four banned types of dog under s1, and 
participants were cognisant of the effects of that: 
So s1 sets out those banned dogs who are forever labelled as dangerous, when they 
are simply born, for Pete’s sake, no different to any other dog. The legislation tells 
you to be scared of them, irrespective of who owns or trains them, or how and 
where they live. It’s ridiculous. This in my view is where we start. If we can’t change 
this legislation we can’t changes things for the better (TS4). 
It is worth noting again that although the DDA was introduced as a solution to dangerous 
dog control issues, for many participants, as can be seen in this above quote, the DDA is 
in fact the problem, particularly how it defines it and specifically what is legally considered 
a dangerous dog. 
Not all of those interviewed were of exactly the same view, indeed there were two or 
three alternative voices raising interesting points around the nature of dangerousness. One 
participant in this research, an epidemiologist, approaches dangerous dogs from the 
perspective of preventing serious dog bites, as well as deaths, and believes an examination 
of the types of dogs involved in such incidents, particularly those in the home and 
involving children, suggests that these could be reduced or eliminated if certain breeds/
types were indeed not available to the dog-owning public. This is of course the claims of 
those who framed s1 of the 1991 DDA, as to its purpose, although the RSPCA’s report 
on the 25th anniversary of the DDA (RSPCA 2016b), has sought to debunk the 
suggestion dog bites can be reduced in this way. This approach to managing risk factors 
also surfaced in interviews with some police officers. One police officer was resolute that 
s1 dogs represent a greater danger to the public that other types of dog:
They absolutely have the potential to be dangerous and far more dangerous than 
most other popular breeds. In the wrong hands they can do serious damage, I’ve 
seen it. In that sense I am practical about the ability of this legislation enabling me to 
act and prevent something serious happening (POL2). 
Clearly in defining the problem and the contribution of ‘dangerousness’ to that debate 
there isn’t the consensus that may otherwise be needed to bring about change.
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It was clear in both interviews with police officers and when observing various policy 
meetings with a range of forces that they view the DDA as an essential instrument of 
enforcement which needs to remain at their disposal: 
What you have to understand is that this is our essential toolkit for dealing with 
certain undesirables and their dogs, whereas otherwise I may have struggled to 
interfere effectively with their ability to both harm their dog and others. There isn’t 
much else relevant that is policed or resourced properly but this is something open 
to me of course (POL5). 
This suggests of course confirmation of the work of others, such as by David J Smith 
(1986), on how the law does not set out the mechanics of policing but is in fact a 
permissive framework, used by the police as a ‘flexible resource’ where they have the 
latitude to employ different provisions depending on their need or wider goals. This may 
be contributing to their stance in the debate on the definition of the problem, producing a 
reluctance to acknowledge that dangerousness is perhaps more complex than the 
legislative framework would suggest. Lending itself to this was my interview with one very 
senior officer who acknowledged that dogs were not quite as implicated in some serious 
crimes as may have been suggested at one time:
Well I do have to say that if you look at organised crime, if you think about the 
range of crimes that we see every day in the sphere, the things we’re called upon to 
police, our priority then no I’d have to say the dog is not used as a weapon, for 
instance, that’s not happening now (POL1). 
This indicated that perhaps legislation may not be the way to spuriously link criminal 
activities in order to target certain offenders.
Prior to embarking on this study, I had witnessed countless examples of some of the same 
policy actors referring to the issue of dog fighting and its link to dangerous dogs. As has 
been discussed earlier in this thesis, it is claimed the DDA, and in particular the BSL 
element contained within s1, was introduced in order to protect the public from fighting 
dogs. It is important to note here that by the time I was collecting data, the rhetoric had 
changed. From those more comfortable discussing the issue, largely from within 
enforcement and dog charities, there was a recognition that the experts no longer linked 
dog fighting with status and dangerous dog issues. These respondents were also critical of 
those who did make such a link, including academics such as Harding and organisations 
such as the League Against Cruel Sports, specifically due to impact this has upon the 
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definition of dangerous and the contribution to the debate about the true nature of the 
dog problem:
…this is irresponsible, possibly dangerous, because it misleads the public and more 
importantly in terms of policy, the Government, in their [the Government’s] mind, it 
probably justifies their actions and the retention of BSL, not to mention the lack of 
impetus to truly tackle the real problems (RS4).
Certain factors at the heart of police work were apparent from another enforcement 
perspective too, that of local authorities. They were aware of the fear that DLOs hold of 
the potential of any dog they have seen, to go on to commit harm. Once again the dogs 
were, in most cases (where they proved to have a placid temperament with no signs of 
aggression) viewed as the victims, with one participant admitting as a result his team will 
perhaps from time to time let Pit Bulls through the system and not call the police:
If we suspect we have got a s1 dog, they [local police] send somebody down to 
have a look, the first question they ask by phone is have you got an owner, no - it’s a 
stray dog, not microchipped, can’t trace an owner. And you just know that they are 
going to turn up and say yeah it’s a Pit Bull, because if it’s a Pit Bull we have to take it 
for destruction….. We have probably done four or five in the last year and about 
that many each year. They won’t even get the dog out, he’ll look at it through the 
kennel and go ‘yeah its a Pit Bull’. Because there is no owner present, there is no 
comeback and there is another Pit Bull off the street. My staff are very dog 
orientated and they dread calling the [police force] to say we think we’ve got a Pit 
Bull, so sometimes a borderline dog might get through. So we’re actually letting Pit 
Bulls through because they don’t want to see them destroyed. These are lovely dogs 
(LG1).
This made for an interesting example of two sets of street level bureaucrats subverting 
the intention of the legislation in a completely conflicting way - police officers moving to 
include dogs outside of the legislation to exclude any potential future risk, whilst those in 
local authorities work to exclude dogs that technically should be captured and dealt with 
by the legislation. Both of these sectors have reworked and resisted the official policy as 
set out in law in order to meet their different needs and concepts of the problem, which 
has interesting parallels with other practices in the criminal justice sector (such as judges 
subverting the ‘three strikes’ laws). When discussing such a scenario with participants of all 
views, there was consensus that in fact despite these actions by LAs there was no known 
case of a dog - having been through a local authority’s system (and avoiding police 
detection as a s1 dog) - going on to attack or kill. And this is information that would likely 
come out given the intense scrutiny following a serious attack. Even if that were not the 
case, since April 2016 all dogs leaving LA control must and will be microchipped - 
removing any means for obscuring the LA’s actions. In terms of the problem construction 
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however, participants could not offer an explanation why such seemingly powerful 
evidence as this that type/breed may not be the factor to fear would have such a little 
effect on policy or societal responses to Pit Bulls.
Ultimately there was only a small section of elites interviewed that were comfortable with 
the term ‘dangerous’ applying to all s1 dogs. This was not least of all because it is inherently 
difficult to identify what is a s1 dog given they are not a breed and their DNA cannot be 
tested for this purpose - indeed a dog may have more DNA of another breed but look 
sufficiently similar to the standard for a PBT as to be positively identified under the DDA. 
This point was illustrated by one participant, although not himself amongst this smaller 
section:
I do think just by banning them back in 1991 we made it worse, we should have just 
managed them, not banned them. It gave them a label. Back in 1989 and before the 
ban I remember people used to boast about having Pit Bulls and I used to go to 
Battersea Dogs Home and somebody was usually outside selling puppies as Pit Bulls, 
and they’d be Jack Russells or something else, and they used to command money. 
After the Act you’d go to the same people and they’d say no, no that’s not a Pit Bull! 
The name Pit Bull came to mean something and it was irrelevant what it was, and 
probably many weren’t even pits. But it had a much bigger status when the Act 
came in (LG1).
As many participants pointed out this rather makes a mockery of the definition of certain 
dogs as being dangerous if they can’t even be accurately grouped as one type of dog and 
their genetics also differ quite considerably.
When asked about the use of the label ‘dangerous’ and its effect on the desirability of 
certain similar-looking breeds however, the small section of elites supporting s1 did 
concede this was most likely a factor. They differed from the majority of participants 
however in so much as this was, in their view, the price that had to be paid for a safer 
society. As such, innocent dogs (a very anthropomorphic term but nevertheless utilised 
reluctantly as shorthand by most participants), they believe, will have to be humanely 
euthanased in some cases so as to stop those criminal elements, and those ill-equipped to 
keep certain dogs, from harming others. What is interesting is that despite being in a 
shrinking minority of policy actors, these views are held by those, such as the police, who 
are amongst the most influential with regard to the continued existence of this policy. In a 
highly politicised world of 24 hour sensationalised media; social media and litigious 
individuals, a risk-averse government may prefer to listen to only those charged with 
providing for public safety - i.e. the police who have also historically been, of course, a 
  of  178 311
powerful ‘key definer’ in the problem-shaping stream of the crime policy process. The 
other participants, even those who work closely and very well with the police, recognised 
that change was impossible without first convincing the police such change would not 
bring an increase in dog attacks. 
’Status’ dogs
The term and perceived phenomenon of ‘status dogs’ was the original inspiration for this 
thesis and of special significance to me not just in the commission of this work but also in 
my professional role. Its use in the literature may have become passé but in interview and 
in my ongoing observations it remains in use, often accompanied by an acknowledgement 
that any suitable alternative does not exist. There was consensus amongst participants 
about meaning, if not consequences, and was best described as thus:
It is largely those dogs that are used to intimidate, harm or frighten people, and may 
be aggressive and trained to be so. But I think dangerous dogs is a lot more difficult 
to define because you could actually argue any dog has got the potential to be 
dangerous given its anatomy and physiology or physical appearance rather, so I 
certainly differentiate those…..I would say that there is an issue with people who 
wish to use dogs, for status purposes, choosing those dogs that will frighten people 
and have the physical appearance to do so and a lot of bull breeds will actually lend 
themselves to that. So if you’ve got something like a Staffordshire bull terrier that’s 
quite big, quite muscly, then you can train it to bark at people and to look aggressive, 
then yeah you’re going to use that rather than a poodle (RS2).
In terms of the origin of the label ‘status dogs’, during interview one RSPCA participant 
revealed their belief that it was in fact the RSPCA who invented it and then promulgated 
its use although this expanded into the context and justification for the actions and 
decisions taken: 
To be honest I have always had a very horrible feeling we were the first. Then of 
course everyone else jumped in, I guess that often happens though to be fair. I can’t 
remember who said it or why it started to get used, but it just stuck really 
quickly…….Having said that, at the time, it was the right thing to do - to highlight 
the dogs that were reflecting their status in society (RS4). 
We discussed in more detail what alternatives for articulating the problem were available 
to those seeking to highlight the issues they were facing. There was an acknowledgment 
these were absent and some alternatives were worse and as such the role of the RSPCA 
in its construction was defended. However the label was also understood to have 
produced other problems: 
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So we might reject it now but it was certainly better than calling everything 
dangerous which is misrepresentative. So it wasn’t completely wrong but it was too 
narrow……But it’s bad. It’s not an accurate description of the problem and worse it 
misleads and misinforms. I don’t like it. But once it became entrenched and once 
Defra adopted it, and then the Met created the Status Dog Unit, it became difficult 
to challenge (RS4). 
This analysis of the RSPCA’s invention of the term, also confirmed by Harding (2012), was 
loosely or tacitly confirmed by some other lobbying groups interviewed who also 
acknowledged its importance for the construction of the problem and opening up debate: 
…the RSPCA [and name of RSPCA personnel] were certainly the first people I 
remember talking about the problem. We were experiencing issues but had not 
articulated or thought of them in the same way. Having a label [laughs] - isn’t that 
unfortunate given how that encapsulates what we now know to be wrong about it? 
- but anyway having a ‘name’ for what was going on helped us all come together and 
start talking about solutions (DNGO1).
Veterinary and scientific sector participants didn’t reject the term status dogs, only its 
application. Some were at pains to point out the very many trends and fashions of dog 
breed ownership and how indeed this bestowed a clear message the owner wants others 
to observe:
We talk about the breeds, both the Paris Hilton handbag dogs and the high class 
crook who has a doberman with a diamond collar, but what status does a rescue 
dog convey for instance? That middle class, socially responsible person wants you to 
know that they have done good, possibly better than you with your dog bought 
from a breeder. Tut tut. It’s morally superior attitudes but it’s still conveying status, 
isn’t it for Pete’s sake (TS1).
The theory is that all dogs, including rescue dogs, convey status of one form or another 
and they become a symbol. As such the dog communicates exactly what that owner 
wishes to communicate to the exterior world. The argument continues that the 
categorisation of status dogs is a middle class construct regarding, in the main, but not 
exclusively, bull breed owners, under a certain age and in socially deprived areas. However 
as several technical specialist participants noted, non-status dog owners have failed to 
recognise the status they convey with their own dogs, preferring to see only the ‘lower 
classes’ as the communicators of status through their dogs. When I posed this question to 
other participants a small number claimed to have had previously articulated the concept 
in a similar way. One RSPCA participant suggested this issue has been discussed in relation 
to those on the periphery of the shooting and hunting fraternity who would appear to 
always own a Labrador or Springer Spaniel: 
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We may not say it in our key messaging but what dog you own does say something 
about you. We don’t want to put people off adopting those most in need in our 
care but we do know that our dogs are always communicating something about 
who we are. Don’t forget we [RSPCA] struggle to rehome the really ugly dogs 
(RS4).
There was also a view amongst participants in local authority and some welfare NGOs 
that Defra’s definition of status dogs was contributing to the problems: 
I think it has legitimised and embedded certain ways of thinking around young 
people in inner city areas and their use of dogs. It left other people imagining all 
such dogs were dangerous dogs and they were a threat to be feared (RS3). 
It was further argued this had brought untold confusion. The terms ‘status’ and 
‘dangerous’ [dogs] have been, and continue to be, used interchangeably throughout the 
sector and even amongst policy makers, according to the welfare participants - the same 
group who have perhaps grown sensitive to its use during recent years. But their 
arguments that the statutory and government sectors were slow to acknowledge the 
shortcomings of the term and worse any potential harms its use may cause, were perhaps 
unfounded as there was some recognition of the need for clarity in articulating the 
problem:
I have to say that we [force area] might have dangerous dogs, but not necessarily 
status dogs and there is an extremely important distinction and implication for our 
resources. We know where our work lies on dangerous dogs, whatever your view, 
these are straight offences we are duty bound to police (POL1). 
This senior officer and advisor to government on this issue, was very clear on the 
distinction and the need to formulate different contrasting plans that tackle the outright 
offence of owning (etc.) a s1 dog, and the lower level anti-social use and abuse of dogs - 
usually those of a ’bull breed’ - in our communities. Overall the police interviewees were 
less concerned about the consequences of the use of the term ‘status’, which, given they 
are charged with a very specific role around dangerous dogs and protecting public safety, 
is perhaps understandable. Other participants clearly believed that whilst ‘dangerous’ as a 
word and a phenomenon could, and indeed had, heavily influenced ‘status’, it was highly 
unlikely the reverse was true and more than that, it was inconsequential therefore 
suggesting ‘dangerous’ sat above ‘status’ in a hierarchy of some kind.
I probed interviewees further for their views on how the terminology was, in their 
opinion, exacerbating the problem and one particular response signified the collective 
view: 
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As a term, ‘status dogs’ is contributing to the problem. I actually agreed with Roger 
Mugford  at a Parliamentary reception years ago on this subject when he said that 50
we all need to stop calling the issue ‘status dogs’ and instead call it ‘fluffy, cuddly dogs’ 
because no gang member is going to want a dog like that then! (LG1). 
Certainly there are accounts to corroborate these perceptions, not least of all amongst 
some of the young people interviewed in Hughes et al. (2011) where they responded 
that they would seek out alternative breeds when asked what action they would take if 
bull breeds became popular with pensioners and the image of those dogs became softer 
as a result. 
Almost all participants expressed concerns, albeit varying in significance, regarding the 
continued use of the term ‘status’ in addition to the misapplication of the term dangerous: 
We have to look at these words and admit they are the problem, I mean status and 
dangerous, indeed both can be a misnomer, but even saying that, lacks significance. 
What happens in society as a result of using them, do we even know? I know it’s not 
helping the problem (DNGO4). 
Participants who felt strongly about the shortcomings of the lexicon also expressed 
frustration about how to convey the problems inherent with their use:
We do need to be able to say, hey there’s an issue. We’re seeing problems with kids 
and their dogs, we think this is what is needed. If we can’t do that. Well. But also, also 
we all should be worried about what it says about all of us and the sector if we 
cannot convey the problem without making it worse (DNGO3). 
It was clear that the debate around the terms had now led some participants to be 
hesitant to use ‘status dogs’ even as an historic descriptor of the phenomenon. It was very 
clear indeed that the term status dog, as a ‘speech act’ has conferred a new reality, which 
in itself has consequences that participants of this study were attempting to suggest may 
well then be self-fulfilling. There was also an open invitation from participants to engage 
further in understanding these consequences. Many would welcome the socially 
responsible decision, among the welfare sector at least, to understand the consequences 
of labelling a problem, but it was also clear those same organisations have lacked the 
expertise and resources to do so adequately - which can be explained in part at least by 
their narrow remits around animal welfare. 
 Dr Roger Mugford, as referred to in Chapter Five - had worked with the Queen’s huskies and advised 50
Home Secretary Kenneth Baker MP during the passage of the 1991 Act. Dr Mugford subsequently reversed 
his position and campaigns against the DDA as well as testifies as a defence expert.
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7.3 A substitute social harm
During interview, most participants returned to the consequences of the 1991 Act on 
dog control today and the policy proposals under persistent debate for at least the last 
decade. This speaks, of course, to the notion that laws and actions have created 
consequences, reflecting the long tradition in sociology of recognising the ‘unintended 
consequences of action’ (Merton 1949). In this instance it is argued that it has resulted in 
further, or new, harms victimising both dogs and humans: 
All we’ve ended up with is types of dogs being bred to look like Pit Bulls and what 
they perceive to ‘behave’ like Pit Bulls. So they have just got round the legislation. But 
unfortunately what it has done is created the problems….that people think about a 
Pit Bull terrier type of dog, believe it’s inherently aggressive and then generalise that 
to other types of dog that might be similar in its physical appearance. So I actually 
think the legislation has been incredibly damaging for dog welfare, but actually even 
speaking to the public, because you’re still telling the public that these bull breed 
types of dog are dangerous, they then don’t - this is a generalisation - but they don’t 
really then understand any dog can be aggressive, so it just doesn’t help educate 
people and protect them - what its original purpose was for (RS2).
The 1991 Act was introduced by the UK Government with their proposal to reduce dog 
attacks on humans by removing from society the types of dogs that were believed to be 
used in dog fighting. There was agreement from most interviewees that this was not 
ultimately successful in terms of eradicating the four types and instead led to an increased 
attraction of these dogs and those breeds, such as the Staffordshire bull terrier, that looks 
significantly like them. Those people seeking out such dogs for ASB and criminal activities 
would be forgiven for believing the dog was inherently dangerous and coupled then with 
their lack of the intricate knowledge for socialising and training them, would be more likely 
to generate bad and aggressive behaviour through reinforcement, thus creating the 
dangerous dog they were intentionally seeking. Although participants, primarily the police, 
foresee a role for the continuance of s1 of the DDA (for reasons discussed previously), 
the majority of interviewees were of the view that BSL had effectively had an augmenting 
role for other dogs, by bringing those dogs similar in size, stature and appearance to the 
attention of irresponsible and uneducated owners looking for conferred status. Dogs that 
are illegal and those that look similar provide a unique avenue to portray an individual’s 
desire to look menacing and intimidating to their adversaries without risking the far more 
severe penalties associated with carrying knives or guns. Participants were clear that only 
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through banning certain dogs has such status been conferred by Pit Bulls and similar dogs 
and that such a reputation was otherwise unfounded: 
Of course I don’t have to tell you, you know don’t you, that they were considered 
the nanny dog, the dog to trust with your children’s lives, years before, how did that 
change? Through telling the world they were born killers, that's how. It all went 
wrong from there (TS4).
Participants were very articulate about the consequences to both dogs and humans. 
Section 1 dogs, if detected by the authorities, were put to sleep, but they were often put 
to sleep by innocent owners who, following the 1991 Act’s introduction, thought their dog 
was inherently dangerous no matter how many years they had kept it with no incident, 
and no matter whether it was actually a s1 dog. During interviews this effect was 
reported to have continued even after the 1997 (and to this day). Other dogs were 
abandoned or severely neglected for the same reason. Meanwhile those utilising the Pit 
Bull for their own criminal gains, recognising the potential of the new market place and 
the monetary value of the trade, organised cruel breeding programmes with an illicit 
underground network for selling the puppies on. Behaviourally similar, and only marginally 
physically dissimilar, breeds fell subject to those with less than decent intentions as they 
became a way to continue to convey status whilst circumventing the new legislation. 
Owners of dogs had their family pet removed based wholly on its looks, not its (or their) 
actions, and those who resisted or attempted to avoid detection, risked a criminal 
conviction. There is no evidence that serious attacks by particular breeds or types ceased 
either :
You only need to look at the data, we know other breeds were biting. Perhaps with 
less hysteria in those days, people might not have gone to A&E, and we’ll never 
know the true picture, but the fear is people and children immediately believed all 
other dogs to be safe, because they didn’t make it on to the Government’s kill list 
(RS3).
In 1997 the amendment to the DDA was passed permitting owners to potentially keep 
their dogs once a court was certain a number of conditions had been met, including the 
dog must be neutered, be permanently identified, be muzzled and kept on a lead in a 
public place, and not be with anyone under 16 in a public place. These all clearly have 
consequences to the dog and its human family, particularly the children. All participants to 
some degree or other recognised the positive effects of neutering - strongly advocated by 
the dog policy sphere - but there was also an understanding that these are fairly 
draconian measures that carry repercussions for a dog’s welfare:
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It is still a legal mutilation that is not a legal requirement for any other breed or 
animal on the planet. Far more important though is the harms, behaviourally 
speaking, to a dog permanently muzzled and on a lead. It doesn’t get to interact 
with other dogs and humans and it will quickly get unbelievably frustrated (TS4). 
This aspect was discussed in more detail by participants with an understanding of 
veterinary or behavioural sciences. There was significant concern that these measures can 
result in aggressive behaviours. The tragic irony was not lost in discussion with these 
participants who noted that these were the very behaviours that the constraints were 
intended to limit or control. Instead they can, in some dogs, create or exacerbate 
problems, leading to the potential for more, not less attacks: 
Let’s be frank and I don’t say this lightly but why would anyone want to frustrate a 
powerful dog. And these things do frustrate the poor things. We make them live a 
dull frustrating life where they can’t play and interact in their natural way, surely 
potentially making this dog a risk to its family, despite never being much of one 
before (DNGO2).
7.4 The role of the media
Turning to the role of the media participants were eager to discuss its effect on the 
phenomenon and therefore what contribution this makes to the construction of the 
problem. There was broad agreement that the press is a worthy recipient of blame most 
usually due to the over simplification of complex dog behaviour and societal issues, as well 
as the finger-pointing (aimed at dogs) misleading the public and therefore policy makers. 
However some interviewees blamed the media without confronting any uncomfortable 
truths about where the media sources the news upon which it reports, such as their own 
organisations who may be guilty of a marginally sensationalised press release or two in 
order to gain the necessary attention for their campaigns or the recognition needed to 
please funders. Some participants conversely, interestingly more in the local authorities, 
proceeded to also point out the media’s usefulness. Although there were more positive 
representations of the need for the media in some interviews this did not extend to 
complimenting their research and reporting skills. This did at least though hint of an 
awareness of the responsibility of the agencies involved to feed broadcasters and 
journalists the correct information.
Agreement was clear across the pool of elites that the media was to blame for 
consistently and repeatedly using damaging terminology, ‘weapon’, ‘monster’, and ‘devil’ 
  of  185 311
dogs were all cited and indeed can be seen in numerous examples within the media 
coverage explored in Chapter Four. It was also highlighted by participants to be in conflict 
with the extensive coverage otherwise seen which favours dogs and indeed as a result 
promotes their ownership. There are a multitude of dog related magazines, regular 
columns and websites dedicated to promoting dog ownership and showing their aspects 
in a positive light. Given their readers, sales and following, it is evident this is popular : 
So what do the public then get? Mixed messages with no explanation. Loads of 
positive information and loads of negative information all at the same time, and 
nothing to tell you why certain dogs or certain people with dogs are a danger - so 
it’s no wonder it all becomes the fault of certain breeds - that’s easier to understand 
(DNGO3). 
A very specific area for which the media was blamed was linking status and dangerous 
dogs to dog fighting:
So this is where everyone gets frustrated, you guys, other welfare groups, us as well. 
I do understand. Linking a dangerous dog issue to dog fighting even when there has 
been no mention of a dog fight involved is what comes naturally to them, but 
bottom line, this is a media myth and a dangerous one (POL5). 
Even where the evidence base was fiercely contested most participants were aware of 
the debates at the time of the introduction of the DDA and the justification that s1 dogs 
were used for fighting. It goes some way, for some interviewees, to explain the media’s 
rationale and not least of all because despite long-running campaigns, and changes in this 
legislative arena, s1 of the DDA has survived and could therefore be reasonably expected 
to have a legitimate purpose in the Government’s mind. It also has the appearance of 
support from one or two other quarters, as discussed earlier in this chapter, namely the 
League Against Cruel Sports who launched their first formal dog fighting campaign in 
December 2015, based on a report they commissioned from Harding and Nurse (2015) 
which appears to depict most anti-social uses of dogs by young people as dog fighting. 
Some participants engaged with the research in this area expressed frustration again:
He sensationalises everything. I get it, that’s what gets them [the media] interested, 
but it’s ultimately damaging. The handful, tiny minority, of incidents which could be 
seen to be related to dog fighting or other crimes, are nothing to do with the status 
and dangerous dog phenomenon (RS4). 
Nevertheless, they are of course related because the profile of these stories in the media 
and in Harding’s (2012) work, influences the perceptions of others of what constitutes the 
dog problem. 
  of  186 311
Dog fighting does occur in the UK and stories in the media will surface a few times per 
year often associated with an RSPCA prosecution of an offender. The images are naturally 
found to be harrowing and usually only those with dogs displaying aggression are favoured 
by the press, and they will also be bull breeds, if not Pit Bulls or look-a-likes and therefore 
prohibited. Interviewees remarked that they understood such pictures will naturally 
influence some readers: 
We know, don’t we, what people see when, I mean some people see when they see 
those pictures. If you don’t already know differently and I mean really know, then 
they are going to make them fearful of those types/breeds of dog, even if they do 
understand most of them are not used in dogfighting (POL3). 
Links between status dogs and gangs, which was discussed (and rejected, not least of all by 
the police) earlier in this chapter, was also raised again in the context of the media 
coverage. Several participants referred to the ‘myth’ or ‘perpetual myth’ driven by the 
media which would seek to link gangs to the criminal use of dogs. The responsibility for 
this was directed at the tabloid media as well as online sources with the 
acknowledgement that legitimacy may be provided in the view of these journalists 
through Harding’s research: 
They haven’t produced any basis for this have they. Because there is no factually 
supporting evidence. The media and public just feed off each other, and his 
[Harding’s] work merely provides the nourishment to sustain this vicious circle 
(RS4).
Participants with the relatable experiences and knowledge, did discuss the links to other 
criminality and there were numerous examples of where the irresponsible and dangerous 
actions had led to injury and death, amongst guide dog owners and communication 
workers for instance. As far as the participants representing those sectors were 
concerned, the media is crucial to highlighting these case studies in order to achieve public 
support for changes in the legislation. The harrowing cases where guide dogs have been 
attacked and killed was the centrepiece of the Guide Dogs communications strategy in 
achieving better sentencing and redress. Only case studies in the press could bring the 
recognition of the consequences, not just to the assistance dog but to the owner, who 
having been unable to save their dog may then find themselves without this essential 
assistance if the dog is killed or retired on health grounds. There was echoed praise for the 
media coverage of many, very serious, incidents of postal workers, and other 
communication staff, who, being subjected to dog attacks, have sustained life-changing 
injuries. There remained an acute awareness, however, of the dangers of labelling certain 
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breeds and certain owners accompanied by explanations of the measures that have been 
taken to help mitigate this whilst simultaneously remaining cognisant of the fact this is not 
their constituency or primary function. These organisations concerned with the 
consequences of dog behaviour rather than the dogs themselves have joined large-scale 
coalitions and campaigns on these matters:
We understand how important you guys and the other groups are. We need to 
work together, we’re aware that in the long term if the problem gets worse due to 
it being misrepresented and tackled in the wrong way, that’s only going to affect our 
members more (DNGO5).
There was no mistaking the strength of feeling amongst interviewees that the media was 
contributing to the problem by conveying status and a specific reputation on certain dogs, 
which breeds ignorance amongst the general public: 
The papers, the poorly researched online articles too, they, well we know don’t we, 
damage a lot of the work the animal welfare charities are trying to do to mitigate 
this. It feels like two steps forward three back when we get a load of positive stories 
in and then one semi-serious attack undos all that (RS2). 
Those that work directly with their organisation’s communications divisions were more 
acutely aware of the changing dynamics of news sources. The advent of social media and 
news websites has altered the nature of print media which has adapted by becoming 
arguably more sensationalist in order to protect sales. This, plus 24 hour coverage, and the 
need for small bite-sized digestible pieces, leads to an increased risk to integrity, and 
particularly a vulnerability surrounding research and securing the facts. Participants 
believed the dog to have been the victim of these changes:
When you go online or read the papers, readers are always left thinking it was the 
dogs’s fault. I know it’s difficult perhaps to blame the parents of a newborn baby that 
died but it is inherently wrong to blame the dog, to just blame the dog, if anyone 
truly wants to understand what happened (DNGO4).
7.5 Summary
This chapter has sought to map the definitions and categorisations of ‘the dog problem’ in 
use by those most closely associated with the phenomenon of status and dangerous dogs. 
This includes the widest consideration of the dog problem in society from breeding, 
trading and socialisation, the identification of dogs in general and the specific identification 
of certain breeds or types, to the more organised criminal use of dogs in fighting or gangs, 
as well as the contributions of labels such as dangerous, status dog and a responsible dog 
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owner. In considering the problem construction it is also necessary to consider the views 
of media representations and their effect on public perceptions given how vital this factor 
is to policy makers. The collection of narratives gathered for this research from various 
policy actors situated at several different vantage points in the system, illustrates a key 
finding that the universal descriptors suggest a somewhat chaotic framing of the issues. As 
a result of such an imbroglio, early indications are not encouraging for any typology or 
clear definition of dog control problems. This is undoubtedly affecting the policy process 
and the ability for some sections of the policy community to bring about change and the 
repeal to s1 so widely desired.
This chapter therefore holds true to Kingdon’s description of how different versions and 
dimensions of the problem are continually floating around the policy arena. Some of these 
may gain more attention and support at certain points in time, while others, for a variety 
of reasons will either be dropped or possibly reinvented and combined with other ideas 
to form new constructs. Many of the categorisations of the problems captured at 
interview clearly lacked the type of focussing events that Kingdon highlights as essential for 
initiating change. Whilst there was palpable frustration from the dog welfare participants at 
not being heard, they could not deny that in the policy landscape, as an essentially over-
crowded field, it was often impossible to be noticed without some form or other of 
accelerant. Those problem dimensions that did have focussing events, namely death or 
serious injury from a dog attack, also combined with the other features of MSA to 
eventually produce a policy development, although not the changes many of those 
interviewed wanted or supported, but this will be discussed in the following chapters.
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Chapter Eight 
The Policy Stream:  
Legislation, interventions and substitutions 
8.1 Introduction
Kingdon contends that the policy process will contain a plethora of possible solutions, 
essentially a suite of concepts and ideas that are continually proposed, developed and 
debated within policy communities. In three separate sections beginning with the more 
peripheral proposals before moving on to the policy process in 1991 and finally the 
impact of that era on later developments, this chapter will seek to examine the ‘primordial 
swamp’; the state of dog control policy ideas continually getting swapped around and 
adapted through the process of ‘softening up’ in order for life - and the early 
manifestations of policy - to emerge. I found no formal nor democratic structure within 
the policy network, which is in itself consistent with MSA, however MSA also contends 
agreement must occur at some level in order for one idea to rise out of the ‘policy 
primeval soup’. Therefore the debate and agreement amongst the dog control policy 
community, something richly illustrated through the participants of this study, is of key 
interest when considering what solutions were successful and also those that were not.
An individual’s proximity to the making and execution of law would appear to have 
directly affected their views given during interviews, which created clear sub-groups of 
participants, particularly evident when considering the proposed solutions to dog control 
issues. It was to be expected, perhaps, that those representing the statutory bodies have a 
somewhat more pragmatic view, in contrast to some of the more idealistic views taken by 
individuals and organisations operating on the fringes and, as such, further away from 
direct lobbying and/or enforcement. This was illustrated throughout the discussion around 
legislation where, for instance, there was, amongst the delivery agencies, less concern with 
the origins of, and therefore evidence for, any particular law regarding dogs, but more of a 
preoccupation with its practical application in the field. This could also be explained it 
would seem by the background and experience of the particular individual being 
interviewed rather than the body or organisation they now represent. If they were not in 
post in 1991 or in years where other relevant legislation has been consulted, debated and 
  of  191 311
introduced, they were less interested, perhaps feeling insecure, in discussing or analysing it 
in any depth. That said, the balance of both groups assisted with building a picture of the 
effects the body of legislation has on the problem, irrespective of the evidence for it, or its 
original intentions, and the policy solutions being proposed.
Although legislation concerning the control, trade and management of dogs had existed 
for many decades (see Chapter Three), the majority of participants primarily referenced 
the Dangerous Dog Act of 1991 and its directly related measures introduced since that 
date, to be discussed in the second and third main sections of the chapter. This was 
interesting in itself for it was clear that despite a whole variety of issues given in their 
accounts as to what constitutes the UK’s dog problem, as explored in the previous 
chapter, in fact participants were focussing in this section of the discussion almost 
exclusively on the legislation that purports to determine what a dangerous dog is. When 
questioned further all participants, from all sides of the arguments, attached great 
significance to this legislation either directly and intentionally, or more indirectly and subtly 
whilst discussing their wider assertions. For this reason this chapter can only reflect that 
emphasis, with far fewer solutions explored in relation to the other characterisations of 
the dog problem given in Chapter Seven. It is quite likely that participants had drawn 
themselves away from their initial assessments of the impacts of wider laws or regulations, 
or lack thereof, on areas such as straying, breeding and trading, and narrowed their focus 
due to the questions and discussions becoming pinpointed to dangerous and status dogs. 
That said, their wider accounts for dog problems in society were rarely re-offered by way 
of explanation of this specific policy area, even when prompted. This suggests a narrower 
suite of ideas within the maelstrom than would be suggested by the breadth contained 
within the problem definition.
8.2 Solutions to the periphery
Although, as stated, the DDA and the control of dangerous dogs dominated the 
discussions at interview in relation to the solutions under debate and those that had 
resulted in change, the animal welfare participants did cover, to a much lesser degree, 
other aspects of the ‘dog problem’. There was some discussion upon the need to control 
the breeding of, and trade in, puppies and what proposals had been suggested so as to 
improve welfare, educate owners and ultimately reduce dog attacks. As outlined in 
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Chapter Seven there was a wide reaching concern that the supply of puppies was a root 
issue lacking sufficient attention. At the time of interview the Welsh Government had 
completed a four year project to develop regulations to improve breeding, which many of 
these participants had been directly involved in. There was a strong view shared by these 
participants that the developments were a positive one. Of course the welfare sector had 
wanted more stringent measures than was achieved but conceded that the dog breeding 
industry had to concede far more in the way of defeats, and standards were certainly 
expected to change quite significantly. Some aspects such as the reduction in the number 
of breeding bitches was deemed to be more easily enforceable than perhaps other 
measures such as the minimal amount of socialisation time breeders must provide for 
each puppy. Concern from both inside and outside local authorities over the necessary 
resources to enforce such regulation was expressed with some force:
I have to say that we were all for this and we remain so, but my team gets smaller 
every year, some councils don’t even have a team! How we are going to persuade 
our powers that be that we need to do this work and be trained better to do it, 
remains the key issue (LG3).
Even though it was too early to determine if the new regulations would tackle the 
problems as they have been previously outlined, those participants in England (or who 
covered both nations) were openly admitting to envy at the developments in Wales, given 
Defra had indicated no appetite for equivalent measures in England  and exhausting 51
campaigns had been live for over a decade.
Dog Identification and licensing
Whilst a wide range of interviewees raised the issue of dog identification and licensing, it 
was a greater preoccupation for the statutory sector and those organisations responding 
to the excessive numbers of dogs in society. Dog identification or mandatory 
microchipping has been an evolving policy area since the abolition of the dog licence in 
the 1980s with and both England and Wales only recently (and during my data collection 
period) passing legislation to govern this (The Microchipping of Dogs (England) 
Regulations 2014; The Microchipping of Dogs (Wales) Regulations 2015). The new 
regulations provide for the formal identification of dogs to allow them, in theory, to be 
 In fact within two years Defra indicated the Government was minded to overhaul the dog breeding 51
regulations for England along with a range of other animal activities. The Animal Welfare (Licensing of 
Activities Involving Animals) (England) Regulations governing dog breeding, amongst a range of other 
regulated activity, were passed, and came into force in 2018.
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returned to their owners when lost or recovered following theft, but to also enable the 
apprehension of owners who allow their dog to stray or behave antisocially, or if it should 
it be illegally abandoned or killed. This is dependent on owners’ compliance with the new 
law and the sufficient enforcement of the associated powers. About this there was a 
degree of scepticism amongst research participants from across local government in 
anticipation of the regulations coming into force: 
You only have to look at next year with microchipping, which realistically, is it really 
going to make a huge difference from where we are currently? I don’t think it will 
because Defra, central government, are telling us, local authorities, to give it a light 
touch, that’s so they don’t have to give us any money. I look after animal health too, I 
don’t know whether you know much about the fiasco of the horse passports, but 
basically dog microchipping is going to be a mirror image of that……To me, really 
the only way your microchipping is going to work is if you have got some kind of 
national licensing scheme, that generates some money, that’s ring-fenced, that’s put 
back into local authorities. Then you could start from the very bottom then, you 
know as a start, at bottom, to make sure dogs are identified, breeders are identified 
and then start tackling those breeders that are irresponsible breeders. Obviously 
you can then start tackling all the illegally imported dogs or dogs that have been 
brought in abusing the pet passport, but you need to start somewhere (LG2).
I have recorded within my fieldwork notes, over an extended period of time, a tangible 
shift in the position of many dog welfare organisations in their support for dog licensing or 
mandatory annual registration scheme. This had been the lone policy of the RSPCA for 
several decades, while other organisations, such as Dogs Trust, were not even in favour of 
mandatory microchipping as an interim measure until very recently . The journey of 52
policy reversal or development that the other animal welfare NGOs have gone on could 
well be attributable, in part, to the problem of dogs in society but unfortunately a direct 
link was not offered by interviewees, perhaps due to their sensitivity and embarrassment 
and, as such, this is an area that would certainly benefit from further investigation.
The mandatory microchipping of dogs is also being linked in some boroughs, in both 
England and Wales, to schemes designed to identify dogs and thereby owners who allow 
their dogs to foul but do not dispose of waste responsibly. Campaigners have been trying 
to develop proposals and engage local authorities to try a new system. In some areas this 
has gone one step further with at least two local authorities exploring DNA identification 
(BBC 2015). The premise is that only those owners who have supplied a sample of their 
dog’s DNA will be allowed to walk that dog within specified areas. This control and 
 The Dogs Trust have never published the reasons behind this or why they suddenly reversed their policy 52
position in order to support calls for mandatory identification for dogs.
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ghettoisation of dog-permissible areas could be seen to be linked to other issues 
regarding permissible spaces for dogs and their owners, but for now has drawn little 
comment from the experts, who appeared to be giving the issue more thought. 
The issue of straying dogs and irresponsible owners will always be of greater importance 
to certain respondents however its links to the misuse of dogs in society for harm or 
criminality isn’t exactly tenuous but requires a particular insight. Rather than this being a 
root cause or explanation of the problem, it can be more accurately characterised as 
further evidence of a wider regard for dog ownership and the level of irresponsibility 
associated with that. One Task & Finish group evidence session dominated by this issue 
saw one smaller dog rescue NGO calling on the bigger rescue NGOs to take on stray 
dog contracts to help ease the problem (RSPCA 2016a, Annex Four: Verbal evidence 
transcripts, Hope Rescue) – which was a direct reference to the larger dog welfare 
organisations, such as the Dogs Trust and the RSPCA who rarely hold local authority stray 
dog contracts . Apart from this area being one of the few responses to dog issues 53
directly funded by central and local government (thus making charity involvement 
questionable), it denotes a disregard for the work of the big NGOs across England and 
Wales in tackling the other causes of dog problems, such as cruelty and neglect. The 
consequences of stray dogs to society have understandably become the idée fixe to many 
dealing with the fall-out, but as such they have a parochial, although equally valid, 
perspective on the entirety of the problem at hand. 
8.3 The root: the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991
Most participants were keen to explore the background to the 1991 Act as the single 
biggest event to dog control that has had lasting consequences on the policy landscape 
still being grappled with today. In fact a significant number of the interviewees from across 
the NGOs, local authorities and police were in the same or similar (usually marginally 
more junior) role, and were working alongside each other then too. During these 
interviews, the interplay between these experts came starkly into view: 
I think it [the 1991 Act] was too quick. It wasn’t considered and I do think 
Government was influenced by a small number of the charities at that time, 
 Both organisations run activities designed to work with and assist local authorities with stray dogs – the 53
Dogs Trust operate a neutering voucher scheme, for instance – but Hope Rescue take the dogs directly 
from pounds and would like to see others do the same.
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predominately the RSPCA. And it is funny in a way because Gavin Grant  was one 54
of the people that was driving it and then just at the point where it was about to 
become legislation, he opposed it…… But then you had people like Mugford  who 55
was going to be making thousands out of it, so he was all for it, making some 
ludicrous statements to the press (LG1).
The fact that many participants had direct personal experience of 1991 become clear at 
the start of each interview when I began by exploring their background and knowledge. 
Returning later in the interviews to the issue of their own involvement in the 1991 policy 
process elicited a more reserved response in many of those participants, which presented 
as a reticence to explore factors that could expose their own culpability. The BSL section 
of the DDA is, of course, now widely perceived to be very poor legislation, with quite 
extreme effects on dogs and owners. Even senior police officers, who are unlikely to 
criticise it (indeed they support certain aspects), are acutely aware of how controversial it 
is, and perhaps the lack of evidence underpinning it (to be discussed further). When 
pressed further most participants were able to discuss only relatively anonymised blame 
of the other parties involved, although as illustrated above, one or two were happy to be 
quite blunt. Either way, there was a significant degree of historical recrimination: 
This is bad legislation, right? Obviously. Frankly who could argue otherwise. But as to 
who is going to say ‘oh yes I did think it was a good idea at the time’? Well no. No I 
don’t see that! I mean no-one wants to get stuck with the blame - have the 
campaign-y and rights-y groups focussing on them, do they (DNGO1).
Although of course John Major’s UK Government of 1991 and Kenneth Baker MP in 
particular also came in for some criticism, there was a very interesting self-recognition that 
the stakeholders themselves had been ill-prepared with their arguments, complicit even at 
times, or at the very least naive. At least two participants did, in my own view and 
understanding of that time, reinvent their own roles to play down their influence. Others 
were more willing to accept some responsibility, for example one who said:
Of course we supported it given what we thought we knew about dogs and dog 
attacks. It was popular in most quarters but in our defence and in all honesty we 
didn’t know as much about [dog] behaviour in 1991 as we did in 2014. Most people 
have adjusted as they’ve learnt more (RS3). 
There was indeed far less dog behaviour scientific research, coupled with a strong 
 Gavin Grant was the chief political operative for the RSPCA in 1991 and later returned as Chief 54
Executive between 2012 and 2014.
 Dr Roger Mugford, as referred to in Chapter Five - had worked with the Queen’s huskies and advised 55
Home Secretary Kenneth Baker MP during the passage of the 1991 Act. Dr Mugford subsequently reversed 
his position and campaigns against the DDA as well as testifies as a defence expert.
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influence from the USA within policy making, to contend with twenty five years ago. The 
enactment of BSL ordinances at US municipal and state level had been escalating during 
this period and for those within the policy community at that time this had a certain 
significance: 
It was never specifically said or minuted exactly. I just remember that we were all 
aware of what was happening elsewhere. We certainly didn’t invent the idea. Well 
something had to have been influencing them [UK Govt], it’s not that there was a 
big NGO campaign to bring in BSL and his [Baker] predecessor had ridiculed such 
an idea from the opposition just before that (DNGO3). 
Similar thoughts were echoed on this point however it fails to take account of some of 
the very public statements the RSPCA had made at the time - to which Douglas Hogg 
MP, then with the Home Office, referred to just two years early in 1989 - which listed 
additional breed types the RSPCA was calling to ban (discussed in Chapter Five). 
Although RSPCA participants in this study were candid about the RSPCA’s role in 1991, 
many were either not in post then or they were not working in close proximity to this 
issue at the time. Thus, they genuinely appeared unable to discuss this area except in 
regard of what they had heard from others. One key expert who had been employed in a 
pivotal role within the RSPCA in 1991 returned to the Society for a period of time that 
coincided with my data collection. Although we were unable to organise a time for a 
recorded interview , I nevertheless observed their participation in workplace meetings 56
on this subject and recorded our one-to-one discussions, with his permission, in my field 
notes. During these sessions he was very forthcoming and eager to discuss, in particular, 
the introduction of the DDA. There were also interesting omissions though, such as the 
RSPCA’s pro-BSL campaign position at that time, which called for an even longer list of 
banned breeds. No explanation was offered despite this position being corroborated by 
Members of Parliament during Parliamentary debates at the time (HC Deb 15 June 1989 
vol 154 c1190) and also during this study by an ex-police officer participant employed 
during that period: ‘The RSPCA were saying yes let’s ban them but also let’s have a 
registration scheme…. let’s not kill them’ (TS5). 
I also recorded within various RSPCA accounts, a dismissal of any question of competition 
from other NGOs, believing most, if not all of them, to be irrelevant except for what use 
they posed to the RSPCA’s own goals. This was further recounted by other participants 
 They left the RSPCA during my data collection period and became uncontactable immediately afterwards.56
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on the receiving end of this sentiment who detailed some of the squabbles and conflicts 
between the stakeholder groups. The Kennel Club is the official registration body for 
pedigree dogs and membership club for dog breeders, and thus not a dog welfare charity 
like the other participating NGOs. As a result it often finds itself on the outside or in 
conflict with some of the unifying dog welfare campaigns in recent times such as puppy 
breeding and tail docking. However, during interview they were eager to claim the higher 
moral ground, referring to their rapid adoption of a firm opposition to BSL. They also 
claimed an early insight into the effects of BSL:
There are many effects of breed specific laws but one we have warned against for 
as long as I can remember is that it can perpetuate dangerous perceptions, and thus 
breeds not on the banned list would appear safe. We don’t want people to 
suddenly become fearful of all dogs but they have to understand any dog can be 
dangerous (DNGO4). 
Whilst opposition to, or variances of, BSL were clearly being debated by the policy 
network at that time, there was little agreement between the main actors - a regular 
feature of policy making that Kingdon refers to as fragmentation. Participants were unable 
to offer at interview explanations for how the legislation had reached the statute books in 
such a climate of disagreement and discontent but there was some suggestion the 
agreement of the police, UK Ministers and the RSPCA at that time could have been 
sufficient. This is explored further as a component of the political stream in Chapter Nine. 
This central role of elected officials and other government officials is recognised within 
MSA because the responsibility for the emergence of proposals or items for the policy 
agenda does not solely rest with pressure groups. This was noted by participants with 
direct experience of the policy field in 1991 who confirmed the significant role of the two 
civil servants and the Minister Kenneth Baker MP who fully participated in all the key 
policy debates. Conforming to the patterns described in MSA the interest groups active in 
1991 did not structure the public agenda at that time. They did, however, appear to 
provide agreement - consenting to BSL - as well as propose their preferred alternatives 
and complementary amendments to the Government’s original proposals. These took the 
form of additional breeds to be banned and the reintroduction of dog licensing, both of 
which failed.
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The role of evidence
The construction of risk posed by the introduction of the 1991 Act persists to this day, 
with successive governments (including the devolved nations) grappling with the measures 
within this legislation. In the years following its implementation though participants 
reported tensions running high:
It soon became obvious that everyone was becoming uncomfortable with 
exterminating dogs. It was raising emotions sky-high. God forbid anyone would have 
said it wasn’t working. We had Pit Bulls coming out of our ears. I can’t believe 
anyone wanted to be part of a kill squad (POL5). 
There were a number of factors surrounding the implementation of the DDA which was 
causing concern for enforcers, welfare organisations and the courts (as discussed in 
Chapter Five). Participants recalled the debates during that period and the various 
solutions under discussion. Repeal was mooted but lacked support as most organisations 
and bodies continued to approve of the measures and indeed initially anecdotally believed 
it to be reducing aggressive dogs in society. Instead a growing recognition that something 
far less draconian must be done to allow responsible and otherwise innocent owners to 
retain their family pet contributed to proposals ultimately enshrined in the 1997 
Amendment Act:
So, ok, we knew the situation could not continue. Whether it was working or not, 
the truly awful, heartbreaking stories of owners having to have their dogs killed. 
Sometimes these were just old, toothless Pit Bulls, no threat to anyone. So the 
Amendment had to come. So now dogs already alive could stay that way, but we 
still had fear-based policies and laws to tackle, did we not? (RS3). 
However there was disagreement amongst policy experts as to why the 1997 
amendment came about. Those in the enforcement sector understood there to be 
process issues overriding any desire by the Government to soften the effects of the 
legislation: 
We all thought, at that time, this is just a way to get them [PBTs] back before the 
courts again. I don’t think anyone actually thought, we’re saying some Pit Bulls are ok, 
let’s allow them to go on to the register. Sometimes that did happen and we knew 
the opening of the register would be good but actually the 4B process  was about 57
taking a limbo dog back to the court for a decision (TS5).
When participants were asked what was happening on the ground as new legislative 
frameworks came into being, those in post from 1991, or for most of the period since, 
 As described in Chapter Three.57
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confirmed a strong and long-held belief that after an initial reduction lasting perhaps less 
than ten years (after the 1997 amendment), the numbers of Pit Bulls grew year on year. 
Asked to reason why that may be, and what impact that had on the solutions being 
discussed, participants confessed to possessing an incomplete picture of any wider social 
factors and trends and therefore a reluctance to speculate. Working only within the animal 
sector, there was an uneasy recognition that it provided little clue to other social dynamics 
at play:
It’s hard to say though isn’t it. I’m not sure what we could make of it. Other issues 
were going on, other crimes and problems - is this related? Probably. We’re told 
dogs became weapons because knives and guns and other stuff was becoming too 
hot, the penalties too high. I’m not sure we’ve understood those issues and if we 
can even be expected to (LG4). 
Participants appeared to propose that the dog control policy community was ill-equipped 
to understand the extent of the problem. There was a recognition other forces may be at 
work but that these extended beyond the expertise of the network:
People talk about other social fabric issues such as the breakdown of family 
networks, social deprivation, adapting to environments and new crimes - that all has 
to be connected, doesn’t it? But I’m not sure we’ve proposed holistic solutions to all 
these massively complex issues when we’re concerned with just a small part of it - 
dogs! (RS5). 
Participants were more comfortable in recognising a more tangible and straightforward 
issue surrounding the DDA in that it misinforms the public on which dogs are dangerous, 
presenting new problems, requiring new solutions. As certain undesirable dogs became 
desirable to certain elements in society so breeding them became popular and profitable: 
Suddenly there were all these cultural references, from celebs with Pit Bulls to 
celebs called Pit Bull. Meanwhile the media was doing the criminals' job for them by 
making everyone fearful of those dogs. We had to start talking about what could be 
done (RS4). 
It is clear that for many within the policy community the dog control ‘problem’ developed 
from s1 of the DDA itself - the very measure designed to tackle dog control issues, and as 
a result, solutions had to be adapted and discussed in relation to this. The 1997 
amendments were only part of that debate.
The issue of the policy path that led to the introduction of the 1991 Act has posed 
challenges at interview, including falling victim perhaps to over-rehearsal as I sought to 
revisit the issue for perceptions on the link to evidence. Those participants who were in 
post (or similar) in 1991 were often defensive or even vague about certain details. The 
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stock answers recognising the inadequacies of the legislation were difficult to navigate in 
order to access the raw accounts of the role for expertise and science in discussions on 
solutions. Nevertheless, even where it was a lengthy process, I was able to elicit further 
details, particularly once we had discussed mitigating factors such as the paucity of 
scientific research concerning human and dog interactions and behaviour available at that 
time:
Ok I don’t think it’s a revelation to say that no, there wasn’t the evidence back then. 
Evidence didn’t mean the same thing, we used our best judgement and that held 
some weight. We just didn’t know what we know now (RS3). 
This position was echoed by other participants who were keen to convey their firm belief 
that the general policy environment placed less of an onus on what we would now call 
evidence. Further than that, it was believed that the representations made by the welfare 
NGOs were thought to hold weight and in themselves were regarded as proof in 
reference to both problems and solutions: 
We were respected for our views, we were the experts. It was different then of 
course. It’s not that we won every argument, there were always other ideas that 
may be more attractive to MPs etc. That said, [in supporting the DDA and the 
amendment] we were responding to what was deemed to be a problem and a call 
for what could work rather than being responsible for championing it originally 
ourselves (RS3). 
Participants were clear that any organisations, including animal welfare NGOs, were simply 
not required to substantiate their views and claims in the same way as they are today, 
which perhaps sat in contrast to the notion of post-truth politics and a decline in 
deference to expertise. There was also an understanding that the policy process can be 
easily influenced by other factors: 
So let’s be frank. We know every government will cherry pick what it needs and 
claim support from whoever spoke up on that particular point. We’re not naive. I’m 
sure the Government heard what it wanted to hear in order to move ahead with 
the legislation (DNGO3). 
Given the policy community members I interviewed could account for very little, if any, 
debate and discussion on breed specific measures, it may never be known exactly how 
the proposals made it into a Bill and then on to the statute books. The Minister at the 
time, Kenneth Baker MP and his opposition number Roy Hattersley MP, made it very clear 
they are unwilling to revisit the issue at interview with me, which did not surprise 
participants who acknowledged the continued controversial nature of the legislation and 
how exactly such a solution came to be proposed.
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Policy transfer was a reoccurring theme in so much as those participants who were in 
post during 1991 were aware that legislation that sought to single out specific breeds had 
first been designed and introduced in the USA. Although participants may not have had 
an academic focus on policy transfer they echoed many of the key issues criticising the 
notion that the importation of a solution failed, specifically in this case, to take account of 
any UK-unique features within the problem itself. Participants had already stated that BSL 
was not born out of any debate within the policy networks, of England and Wales to their 
knowledge, and so they were unable to attribute the proposals to any policy actors in 
particular. There was an assumption that it was from within Government who it was 
believed were often influenced by developments in the USA. There were a small number 
of participants (employed in this arena more recently) who had believed the legislation to 
be a UK invention which when explored had an interesting effect on their notions on the 
trend for repeal, which all participants acknowledged was striking: 
Mmmm so it came from the States? I’m not sure I knew that. I mean it makes sense 
and doesn’t surprise me, I just think I’ve heard people claim it’s ours, like it’s 
something to be proud of. So hang on then, why would we accept the US had good 
reason to introduce it, but then decide they could not have good reason to repeal 
it? (LG3). 
This pause or termination of policy transfer was discussed and explained as being 
potentially part of a bigger policy picture that has witnessed less mimicry of the USA and 
more homegrown solutions with an emphasis on UK evidence. This may be true given the 
UK Government has, rather than explore and embark on a path (even a long term plan) 
to repeal, instead sought to codify BSL by embedding it in new measures. 
Although BSL was devised elsewhere, the UK Government was itself consulting unofficially 
on what breeds to ban here ahead of the 1991 statute and interestingly this would appear 
to alter the contention that the legislation was about banning fighting dogs: 
In 1990, I was told that when the Government drew up the list for s1 dogs…
originally they had five breeds on there and the fifth breed was Rottweilers and 
they didn’t include them because the Rottweiler club of Great Britain boasts a 
100,000 members and they just thought that’s too many votes to lose. So that is 
why there is a clause in there that the Secretary of State can add dogs to the list 
without going to consultation or anything else (LG1). 
This corroborates Lord Baker’s own autobiographical account discussed in Chapter Five 
and is an interesting example of how the political influence of certain fractions can shape 
the details of policy solutions - exposing the fact that such solutions have nothing to do 
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with ‘what works’. Indeed no evidence was put forward that Rottweilers (and potentially 
the other breeds under consideration) were used by dog fighters in the UK and indeed 
not all current banned s1 types have been either. Participants were cognisant of the effects 
on the dog owning public by banning certain breeds, given particular breeds are often 
more popular with different affluent or non-affluent sections of society, and what influence 
this had, and may have continued to have, upon discussions surrounding solutions. 
At the point of the introduction of the DDA, dog fighting had long been illegal in the UK, 
although it existed underground then, as it does today, and participants could offer no 
information as to why it was overtly linked, at the time, to the increased concern 
regarding dog attacks: 
This was an issue of public safety which was linked to the increase in PBTs and 
worries around dog fighting cases, but there wasn't really anything telling us the 
dogs in the attacks on kids were the dogs in dog fighting - just that it might be the 
same breeds (RS1). 
No interviewees suggested that the proposals were touted in 1991 as a means of 
addressing the dog fighting problem only that removing the same types of dog in society 
was necessary in order to protect the wider public. However the fact that dog fighters 
train their dogs to be dog-aggressive and not human-aggressive was largely ignored or 
misunderstood at this time, participants agreed. Some defence of this fallacy and what it 
meant to the solutions being proposed was nevertheless offered: 
[I]t was reasonable to question why dog fighters were using specific dogs and why 
other undesirables were obtaining the same types of dog. It gave us good reason to, 
sort of…..point the finger at these dogs (POL2).
8.4 Post 1991 - The perpetual policy soup
The following section deals with the policy soup that existed after the DDA had bedded 
in, but first it is worth noting that for many of the participants, the 1991 Act was their 
own focussing event as it created the problem their professional expertise was then called 
upon, or even invented and designed, to address. It should be seen as a watershed 
moment in dog control policy that created the now perpetual chaotic and messy ‘white 
noise’ (RS3) policy environment. As has been discussed it can take some time for a 
proposal to make it out of the debate within the policy community and into being. Since 
the issue of status and dangerous dogs escalated and came into prominent view - agreed 
by participants to have been around 2005/6 - the solutions that have been advocated by a 
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series of policy actors have been plentiful, with some moderate proposals even 
succeeding into action. Whilst participants acknowledged that repeal has also been 
discussed seemingly ad infinitum, it is in the knowledge that Government has no appetite. 
Participants discussed the campaigns each of them took on or witnessed during this 
period and up to, and including, 2014, with a relatively unified position from the welfare, 
veterinary and local government sectors that a consolidation of all dog related legislation 
was needed along with the reinvention and updating of specific dog control notices, 
coupled with trained, skilled and well-resourced enforcement. Some of the animal welfare 
sector worked on legislation with that aim and this was embodied in Lord Redesdale’s 
Private Members Bill which was attempted in 2008/9, 2010/11 and again in 2011/12 but 
has now permanently lapsed. Participants acknowledged that the vehicle of a Private 
Members Bill may have been a contributing mistake. Whilst in some instances these 
backbench bills are supported by government because their own legislative agenda is full, 
in the case of Lord Redesdale’s Bill on dangerous dogs - which contained most of what 
the welfare sector were calling for - this was not the case: 
Let’s be frank there are good and bad bills and that one wasn’t necessarily a good 
one. It had other issues, of course, not least of all who was involved with it, but they 
also didn’t appreciate the need to discuss with the right people in Defra and the 
Home Office, they had ignored and frozen them [UK Govt] out (RS4). 
Other very similar draft (but not tabled) Bills were constructed across various stakeholder 
coalitions around this period, all with the aim of repealing almost all existing dog control 
legislation (the abundance of which is illustrated in Chapter Three) due to its complex and 
confusing nature for both enforcers and dog owners. Consolidation was argued, in 
interviews, to have been proposed not just for its simplicity but also in recognition of the 
specialist nature of this area of social control particularly given dogs can be a clear danger 
to people and their welfare can also be an extremely emotive subject for many. The 
various guises of a new dog control bill were all designed to provide clearer advice and 
responsibilities and replace the emphasis on breed although not all proposed repealing s1. 
Participants suggested this was in recognition of the political opposition to such a move 
and the need to engage the police as the senior policy actors within the network who 
would only come on board if that specific measure was off the table. There were, as was 
alluded to, other reasons for the Redesdale Bill’s failure and thus the conflict and 
fragmentation factors of the policy network came sharply into view, once again. The 
NGOs were not able to agree, with the interested statutory bodies, on one draft Bill. 
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Several made it into the grasps of MPs and Peers, only to fail at the first hurdle in 
Westminster and it was clear that some interviewees believed that the Redesdale Bill had 
been the one opportunity to get it right: 
We lost it. It’s not that I blame anyone in particular, but we all knew the legislation 
wasn’t working and we’d built up momentum for change, then we couldn’t all agree 
on what should succeed it, or more importantly whose name was on it and getting 
the credit. We let it slip through our fingers (DNGO1). 
The Government meanwhile was aware that whilst it could easily justify ignoring the so-
called ‘white noise’ emanating from the disagreement amongst stakeholders, it could not 
ignore the call for change completely, given there was some unrest in statutory quarters. 
The police were working closely with the CWU and Guide Dogs on what were very high 
profile issues around attacks on communication workers and assistance dogs: 
70,000 members, and dangerous dogs is their number one issue. I worked hard to 
get a lot of media attention for our members, the victims of these horrific attacks 
and we were extremely successful. Our campaign ‘Bite Back’ has been huge, with all 
the main players on board. We had 6,500 dog attacks on postman at the peak in 
2007 and something had to be done. We collected all the evidence we could. I was 
the first to do that and those stats are now used by Defra, Home Office and 
everyone (DNGO6). 
Indeed these focussing dog attack events were fundamental to the policy responses 
ultimately coming to the fore. The feasibility of amending certain measures around 
culpability on private land and penalties for injured or killed assistance dogs suddenly 
became entirely possible through the vehicle of the new Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and 
Policing Act of 2014. It would appear therefore that those representing the 
communication workers and assistance dogs sectors fulfilled the role, as Kingdon (1984) 
outlines, of ‘policy entrepreneur’, highly successfully. Through their campaigns, brokering of 
multi-agency partnerships and access to politicians they managed to exploit the right 
opportunity to introduce a solution that had already gained a values acceptance from the 
main experts: 
This wasn’t a difficult campaign to run, these are very emotive, very real issues 
affecting people who already have huge challenges. Frankly who could argue against 
the effects on a blind person from the horrors of their guide dog being attacked or 
for that matter argue against better protection for postmen? Both have a 
fundamental job to do and should be able to (DNGO5). 
Thus the 2014 measures were then introduced, although the dog welfare NGOs were 
quick during interview to identify the missed the opportunities. Interestingly as a direct 
consequence, in the views of other participants, within the policy community the divide 
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between stakeholders was now said to be at its widest. No participants could claim, that 
dogs, or indeed their owners, were less demonised as a result of these new (2014) 
measures or that despite all the coverage about increasing responsible dog ownership, 
there is little to reduce the attractiveness of certain breeds (those banned and those 
which look like banned types), to owners with unscrupulous intentions. This new fissure 
clearly had a significant destabilising effect, further fragmenting the welfare NGO sector 
and sinking the various other more large scale policy solutions back into the ‘swamp’. 
Repeal of s1 of the DDA had never looked more unlikely and by using yet another statute 
- the Anti-social Behaviour and Crime Act 2014 to pass further measures, interviewees 
recounted how a consolidation Act also never looked further away. Some interviewees 
were adamant that the 2014 developments increased the punitive nature of dog control 
measures in England and Wales. They acknowledged the ability of a scaled and 
proportionate response within the various anti-social behaviour control notices under the 
2014 Act, however the potential for such an emphasis is seriously hampered by the lack of 
resources for enforcement, citing not just the lack of local authority and police officers in 
general, but also specifically those with sufficient training, knowledge and expertise as to 
execute such duties without having a further detrimental effect on the dogs in question:
My concern for the wider implications, London-wide or nationwide, is that you’re 
going to have people that don’t know or understand dogs that are maybe issuing 
these notices. I mean I can judge fairly well what is reasonable behaviour from a dog 
and an owner, and what is reasonable and what is anti-social. For some people that 
judgement might not be there…..For some boroughs who don’t have dog people, 
they are going need some form of training on implementing it [2014 Act] (LG1).
The police were engaged in this research at both a senior policy level (NPCC) and a local 
policing level (usually DLOs and their command, within individual forces). The latter only 
revealed vague clues as to their own personal view and rarely strayed from the official 
police line. Within my RSPCA role, where I act as lead on policing at a policy (not 
operational) level, I am however in close contact with a number of DLOs across the 
country, during regular meetings with which I have kept detailed field notes. Many of these 
serving and ex-police officers expressed deep concerns about the consequences for dogs 
and their owners from the legislation, and the requirements - often expressed as a 
personal burden with deep psychological effects - that it places upon them to act. That 
said, as has been alluded to before, serving police officers also live in constant fear that a 
s1 dog they have allowed to return to its family home, goes on to harm an individual. 
There is little individual police officers can do differently when the legislation establishes 
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what is contained within s1 as a simple straight offence. There are no areas for 
interpretation (other than later, after the assessment of both dog and owner on whether 
the dog can return home). The legislation itself was recounted, during interview, to be at 
the root of the construction of their fears: 
So the law, yeah, it determines what is a dangerous dog. Yes of course there should 
be s3 to remind everyone of the danger from any dog, but s1 says from birth this 
other dog over here is also dangerous for no reason other than the way it looks. I 
just have to get along with that, no questions (POL5). 
There was little to suggest that this is spoken about within the policy networks. Only 
certain officers participate in any national or regional policy debates and so opportunities 
to discuss solutions, in forums that contain both ground level police and other 
stakeholders is limited. There is a police Dangerous Dog working group chaired by the 
lead NPCC officer, but until very recently not all forces have been represented and of 
course within police structures, individual forces are autonomous, thus officers are 
responsible only to their own command. Officially the police are not policy making but as 
all participants agreed, they are the main, and sometimes only, stakeholder to which the 
UK Government listens: 
Let’s be really clear, sometimes they [Government] listen to this group or that, 
particularly if it’s a copper, but ultimately the Government will do what will get it the 
most votes. It’s not necessarily what is right for dog owners, whether they [the 
public] understand that when they vote or not (LG1). 
As was reiterated at interview with senior police officers, whilst there are circumstances 
surrounding the misuse of dogs, with incidents of serious attacks involving s1 dogs, the 
legislation, in their strong view, should be retained. Other interviewees were also acutely 
aware of this position:
Of course we know what the issues are, but what we need though, is a plan. We 
know the police fear not having the right tools to tackle the scumbags, and the 
Government fear the first attack after repeal, but that alone is not justification for s1 
- for keeping it (LG1).
Repeated references to best practice in partnership working were made by those 
statutory bodies and NGOs involved in their creation and execution. This included Service 
Level Agreements and Memorandums of Understanding with major stakeholders such as 
the Police, Guide Dogs and CWU, and clearly these were a factor in establishing 
agreement within a powerful sector of the policy network. According to the MSA model 
of policy making this would have been one key factor in ensuring success. There was also 
discussion with senior police officers on the potential for removing opposition to repeal 
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by reducing dog bites/attacks through intervention and prevention programmes. These 
were a mix of disposal orders for those caught offending with their dogs, to early 
intervention programmes which identifies groups of people potentially vulnerable to 
factors which could lead to them offending with their dogs in future. In 2010 I had visited 
one such trial programme within a Youth Offending Team in an inner city area for the 
research project Status Dogs, young people and criminalisation: towards a preventative 
strategy (Hughes, Maher & Lawson 2011) in order to interview a young person caught for 
the theft of mobile phones by using his dog to threaten the victim. This young person, as 
part of his sentence, was being taught about animal welfare and in particular the DDA. I 
used this example in the interview discussion to elicit more information on what place 
such programmes took in the debate on solutions. It was clear that many participants had 
no direct experience of such programmes and instead confessed to succumbing to an 
element of conventional wisdom as to the efficacy of such measures in tackling dangerous 
dog issues. In reality these were admissions that such ideas were proposed for mere 
populist reasons however fundamentally when pressed for a more elaborate answer, 
participants didn’t see how they alone could work or even begin to work without first a 
repeal of s1 and/or a consolidation dog control Act. Police participants were pragmatic 
about the contribution of such intervention schemes: 
Many programmes have been bandied about like they’re a panacea, whereas in fact 
they are long after the horse has bolted. Aren’t they? That said only once such 
schemes, or something else, for sure, has been proven to be effective could there be 
a reasonable opportunity to discuss alternatives to s1…… And as you know our 
position is that any premature repeal would pose an increased danger to public 
safety (POL1).
Substitute harms and proposals for change
Participants all agreed that the DDA effectively criminalises erstwhile innocent dog 
owners but admitted this aspect is rarely discussed in the debate on proposals for change. 
Setting aside those that may have intentionally sought out a banned type of dog, most 
progressing through the exemption scheme permitted by the 1997 and 2015 
amendments have innocently acquired the dog, perhaps as a puppy when it can’t even be 
identified as a s1 dog (that is the case until approximately 9 months of age). Despite 
caring for that animal, socialising it and raising it responsibly and through no fault of their 
own, should they want to keep it, they will find themselves on the wrong side of the law. 
The risks to themselves and to the dog are higher should they wish to contest the police 
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identification of the dog as a s1 . There are numerous accounts of such difficult situations 58
for dog owners and these provide an insight into their extreme mental anguish. Some 
participants (DNGO2) wanted to discuss these case studies again in detail, but admitted 
the practice of doing so as part of the proposals for repeal, was not for some reason 
effecting change. 
Some dogs are seized in police raids on the home which in itself can be terrifying. 
Although the methods employed before 2014/15 were deemed more brutal - dogs have 
been taken to an unknown location to be kept until the court case which in several 
instances has taken over two years. There is an accumulative effect from this on the dogs 
and owners from the circumstances of the seizure to the time in kennels, which can cause 
separation anxiety for both, and behavioural issues for the dogs concerned due to limited 
exercise, boredom, frustration and infrequent human contact. Solutions to this particular 
aspect were discussed at interview where some expressed cynicism that the proposals 
and subsequent changes primarily came about due to concerns about welfare. Instead it 
was argued that practical and resources issues were a more likely overriding motivation: 
The Government and the Police definitely know what the concerns are, but let’s be 
honest they heard some of the arguments of the distress to dogs and owners, but 
there was a huge motivation to do something to bring down their huge kennelling 
costs too, which course we totally get. For them this would be a more immediate 
problem (LG2). 
This was an interesting example of solutions to problems - in this case long term 
kennelling - being debated, but where the motivations for the agreed change significantly 
differ across the policy network. Nevertheless a certain amount of change was achieved 
with the introduction of ‘doggy bail’ (the IES). And as fractured as the policy community 
was at this point in 2014 on repealing s1 and what solutions were necessary to tackle dog 
control in society, there was agreement that an Interim Exemption Scheme was required. 
The scheme - for behaviourally-sound dogs, and owners deemed fit and proper - enables 
police officers to manage the various risks involved and leave the dog with the owners 
during the pre-exemption period. The earlier concerns regarding processes under s1 was 
argued by interviewees in the enforcement sector to have been very effectively 
addressed. Dogs in kennels for long periods is now happening in far fewer situations 
although there were no official statistics available at this time:
 As discussed in Chapter Three the legal emphasis is on the owner to prove the dog is not a s1, rather 58
than the police having to prove that it is. 
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Things have changed a lot and we have a lot more flexibility. This was a good 
outcome, which we all agreed with. We work hard now to keep the dogs with their 
owners and we’ll do a paper seizure, so the dog may then only with us few days to 
just a few hours where possible (POL4). 
These and other more recent developments in regulations governing dangerous dogs 
brought in through the 2014 Act and 2015 Statutory Instrument were argued by the 
welfare participants to have created new harms or certainly the potential for them (given 
these measures were new at the time of data collection), which has brought an interesting 
dimension to the solutions being touted. It was the contention of the welfare NGOs and 
other participants that dogs can now be more easily banned from certain public spaces. 
This risks ghettoising areas for dog owners and distancing dog owners from non-dog 
owners; limiting their interactions and increasing the risk of friction between the two. The 
prevention versus retribution balance of the new measures was deemed by many in the 
welfare groups to lean too heavily towards the latter particularly in light of the risks to the 
general population from dogs being very low. And in relation to other changes introduced 
at the same time, there was a great deal of concern in relation to offences now extending 
to cover private property. The potential efficacy of these developments was met with 
scepticism:
I just don’t know. I don’t see it. It doesn’t look to tackle those factors that create 
status dog owners, it sweeps up all dog owners. How exactly is a dog supposed to 
know a legitimate visitor versus a burglar, especially when most people can’t even 
train their dog to fetch or not pull on the lead? (RS4). 
Most importantly the welfare sector participants indicated these changes emerged from 
the policy community led by just a few more prominent voices, to the detriment of others 
particularly those concerned with the wellbeing of dogs. There was a contention that the 
Government’s complete refusal to entertain discussions on repeal had opened up 
opportunities for those who were willing to ignore that significant fact and propose 
effective solutions (unrelated to repeal) designed to tackle other aspects of where the 
policy community agreed there were problems. Therefore those particular policy 
advocates gained an audience that those seeking repeal were effectively excluded from.
It was conceded that these new, successful measures had been attractive as they may offer 
legal and financial redress to post office workers and other house-visiting professions, but 
concern was expressed at any effective preventative element unless perhaps more people 
kept their dog confined or locked up on their property - the effects of which will be 
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detrimental to a dog’s welfare. A dog in such an attack would most likely face destruction, 
depending on the severity, and thus the potential for any further attack is removed. But of 
course, as the opponents to these measures pointed out, there are other methods for 
preventing attacks in the first place for which the dog does not pay with its life. In relation 
to this also, there was a general understanding that status dog owners might be 
disproportionately represented amongst those situations where the dog is destroyed, 
given their potential lack of detailed knowledge of legislation and dog training, and also 
perhaps because they may have limited facilities to segregate their dog from visitors.
Legislation was not recounted as the only cause of substitute harms through the creation 
of new problems, however. There was a general fear from participants that some of the 
dog related intervention and prevention programmes could well be contributing to the 
problem, given the lack of regulation for the training and behaviour industry. Not all 
delivery partners subscribe to the same schools of thought on dog behaviour . Innocent 59
dog owners looking for help with anything from puppy training to how to tackle worrying 
behaviours could end up with unscrupulous and unqualified self-defined experts, with the 
potential to cause their dog, and by extension themselves, harm. Many of the participants 
recounted how proposals for regulating the training sector had been discussed for years 
without effect. It was acknowledged that an industry body - the Animal Behaviour and 
Training Council (ABTC) - had been set up in response to criticism of the training sector, 
however a self-regulating body with a voluntary membership was thought to be limited in 
its ability to ensure consistently high standards. Reputable welfare NGOs felt immune 
from many of these issues within their own programmes but they recognised the risk of 
exposure to poor training practices within small NGOs who lacked access to the latest 
welfare science. The risk could extend beyond those organisations on the outer fringes 
however and include those in enforcement also:
Let’s just remember that just because a police officer is a highly trained dog handler 
also doesn’t necessarily mean he knows enough about dog behaviours as to be 
advising status dog owners out on the street or within their projects. In my 
experience some police officers have given 100% the wrong advice (TS4).
This appeared to be another clear area where concerns were widely shared across the 
policy community however as yet either the solutions around regulating the dog training 
 Even within TV programmes on the subject there is a huge difference between those advocating positive 59
reward and reinforcement, such as Victoria Stilwell, and those who believe in a pack structure and 
dominance, such as Cesar Millan. The latter was strongly criticised by interviewees who expressed disbelief 
that he, and those within his school of thought, continue to gain a substantial profile and airtime.
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sector have either yet to be adequately developed and articulated, or Government is not 
yet convinced of the scale of the problem and the efficacy of any proposed solutions.
It appeared to many participants that some responses to the problem, such as the 2014 
measures had contributed to the anthropomorphisation of dogs in society. The 
expectation that dogs make decisions on who to attack - the visitor or the burglar - was 
claimed to be, if not in the minds of the policy framers, in the minds of some of the dog-
owning public:
Dogs are far more understanding and tolerant of us than we are of them and in 
response society treats them as if they reason in the same way we do. Not 
understanding dogs, their genetics, their traits, their behaviours is setting ourselves 
up to fail (TS4). 
This is a notion that relates to the blame being consistently situated squarely on the dog 
in the case of any dog attack. The media is quick to blame the dog and rarely the actions 
of the owner or the victim who mis-read or ignored the warning signs. General 
knowledge in society of how to interact with dogs safely was deemed to be woefully 
inadequate:
This is wrong really, isn’t it, with dogs paying the price often with its life. The owner 
however, is rarely held to account and is ultimately able to get another dog and 
subject it to the same conditions that may have led to its predecessor attacking 
(DNGO4).
These are issues under debate by those within the policy community but the 
accompanying solutions have not yet emerged with any form of coherency other than a 
over generalised point on the need to address how society educates itself about the 
status of animals in general.
The path that legislation has taken over 25 years may yet prove to serve only to damage 
the human-dog bond and it was clear most participants felt it has done nothing to 
enhance it. The improvements in 2014 are reported to be offset by the disappointment of 
the missed opportunities to consolidate the law and repeal s1 of the DDA. By retaining 
and solidifying BSL within the law of England and Wales, the UK Government and the key 
policy actors who support it, chose to ignore the direct contribution this legislation makes 
to the status dog phenomenon and the substitute harms to dogs, owners and the general 
public.The solutions it was held up to deliver may yet prove to produce even more 
complexity to the dog problem.
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When analysing the more recent changes in policy, for instance in relation to the 2014 
measures, participants acknowledged a positive development in the relationship between 
national and local governments. This was welcomed given it followed a difficult period 
when the Welsh Government was forced to withdraw its own Dog Control Bill under 
pressure from the Home Office. Participants praised the Welsh Government draft Bill 
launched at the end of 2012, which contained many of the measures previously touted, 
such as dog control notices, intervention courses, and training for enforcers. This praise - 
from local authorities, animal welfare charities and workers’ unions participants - was 
despite the Bill containing no repeal of s1 of the DDA, which can be explained in part 
because these powers fall outside the Welsh Government’s purview. The Police however 
were mainly either unaffected (due to being within a force in England) or felt insufficiently 
consulted before the Act in Wales was withdrawn. They had, however, been given direct 
input into the ASBCP Act, in one form or another throughout the development process 
and, as a result of having their evidence listened to, reported a greater affinity with its aims. 
But when I asked other enforcers, the local authorities, if this Act had incorporated the 
direction they needed - in effect whether it was future-proofed and whether it provided 
all the necessary materials to solve their current problems, there was an unequivocal 
response: 
No! It is another tool that is going to help us now but it is a bit like the 1991 Act, 
everyone said 1991 was going to be the saviour and then by 1995 that actually was 
useless. We’ve spent 10 years lobbying for these changes and presenting our 
evidence to the powers that be and it has taken so long that the problem is 
changing and what we’ve got is outdated slightly….. It’s a fault of the system, we 
need to make a change on the evidence and you’ve got to gather the evidence over 
time, but by the time you’ve got the evidence to change the law, the problem has 
moved (LG1).
The role of evidence 
The existence, nature and regard for any underlying evidence of the phenomenon of 
status and dangerous dogs is intrinsic, of course, to the perception and construction of the 
‘problem’ as outlined in the previous chapter. Through legislation and intervention, policy 
makers have outlined fighting dogs; dangerous dogs; and out-of-control dogs as a public 
safety issue and therefore the problem at hand. However, animal welfare organisations, 
other stakeholders from the periphery, observe the problem, not in isolation from public 
safety and dog bites - not least of all due to the consequences to an individual dog (and 
its breed/type) - but as a symptom of the primary issue, that of irresponsible dog 
  of  213 311
ownership. This difference and conflict in emphasis between the two positions was 
observed by participants to be linked to the evidence, or evidence vacuum, depending on 
the stance taken. These positions and perceptions of the problem affect the ability of the 
policy community to come together to agree, in some form or other, the necessary 
solutions.
Attempts to link dog fighting to dangerous and status dog issues, as well as BSL, have 
persisted throughout the last few decades but intensified, participants felt, since the 
development of a phenomenon in 2005/6. In addition to a retrospective application of the 
evidence of today, to the ‘dog problem’ of 1991, there are a small number of practitioners 
and researchers who argue the evidence of a link exists. The practitioners - who have 
sought to uphold current examples as justification for the legislative measures originating 
in 1991 - can mostly, but not exclusively, be seen amongst the police. Other participants, 
even those from diametrically opposed views understood this position amongst enforcers: 
I get it. I think we don’t have to be critical to recognise that few police officers 
would prefer to relinquish powers they have and have used. If I was them, if there 
was nothing to replace it particularly, I would want to keep a full toolbox to deal 
with all eventualities (DNGO5). 
Alternative controls, which could see the legalisation of Pit Bull ownership, deeply concern 
police officers of all ranks, as they are charged with public safety and thus can ultimately 
live better instead with the consequences of the current measures:
Yes, it’s brutal but true, I’d rather be hated for a dog being put down humanely than 
a child ripped to pieces by a dog the law - rightly or wrongly - says I should take off 
the streets. And that’s the way most of us think you know. We don’t want the dogs 
to be put down but that’s a far more pleasant death than someone mauled and 
eaten. I couldn’t live with that (POL3). 
This was used in interviews by way of explanation for the reluctance by police officers to 
discuss repeal and therefore participate in those specific debates. It was also an indication 
of the security of position the police experience within the policy process as they 
recounted no fear of repeal while they remain opposed to it.
Others concerned with epidemiology at a veterinary level also had a more positive regard 
for the simple elegance of removing certain breeds that dog fighters (of any level) are 
attracted to. The idea being that any danger that exists, however remote is also removed - 
which in itself was acknowledged as an argument for actually adding to the banned breed/
type list, to include a significant proportion of the dog population particularly any large, 
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powerful dogs. This section of participants also referenced the work of Harding, whose 
arguments, they believed, support increased removal or control of certain types of dog. 
Although there was also some recognition that there were media and market-based 
motivations for some of Harding’s more dramatic statements on the scale of the problem 
and the severity within the particular case studies he highlights. Whilst Harding may be 
considered by some as a policy entrepreneur, in fact the majority of participants rejected 
this notion on the basis that he is not, in their view, working in close proximity to them or 
on the frontline, and because he originally pursued research on this subject matter 
through only the prism of gang culture which does not represent the wider societal issues 
surrounding dogs.
As discussed in Chapter Four, criminological researchers Harding and Nurse, and by 
extension the League Against Cruel Sports who commissioned their 2015 report, have 
argued that status dog issues are in fact dog fighting issues. Participants discussed that this 
may be attributable to the particular interpretation of dog fighting (from the USA) used, 
given that no universally agreed typology has been adopted in the UK. However this 
contention by Harding and Nurse was not supported by the experiences of the 
participants and further than that, concern was expressed (also see the previous chapter 
for categorisations of the problem) that there is no evidence to support such a claim. 
Several participants were concerned that these assertions could have serious 
consequences for policy making within this field: 
This worries me, you know. It fails to understand the context. By not challenging, by 
just saying it [the PBT] was prohibited in 1991 because ‘it’s a fighting dog and 
because it’s inherently aggressive’ that then perpetuates the myths we’re working 
very hard to get rid of and then you get Staffies dragged in as well (RS2). 
Several participants delved deeper into this issue, expressing significant concerns about 
how such published work is not assisting the policy debates, partially because it is a 
distraction from the real discussions on solutions and partly because it may perpetuate 
some of the poor perceptions of dogs and their behaviours, and their owners similarly: 
Let’s think about this for a moment because its got some, it’s quite dangerous this. If 
the papers and the people reading them become convinced that any young person 
with a staffie is involved with dog fighting, then we’ve got a much bigger problem. It’s 
far from helpful (DNGO4).
One or two within the welfare sector speculated that if such opinions gain a foothold, 
potentially the UK Government may become even less inclined to address the status 
  of  215 311
afforded to dogs who look a particular way through BSL. The solutions Harding and Nurse 
proposed - such as the need for a separate offence for dog fighting  - gained no traction 60
with the majority of participants not least of all for the absence of what dog control issue 
this would address. Such a move was not reported to have been discussed within the 
policy networks at any point and as such this would illustrate its remoteness from the 
process itself.
Further evidence of this was illustrated by Harding’s presentation, which I observed, to the 
Policy UK event, Dealing with Dangerous Dogs and Associated Behaviour on 3rd May 2017 
which was in stark contrast to the presentations of practitioners from the welfare sector 
and the police in that it focussed on the few very extreme cases of child deaths and 
attacks or where criminals have trained dogs to guard their activities and attack the police. 
Harding’s academic focus (originally as a gang researcher which developed into gangs with 
dogs), has brought widespread attention, ensuring a place within public criminology this 
subject matter had erstwhile escaped, which in itself participants welcomed. However 
entering the marketplace for research in the media spotlight can increase the vulnerability 
of research to being led only by what will secure headlines and certainly Harding was the 
only conference presenter to be witnessed being interviewed by a TV camera crew during 
this event. This was despite the fact his empirical research was now eight years old and in 
conflict with the findings of the rest of the panel of experts presenting more recent 
studies and direct workplace and frontline experiences. Presentations immediately before 
Harding, for instance from a London borough local authority dog warden (also 
interviewed for this research), had warned of the pitfalls of linking irresponsible dog 
ownership and so-called status dog issues with young people :61
We thought it was the youngsters didn’t we? We all said it, not all that long ago 
really, but we know something different now, don’t we. I’m here to tell you we were 
wrong back in 2009, it’s actually over 25s or even older. It’s people my age, it’s the 
older generations not picking up their dog mess! (LG1).
Likewise the dangers of mis-labelling were also discussed at the event and within many of 
the interviews, in one such interview the participant ridiculed his previously held views: 
You don’t need me to tell you, what plenty of people were saying, what they 
thought they were seeing. We were calling it as we saw it, hoodies with their 
backsides hanging out and dogs on a chain stripping bark from trees, as dog fighting 
(LG1). 
 As opposed to the general offence of animal fighting within s8 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006.60
 Specifically 11-25 year olds were cited.61
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However, extensive work in that particular borough had developed good communication 
lines with those particular young people and established with almost certainty the bark 
stripping was a misunderstanding by them of dog behaviours, easily corrected with 
education and the provision of dog training materials and a dedicated park with proper 
equipment:
Most importantly we found out for the vast majority of these scenarios it is 
definitely not dog fighting and it is dangerous to say so. I wish it was easy to get this 
message out, but it’s just not as much of a headline is it, when we solve a problem 
that didn’t really exist! (LG1). 
The design of the 1991 legislation and even subsequent amendments have fundamentally 
enshrined the intention to remove four types of dog from Britain’s shores, and thus in 
itself is evidence that the Government believed and still believes such a move (although 
universally accepted by participants as impossible) would solve the ‘problem’. The content 
of my interviews repeatedly returned to this point as participants often confessed to 
bafflement that the failure of the legislation - given it is universally accepted there remains 
a proliferation of PBTs - has failed and yet remains on the statute books. Participants 
within the welfare sector were unequivocal that apart from the obvious futility and failure 
to eradicate the PBT the evidence for it working as a control measure, is absent: 
The DDA doesn’t work in its current form, well s1 I mean. It has not been proven 
or demonstrated, in 25 intervening years, with empirical evidence, that those types 
of dog should be removed from society and that the public will be safer for doing 
so (RS2).
A majority of interviewees were again unable to explain, and indeed expressed 
considerable frustration, as to why repeal and the arguments for it, continue to be ignored 
at Westminster. It was clear they believed expertise and evidence is being ignored partially 
in deference to the police as the the more revered stakeholder, and partly due to political 
factors, which are explored in the next chapter.
Other legislative developments, contained within the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and 
Policing Act, as well as elsewhere in secondary legislation, have sought to adopt at least 
some of the proposals the stakeholders have long been lobbying for. The practitioner’s 
guidance Dealing with Irresponsible Dog Ownership issued by Government (Defra, UK 
Government and Welsh Government 2014) was acknowledged by most of the statutory 
sector participants as being as a result of the evidence base put forward by the extended 
policy community. That said not all local authorities are using the new measures placed at 
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their disposal - by way of a sample, at the aforementioned Policy UK event (3 May 2017) 
only a quarter of the 25+ councils in attendance had implemented and utilised the 
powers and guidance in the three years since they had been made available. This is 
perhaps surprising given it can reasonably be assumed that their attendance at this costly 
conference indicated a keen interest in dog issues within their borough.
The DDA was intended to reduce dog bites and attacks. Although it was assumed this 
would mostly happen through the eradication of the PBT, there was clearly, participants 
agreed, some recognition by legislation-framers that all breeds could be dangerous; 
because that principle exists within s3, which allows for action to be taken against owners 
of any dog, of any type/breed, found to be dangerously out of control. Concern was 
expressed however that this is often the extent to which the Government is prepared to 
recognise the role of evidence for non-breed related aggression. As an emerging scientific 
field 20+ years ago, this was perhaps understandable, however it is now a relatively well-
populated area that is attracting an increasing number of researchers, indicative perhaps of 
a wider academic interest in the human-dog bond. Hope was universally expressed that 
society would become more informed and policy proposals would begin to reflect that.
The Government’s interest in evidence of the role of breeds in dog attacks, and the 
contribution this can make in discussions regarding solutions, has in fact been extremely 
high at one time. A large number of participants were aware of the Defra-funded 
Liverpool Veterinary School systematic literature review which had found no studies to 
support a relationship between breed and aggression (discussed in Chapter Five). 
Disappointment was expressed, however, that the study was then effectively ignored and 
conspicuously absent from subsequent debater, as though Defra had changed its view as 
to what discussions on proposals it wished to be a part of. The policy soup was 
determined to be less enriched as a result in terms of the breadth of debate and indeed 
there was frustration amongst those who had hoped its contribution would have been 
more meaningful: 
It should have got much more of a public profile than it did, but it was perhaps that 
it was funded by Defra and obviously there’s the issue with the Dangerous Dogs 
Act…and from that there’s a lack of evidence to help us move forward with 
legislation and even educational measures. This puts the RSPCA in a tricky position, 
but from my point of view [in the absence of this] it wouldn’t mean I wouldn’t be 
able to write policy, what I would then draw upon is the expertise of the people 
that work in the field and what is generally commonly established and accepted 
(RS2).
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Much of the data cited as evidence throughout the field of commentary are vulnerable to 
criticisms regarding its validity and applicability but it would reasonable to assume that 
Defra would observe the merits of its own commissioned research. Given it was funded 
by the public purse, participants also felt it was reasonable to expect that if Defra had any 
misgivings about its own research these should be made public. No such critique or 
retraction have ever been lodged and as such the conclusions of the Liverpool University 
review should be viewed in themselves as robust. The relationship therefore between 
evidence and response; that is breed-related aggression and breed-specific legislation, 
should be at its strongest in this area and yet it couldn’t be more at odds:
But I don’t really think they [Defra] took anything from it. I only say that because in 
my experience of Defra-funded research they generally don’t seem to implement 
what the findings are. What we were hoping was that that would give some 
evidence to repeal breed specific legislation but there just seems to be absolutely 
no appetite to do that (RS2).
There would appear to be questions therefore regarding the true status of the epistemic 
community (Haas 1992) and the notice taken of its superior technical knowledge within 
the dog control policy process. Contrary to Haas’s notion, the scientific and veterinary 
expertise inherent to determining risk in the dangerous dog issues does not appear to 
have been the ‘transmission belt’ of knowledge, and instead may have been dismissed in 
favour of practitioners such as the police. During interviews we discussed this aspect and 
the ranking, in importance, of evidence. In a risk-averse society, it was agreed, albeit 
begrudging by some participants, that the conventional and practitioner’s wisdom of key 
stakeholders such as the police, who are after all charged with protecting public safety, 
must be taking precedence over scientific evidence. Further to this if the evidence of 
substitute social harms or additional harms, caused by the existing regime, is less influential 
- perhaps due to the sector from which it emanates - this will have far less influence upon 
the Government. Recognition was given that the Government has acted where influence 
has been put to bear in recent times, but these are also instances where there has also 
been the backing of the police such as the changes brought in 2014 and 2015. This was 
illustrated clearly by one participant present during those particular policy proposals: 
Aye, when everyone is singing from the same hymn sheet, they [UK Government] 
will act, but for many repeal is a deal breaker. That divides people up because the 
police won’t then come to the table. If they aren’t there, you’ve got nothing 
(DNGO1). 
Some participants discussed the potential for the regard for scientific evidence to change 
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in the near future due to an increase in attention from those working to protect child 
safety. As children are a recognised sector of society more at risk of death or injuries with 
long term consequences from dogs, child protection advocates from within social and 
health services have sought to establish risk factors and prevention models. Although 
hospital data have been used across all disciplines to track dog attacks and bites, it is 
universally recognised to have significant flaws (as discussed in Chapter Four). A more 
qualitative approach is being adopted by the human welfare sector to assist with 
determining risk factors. The forensic behaviourists interviewed were particularly 
enthusiastic about this focus: 
We know breed isn’t a factor, but we need to know what is, what happens in that 
home right before that attack and in the weeks and months leading up to it. 
Destroying the dog, as is normally the way, before we have had chance to study its 
behaviours and its interactions with humans, is effectively destroying the evidence. If 
we can persuade more forces to work with us perhaps we can begin to understand 
what led to the attack (TS4). 
Animal welfare specialists confirmed the same view and the need to understand the 
influences on where the dog attacks; the size of the victim; the actions of the victim, the 
severity of the attack, and the animal welfare standards the animal has experienced, in 
order to shape proposals for change: 
Sadly there still is not sufficient research for us to really understand what it is about 
those particular fatalities and what led those particular dogs to behave in that way. 
That is something that is lacking and because of that it is difficult to put true 
defensive measures in place. And what we do is end up looking at more risk factor 
based research to try to get an indication of what has correlated with attacks, 
because we don’t have anything concrete on cause and effect (RS2).
Of course it was understood by participants that where children have died as a result of a 
dog attack in the home, there will undoubtedly be other priorities for the authorities, 
however the reluctance by the press and most commentators to discuss the contributing 
factors of human behaviours (including the rearing of the dog) that could have 
contributed to whatever led the dog to attack, further obscure the real opportunities for 
lessons learned. There was a sense of hope, in our discussions, that this area of emerging 
evidence could contribute positively to enabling a policy development to emerge from 
the soup with the necessary support from stakeholders. For now though frustration was 
rife that evidence is often being prevented from being collected in the first place, which 
would not happen, several interviewees commented, in other criminal cases. It should be 
noted that it isn’t always the case however and we did discuss the Coroner’s unusual steps 
following the death of Jade Anderson in 2013 (as discussed in Chapter Five). Indeed this 
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very tragic ‘focussing event’ produced the moniker ‘Jade’s law’ for the 2014 amendments 
to the Dangerous Dogs Act which extended cover to private places, because the owner 
of the dogs in Jade’s case could not be prosecuted for dangerous dog offences. 
Participants were keen to point out however that she was successfully prosecuted for 
animal cruelty - which has significant connotations for the causes of dog attacks. Several 
interviewees argued that whilst they did not wish to appear in any way unsympathetic 
regarding Jade’s death - this prosecution was very significant. This was because it sharply 
brought into focus the potential for links between animal cruelty and the causes for some 
dog attacks usually, and frustratingly, disregarded by the media and onlookers. Jade’s tragic 
and preventable death was met with widespread anger and public attention - those within 
the policy community that I interviewed hoped it would facilitate a significant shift towards 
the real factors contributing to the dog control problem.
8.5 Summary
This chapter has sought to address the second key objective of this thesis namely to 
examine the various policy 'solutions' that emerged in relation to the dangerous and 
status dog problems. As such it has summarised and explored the main policy 
interventions that have been discussed, debated and produced within the policy networks 
of England and Wales. Reflecting the emphasis from participants and throughout my data 
on the more obscure constructs of the dog problem around breeding, trading and 
identification, the majority of discussions on solutions has focussed upon the Dangerous 
Dogs Act 1991. This included the issues the DDA purported to tackle during its 
development and the role of the policy actors in those debates before progressing to the 
discussions surrounding the evidence for those solutions which would now appear to be 
in doubt, although there is an acknowledgment that far less was understood about dog 
behaviour and aggression some 25+ years ago. Nevertheless successive governments have 
remain wedded to their position, seemingly unmoved to activate change beyond the main 
amendments in 1997. The policy soup since that time has developed further, not least of 
due to the influence of a perceived phenomenon of status dogs, often confused with 
dangerous dog issues either through lack of knowledge or with purpose. This has been 
directly linked to the issue of substitute harms, which in itself required the policy 
community to adapt and discuss new proposals, some of which were successful, possibly 
because they fell short of requiring the repeal of s1 of the DDA. The role of evidence was 
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once again considered as the nature of society’s understanding of dog attacks has 
deepened. To what extent this is appreciated in the development of new dog control 
proposals may not, at this time, give cause for too much hope however. 
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Chapter Nine  
The Political Stream:  
Influencing forces 
9.1 Introduction
The third component of Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Analysis (MSA) requires an 
assessment of the political arena in terms of its connection to the phenomenon of 
dangerous and status dogs. The chapter is divided into four distinct sections with the first 
three reflecting the main elements that Kingdon highlighted as key features within the 
MSA’s Political Stream. The first of these will discuss a particularly abstruse object of study: 
the ‘national mood’, through trends in the media, public consultations, polling and party 
political dimensions. The second element of 'organised political forces’ is examined 
through a more in depth review of the policy network including its fragmentation and 
competing forces. Themes conveying the political dimensions of the various stakeholders 
relationships have already been explored but I return to these issues in order to 
contextualise what influence their interplay, competition and level of mutual respect has 
had upon policy makers and the political sphere. The third element incorporates the 
various ‘governmental’ changes from powerful individuals in the cabinet to general 
elections. Administration changes have been numerous during the time period most 
acutely under examination and indeed the additional element of devolution upon dog 
control policy, has also provided an interesting backdrop. A final section considers 
Kingdon’s notion of ‘coupling’ and ‘policy windows’ and what evidence there is for these 
within the development of dog control policy in England and Wales. 
Given the themes are organised to reflect the key elements of MSA, this chapter does not 
necessarily reflect a precise temporal structure. It is clear that many participants during 
interview responded with a continuum in mind as many of the features, such as the 
competition between NGOs, have remained relatively static in terms of their influence 
(the nature of the conflict will of course change). Political changes such as elections, 
devolution and new political parties in government do, however, anchor particular aspects 
of the data in time, nevertheless I have attempted to ensure clarity regarding the relevant 
time periods throughout when presenting these findings. 
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9.2 The Canine Zeitgeist: the National Mood
Beyond the considerations afforded to the views and opinions of the policy community, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, politicians also gauge the wider national mood. 
Prominent politicians from the UK Government and the opposition benches with 
responsibility for dog policy - those both in post in 1991 and at the time of my data 
collection period - were not willing to be interviewed for this case study. As such, it is only 
possible to explore the possible influences of national opinion on their actions from public 
records at the relevant significant moments in time, as discussed in Chapter Five, and from 
the personal and organisational experiences of the elite interviewees participating in this 
research. Politicians read shifts in the national mood from from a variety of conduits, not 
limited to public correspondence, polling, the press, social media and mid-term or local 
elections, many of which emerged as themes explored below.
During interview the various polls that have been commissioned and publicised over the 
years (such as those discussed in Chapter Five) were discussed in some detail. Their 
influence upon politicians and wider society was recognised to be quite substantial 
although as a method of gauging opinions, most participants were keen to emphasise the 
inherent flaws. The types of questions used, often leading or certainly lacking in important 
detail, were the most prominent issues but also sampling and timing - such as following a 
recent particularly gruesome attack - were also referenced as problematic. Several 
interviewees, particularly within the welfare NGOs were troubled by the complexity and 
nuances of the dangerous and status dog issues being reduced to over-simplified and 
broad positions, mediated through media attention, echoing other themes regarding 
definitions, the construction of the problem and the impact of negative influences. The 
perceptions of national mood by politicians was deemed to be arguably more important 
than the reality:
I’m really not sure what politicians think people think is the same as what people 
actually think. They will always accept whatever poll tells them what they want to 
hear. It’s the same cherry-picking as anything. They still think the country wants pits 
banned so that’s what they are running with (LG3). 
This echoes the work, of course, by Roberts and Hough (2005) which suggests policy 
makers respond to public opinion without first accurately capturing and understanding it. 
As a result public expressions for more punitive controls may be mistakenly taken at face 
value.
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Participants nevertheless remained eager to engage with the issue of the political 
assessment of the national mood. Whilst acknowledging it as a complex and ever-shifting 
entity, most also recognised it as another key factor for government inertia on the repeal 
of s1 of the DDA: 
Ah you mean the canine zeitgeist and the reinvention of the dangerous dog in our 
times? A nation of animal lovers does not like to be told how to look after a dog, 
they think they are born with that know-how, but they also expect the authorities 
to protect them and their children. They expect the system to know what a 
dangerous dog is. How do we explain to them there is no such thing as a 100% 
non-dangerous dog, and they can’t ask the Government to have a crystal ball about 
certain dogs? How do we convince Defra they can’t and shouldn’t, particularly if 
they thinking they are reading this as the public view? But we live with a public that 
wants Governments to protect them from harm and that means to be tough on 
crime. It’s easiest, by far, for the Government if they go with that angle (RS3).
The national mood could not be characterised as one of consensus on dangerous and 
status dogs. Even amongst dog owners or sympathetic members of the public, there is a 
lot of fear of certain dogs and certain types of owners of these dogs. The interview 
evidence gave rise to two main examples of perceptions of public opinion about dogs and 
risk. Firstly, the media symbolism of these dogs, with ‘devil dogs’, ‘weapon dogs’, and the 
visceral nature of the word ‘dangerous’ referenced and discussed by the participants once 
again, illustrating the powerful driver of policy concerns that the tabloids can be. Secondly 
public fear of certain dogs was argued to be evidenced in the reluctance of many people 
to rehome and take on bull breeds, and also in their interactions with these dogs in public 
- most participants recounted stories to illustrate the difference in reaction between 
member of the public meeting for instance a Staffordshire Bull Terrier or a Labrador when 
out for a walk. Both these issues were regarded as underpinning the reactive nature of 
policy rather than any rational process.
Public and media pressure can be difficult, if not impossible, to quantify, but nevertheless 
participants wished to discuss the significant contributions to the picture that public 
meetings, petitions and consultations can have. Defra undertook public consultations in 
both 2010 and 2012 on a series of questions including; mandatory ID; an extension of 
offences to cover private property; and measures to reduce or eliminate time spent in 
kennels for suspected s1 dogs (where a suitable owner existed alongside a favourable 
behavioural assessment of the dog). Participants made reference to the Government’s 
formal response to these consultations (Defra 2012) for its value in illuminating the 
Government’s regard for public opinion:
  of  225 311
I think nearly 30,000 responses came in didn’t they? Even discounting those from 
the major charities and others like that, and their supporters, that’s a big indication 
of public thinking. If you ask me that’s also why they softened up on a few things 
(TS2). 
Indeed, the Government themselves track the huge shifts in favour for both mandatory ID 
and the extension of offences to cover private property within the first part of the 
response. Consultation responses were not generally viewed by interviewees, however, as 
having a significant influence on the Government as they were not always seen as a 
representative form of public opinion. Responses have traditionally been dominated by the 
key organisations and stakeholders and in more recent years these campaign groups have 
used software, or stirred up supporters on social media, to submit a copy of the 
organisation’s position to the consultation. Some participants were acutely aware that in 
fact on a number of occasions more than one administration within the UK has 
discounted large proportions of submissions as being the sole consequence of an NGO’s 
campaign:
We’ve talked about challenging this stance that all of the responses we generate 
through Engaging Networks  are openly disregarded or counted as one response 62
from the charity that’s running that campaign. We know that’s wrong because each 
response requires an individual to submit it themselves, but it is interesting in the 
context of what you just asked me, that yes it’s probably the case that those 
governments look to measure public opinion from the other responses, that aren’t 
connected to our campaigns. I know you’ve said before that Welsh Government has 
said this publicly, I’m not sure Defra have, but they are certainly doing it (RS4). 
The press and social media 
The role of the media in communicating public opinion was discussed at some length and 
provoked some disagreement between whether they drive public views or convey them 
and what government makes of this:
I see a role for them, I do, and it’s an important one, but I do have to ask if they can 
be a trusted source for government to refer to and see as representative. They are 
not dog experts and in an ever increasingly pressurised market place are they really 
able to put the time and effort into investigating public views? I get they will print 
what sells, but what direction is the influence going in then exactly? (LG2). 
There was concern therefore that the Westminster machine may well be interpreting 
public opinion from a flawed source although there was recognition that there was a 
 Engaging Networks is complex software utilised by charities and pressure groups to channel supporters 62
to calls-to-action, providing them, for instance, with a pro forma response, or letter, or petition to sign, all 
within its domain.
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significant difference between the tabloids and more specialised media. Some of the 
broadsheets and dog specific publications have increasingly been more favourable towards 
bull breeds and have recognised the consequences of s1 upon dangerous and status dog 
issues as well as the evidence vacuum which attributes aggression to breed. Positive 
editorials along these same lines were also hoped, by participants, to reflect a growing 
sense of appreciation by the public of the complexities of the issues and the need for 
change. But problems emanating from s1 of the DDA are nevertheless extremely 
complicated to communicate and indeed so are the secondary partial-solutions being 
proposed if repeal (as the primary goal of many within the policy network) is off the table. 
This issue of complexity could afford the media a greater role in influencing the national 
mood, particularly if they are oversimplifying the key points.
Also under discussion was the issue of what happens in the media as a result of a 
focussing event such as a serious dog attack resulting in life-changing injuries or death. It 
was clear that the perception amongst interviewees from most sectors was that it is not 
the Government who is blamed, whether by the media or the voices of the community 
they seek to reflect. There is no substantive examination, by the media, of the various 
ongoing policy debates and solutions under discussion within the policy soup, with respect 
to what the Government has done or not done: 
You don’t see any real outcry that the Government created the situation that led to 
that attack. You might see something that suggests resources, say at a local or police 
level could be at fault, but you don’t see in the media, unless they quote one of us 
saying it, ah yes, that’s because of s1 of the DDA, do you? (DNGO4). 
I asked participants if this then meant that politicians are not hearing what they need to 
hear and that the outcry following an attack is misleading in itself, to which there was an 
emphatic yes, although there was no accompanying suggestion of an easy solution. This 
therefore may well insulate the Government and lead them into thinking the wider public 
do not feel the legislative framework is to blame and there is no national mood geared for 
change.
Social media was deemed to be one factor that may combat any diversion the media 
creates inadvertently or otherwise. For all its faults, discussed in some detail, participants 
were quick to point to its ability to put politicians in direct touch with public feeling on an 
issue. Research participants pointed to a number of high profile campaigns to save specific 
dogs and/or raise money for court cases often shared many times over and viewed by 
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hundreds of thousands. As a result social media was deemed to have replaced the 
previously more prolific vehicles of petitions and public meetings. Acting as a peer-to-peer 
communication tool, in addition to its other functions, it has provided a conduit for crucial 
information about dog behaviour:
We see more organic discussions about dog behaviour and the legislation now. Yes 
there are campaign groups involved too, but as we well know, they can’t control 
their supporters. We can only guide and provide connections to the information 
(DNGO3). 
Who is the constituency?
MSA poses that it is not necessarily the mass public that determine the national mood in 
the minds of our politicians and indeed they are also persuaded by social movements 
which can provide the same measurement of intensity but do not have the breadth of the 
wider public. There are clearly electoral and profile benefits for individual politicians, 
political parties and governments from certain policy proposals that will induce them to 
associate with that movement, even if that movement is not representative of the public 
view as a whole. That said no interviewees were able to draw comparisons in respect of 
dog control policy and the link to s1 of the DDA. There was a recognition that this may 
have happened around greater penalties for attacks on assistance dogs and so it was 
acknowledged as a potentially essential component of the policy making process.
In progressing this discussion further it became obvious that participants perceived there 
to be a very party political dimension to the Government’s approach to assessing the 
national mood. 
You know it seems to me that it is the political party and their own ideology that 
affects who they listen to and consider as the public, doesn’t it? They listen to 
specific sectors, perhaps what you’d think of as their known followers. That’s my 
experience but it stands to reason (DNGO6). 
This reflected a popular view of the national mood having party politically motivated 
components. It is possible for any political party to determine the mood, not of the wider 
public, but of perhaps just its own base and for those it must appeal to, to be reelected. 
This presented in the analysis of Government views centring on Conservative Party values 
at the time of the introduction of the DDA and since 2010, which appears to have 
produced a verdict that status and dangerous dogs are the specific problem of a particular 
demographic: 
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The Tories have either knowingly, or not, presented the status dog issue, well most of 
these dogs issues to be fair, as a problem of the lower classes in areas where they 
do not seek, and, let’s face it, are unlikely, to return a candidate of their own (RS4). 
The point was made that the control of dogs within these ‘to-be-feared’ communities 
suffering from social deprivation can only win the Conservatives votes in their loyal and 
target constituencies and lose them very little elsewhere, given they have traditionally had 
little presence in deprived areas. There were some alternative ideas proposed by the 
enforcer section of participants, however, in so much as targeting young parents, who may 
have expressed their fears through the media and elsewhere regarding dog control, may 
transcend partisan politics. The reasons given is that strategies seeming to be tough on 
crime and remove or reduce the risk of harm involving children retain popularity. It was 
claimed by the same enforcer group that this had happened in the case of extending 
offences to cover private property after Jade Anderson was tragically killed by dogs.
Related to this was the argument that politicians in the UK now exist in an almost 
constant state of electioneering, with a total of 28 referenda and local, devolved and 
general elections across England and Wales just since 2005. This frequency of doorstep 
contact has brought politicians in close proximity to their constituents allowing them to 
acquire a picture of exactly what issues and proposed solutions gather support. This has 
not been the only developments to increase the interaction of politicians with their local 
(and beyond) population however, social media also came back into focus: 
All these platforms, Twitter and what have you, they’ve really made a difference 
haven’t they? They’ve transformed how we see them. They have effectively made the 
MPs far more accessible, perhaps not 24 hours but the perception of it at least for 
many people (DNGO4). 
Open social media profiles and inviting, interactive websites have enabled perceptions of a 
close relationship and a greater sense of familiarity with politicians, amongst the public. 
Whereas at one time a sometimes long wait for an appointment at an MP’s monthly 
constituency surgery, or an exchange of letters, may have been the only avenues open to 
constituents, they are now able to see and hear the views of their elected representative 
and comment on these publicly, as well as - depending on how that politician organises 
their office administration - interact directly via email. Some participants argued this was 
increasing the ability of MPs to assess the national mood and may be a cause for 
optimism:
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I know we all moan about Facebook and Twitter, but look we know MPs are reading 
it avidly, because they need to know what’s going on and that’s a really fast and 
frankly cheap way to do it. What this means for us is that we need to convince the 
public it’s time to repeal s1 and it’s time to understand dog behaviour a whole lot 
better (TS4).
The moving pendulum
Politicians do not just detect the national mood at a specific moment, they are also 
sensitive to changes. This was again cause for hope amongst the dog NGOs participating 
in this study who interpreted the public consciousness as becoming more knowledgeable 
about dogs and sympathetic to the arguments for repealing s1:
This is going to be crucial because we know the Government fears, is petrified of, 
the first dog attack after repeal. Sadly we know there will be an attack, not because 
of repeal but because it is somewhat inevitable when there are so many people 
unable or unwilling to read the signs dogs give off as a warning. There’s a long way 
to go on that front, but that’s not going to happen while we have people thinking 
they are safe as long as they don’t have a Pit Bull. If we can convince the public it’s 
not s1 then maybe we can convince the Government to repeal and that it won’t 
anger the public, and that it won’t be unpopular (DNGO1).
Clearly the national mood is only one component but there was a recognition from the 
dog NGOs and the technical experts that change was not necessarily going to happen 
solely on the word of experts but that tangible public support is going to be crucial. The 
examples set by the many US states and other countries around the world who have 
repealed or are repealing their breed specific legislation was also hoped to assist with this 
transition. It was understood that politicians and their officials place great significance on 
public opinion and thus it has meaningful consequences for the direction of policy. 
Proposals can easily be fast-tracked riding a wave of opinion or indeed they can, simply 
and quickly, be lost. 
9.3 White Noise and Competition: Organised Political Forces
Examining the nature and extent of consensus and conflict within the policy networks is 
an essential component to understanding the impact upon policymaking regarding dog 
control and of itself could warrant the employment of Policy Network Analysis in a 
further study given the degree of fragmentation and competition uncovered. For the 
purposes of this study however, participants provided a rich account of these issues, first 
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seen in the breadth and contradiction in their views of what constitutes society’s ‘dog 
problem’, in Chapter Seven. The resultant lack of coherency between participants and the 
organisations or sectors they represent, and how these different parties deploy distinctive 
definitions or categorisations to promote their perspective, is explored further below, 
along with additional accounts of both rivalry and unity on the legislative policy solutions 
proposed.
The particular view each participant has on the issues under discussion greatly affected 
their characterisation of the problem and therefore the terminology they employ, as has 
already been explored. They also appeared, and sometimes expressly confessed, to being 
influenced by a series of organisational or personal vested interests - although this was 
often followed by a request that I not quote or attribute any such comments to that 
individual, which suggested a heightened sense of professional self-preservation. However 
this is, of course, a noted attribute of elite interviewing, discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Six. Some of the participants do not appear to have previously overtly articulated 
these inter-agency differences before being interviewed and therefore have arguably been 
operating in their day-to-day roles without the necessary reflections that could have been 
beneficial to the interviews. Questions supplied by me in advance would have allowed 
them sufficient time as to consider the ramifications of their characterisation of sensitive 
professional relationships, possibly allowing them to speak more freely at interview. Several 
interviewees reported that the interview represented the first occasion they had begun 
to consider the impact of conflicts and consensus upon the phenomenon of status and 
dangerous dogs and the policy direction in response to it. 
It is worth noting that with all interviewees I discussed the definition of these network 
relationship characteristics and clarified that ‘conflict’ represented the general 
disagreements between policy actors and ‘competition’ was a subset of this. This referred 
specifically to disagreements that emerge on matters of principle and those born out of a 
simple motivation to defeat a contemporary in the policy network. Competition was 
deemed to arise out of professional jealousy and the desire for recognition, as well as the 
increasing market demands on resources - for some this constitutes statutory funding and 
for others the need to attract and retain supporters and donors. The fluctuation between 
partnership and hostilities within the animal NGO sector was acknowledged to 
occasionally suffer from general conflicts around the interpretation of scientific evidence, 
but in fact many situations were attributed to competition: 
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Basically in own little worlds we all want to be the expert, to be recognised for 
what we do, to reign supreme over the others [dog NGOs], it’s essential in the 
public eye, for their support and for our political influence (DNGO3). 
Conflict was also explained, perhaps excused by some participants, as a feature of 
everyday campaigning, profile-raising and fundraising activities these NGOs experience 
and contribute to on a daily basis and of course this exists across the whole third sector. 
To more openly acknowledge the damage caused by such actions upon the policy process 
has been fruitless, in their minds, given no one NGO will volunteer to bow out and close 
its doors. But these conflicts were not exclusive to dog policy organisations, and their 
existence within other sectors was also made very clear : 
There are a lot of other law firms out there, a lot of training providers looking to 
cash in on this issue, there are a lot of court experts and everyone wants to make a 
name for themselves, of course they do and then business is scarce for some too. 
Where there is not enough business to go around I worry what people are 
prepared to say and do. They turn up at meetings and policy conferences and say all 
sorts and that’s bound to be having an influence (TS3).
The biggest target for criticism from all participants was the RSPCA. From a 
methodological point of view, I found this reassuring purely because it resolved any 
concerns I had in mind that my own role within the RSPCA would hamper fieldwork and 
limit my ability to collect true and unabridged accounts from the participants. There was a 
potentially increased risk of this within my chosen methodology, due to the fact elite 
interviews may suffer more from the fears participants have of the consequences of 
causing offence or conflict, given their high profile role within their sector. The criticism of 
RSPCA was characterised sometimes as general conflicts but more often for specific 
competitive behaviours:
So then we had the Dangerous Dogs Act Study Group which included a number of 
charities around the table and the RSPCA, with predominately [RSPCA 
representative, also a participant of this study] presenting it, pulled away from the 
group, so had done a lot of work to get us to that stage and then pulled away from 
it in a similar sort of fashion to Gavin [Grant] . Really I think it’s a case of, you do it 63
the RSPCA way or no way. That’s very much the RSPCA in totality. A lot of the 
things they do are great but their skills around negotiating aren’t one of their 
fortes…. You can see why that’s the mentality though, when you think that a 
problem arises and the local authority say no we’re not doing it, it’s always, give it to 
the RSPCA and they will deal with it. And the RSPCA never say no and I think they 
should sometimes (LG1).
 Gavin Grant was the chief political operative for the RSPCA in 1991 and later returned as Chief 63
Executive between 2012 and 2014.
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This participant was clear both in his criticism and his high regard for the RSPCA and 
indeed has worked closely with the organisation’s field and policy staff for over 30 years. 
These direct criticisms were further suggested to be related to the RSPCA’s refusal to 
participate on any occasion where they are not in control of the agenda. Further still the 
RSPCA’s public affairs team was sometimes considered to be petulant where they were 
not able to take full credit for a project or where their participation would be diluted 
amongst a multitude of partners: 
There is an issue for sure. It sounds awful but it’s just the way it comes across 
whenever there’s been a big working group and we’re all together. If someone else 
leads on an issue or wants to, the RSPCA comes across like, I mean those other 
groups, it regards as beneath them (DNGO1). 
Thus, the judgement is that the competition between organisations, and the importance 
of dominating and acquiring the credit for any success, can become more important than 
the shared animal welfare goal. The analysis of the participant (LG1), which was indicative 
of the views of other cross-sector interviewees, albeit in more couched terms, is of high 
validity given his knowledge and experience of the RSPCA and importantly the context 
and legislation within which he and the RSPCA works. Criticism of the RSPCA is far from 
uncommon, however there is clearly a significant value to the testimony of an insider such 
as this.
The features of competition were evident in other sectors and agencies where resources 
are a key factor :
I’ve sat on various groups, I’ve sat on parties where it fractured and I was opposed 
to the RSPCA’s stance but we could always come together to move forward. I 
always maintained though these were the wrong groups, it needed to come from 
the local authorities and the people that were dealing with it. You had the [force 
area] police there, and you had the charities, but of course they are dealing with it 
from a different angle. The people dealing with it a the sharp end are the local 
authorities (LG1).
This was interesting because it betrays a notion that some delivery partners are more 
important than others in the context of exerting influence over policy, which of course 
may be true and was certainly echoed in other interviews. What was not expressed in 
this discussion around a hierarchy of influence was whether that hierarchy is affected by 
one particular organisation’s core work - i.e. whether it is a campaign group, referred to as 
“those keyboard warriors” (DNGO1), or for instance has a body of field staff on the 
ground and thus gathering direct experience. There were a range of enthusiastic and 
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defensive positions put forward in this regard which betrays a fundamental disagreement 
within the policy community. If the organisations are unable to agree in the most basic of 
terms who does what in a very practical sense, there can surely be little hope for a 
coherent outline of the problem. All of the local authority participants expressed similar 
views on this issue although one, who occupies a national representative role, was of the 
view that issues of coherency and competition were linked to the lack of direction and 
facilitation by Government.
It was also acknowledged that individual voices may have been drowned out by the lack 
of collective coherency:
Although we’ve got the legislation [2014 developments], unfortunately, a trick was 
missed. I shouted and shouted about it, but obviously not loud enough, because 
what I would have liked to have seen the Government do is to give local authorities 
a statutory obligation for enforcement and make local authorities responsible for 
managing dog populations (LG1).
This would appear to suggest a view that it is whoever shouts the loudest will be listened 
to, whereas in fact the competition has been fierce amongst stakeholders at time, in 
particular to first articulate the problem, secondly to pitch the correct ‘solution’ and finally 
to claim the victory. As was recounted from around the time of the 2014 proposals: 
We knew we had the grasp of what was wrong and what we all needed to do to 
fix it, but no-one was listening to us - to do so would mean dropping their own 
proposals in favour of ours and that’s simply not how it works (DNGO3). 
Such infighting and self-interested behaviours across a very wider spectrum of key groups 
could only be making it impossible for the light to fall solely on the true nature of the 
problem. One of the more difficult of conflicts, specifically featuring the welfare 
organisations, police, local authorities and other groups, such as the CWU, was around the 
dog control policy changes made under the ASBCP Act in 2014:
This gets my back up right. I did all this work to pull people together and it was a 
farce, everyone trying to bring in their own agenda and missing the bloody point. 
That time, well, which was the stormiest period, by far, and oh what a bun fight, 
amongst a bunch of flaming idiots. It almost cost us everything (DNGO6). 
Even where agreement on individual measures existed, organisations failed to identify that 
fact to ministers/civil servants in either direct discussions or in their literature. Yet once the 
legislation had passed those same organisations were almost immediately seemingly less 
critical despite their proposals not being adopted: 
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We were really chuffed to get those amendments through, it’s what we asked for 
and what was needed. It’s not everything yet I know. But it’s a miracle we did 
because it’s like the fight is more important than the outcome for some of them 
(DNGO6). 
This exposes a very interesting feature of the fragmented nature of the dog advocacy 
policy community. It would appear to suggest they may ultimately be somewhat unaware 
their actions may undermine their political influence or if they are aware it hasn’t thus far 
resulted in a change of approach.
‘White noise’ and its effects on the process
A feature of pluralist societies is a multitude of voices that will conflict and debate issues, 
but from which must emerge cogent argument. As such I asked participants to describe 
the level of coherency they believed policy makers could perceive from the debates on 
status and dangerous dogs. It was in answer to this question that many participants 
appeared to reach an important realisation on the effects of the ‘white noise’, although 
there were others who claimed this to be a very obvious consequence: 
You ask a question that politicians must answer really. For me, I can’t see how they 
can wade through all the different slogans, messages and briefings. Yes frankly, of 
course it’s a maelstrom. Indeed, it’s a revelation when we get anything done. I do 
wonder how it looks from the outside (DNGO4). 
Of course this issue of an internal coherence of perspective and values echoes the 
findings and characterisations of others (Marsh & Rhodes 1992). But if the recognition of 
the lack of collective coherency was indeed high, why would these organisations not also 
have analysed its effects and concluded it was having a detrimental influence on gaining 
any ground with governments and key stakeholders I asked participants. A general view 
was articulated well by one participant:
Well because they are all arrogant, because we all like to think we work for the best 
organisation that must get the credit. And if secretly we know we don’t work for the 
best, we have a chip on our shoulders about the better organisation and we will 
work to overshadow them if we can (RS3). 
Those sitting outside of that immediate group of welfare and lobbying organisations, but 
still an insider to the process, have perhaps the best non-governmental perspective on it: 
You’ve got the RSPCA, Battersea, Dogs Trust, the Kennel Club and others, all these 
groups involved and they are all pulling in a slightly different direction which is why, I 
think, we didn’t get anywhere for many years (LG1).
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Early in the data collection there were expressions regarding coherency or lack thereof: 
‘Ultimately we are creating our own white noise, which government can just duly 
ignore’ (RS3). 
This was echoed by the dog NGOs and the local authority sectors, who applied a similar 
‘radio static’ descriptor to the issue. I posed this concept to later participants following 
their own account of what clarity existed within terminology and messaging of the 
phenomenon. Some interviewees immediately warmed to the ‘white noise’ argument 
perhaps through a now revived perspective - as I encouraged, through questioning, a self-
reflection upon a very lengthy career in this field, they may have acquired the ability to see 
through a new lens. But others had already provided evidence of this problem already, 
through their accounts and their criticism of individuals or organisations attempting to 
affect policy. For that latter group, when asked a direct question on this aspect - where 
respondents did not appear defensive verbally or in body language, there was sometimes 
an explicit acknowledgement of being part of this problem. That was further confirmation 
this finding was valid. For instance, when any examples of the ‘white noise’ manifesting in 
inter-group fighting during the passage of legislation in recent times, one participant, after 
some thought, remarked:
That’s what happened when the Dangerous Dogs Act Study Group fractured, 
Government just said argue amongst yourselves and then bring it to us, because at 
the moment you all seem to disagree. But we never went back to them (LG1).
When encouraged to talk about the manifestations of this competition and lack of 
coherency participants separated them out into practical consequences and policy 
implications, which in themselves may lead to practical issues at a later point. The practical 
category was illustrated by the local government sub group of participants who talked 
about instances where management and communication systems and agreements are not 
in place, there then appears to be a ‘buck passing’ problem with no lead agency taking 
over all control:
What you get is the buck being passed on. So it’s ‘oh it’s a police problem’, no 'it’s 
not our problem it’s a local authority problem’, ‘it’s a charity problem’, you go to the 
charities and they say, ‘no we don’t want it’. Then nobody does it (LG4).
Participants also became keen to discuss the impact of conflict within the policy 
community upon the various intervention programmes tried by local authorities, police 
and charities:
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I was thinking about all the projects with young people and dog owners. How we’ve 
often struggled to get these off the ground, yeah? Is it any surprise that the 
programmes have appeared to anyone in the know as ill-thought-out and non-
evidenced when the sector is so incoherent and lacks structure or agreement? 
(RS4).
This participant was directly linking competition and coherency to the tendency for 
organisations to run programmes with too little reliance on social research or robust 
evidence, because such initiatives are not evaluated with any legitimacy and because the 
sector is so fragmented this dissuades professional stakeholders, and potentially 
government, from becoming involved: 
This is fairly easy to understand to be honest. These organisations run these projects 
as they do simply because they can get away with it when everyone is busy shouting 
at each other and no single standard has been agreed. That has to have the potential 
for a negative impact (RS4). 
On this latter point participants mostly agreed that ‘what works’ was actually, in fact, a 
subjective and ultimately un-evidenced myriad of opinions, indeed they agreed accounts of 
solutions were in fact all but unintelligible and opaque when scrutinised by anyone 
knowledgeable, but the resultant smoke and mirrors worked well on the public and the 
layman politician. However, with such an acknowledgement and confession, there did not 
accompany any explanation as to why each of their organisations nevertheless continues 
to vie to be the principal and knowledgeable stakeholder the public and government listen 
to. 
The patterns leading to the 1991 Act, then the 1997 Amendments, and later the 2014 Act 
were recounted with a high degree of consistency amongst participants. I also found 
consensus on the vast majority of issues around dog behaviour, welfare, s1 of the DDA 
(1991) and also what doesn’t work, including almost universal agreement on the time 
scales of the phenomenon. Despite this uniformity however participants acknowledged 
that although similar marketing and externally messaging on dog control has been utilised 
by the NGOs and others, there have been very few instances where stakeholders 
referenced each other. Nor indeed has there been much publicity generated for where 
strong agreement and consensus did occur. It was acknowledged that for anyone coming 
afresh to the policy arena, this would present navigational issues: 
Yeah it’s true that if you started work in this field or were trying to research the 
issues as a dog owner you would not know who were the experts, who was dealing 
with what, and who agreed with who. You wouldn’t find it all the easy to sort out at 
the beginning either (TS2). 
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This revealed an interesting paradox in so much as conflict did not appear to be rooted in 
any substantive issues and indeed the majority of the policy community suffers from divide 
over only the minutiae and yet these stakeholders usually fail to communicate effectively 
and with a united voice. Participants acknowledged that did not appear to be in any rush 
to change this landscape and set about publicising all areas of agreement. This was despite 
the fact that most interviewees understood that to do so may be related to the success 
of any solutions on dog control they wished to see come to fruition. 
The second aspect of the consequences from competition and incoherency upon the 
problem itself, discussed by participants, was the impact on Government with some 
openly recognising that it meant Government did not have to observe the problems the 
‘field’ were reporting to them, given there was a “cacophony of voices, confusing the 
issues” (RS3). Government was also not obligated to listen to the myriad of messages 
offering little in the way of evidenced-based solutions:
So although we were trying our best, in my view, at times, to coordinate our 
messages on evidence-based problems at least it’s obvious that at certain times 
we’ve just been ignored. I’d like to think it’s because of other factors but the 
likelihood is some people weren’t singing from the same hymn sheet (RS3). 
Others argued that the coherency issues provided the cover of time for the Government 
to determine what would be popular - by observing the media and the public’s support 
for the campaigns - and not actually what would work:
It seems to me that the Government could hang on a bit, see what happens for a 
while as we all jump and down and see what comes out in the wash. Ultimately 
there are those in power preferring the well-rehearsed messages and punitive 
legislative responses to the social intervention programmes, which, I get, are 
traditionally more difficult to communicate (RS4).
Some participants, perhaps amongst the least experienced, surmised that because these 
issues of conflict within the policy communities have not been adequately acknowledged 
and explored, it wasn’t reasonable to expect the Government machine to truly 
understand the nature of the phenomenon nor engage with the solutions being proposed. 
This is a view that can be characterised as sympathetic towards Government. There was 
an alternative, more cynical view, explored by others, that the maelstrom works in the 
Government’s favour: 
So the infighting muddies things and whilst the sphere is a bit murky they can 
continue to do nothing. And the press is unlikely to grasp the key issues either so 
they have been useless at holding Government to account too (LG2). 
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Thus incoherency could be said to suit policy makers at times and one indication there 
could be evidence for this has been the Government’s reluctance to facilitate or 
coordinate discussions with the sector. Whilst there are, and have been, several forums, 
not least of all the police’s Dangerous Dog Working Group, they are not inter-agency in 
the main and none have all essential sectors represented.
The animal welfare policy sector is certainly not the only one to suffer from fragmentation 
and the resultant competition by the main stakeholders that dominate debates, and 
participants argued their failings must surely be replicated elsewhere. What is clear, though, 
from the evidence gathered for this research is that Government is able to legitimatise its 
ignoring of these stakeholders when they are so unable to agree on the nature of the 
problem and how to characterise the solutions. In a constantly evolving policy arena this 
may be considered a feature of the process itself however it remains relatively unusual 
within animal welfare. For instance the campaigns to ban primates as pets, or wild animals 
in circuses or for that matter behaviour change campaigns such as cat neutering or dogs 
dying in hot cars, whether a welfare NGO coalition exists or not, there appears to be 
clarity and coherence amongst the stakeholders and thus any lack of change in those 
policy areas can be argued to be explained by other reasons.
A feeble consensus
The ‘communication flows’ of which Kingdon speaks, where governments are able to 
distinguish an intensity of support on an issue, appear to be absent in this instance. Some 
of the participant dog NGOs nevertheless argued that whilst there has been significant 
disagreement over the problem definition and the appropriate solution, there is sufficient 
consensus as to have reasonably expected some change, particularly around s1 of the 
DDA. However even if that is the case the Government has been predominately 
influenced by one sector, the police, who have traditionally operated as a powerful actor 
elsewhere in the crime policy network able, for instance, to prevent the straightforward 
application of particular policy developments (Jones & Newburn 2013). The police may 
not possess quite the superior political resources and ability to affect the economy that 
Kingdon describes and attributes as to why politicians will favour one sector - but they are 
undoubtedly regarded as the leading stakeholder in what might be viewed as an unofficial 
hierarchy on dog control policy. Two decades of risk-averse centrist to right-wing 
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governments committing to an overarching policy agenda of being tough on crime, was 
offered by participants as to why the police occupy such a privileged position:
Good luck getting anything done while the police don’t want it. Defra listen to them 
and them only on this one. MPs are always worried about looking soft, they need 
the police, they can’t appear to ignore what the police are saying, it’s far too risky for 
them (RS3).
 
The police themselves acknowledged in interview their influence is substantial if not a 
dominant force: 
Yes of course it’s fair to say Defra have made some murmurings at times on s1, just 
a couple of questions probably after they’ve heard from you guys, or a new Minister 
has been lobbied, but for now, and until we get incidences of dog bites down, see 
the general trend downwards, and we can say to them, yes, the measures are having 
the right effect, they are working, then no, that’s just not going to happen. We’ve 
been very clear (POL2).
The accounts given by police during interview for this case study is suggestive of other 
points Kingdon argues in that powerful organised forces are able to suppress or obstruct, 
not just any tangible change, but even the mere discussion of it, within government. 
Participants were asked again - but now in the context of a hierarchy of policy actors - for 
their perceptions of why the police may themselves oppose repeal of s1 and one general 
view emerged, 
They have to oppose it because they benefit don’t they? It’s not just that they worry 
about dog attacks and bites, and I genuinely believe some DLOs do, ignoring the s1 
thing for a moment, but what it is, they benefit don’t they? They have a role, some 
funding, a specialisation, they don’t want to lose any of that. It’s understandable to a 
degree (RS3). 
Multiple Streams Analysis recognises and records this motivation, where groups draw 
sustenance from an activity or function, they will then work to protect it and their own 
interests in its continuance.
Both conflict within the policy community and the nature of consensus explored in this 
case study have failed to achieve the policy changes many within that community desire 
for status and dangerous dogs. Politicians are interested in where the balance of support 
rests and so continued competition and conflict, where no dominant force emerges, 
results in the status quo. This form of stasis is of course a recognised feature within the 
policy networks literature (Marsh & Rhodes 1992) which posits why change doesn’t 
happen. For change to become a possibility consensus must also be successfully 
communicated to politicians, it must be heard, it is ineffectual if not. Inarticulate sectors 
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within the policy networks are answerable to why certain items remain in obscurity or 
barely even on the political agenda despite their every effort. 
9.4 Gained and lost allies: Government in the Political Stream
The final component of the political stream in Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Analysis 
concerns the dynamics of political and administrative changes within the Government 
itself. These changes arise due to events such as elections where the administration can 
change its political colours or through personnel changes affecting ministerial roles. These 
factors were discussed with participants and found to be a feature that had affected the 
policy process for status and dangerous dogs. There were additional factors which fall into 
this category put forward as well, specifically the role of devolution and the conflict 
between administrations, sometimes fuelled by control being in the hands of opposing 
political parties. In examining to what extent administration changes were a factor 
participants loosely divided their considerations into two periods of time: the first being 
the political context to the introduction of the DDA and the initial amendments and the 
second being the rise of the phenomenon around 2005/6 up to and including the policy 
developments of 2014/5. There were additional comments featuring predictions 
specifically centred around the ultimate goal of many of those interviewed, that of the as-
yet unrealised repeal of the UK’s breed specific legislation. However the interview data 
were collected in 2014/5 and therefore, it must be noted, cannot accurately encompass 
the political and administrative changes post 2016.
As has previously been discussed, many of the participants of this case study were in the 
same or similar professional roles in 1991 as they are in now. For those that were not, 
they are often in political advocacy roles and as a result have studied the evolution of the 
political context and its relationship to the dog control policy process since taking up their 
post. It could be classed as essential knowledge within all the sectors interviewed in order 
to develop one’s status as an expert, because the origins of both distant and recent 
developments, and the political motivations underpinning them, are crucial to 
understanding current policy solutions, as outlined in Chapter Eight. The discussion with 
most participants around the political events of 1991 was therefore very thorough and 
informed. 
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At the end of the 1980s many listened to the proposals for BSL, which included the 
euthanasia of all qualifying dogs, being roundly rejected by the UK Government’s 
Conservative Home Office Minister Douglas Hogg in the House of Commons, who, as 
referenced in Chapter Five, labelled any such move as ‘manifest nonsense’ (HC Deb 15 
June 1989, c1187). Coming from whatever side of the arguments on BSL, this didn’t 
appear to allow for any room to manoeuvre and although some report then turning to 
alternative solutions to tackle dog control issues, such as the reintroduction of dog 
licences, elements of the policy network continued to discuss BSL. Political consensus was 
established across the floor and other barriers were in the process of being overcome 
such that when Kenneth Baker MP entered the Commons as the new Home Secretary 
late in 1990, the path was nearly clear for the DDA and its new measures bringing BSL to 
the UK for the very first time. These barriers are very well-known to the interviewees, 
one surrounding which block of voters could be expected to be effected by which breeds 
were banned was clearly illustrated by one participant:
They dropped the Welly Brigades’ dogs didn’t they? They had to be careful not to 
sweep up their own members and voters, because initially that would have 
happened, all sorts of breeds were considered at one point. I reckon that is why 
Hogg wasn’t going to do it, but Baker found a way (LG1).
The change in Home Secretaries also enabled a change in the policy agenda. This was in 
part attributed to Baker’s policy making style. He engaged with, but also controlled, the 
stakeholders with a forthright manner and proudly recounts in his autobiography (Baker 
1993) his contempt for his civil servants who he believed at times worked against him and 
any progression or change. Baker was known for engaging with third sector groups and 
statutory agencies but some participants believed this was often to provide the necessary 
cover or protection for the proposals or policy changes should they prove to be 
controversial. He was also discussed in the context of his regard for the individuals and 
organisations with whom he engaged with, and from that what his views were on what 
constituted robust evidence in favour of the effectiveness of BSL. One participant recalled:
Well this was a different era and one where scientific or social studies just didn’t 
come into it. Our opinion and the opinion of others mattered, but what did we 
know? None of us knew whether it was even working in the States. I’m really not 
sure it would have happened if he hadn’t been Home Sec though (RS3).
Later the weakened Tory Government was in 1996, in its final year or so in government, 
attempting to make changes in response to a strong voice within the policy community. 
That strong voice was again from the police who were experiencing legal and technical 
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issues with the 1991 Act. The Amendment Act was brought forth in 1997, in the final days 
before Parliament was prorogued for the election, to enable the police, as they recounted 
in interview, to act upon dogs held effectively in limbo. After time had run out on the 
prosecution case against an owner the dog was left in kennels with the police then lacking 
the powers to euthanase or rehome the dog. So, as far as the police were concerned, 
there was merely a procedural issue to address with these amendments - which the 
incumbent Government took seriously. In contrast welfare participants believed the main 
thrust of the amendments introduced were to respond to the outcry about so many dogs 
being put to sleep. Several participants also recounted how that was the very issue that 
had turned the RSPCA away from BSL, as they had in 1991 in fact advocated neutering 
and licensing (rather than euthanasia), to allow the breed/type to die out instead. The local 
authority sub-group attributed change to the forthcoming general election and the desire 
by the Government to appease certain sectors, as growing unease had been detected 
amongst their own backbenchers who were soon going to be facing the electorate on the 
doorstep. Others within the welfare group suggested the Government knew it was going 
to be voted out of power and thus there was some motivation in tidying up its own 
business:
I think some of them [in Government] knew the end was nigh and better to 
address the issues created by their own legislation and shore up the Act before any 
new Government embarrassed them. That has to be a possibility and one that I’ve 
also heard an MP or two say (DNGO3). 
Initially of course the 1991 Act and its 1997 Amendment appeared to have had the 
intended effect of eliminating the four named types of dog and this was confirmed by 
those working in enforcement at that time:
After the first few months I’d handled hundreds of these dogs and I began to think 
something is not right here. Then after 1997 it [the numbers of s1 dogs the police 
were seizing] died off (TS5). 
For seven or eight years after this period the issue was effectively dormant and no 
participants could recall any particular discussions within the policy networks. That said 
police participants acknowledged there was only one DLO outside of the Met Police until 
just a few months before five year old Ellie Lawrenson was killed by the family Pit Bull on 
New Year’s Day 2007. As such there was no-one qualified or charged with identifying s1 
dogs in 41 police forces across England and Wales before the focusing event that was this 
tragic death: 
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So Ellie Lawrenson was killed. Awful, just awful. Can’t imagine. And this whole thing 
kicks off suddenly. There’s a problem. Labour didn’t like this, it was happening in their 
backyard. They could see events were escalating and they started engaging with us. 
There was an opportunity for them to change the direction because of what 
happened up there (DNGO1). 
The Labour Government was indeed, as participants agreed, then engaging with the policy 
network over these next few years. Whilst, having firmly supported its introduction, they 
were not ready to repeal s1 of the DDA, they were recalled by most participants to now 
be listening to the debates from stakeholders: 
So this is when the Met got the backing they needed to set up their Status Dog 
Unit and we got invited to Number 10, do you remember? That was not an 
everyday occurrence! We had a Government that was listening at least. But it was 
now too late. It came too late (RS4). 
As discussed by the participant above, it was now 2010 and Labour lost the election, to 
be replaced by a coalition between the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, with the 
Conservatives possessing the upper hand, as the senior and much larger party. This had a 
detrimental effect on the policy network and the work done thus far : 
There was simply no desire whatsoever to pick up the mantle from Labour or 
reconsider the legislation they themselves had brought in. More importantly it was 
not on the agenda and nor was it going to be, given their preoccupation with 
overturning what their predecessors had done (DNGO6). 
This change in administration caused an ideological redistribution within Government that 
some participants, particularly the welfare and local authority sectors, felt created new 
barriers to securing change.
The phenomenon was agreed by participants to now be in full swing by 2010 and a 
palpable level of hysteria towards large bull breed dogs was witnessed by the policy 
networks. The representatives of those networks in this study then recalled discussions led 
by Government officials about adding to the banned breed list. This was contrary to what 
the dog NGOs wanted and at interview they were grateful that it had not been 
supported by others within the policy community either. Swings are an inevitable part of 
political dynamics, with one period often a reaction to the former. Participants were aware 
that the new coalition Government was seeking to assert its tougher stance on crime and 
would be more sympathetic to additional, not seemingly fewer, control methods, which 
was the new Government’s perception of repealing s1. With any option of repeal being 
categorically discounted, alternative ideas were now emerging out of the policy soup 
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which allowed for change without entertaining any notion of reducing controls afforded 
through BSL. These new policy ideas centred on mandatory identification and extending 
the DDA to cover private dwellings, as per the aforementioned consultation by Defra. 
Jurisdictional conflicts
Then came an entirely different factor, one of conflict with another government - the 
Labour controlled Welsh Government - who announced plans in November 2012 for 
their own Dog Control Bill. This was a very significant development in Wales given the 
National Assembly for Wales had only recently acquired powers to pass its own primary 
legislation. Time and resources afforded to the Bill process are not insignificant and yet 
these were to be allocated to the issue of dog control in the Assembly’s first term as an 
immature legislature in possession of these new powers. Participants who worked with 
both administrations recalled the negative response from the UK Government about 
Wales’ plan to legislate in an area it believed was reserved for itself:
They were serious [in Wales], what’s more they were going to put a huge dent in 
the UK Government’s plans, or lack of! The swords were drawn immediately, it was 
tense, you’ll remember. Of course party politics played a part but I also like to think 
it’s because they [Welsh Government] listened to us here, they understood what 
was needed (LG3). 
Jurisdictional issues can sometimes lead to compromise and even an improved consensus 
as a result, but in this instance the competition and conflict between the two 
administrations quickly led to stalemate:
Behind the scenes they were busy threatening each other. The Welsh Government 
seemed set to continue but the UK Government was equally determined to stop 
them. They’d already been in the Supreme Court once or twice, was it? And I just 
think the Welsh started to get worried. The First Minister wanted to pick his fights 
carefully on ones he could win and this was a grey area one. Animal welfare is 
devolved and had been since 2011 but public safety was much more difficult to 
define in their powers (LG4).
I discussed the key factors with participants who worked solely in Wales or in both 
countries. It was suggested to me that the stalemate between governments could not 
continue although it was some months of difficult negotiations during which the Welsh 
Government attempted to keep its Bill alive. Ultimately it was the Welsh Government that 
gave way and Defra triumphed quietly. The episode was deemed to be embarrassing for 
the UK Government as it viewed the Welsh Government as having publicly challenged 
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their position and seniority. It was widely known that the UK Government wanted to 
wrap up the changes to dog control policy within the Anti Social Behaviour, Crime and 
Policing Act 2014 and their wider agenda had been endangered by the interference of the 
singular goal of the Welsh Government. Known to only a few of the interviewees was that 
the Welsh Government feared a loss in the Supreme Court and dog control was not 
deemed noteworthy as to risk defeat. The Welsh Bill was fairly quietly withdrawn.
The legal parameters were not the only reason for the retreat by the Welsh Government, 
there was a reshuffle and a new Minister : 
The previous Minister was good, he introduced the Bill and didn’t see to want to 
drop it, but then when the new Minister came in well, we all thought right this is 
right guy for it, I mean he is known for being bullish, no? but in a good way, so I guess 
if he couldn’t make it happen, no-one could (LG3). 
The new Minister was deemed to have different priorities, he appeared content, in public 
at least, to suspend the Bill and work with Defra. His officials reported to a number of 
interviewees that they had influenced the 2014 Act and the other measures, in a positive 
way, blending the plans they had had for Wales with what had been outlined by the UK 
Government, softening some of these in the process. Participants were all of the view that 
the UK Government’s dominant stance was not altruistic nor was it out of some regard 
for elegant and uniform legislation, given that it is a policy area devolved elsewhere in the 
UK. Rather it was a rush to claim credit for any changes to be received positively and 
there was also a bigger war raging between the two governments over power and 
influence to which the Wales Dog Control Bill fell victim. 
There are some benefits to pursuing a PhD on a part time basis in that a phenomenon, 
and any corresponding policy process, can be observed over a longer time period which is 
indeed the case here. However one of the potential drawbacks is the increase in time 
between data collection and completion, which in this instance results in the absence of 
any analysis of the perceptions of changes in Government since 2015. That said, being 
involved with the Welsh Government’s Task and Finish Group on Responsible Dog 
Ownership until its completion in the spring of 2016 brought me back into contact with 
many of the same elite group in the context of this research, and I was able to record in 
my field notes their perceptions of the 2015 general election. Whilst some believed that 
little had changed from coalition to Conservative Government, others argued that the 
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Government had swung further to the right and was less likely as a result to entertain 
anything that lessened the state’s control of dogs:
Wise up, right. We’ve got it potentially even harder with this Government. They are 
desperately hanging on to the right wing base who are constantly being seduced by 
UKIP, they are not going to listen now. We’ve got to look at other ways to focus 
attention (DNGO6). 
Others discussed their hopes for the emerging leftwing and more socially tolerant 
movements led by the new leader of the opposition, Jeremy Corbyn, although realistically 
they posited he was not likely to remain there long nor could they claim he was engaged 
on this issue, having no record of any interest from him on dog control policies.
9.5 Coupling, events and windows
Having considered the three specific features of the political stream and indeed all three 
central elements of ‘problem’, ‘policy' and ‘political' within MSA, this final section considers 
Kingdon’s notion of ‘coupling’ and policy ‘windows’ and what evidence there is for these 
within the development of dog control policy in England and Wales. Coupling is described 
as occurring when the three streams, which normally operate independently of each 
other, come together in a critical window of opportunity which Kingdon argues is when 
policy change is most probable. It is important to note however that despite the simplistic 
description a policy window may not in fact open automatically or in a logical fashion. It 
might be that a window must be forced open by policy actors of great influence and 
usually via projecting a collective national mood with an inherent appetite for change. One 
window is sometimes created by another as an issue comes in on its tail, perhaps as a re-
working of a previous solution. The window may also not remain open for long as the 
streams may fluctuate and decouple as quickly as they converged - illustrated, for instance, 
in a snap election.
There are perhaps three main episodes of policy change within dog control to consider in 
this context, namely the lead up to and creation of the DDA; the development and 
implementation of the 1991 Amendment Act; and the 2014 and 2015 changes introduced 
via the ASBCP Act and the Exemption Scheme Statutory Instrument. The evidence from 
participants suggest that there was a linking of processes leading up to the 1991 Act. 
Whilst the policy network was much smaller at that time there had been a small amount 
of discussions led by Home Secretary himself on the principle of introducing BSL. Whilst 
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this proposal was rejected by his predecessor in its first consideration, the perception of a 
growing dangerous dog problem caused by dog fighting breeds was brought sharply into 
focus by a huge outcry following the attack by a Pit Bull on six year old Rukhsana Khan. 
Determined to overcome recent political events which could otherwise weaken him, and 
backed by an equally motivated Prime Minister with a desire to appear tough on crime, 
BSL was immediately introduced. Arguably, participants described this window being 
somewhat forced open as the Home Secretary asserted his powerful position; ignored 
the rest of the policy community’s wishes for licensing and a slow elimination of the 
banned types; and utilised a once easier system to push legislation through the Commons 
in just one day (see Table 1).
 
The 1997 Amendment Act was not under Lord Baker’s control and indeed the exact 
conditions that led to change remain partially obscure as participants have conflicted 
somewhat in their accounts of this period. The welfare groups believe the need for change 
rose up through the political arena due to the emotional stories of dogs (and sometimes 
their owners) losing their lives entirely unnecessarily. However the enforcers consider the 
Amendment Act to be as a result of process problems and dogs being left in kennels not 
able to be put to sleep nor to return to their owner as they were prohibited. It is entirely 
possible that both contributed to the construction of the problem at that time as the 
solution was the same - to permit an exemption scheme and tidy up the legal processes 
for fit and proper owners to reclaim their dogs. The political stream completed the 
necessary coupling, given, as the participants so aptly described, the Government was 
motivated by a fast approaching election. Whether the Conservatives hoped to sufficiently 
appeal to the electorate so as to retain power or instead they had acknowledged loss was 
inevitable and they were merely tidying up loose ends, the result was the same and the 
policy window was open long enough to pass the legislation. 
The third and final policy window can be said to have opened in 2014 (extending to 
2015) and is perhaps the closest to the analysis suggested by MSA. For the solutions 
brought forth in these measures had been discussed within the policy soup for an 
extended period, initially rejected by many within the community due to an overriding aim 
of achieving repeal on s1 and the inability to compromise and unite on alternatives. 
Focussing events were being quickly highlighted in the media featuring both the acute 
problems of traumatised owners of assistance dogs severely mauled or killed by out of 
control dogs, and the gruesome and life changing injuries sustained by communication 
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workers (accompanied by some shocking national statistics on prevalence). The solutions 
were being readily offered by all sectors in the policy community, there was little or no 
resistance to the idea of extending the DDA to cover private places and indeed to 
increase the penalties for attacks on assistance dogs. The Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and 
Policy Act offered a very convenient avenue for these changes, and by now the Welsh 
Government could be persuaded to drop its own Bill if the majority of its proposals 
around anti-social behaviour orders for people with dogs were met. The streams 
converged in a rather more orderly and logical fashion although it is to be recognised 
many of the problems and proposed responses had been in discussion for in excess of 
five years. 
9.6 Summary
This chapter has sought to discuss the main issues arising from the data utilising the 
framework of Kingdon’s political stream. The political arenas of England and Wales, and 
their effect on the policy process for status and dangerous dogs, have been assessed 
through the perceptions of those working closest to the governments of both nations. The 
main themes of the national mood, organised political forces and changes in government 
have been developed and examined and found to be significant elements at work. MSA 
has allowed for a reconstruction of the path dog control policy has taken over the past 25 
years and what political factors should be considered. The final section summarised this 
path in the context of the coupling of the three streams and how this has led, in the field 
of dog control policy, to change.
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Discussion
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Chapter Ten  
Discussion and conclusions 
10.1 Introduction
This final Chapter is intended to draw together all four Parts of this thesis in order to 
address the central aim of this research namely to explore the nature and dynamics of 
contemporary policy making in crime control via a detailed case study of the emergence and 
re-shaping of 'dangerous' dog regulations in England and Wales. This is considered within the 
next section via the three objectives underpinning the central research aim. The remainder 
of the Chapter comprises a further four sections - where I consider the more recent 
developments with regard to dog control, and what implications this has for policy making 
in this arena, as well as recommendations for future research. A section on methodological 
reflections follows before a final recapitulation of the conclusions of this study.
10.2 Culture of dog control in policy making
This study has explored the nexus of criminology and public policy analysis in order to 
better understand and explain the policy making processes in relation to the control of 
dogs in society through an empirical study of policy responses to the phenomenon of 
‘status’ and ‘dangerous’ dogs. This has focussed primarily upon the past three decades 
across England and Wales via the three following objectives:
• To describe and analyse the dynamics and forms of 'problem definition' in relation to 
'status' and 'dangerous dogs' in England and Wales
• To examine the various policy 'solutions' that emerged in relation to these ‘problems'
• To assess critically the political processes via which particular policy responses were 
challenged and resisted
The following discussion is structured in three parts to reflect these three objectives and 
will seek to consolidate the findings of this study through the amalgamation of the 
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primary documentary analysis of Part II and the empirical findings from a series of elite 
interviews contained within Part III.
Identifying and defining the problem
It is clear from within both the documentary analysis and the interview data of this thesis 
that there is a wide scale issue in society with accurately defining and articulating the 
nature of the dog problem, and its aetiology, into a digestible form. The social construction 
of the dangerous dog phenomenon has taken various guises across the policy debates, for 
many it is purely a public safety issue - or the perception of one - that simply requires the 
removal of the threat. For others the issue is more nuanced or requires a greater 
understanding of other factors such as the organised criminal activity of breeding and 
trafficking puppies, as well as the general ignorance of the welfare, behaviour and 
socialisation of puppies by backstreet breeders. For some, it is the issue of identification 
and the abundance of stray and abandoned dogs, or the media representation of dog 
attacks, or indeed the largely uncharted links to gangs and dog fighting. All of these were 
explored in depth, in Chapters Four and Seven, for their merits in focussing in upon the 
dangerous dog issue, and undoubtedly they offer disturbing evidence of a breadth of dog 
problems in society, which represent a threat to the welfare of those dogs and, often as a 
result, to public safety.
On closer analysis, it is apparent that there is an interconnected nature to the 
representations of the problem and the disjointed nature of the various policy responses, 
which are in themselves considered to be piecemeal and far from holistic in nature (to be 
discussed in the next subsection). Indeed during the exploration of the problem definition 
there have also been contradictory positions presented by policy actors at different times 
(such as interviews with serving and ex-police officers in defence of s1 of the DDA 
through a punitive enforcement position, versus emerging evidence of a softening of the 
police stance not least of all through the adoption of the IES). This is of course a key 
characteristic of a messy and unstable policy environment, particularly one where the 
scientific evidence base and professional experiences are evolving at speed and 
challenging long-held practitioner views. 
The media’s characterisation of the dog problem and in particular those types or breeds 
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owned for their perceived dangerousness and/or the status conveyed upon the owner - 
was a reoccurring sub-theme of my investigation of the problem definition. During the 
height of the phenomenon, which appears to have been during the early part of this 
decade, many scholars were unequivocal in how the media should be held to blame for 
the crisis:
Without any form of institutional legitimacy, the media constructed a discourse 
wherein the pit bull was an illegitimate breed, created by a marginalised social 
group primarily for the illegal and deviant practice of ‘dog fighting’. Within this 
discourse the issue of class was emphasised to such an extent that dog breeds 
and types and the associated behaviours of each were aligned with different social 
classes (Molloy 2011: 126).
Certainly a feature of Garland’s crime control complex is that there is an inherent 
demand upon media outlets to produce sensational stories in order to be deemed 
newsworthy and this has an appreciable effect upon the policy process. As Garland 
suggests (2001: 86), ‘risks and problems that were previously localized and limited in 
significance, or else were associated with specific groups of victims, increasingly came to 
be perceived as everyone’s problem’. Dog attack incidents that, before the DDA, may have 
only been reported locally are now national news, that is despite the absolute rarity of the 
most serious of attacks and the proportion of those attacks actually involving a s1 
prohibited dog being much smaller again. As Molloy also alludes to above, there are 
parallels with Garland’s ‘criminologies of the other’ as both the dogs and their owners are 
repeatedly characterised as the ‘dangerous other’.
To summarise, the first objective of this thesis - to describe and analyse the dynamics and 
forms of 'problem definition' in relation to 'status' and 'dangerous dogs' in England and Wales 
- took me upon a very broad path through what the evidence suggested were either the 
definitions of the problem at hand or were key factors contributing to the defining of the 
problem. The historical definitions, most clearly identified through legislation, were 
unearthed alongside other forms of classification, with special focus upon the dominant 
‘crises, disasters, symbols and other focussing events’ (Kingdon 1984: 103). Kingdon’s 
Multiple Streams Analysis however suggests that some problems will get dropped and 
some will get traction, so I have sought to understand fundamentally why it is that dog 
control became such a highly politicised issue, with a particular period of acceleration in 
the form of the status dog phenomenon circa 2007 - 2014. To address this point it is first 
necessary to consider the other two key objectives of this thesis.
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Policy solutions and ‘vicious’ circles
In consideration of the second objective and the various policy solutions to the dog 
problem that have emerged, a full exploration of the plethora of legislation governing dog 
control was presented within Chapter Three, to complement the data collected from 
interviews with the main policy actors, presented in Chapter Eight. Although various dog 
control solutions put forward have been designed to tackle aspects such as identification 
(eventually successful in 2016) and licensing (unsuccessful thus far) the statute most 
acutely in focus, particularly within the interview data, is the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 (as 
amended). Effectively the policy stream appears to be split into firstly the conditions that 
led to the implementation of the DDA in 1991 and then secondly the solutions being 
proposed in response to it. This second section of the policy stream is further subdivided 
into those policy solutions seeking to strengthen or at least protect the existence of the 
DDA, and those concerned with reducing its most negative effects or repealing it.
The conditions that led to the enactment of the DDA are not easy to understand, even 
when considering some participants of this study were in their professional roles during 
that period. Of course the severe dog attacks that came to light in the late 1980s/early 
1990s were horrifying to most people and some form of reaction was to be expected 
perhaps, as was a demand for action. However, despite being high profile ‘focussing 
events’ (Kingdon 1984), there remains little convincing evidence of any particular change in 
the nature of those dog attacks, after all, dogs are unpredictable animals that have always 
occasionally attacked humans, this is not new. The DDA then would appear to have been 
a solution in search of a problem. That said its origins as a policy solution also remain 
obscure, with some maintaining it was a US invention influencing - as was the case of 
several crime strategies at that time - the UK policy process. Others believe there is little 
to support that notion and that in fact it grew from a simple and fundamental need to 
remove certain problem breeds and types of dog from society.
The implementation of the DDA almost immediately had consequences for dogs and 
their owners. Beyond the obvious effects of euthanasing thousands of dogs that had never 
displayed any signs of aggression or behavioural issues, the effect upon the banned types 
was to make them more alluring to criminals. Dogs that were not covered by s1 but 
looked physically similar began to experience the effects as they too became attractive to 
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those seeking dogs for use in anti social behaviour, or due to a misplaced need for 
protection. The DDA is deemed to have caused a substitute social harm by labelling and 
stigmatising certain dogs therefore making them vulnerable to humans unfit for dog 
ownership, who inappropriately raise and train those dogs to be aggressive, thereby 
completing a ‘vicious circle’. A further substitute harm was identified from the data, namely 
the way in which the DDA has misinformed the public about safety around dogs - 
creating the belief that the only dangerous ones have been removed from society via s1. 
Nevertheless dog bites continue to rise, to this day. As these effects took shape, solutions 
were being continually debated and recombined to form new ideas before being debated 
again. From this, legislative amendments came in 1997, 2014 and 2015 although, as has 
been seen, the fundamental effects, particularly upon public safety, remain the same as 
when the original Act was implemented. Repeal of s1 of the DDA, however, has never 
been considered as a serious option by any government despite its status as the primary 
ask of the vast majority of dog welfare NGOs (and others) within the policy network.
Scientific evidence would appear to have played a rather loose part at most times during 
the debate on policy solutions to the dangerous dog problem. This may be because 
epistemic communities have had less of an impact than could be expected. Dog welfare 
and behaviour specialists, as well as epidemiologists, veterinarians, public health statisticians 
and others have been marginalised in favour of enforcement, specifically police, 
perspectives. Without a solid foundation in evidence there persists a perception (see 10.3) 
that s1 dogs are inherently aggressive and must be controlled; that this issue is inextricably 
linked to dog fighting and gang issues; and that the DDA’s measures can best protect 
public safety. In the most recent guidance issued by the Crown Prosecution Service 
(2017) to its prosecutors in cases where a dog has caused the death of a family member, 
it states ‘if the animal was a trophy dog or status symbol there would be a greater Public 
Interest in prosecuting’. No explanation accompanies this statement as to the evidence for 
such a claim and how it could be proven or why this attracts increased public interest. It 
also ignores the reason why, of course, certain owners are attracted to these dogs. As has 
been seen in this research, in fact, there is a substantial body of evidence which suggests 
that dog fighting and related gang activity is probably much smaller than perceived 
(although warrants further study), plus similar strong evidence bases exist to reject the 
notion that s1 types demonstrate uniquely aggressive behaviours particularly different to 
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any other breed; and there is strong evidence that the DDA is not protecting public safety 
because dog bites continue to rise.
To summarise, the second objective of this thesis - to examine the various policy 'solutions' 
that emerged in relation to these ‘problems’ - required a thorough wade through the 
'primordial swamp' of policy ideas, that Kingdon (1984) describes. This necessitated an 
analysis of the legislation as well as an exploration of the explanations for those solutions 
both enshrined in legislation and those that have failed or remain within the debate. The 
hard line that many within the policy network take regarding s1 of the DDA - that it is the 
largest contributing factor to the dangerous dog problem - potentially prevents the kind of 
‘softening up’ of policy proposals that Kingdon describes. However there may be other 
contributing factors such as the nature of the parties within the policy community which is 
addressed in the next subsection.
Politicking, white noise and the zeitgeist
The third objective required an investigation of the policy environment at an inherently 
political level to determine how responses are challenged and resisted. In Chapter Two I 
stated that although the terminology of policy ‘network’ and ‘community’ would be used 
interchangeably within this study, I also suggested the dangerous dog/dog control policy 
sphere could be considered an ‘issue network’ under Rhodes’ and Marsh’s (1992) typology. 
This is due to the diversity of both participation and participants who have varying levels 
of power. There have undoubtedly been fluctuations during the past three decades as 
organisations have grown more or less successful at communicating their ideas and 
developing collaborations and coalitions as a result. Some of the factors of this success or 
failure have been related to external events, such as elections bringing a different party to 
power, and the zeitgeist regarding dangerous dogs. Other factors include the relative size 
of each organisation, or influencer, operating at the ‘meso-legislature’ level, as Chaney 
(2016) identifies, whereby those with limited resources can struggle to participate as 
effectively as the larger ones.
The pool of participants in this study reflects the breadth of the policy network and 
indeed many of the primary actors from its forefront. As the themes of the findings 
developed, so too did a sense of a natural grouping of participants. Often the welfare and 
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technical specialists share similar viewpoints with a second natural grouping of enforcers 
consisting of the police, local authorities and the RSPCA.The RSPCA participants however 
wouldn’t always appear within this group, particularly on specific issues such as BSL where 
they share many of the views of the welfare fraction and indeed on this issue the local 
authorities also followed suit, leaving the police alone in defence of s1. However within the 
welfare grouping and across the policy network a strong theme of conflict and 
competition, resulting in fragmentation, was also evident. Where agreement amongst a 
number of policy actors exists, such as the negative effects of s1, there remains significant 
disagreement on how to address these policy problems. This key finding also suggested 
that the resultant ‘white noise’ caused by the conflict - the notion that much of the 
dangerous dog policy network has drowned itself out - either makes it impossible for 
government to gather a coherent solution, or indeed permits them to continue to 
legitimately ignore them. The result of this, of course, is that the policy proposals that have 
erstwhile succeeded have been largely unaffected by the developments in the 
understanding of breeds, of dog behaviour, and of the true nature of society’s use and 
abuse of dogs.
To summarise, the third and final objective of this thesis - to assess critically the political 
processes via which particular policy responses were challenged and resisted - posed some 
additional challenges. The main issue was accessing the motivations and strategies of 
politicians in 1991 and throughout the subsequent decades which ultimately had to be 
unearthed from within the documentary analysis and the second hand accounts of others 
within the policy network and not from the politicians themselves given they declined to 
be interviewed . Nevertheless there remains a rich source of information within the 64
documentation, detailed within Chapter Five, supplemented by the empirical findings of 
the interviews in Chapter Nine to illustrate the political forces at work during this period. 
The influence of the unprecedented media coverage of the serious dog attack on 
Rukhsana Khan (and others), coupled with a vulnerable Home Secretary and Prime 
Minister both determined to respond with highly punitive measures deemed popular with 
the public, resulted in what many, even outside of the dog policy network, regard as knee-
jerk, ill-thought-out legislation.
 Home Secretaries and Shadow Ministers during the interview period and those who were in post during 64
the passage of the1991 Act did not respond to requests to be interviewed for this study.
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The dog control policy process
The three streams of ‘problem', ‘policy’ and ‘political’ have undoubtedly come together in 
what Kingdon (1984) refers to as ‘coupling’ on several occasions during the last few 
decades. Beginning with the focussing event of the attack upon Rukhsana Khan which 
contributed to the opening of a policy window resulting in the 1991 DDA; followed by 
the backlash and a slight slackening of the most draconian measures within the Act in the 
1997 amendment; then later with the 2014 amendments which attempted to address 
aspects of dog control whilst ultimately retaining BSL. 
Nevertheless the significant issue of dog bites alone suggests a dangerous dog problem 
remains (although the status dog phenomenon would appear to be subsiding), and much 
of the policy network agree on repeal of s1 even if they cannot agree on the detail of 
what should replace it, so how is it that a BSL policy remains a cornerstone of dog control 
legislation in England and Wales? Tonry (2004: ix) suggests that:
Policy-makers adopt bad policies for four kinds of reasons - evidence, ignorance, 
ideology and self-interest. Sometimes they believe, wrongly but honestly, that 
existing evidence gives valid reasons to believe that policies will have wanted 
effects. Sometimes they act ignorantly, simply not knowing that what seems like a 
good idea isn’t. Sometimes they are so influenced by ideology or political self-
interest that they adopt policies primarily for symbolic reasons, without knowing 
or caring whether they will work.
This explanation may seem rather simplistic and of course in the case of dog control 
policy it may be a combination of all four reasons. The evidence at that time was certainly 
convincing to policy makers and banning certain breeds would have appeared a logical 
move to make however it also suited politicians insomuch as it presented as a bold 
response to public fears. Such ‘playing to the gallery’ whereby politicians were aware of the 
mostly symbolic but populist nature of their responses - in many more areas than mere 
dog control - served to help strengthen an otherwise weak government. 
Time may also change the motivation for retaining a policy that is already set in law. Whilst 
the evidence base may have changed from the time of its introduction - tending to 
suggest the legislation was not going to achieve its original aims - there can also be a 
negative impact from the repeal of legislation. Participants of this study that support s1 of 
the DDA did not however suggest realistic negative effects upon public safety from repeal 
but instead remarked upon the political fallout once a then-legal s1 type dog happened to 
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attack someone. This pointed, in a very fundamental way, to an understanding on some 
level of the symbolic nature of retaining BSL purely for political reasons. 
Dog attacks in recent decades have served as very effective focussing events, but arguably 
no such equivalent event, quite as striking, will occur in a way as to suggest repealing the 
legislation. There are no dramatic news stories that draw national attention from the 
consequences of s1 dogs being banned, and the substitute harms are far more nuanced 
and difficult for most to comprehend. The drivers for change are harder for campaigners 
for repeal to come by. So too the repeal campaign may have suffered from a lack of ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’ who occupy the kind of status and role in the policy network that Kingdon 
(1984) suggests is needed.
Dogs and a Culture of Control
Many of the facets of contemporary dog control policy in England and Wales appear to 
evoke the features of Garland’s Culture of Control (2001) particularly the symbolic, 
overly-punitive, knee-jerk, expressive policy making which eclipses any adaptive and 
evidence-based strategic response. As Garland (2001: 173) details:
What this amounts to is a kind of retaliatory law-making, acting out the punitive 
urges and controlling anxieties of expressive justice. Its chief aims are to assuage 
popular outrage, reassure the public, and restore the ‘credibility’ of the system, all 
of which are political rather than penological concern.
Indeed the DDA and its aftermath also expresses the Janus-faced culture of control, in line 
with the contention that crime control is in fact contradictory, with pragmatic adaptive 
crime strategies being contemporaneous with the politics of denial. The ‘responsibilisation’ 
Garland (1996) discusses can be seen where the ‘partnership’ enforcement approach of 
local authorities and police enforcement is encouraged - by government (thus passing on 
responsibility) - to include the welfare NGOs, particularly on preventative strategies within 
inner-city dog-owning communities. The redefining of success and failure can also be seen 
at certain moments, particularly, for instance, when the huge surge in s1 dogs seized by 
the Metropolitan Police Service’s newly established Status Dogs Unit were used as a 
justification for BSL. And likewise the key performance indicators (discussed by many 
police officers at interview for this research) centre upon what can be controlled, such as 
police kennelling costs, rather than the problem of rising dog bites in society.
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The DDA has also been shown to be symptomatic of Garland’s ‘criminology of the other’, 
with, according to its logic and imagery, a criminalised world of monsters, human and non-
human, and of exaggerated fears/panic, through the use of gladiatorial style language and 
the labelling of ‘dangerous’ dogs and their ‘dangerous’ owners. This had another effect in its 
ability to marginalise the owners as credible stakeholders in the policy process. As Molloy 
(2011: 126 ) outlines:
The status of the pit bull owner/breeder as a source of legitimate knowledge was 
overruled by truth claims promulgated by the media, animal welfare groups, 
official agencies, political groups, professionals of various kinds, and government 
discourses. Ascription of anti-social identity prohibited pit bull owners from having 
authoritative status within discursive formations as the moral panic about dog 
fighting excluded pit bull ownership from the legitimate practices of pet-keeping.
As has already been mentioned, experts and professional groups have not escaped 
disenfranchisement either. From a once commanding position upon the policy making 
process, these specialists have been devalued and swept aside. The RSPCA was cited by 
Lord Baker (1993) as a key advisor and supporter in the development of the DDA and 
yet any subsequent representations (in particular during the last decade) have been 
ignored, along with the rest of the dog welfare expert policy network. Garland (2001: 13) 
characterises this as a key feature of the culture of control:
The policy making process has become profoundly politicized and populist. Policy 
measures are constructed in ways that appear to value political advantage and 
public opinion over the views of experts and the evidence of research. The 
professional groups who once dominated the policy-making process are 
increasingly disenfranchised……There is now a distinctly populist current in penal 
politics that denigrates expert and professional elites and claims the authority of 
‘the people’, of ‘common sense’, of ‘getting back to basics’.
To summarise, a number of similarities with Garland’s grand theory have been revealed. In 
the absence of rational, evidence-based and problem-solving policy making, the issue of 
widespread anxiety in relation to the threat of dangerous dogs has been addressed via 
draconian legislative measures. Despite evidence of this legislative framework not working 
and additional harms arising from within it, its measures have instead been retained and 
further codified in law. Public debate, fuelled by high profile and disproportionate media 
stories, has intrinsically linked dangerous dogs with other risky, criminal and anti-social 
behaviours. This ‘othering’, coupled with expressive, symbolic and highly politicised policy 
making, has resulted in a overly-punitive culture of control for dogs and their owners in 
society for some three decades across England and Wales. Or perhaps this is better 
expressed as: the characteristics of the dog control policy revealed through this unique 
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study are merely further confirmation of a broader culture of control within the UK’s 
approach to penal policy. The findings nevertheless remain the same.
The following sections of the Chapter now turn to the most recent developments in dog 
control policy and the policy implications of this sphere.
10.3 Current dog policy developments
I am conscious that since concluding the collection of interview data there have been a 
number of developments in the dog control policy sphere. These warrant further 
empirical research however short of that it is worth briefly exploring some of those 
developments purely in the interests of thoroughness and for their implications for the 
direction of policy.
Today, the human/dog bond - the most complex and profound inter-species 
relationship in the history of mankind - has been reduced to a simple axiom: 
Breed of dog = degree of dangerousness (Delise 2007: 171).
While this quote stems from 2007, it may well be as valid and relevant in today’s dog 
control policy sphere. Even the recent small steps (I go on to discuss below) in an anti-
BSL direction don’t mitigate against this oversimplification and misdirection of the dog 
problem highlighted in the above quote. In fact it could be argued that raising the profile 
of breed/type issues, is reinforcing stereotypes in the minds of some people, intentionally 
or otherwise. Nevertheless, internationally the trend is away from BSL style policies. In the 
30 months following the start of 2012, more than seven times as many US municipalities 
repealed or rejected proposed BSL measures, than implemented such a policy (National 
Canine Research Council 2016) and by the summer of 2017 twenty states in the US had 
brought in a state-wide law to prevent municipalities from introducing any legislation 
based on breed. Other nations had been quick to follow the UK in enacting BSL, first 
Australia - despite never having had an attack involving a Pit Bull (Hallsworth 2011) - then 
Germany, France, Denmark, Norway, Netherlands, Spain and Italy . But this apparent 65
trend for policy transfer in Europe then abruptly stops and only the Netherlands, Italy and 
parts of Germany have thus far repealed their versions of BSL. 
 This is not an exhaustive list of countries in Europe with BSL.65
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Public support for the repeal of BSL in England and Wales would appear to be growing. In 
the summer of 2018 the RSPCA reported that more than 66,000 people had signed their 
BSL campaign petition (RSPCA 2018) and more recently the Blue Cross announced 
80,000 people had signed their version of the same campaign (Blue Cross 2019). Plus the 
majority of stakeholder groups have also responded in support of repeal in a recent public 
consultation from Parliament (Efra 2018, see discussion below). However this support for 
repealing certain dog control laws is not merely an inherent opposition to state control of 
dog ownership, on the contrary, support for alternative methods and regulations is rising, 
some of which, i.e. dog licensing, arguably have measures that reach much further into the 
dog owning public. Siettou et al. (2013) found that 73 percent of survey respondents 
support dog licensing which is roughly in line with what the RSPCA found with 76 
percent in 2010 (RSPCA 2010a: 15) and 82 percent in Wales in 2012 (RSPCA 2012: 9).
Perhaps as part of a routine review or in recognition of the turning tide, Defra surveyed 
local authorities and the police in January 2017 in order to ascertain their approach to 
dog control and welfare, and specifically any measures designed to reduce dog attacks. 
This survey was done without notification to others within the dog policy network and 
thus any opportunity for another stakeholder to respond with salient information - 
perhaps for a locale where a force or council didn't respond - was therefore missed. It is 
impossible to understand at this point why the Government chose to only engage with 
statutory enforcers, as no justification has been given. A subsequent document (Defra 
2018b) was published as a guide to Local Authorities and police, however it does not 
appear amongst the Government’s other similar advisory documents for enforcers but 
instead it is posted on the Local Government Association’s (England) website. The 
document does not provide any analysis of the results of the survey but instead appears 
to seek to delineate the separate roles of the two enforcer bodies and also where their 
responsibilities sometimes converge. There are also case studies of dog bite reduction 
initiatives although they are not accompanied by evidence of any independent evaluation 
of the results in order to validate any suggestion they could be replicated in other 
boroughs.
On 11th May 2018 Efra announced an inquiry into dangerous dogs, specifically BSL (Efra 
2018b), representing the first real hearing for the campaign to repeal s1 of the DDA. The 
vast majority of written and oral consultative elements of the inquiry reflected the 
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positions of the various constituent agencies and key actors within the policy network but 
served to produce little in the way of new evidence or proposals. Nevertheless much of 
the evidence already in existence and solutions under debate had not had a hearing at 
such a senior political and public level before. The inquiry could therefore be regarded as 
having brought legitimacy to the anti-BSL campaign as well as much needed public 
awareness. The oral evidence sessions, which I observed in person or via parliament.tv, 
proceeded as expected with one notable exception, the police. There was a subtle but 
discernible shift from previous positions given (including in interview for this study) seen 
via the oral evidence submitted by NPCC representative, Temporary Chief Constable 
Gareth Pritchard. When asked by the Committee if the DDA is effective T/CC Pritchard 
responded: 
It is partially effective. It has been in place quite a long time. It has changed the 
behaviour in many regards in terms of criminals having status dogs and providing a 
danger to society. But obviously society has changed, patterns of behaviour have 
changed and and you can see that fashions in dog ownership have changed (Efra 
2018b: Q109).
When questioned further T/CC Pritchard added:
We want to see best practice across the world. We are interested in seeing how 
the law can develop. It is a point in time, but on this journey we do need to look 
at options, and we are interested in supporting the research and looking at other 
options to see what might be a more effective way in the future. No Minister 
would just repeal BSL immediately. There would be concerns about the impact of 
that. But we want to be part of a longer-term solution. That would be very 
welcome in the community (Efra 2018b: Q110).
These statements and elsewhere in the testimony of the police represent a minute but 
significant change in approach. Whether this shift is reluctant or voluntary on their part, 
there would appear to be an acceptance that change in some form or other is now due. 
However this was clearly not understood by the Government when a week later Lord 
Gardiner of Kimble, Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Rural Affairs and 
Biosecurity and his lead official, Marc Casale Deputy Director Director, Animal Welfare 
and Exotic Disease Control, Defra, gave evidence to the same committee (Efra 2018c). 
The Chair and several committee members repeatedly point to the police position of 
supporting changes to the current dog control regime, for example: 
…and I really am very sad this morning that you are not more conciliatory, because 
the police, certainly in the evidence they gave us last week, are really quite keen to 
have some interpretation on how, even with keeping those particular breeds in the 
frame, they can deal with a good-tempered dog and rehome it (Neil Parish MP, 
Chair of the Committee, Efra 2018c: Q243). 
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And also for example, Alan Brown MP ‘The police have said they could support a shift 
away from BSL as long as there is an appropriate framework’ (Q267). Any response to 
these key points and questions regarding the police policy position are avoided 
throughout the Government’s testimony until however Mark Casale eventually replied, 
‘We are speaking to the police about what they would like. The police are telling us that 
they are very supportive of our current regime. They are not pressing us to relax it’ to 
which the Chair responded, ‘The evidence we have here is quite different’ (Q276). Of 
course it is quite possible the Government had not been kept abreast of developments in 
the police policy position but it may also be that they merely needed more time to adjust 
to it and assess the impact of such a shift upon the policy network as a whole. If that was 
the case, however, there would appear to have been insufficient time for the Government 
to make that adjustment ahead of the publication of its formal response to the 
Committee’s report where they reasserted resolute support for the current legislative 
framework: ‘The Government considers that the prohibition on possession of such 
[prohibited under s1 DDA] dogs should remain in place for reasons of maintaining public 
safety’ (Efra 2019: 6), and a number of the Committee’s recommendations, for example a 
consolidation of the dog control legislation, were essentially ignored.
The Government also chose not to respond to the Committee’s unusually strong 
comments on the validity of the Government’s own evidence:
‘We are concerned that Defra’s arguments in favour of maintaining Breed Specific 
Legislation are not substantiated by robust evidence. It is even more worrying that 
non-existent evidence appears to have been cited before a Parliamentary 
Committee in support of current Government policy. This lack of clarity indicates a 
disturbing disregard for evidence-based policy-making’ (Efra 2018d: 30).
This perhaps echoed the strength of feeling elsewhere in the policy network previously 
expressed by otherwise moderate animal welfare NGOs who had, for example, issued 
press releases questioning the accuracy of the Government’s evidence base (Blue Cross 
2018). There are perhaps some indications however that the Government was in part 
listening to the criticism of its stance from the policy network’s discussions, as long-awaited 
research was commissioned of Middlesex University in November 2018. Defra’s tender 
documents detailed the scope as:
Provide a more in depth assessment of how authorities currently use the powers 
granted to them; the extent and nature of data collection and sharing related to 
dangerous dogs and identify best practice case studies that can be learned from 
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and practical and proportionate opportunities to improve data collection and 
sharing (Defra 2016 : 21). 66
There are some indications within the policy network that these parameters have 
changed, but in any case they would still appear to be a significant disjoint with the 
recommendations for research Efra set out:
The Government should commission an independent review of the effectiveness 
of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991 and wider dog control legislation. This review 
should begin no later than January 2019. We expect this review to take account of 
the concerns and recommendations raised throughout this Report (2018: 30).
Defra should commission a comprehensive independent evidence review into the 
factors behind canine aggression, the determinants of risk, and whether the 
banned breeds pose an inherently greater threat. We expect to receive regular 
progress updates on the evidence review, and to be provided with the results no 
later than Easter 2019. These results must then be used to inform the 
Government’s future dog control strategy (Ibid.).
The findings of this Government-commissioned study will not be made public for some 
time yet but its framework could either be encouraging in that it provides a legitimate 
platform to present to Government the recent developments in understanding within this 
policy area or it could be a terrible, damaging even, missed opportunity. The Government 
does not, however, have a good track record in regard of observing the outcome of 
research and consultation. It should be remembered that the results of its previously 
commissioned research - Liverpool University’s systematic review of studies relating to 
human-directed dog aggression (Defra 2011) - and the results of public consultations, 
were either partially or completely ignored, without explanation (for example Defra 
2010a, and 2010b).

10.4 Policy implications, recommendations and future research
There are a number of implications for the direction of policy stemming from current 
events. The Efra inquiry itself would appear to suggest the political debate is becoming 
uncoupled from its previously almost exclusive relationship with the pro-BSL position. In 
additional the shift in the police position is yet to be fully understood. Firstly it may yet 
change again given the NPCC portfolio senior officer lead has since retired and the post 
 The document is dated as 2016 thus reflecting the Government’s long-held intention - and subsequent 66
delays - to commission research. It is believed the document was amended to some degree or other, 
however, until its release at the start of the tender process. 
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is currently vacant - a new senior officer filling this role may take a different view. And 
secondly it remains to be seen what influence the changes in approach from the police 
may have upon the Government’s position. In addition the Defra-commissioned research 
has yet to conclude and report, and thus its influence upon the Government position 
cannot be estimated, for reasons already discussed. 
What is already clear regarding this new research is that, judging by the published criteria, 
it has not been commissioned to examine all aspects of the dog control problem. The 
omission of the wider societal factors has been identified as a problem previously by 
McCarthy (2016: 572): ‘Few studies exist which examine how state attempts to “make up” 
dog dangerousness through legal measures may stigmatize some owners (and in some 
case grant social status…) and impact on their social interactions with their pets’. 
McCarthy goes on to identify the implications for animal-human research including the 
idea of companionship being reshaped as a consequence of the level of penalties and 
controls exerted by the state upon the owner-canine relationship, suggesting that: 
….pure companionship becomes more challenging when involving dogs which are 
classified as ‘dangerous’ by restricting the types of canine–human relationship which 
may be formed – where the preservation of public safety through prevention of 
attacks against fellow dogs and humans becomes one of the core modes of 
responsibility for the human ‘owner’ to deliver (Ibid.).
It also remains to be seen what implications will result from the influences of the 
legislative moves of other nations. Whilst the 2018 Efra Committee inquiry returned many 
times throughout their deliberations and evidence sessions to the experiences of other 
countries and what lessons might be learned regarding BSL and alternative methods of 
dog control, they also identified a lack of shared enthusiasm from the Government:
We were concerned at Defra’s apparent lack of interest in learning from 
experiences abroad. Whilst the Government obviously should not ‘copy and paste’ 
initiatives from other countries, it is important to investigate successful programmes 
elsewhere to ensure the UK’s future strategy benefits from a wide variety of 
evidence and lessons learned’ (Efra 2018d: 32).
Meanwhile the rate of repeal across municipalities in the USA - often regarded as a more 
risk-averse and litigious society than the UK - continues, with the latest being Kansas City, 
who in May 2019 reversed a 30-year old ban on American Pit Bull Terriers, American 
Staffordshire Terriers, Staffordshire Bull Terriers and any mixed-breeds with characteristics 
of those dogs, living within the city limits. This will mean that with immediate effect dogs of 
these types currently in rescue centres will be able to find homes and also the city is set 
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to save $246,000 per year that it was previously spending on ‘breed-specific 
services’ (Arnold 2019).
Recommendations and future research
Whilst there is consensus amongst the vast majority of the policy network as to the fallacy 
that links dog aggression to type/breed and that the DDA is working insomuch as 
preventing dog attacks, there is however significant conflict in terms of how to address 
these policy problems. A dialectical discourse to establish what solutions are evidence 
based and best placed to succeed is long overdue. Compromise and perhaps unusual 
coalitions on message would undoubtedly be a necessary outcome. However such a 
process could benefit the policy network immensely, removing the ability of the 
Government to legitimately ignore the ‘white noise’ created by the policy network.
It must be acknowledged, however, that the animal welfare lobby (and the growing 
fringes), even when supported by the scientific and veterinary spheres, may be unable to 
compete with the populist responses to human injuries by dogs. Policy makers can be 
argued to have been very effective at presenting a package that appears to the layman as 
valid in terms of protecting the public. The disjuncture between such measures and the 
evidence base for them is obscured by a general ignorance of dog welfare and behaviour 
and the contribution of those particular factors to aggression in dogs. There must be a 
general appreciation of the dangers of being too specialist and how this can impede the 
policy debating process. Speaking about the ideas in jargon can be seen as gatekeeping 
and excluding people from the interest area, thus disengaging the layman and in turn 
reducing any influence upon the key policy actors in government. As scientific 
understanding of dogs has developed, the gap with regular dog owners has widened and 
arguably little of this information has been communicated successfully. All those within the 
policy network working for change must acknowledge the need, and work towards, a 
greater general level of knowledge about dogs in society.
The study of policy making has perhaps always been more obscure than other academic 
pursuits, as observed by Rock (1986: xi): 
There have been very few sociological descriptions of how policies are constructed, 
presented and applied. And most available description has had little to do with the 
practical logic-in-use of the policy process. In effect, surmise and imputation have 
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supplanted observation. Policy-making has been reduced to the analytic status of a 
small Black Box which is allowed to be neither very puzzling nor particularly 
threatening to other models and ideas.
And indeed over 30 years on and it remains a nascent field. It is hoped that this study will 
inspire others to investigate the making of policy and in particular with specific regard to 
animals and perhaps dog control. Indeed alternative methods such as those discussed in 
the next section of the Chapter may also lead to a confirmation of my results or an 
entirely new perspective on the culture of dog control in England and Wales. I also believe 
some comparative research would benefit our understanding of how dog control policies 
are constructed, particularly if that were to include a European nation as well as perhaps 
the most obvious inclusion of the USA should the Garlandian scaffolding I have employed 
be re-tested.
What is also very clear is that the optimum conditions for repealing s1 of the DDA 
require an alternative framework ready to be deployed, and for that to happen the 
Government would wish to see a solid evidence base for the projected success of a new 
regime, underpinned by robust research. As Medlin (2007: 1318), identified some time 
ago:
There is no question that the reduction of dog bites is an important issue that 
requires government attention and action. Breed bans, however, gloss over the 
complexity of the issue and apply a superficial fix to an expansive problem. The 
proper attention to the pit bull problem requires the study of regulatory alternatives 
that will root out the causes of the problem, rather than the symptoms. 
Irresponsible human actions will continue to produce dangerous dogs as long as 
legislation leaves human conduct unchecked. Banning an entire breed from 
existence will not alter irresponsible human behavior, nor will it reduce the number 
of dangerous dogs resulting from this behavior. A true solution requires bringing the 
issue of irresponsible and inhumane ownership to the forefront.
It is the view of a growing number of advocates, including myself, within the policy 
network that some form of annual dog registration or licensing is needed, perhaps 
amongst other additional measures, as part of a new dog control framework. Far from 
reintroducing the previous UK dog licence - which is roundly viewed as having failed in all 
regards - a new regime would be designed specifically to aid behavioural change, greatly 
increasing responsible pet ownership and reducing a plethora of dog related issues in 
society. As an adaptive policy it can be shaped to respond to specific local issues, and it is 
also evidence-based as it draws upon international experiences such as the pet licensing 
system in Calgary, Canada. The benefits of such a system for wider communities, such as 
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links to human wellbeing, is also already a subject of scholarly interest (Rock et al. 2015). 
Most importantly it is entirely possible that only once such a system is firstly attractive to 
both the public and policy makers, and secondly bedded in well - resulting in positive 
indicators such as a drop in dog attacks - that the UK Government might finally accede to 
becoming unwedded to BSL.
10.5 Methodological reflections
Before concluding this study it is important to reflect upon the research process in terms 
of what it has and has not provided. When evaluating the adaption of theoretical 
frameworks it is, of course, important to determine if they managed to capture the social 
phenomenon they were intended to (Layder 1998). The social world is complex and so 
there must be an expectation that any method designed to understand and interpret it 
will be fallible and perhaps inherently incapable of capturing a complete picture, leaving 
ample space for alternative and perhaps contradictory accounts. Garland’s theory offered 
a scaffolding with which to explain the findings of an examination of policy making 
however such grand theories can lack the empirical specificity surrounding political 
institutions, processes and cultures and their interactions, which are undoubtedly of key 
interest in relation to dog control policy making. 
In relation to Kingdon’s Multiple Streams model utilised as an organising framework, this 
was a useful instrument for capturing and delineating the constituent parts and conditions 
of policy making. In order to be fully reflective it is important, however, to also record the 
limitations of this model, most notably that Kingdon collected his data exclusively in the 
USA some forty years ago (Hill 2013: 179). As Page (2008: 208) identifies, Kingdon’s 
research focuses upon plurality and a political system arguably designed to produce 
equality and a myriad of actors with a role to play in the process. This differs greatly to the 
European/UK reality of political hierarchies where the seniority of role can be a factor 
affecting the nature of the pluralistic landscape. The UK is an ‘Executive-dominated system’ 
where it is possible for one group to dominate or have a disproportionate effect on the 
direction policy takes. This may go further to explain the influence of the police in dog 
control policy which would have appeared to have eclipsed the rest of the policy network 
and any contradictory scientific evidence.
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In the time since MSA was first published there has also been a great deal of change such 
as the growth of the machinery around government and the professionalisation of 
lobbying particularly within the third sector. In the UK there has also been the rapid 
expansion of the meso-legislature with the creation of the devolved parliaments, which 
are also often led by entirely different political parties to that of Westminster. It may be 
that for a future researcher alternative methods of examining policy making, such as Policy 
Network Analysis or Advocacy Coalition Framework could navigate these issues, yield 
different results and provide a quite different explanation for the dog control policy 
environment of England and Wales, therefore confirming or challenging the culture of 
control thesis.
 
Whilst it is the duty of any researcher to reflect upon their own role during and 
throughout the research process I have been in a slightly more unusual position in that I 
am aware that my profession as a senior representative of the RSPCA may have 
influenced certain aspects of the process. The lack of participation by the Members of 
Parliament responsible for dog control both in 1991 and during the data collection phase 
of this study may well have been one of the consequences. Whilst ‘there are multiple ways 
in which qualitative research, conducted by researchers practitioners, can assist the policy 
development process’ (Noaks & Wincup 2004: 15) and as such I remain confident of the 
validity of the findings from the extensive documentary analysis within this thesis, 
undoubtedly the inclusion of interviews with these specific individuals could only have 
served to have enriched the study further. My RSPCA role also challenges me to consider 
what part my personal and professional values have played within this process beyond 
that, of course, of any researcher. It is important to accept the inevitability of intruding 
values but to also acknowledge that it is widely accepted that qualitative research is rarely 
value-free (May 2001: 46-59). A self-aware ‘confessional’ (Bryman 2004: 22) of such factors 
can offer some mitigation and indeed my personal account of my insider-researcher role 
in Chapter One is designed to provide some transparency regarding what aims, opinions 
and expectations I took within me into the field. 
10.6 Conclusion
In summary, this thesis has assessed how a purported culture of control unfolds in the dog 
control policy process across England and Wales and in doing so provided a contribution 
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to the still under-researched area of crime control policy formation drawing upon both 
political science frameworks and also broader sociological/theoretical treatments of 
developments in crime control policy. It provides insider accounts of the 'empirical 
particulars' of policy making that few others would be in a position to acquire given my 
own privileged vantage point in the policy network and, relatedly, access to key elite 
players. Furthermore this thesis presents an original contribution in terms of the focus on 
controlling animal-related harms in criminology, a still under-developed area of 'green' 
criminology.
By employing a rigorous methodological approach triangulating the accounts of the 
primary actors within the dog control policy network with an extensive documentary 
analysis, it has been possible to generate a comprehensive understanding of a subject area 
that has occupied a commanding, often emotional and moral, position within the political 
and public domains over a number of years. As both a complex and controversial issue, 
combining both threats to public safety and harm to animals, questions are inevitably 
raised - given the current regime would not appear to be working - about how we wish 
to see these dangers managed and controlled through government responses. I believe 
criminology has a significant contribution to make to those debates but there is a hurdle 
that must first be overcome, one of prioritisation, that Medlin (2007: 1318) has previously 
identified:
Communities cannot continue to cite the protection of citizens from dangerous 
animals as a paramount concern, while at the same time declaring that they have 
‘more important concerns’ than making the enforcement of animal control laws a 
priority. Responsible dog ownership must be made a socially significant issue on 
which communities are willing to spend time and resources. 
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Appendix A
Elite interview schedule
Background/expertise 
Nature of the ‘problem’
Solutions; policy responses
Policy, politics and influences
1. Your role / experience within the policy community (policy maker/influencer; practitioner; academic; 
NGO; statutory; enforcer ; legal; veterinary; etc. expertise. Length and type of experience) 
2. Is there a dog problem in our society, and if so what is it? Are there elements of a moral panic?
3. What are dangerous dogs and what are status dogs? Do cultural references affect these definitions?
4. Can we explore (if not already) any meaning in respect of youths, ASB/criminal aspects, responsible dog 
ownership, s1 and s3 of the DDA, and animal cruelty. How does it manifest?
5. What is the media’s role?
6. What factors led to where we are? (Explore pre and post 1991)
7. What evidence exists to support the notion of a ‘problem’? (Explore dog aggression, bites and attacks; 
dog welfare; criminality, ASB; etc.) 
8. Who are the main actors in the policy sphere? What are the interrelationships? What are the influences?
9. What role is there for evidence and expertise?
10. Is there a vacuum?
11. What proposals for change have you been involved in during the phenomenon?
12. What is needed for change, and to resolve society’s dog issues? (explore legislation, intervention, 
education, other)?
13. What have been the influences on policy development and in particular the changes we have seen 
from 1991 onwards?
14. What are the political and societal influences affecting change?
15. Have any lessons been learned and what role is there for behaviour change vs legislative?
16. How has change been achieved successfully? What issues remain?
17. What legislation - or draft legislation has been important/influential?
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Appendix B 
Key to elite interview participants 
Table 3. Participant Sector Key 
Table 4. Participant Key for In-Text Participant References
POL Police
LG Local Government
RS RSPCA
DNGO Dog-related NGOs
TS Technical specialist
POL1 Senior officer with national (England and Wales) responsibilities
POL2 PC, DLO and DDA advisor
POL3 Sergeant of dog unit, a large urban force
POL4 PC, full time DLO, a large urban force
POL5 Sergeant, specialised dog unit, a large urban force
LG1 Officer lead of large dog control unit
LG2 Officer lead with a national coordination role 
LG3 Officer lead and a representative to an England and Wales dog forum
LG4 Officer lead and a lead for a professional dog forum
RS1 Chief Superintendent with significant experience investigating dog fighting
RS2 Head of a scientific department
RS3 Ex-veterinary lead
RS4 Advocacy and policy officer
RS5 Adult offender rehabilitation specialist
DNGO1 Policy lead for a multi-species animal welfare charity
DNGO2 Veterinary nurses for a multi-species animal welfare charity
DNGO3 Senior officer of a dog welfare charity
DNGO4 Senior officer of a dog owners’ organisation
DNGO5 Policy lead for group utilising service dogs
DNGO6 Policy lead for a workers’ union 
TS1 Epidemiologist in human-animal interactions
TS2 Policy officer for veterinary representative body
TS3 Solicitor acting in welfare, s1 and s3 court cases
TS4 Veterinarian and Forensic Behaviourist
TS5 Ex-DLO police officer and Forensic Witness
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